Morales v. MinterMorales v. Minter
OPINION
This three-judge court was convened, pursuant to
The original defendants in both actions were Mr. Steven A. Minter, Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare, and Mr. Peter Goldmark, Secretary of the Executive Office of Human Services. They have subsequently been replaced in office by Mr. Jerald Stephens and Ms. Lucy Benson, respectively, who are now defendants herein.
Defendant Stephens, pursuant to
In Morales v. Minter, the Department itself is claimed to be a defendant. Yet this Court, in a
The facts in each case are not disputed. In Ryan v. Minter, each plaintiff applied to the Social Security Administration for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. Although each presumably was eligible for SSI, none received immediate payments because there is customarily a two or three month waiting period 3 from the date of application until the date applicants actually begin to receive their SSI checks.
Since the plaintiffs had no source of income other than public assistance, they applied to the Department for emergency benefits under GR to hold them over pending their receipt of SSI benefits. Yet their applications were denied, pursuant to
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The General Relief Program was established in Massachusetts to “ . assist, to the extent practicable, all poor and indigent persons residing therein, whenever they stand in need of such assistance. . . .”
The statute caused little or no controversy before January 1, 1974 because applicants received their Social Security checks shortly after they applied for benefits. Each state administering a grant-in-aid program was required to give “. . . assistance with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.”
That state of placidity terminated on January 1, 1974, the effective date of a new Title XYI of the Social Security Act, entitled “Supplemental Security Income For Aged, Blind, and Disabled” (S.S.I.),
The new SSI provisions establish a federal “floor” of annual assistance for each aged, blind, or disabled person.
Unlike the former grant-in-aid programs, the SSI provisions establish no duty on the part of the Social Security Administration to make eligibility determinations and payments within a specified period of time.
7
See,
. the Secretary may, upon written authorization by an individual, withhold benefits due with respect to that individual and may pay to a State (or a political subdivision thereof . . .) from the benefits withheld an amount sufficient to reimburse the State (or political subdivision) for interim assistance furnished on behalf of the individual by the State (or political subdivision).42 U.S.C. § 1383(g)(1) .
Thus, if Massachusetts were to furnish “interim assistance payments” under GR to aged SSI applicants awaiting their initial SSI payment, the amendment provides a vehicle whereby the state would be fully reimbursed by the federal government. Nevertheless, the state has chosen not to avail itself of this opportunity.
Despite this, the Department does, in fact, extend GR benefits during the waiting period to persons eligible for SSI who are disabled but who are
under
age sixty-five.
The second case before us, Morales v. Minter, pertains to the other extreme of the statute’s spectrum of eligibility, to wit, the denial of GR benefits to any person below the age of 18.
Three plaintiffs in this action are married. All were under the age of 18, yet over the age of 16, on April 19, 1974, the filing date of the complaint.
Plaintiffs George and Maribel Morales applied to the Department for public assistance on or about February 21, 1974. They were then living with George Morales’ mother, a recipient of AFDC. In fact, George Morales was on his mother’s AFDC budget until May 16, 1974. Neither spouse was then attending school and both were unemployed.
On or about March 1, 1974, Mr. and Mrs. Morales were notified in writing that their application for GR was denied since both applicants were under 18. They reapplied in March and in April of 1974, and again were orally informed that they were ineligible for GR.
Since Maribel Morales was pregnant with the couple’s first child, she was deemed eligible, on May 10, 1974, to receive AFDC benefits for herself and her unborn child. Prior to that date, they had been informed that she was ineligible for AFDC despite her pregnancy and that he did not qualify as an AFDC unemployed father because he had not amassed the number of work quarters required by
*94 Plaintiff Daniel Parzyck will not be 18 years of age until April 23, 1975. He is married to Arlene Clark Parzyck. On April 11, 1974, plaintiff Parzyck and his wife, who was then pregnant, applied to the Department for public assistance. On May 10, 1974, the Parzycks were denied AFDC benefits because Mr. Parzyck, like Mr. Morales, had not amassed sufficient work quarters to qualify as an AFDC unemployed father. They were further informed that they were ineligible for GR because they were under 18 years of age.
Since the date of their marriage, Daniel Parzyck and his wife have resided in the home of his parents who begrudgingly provide them room and board. The Parzycks, at the time of their application, were unemployed and had no independent sources of income.
Before the Court are motions to add three females as party-plaintiffs. We allow the motions. All three are unmarried, not attending school, and residing apart from their parents. 8 From the filing date of their motions to the present, each has been over the age of 16, yet under the age of 18. Two are unemployed and the other earns approximately forty ($40.00) dollars per week at a part-time job. None receives support from her parents. Finally, each has applied to the Department for public assistance but has been refused solely because she was under 18 years of age.
Before we get to the issue of whether these plaintiffs can properly sue on behalf of a class, a summary of the state and federal welfare programs applicable to some members of plaintiffs’ age group is in order.
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),
Although there are some “families” receiving AFDC which consist of the needy child and a caretaker relative, the customary AFDC family unit consists of the dependent child living with one of his parents. Nevertheless, there is a separate component of AFDC, commonly known as AFDC-U, which allows an intact family to receive benefits if the father is unemployed.
In addition to AFDC, the Commonwealth has established, within the Department of Public Welfare, a system of foster care for individuals under the age of 18.
Admission of those under 18, yet over 16, to the foster care program is discretionary and depends upon a finding by the Department that the child is in need of foster care.
9
Nevertheless, admission is mandatory if ordered by the probate court.
Turning now to the certification issue, we have decided that it is more appropriate in this case (Morales v. Minter) to certify two classes rather than one. Fed.R.Civ.P., 23(e)(4)(B). The first class shall be the same as defined, see p. 93,
supra,
except that it shall contain no person under the age of 16. The second class shall be comprised of all poor and indigent persons residing in the Commonwealth who: (1) are under the age of 18, yet over the age of 16; (2) are not residing with their parents or legal guardians; (3) meet all of the financial eligibility requirements for GR; (4) may be eligible for other public assistance programs available within the Commonwealth; and (5) would be eligible for GR but for (a) the application of the age restriction in
We find that the three females, Andino, Rodriguez and Hall, who have been added as plaintiffs herein, are single minors whose parents are either unable, unavailable or unfit to care for them. This clearly makes them eligible for foster care under
We have also determined that Daniel Parzyck is capable of representing those in class one. He is, unlike plaintiffs Hall, Andino and Rodriguez, clearly “ineligible for any other public assistance program available within the Commonwealth.” The distinguishing characteristic between him and the three single females is the fact of his marriage which served to emanicipate him from parental control and support. Commonwealth v. Graham,
Although Mr. and Mrs. Morales are, like Mr. Parzyck, emancipated from parental control and also ineligible for foster care, we do not reach the question of their ability to sue in a representative capacity. Mrs. Morales began receiving AFDC benefits shortly after the filing *96 of the complaint in this case. Thus, her action against the defendants may be moot. 11 Mr. Morales was on his mother’s AFDC budget when this action was filed and when he applied for GR. But no person is eligible for GR if he is receiving benefits under AFDC. M.P.A. P.M., c. I, § D, p. 4, ¶ 12, and c. XI, § C, part 7, p. 1, ¶ 1. Thus, Mr. Morales would seem to be both financially and chronologically ineligible for GR. Given this fact, there is some question whether he has the standing to sue the defendants on the theory that the age criterion for GR eligibility is unconstitutional.
With respect to both the first and second classes, we find that the prerequisites to a class action, as stated in
Some action has previously been taken in these cases. In Ryan, this judge issued a temporary restraining order on October 23, 1974. One week later, the order was amended and has remained in effect, as amended, to date. The gist of the order restrains defendants in Ryan from refusing GR benefits to those in plaintiffs’ class who are awaiting their initial SSI payment. In contrast, a temporary restraining order was denied to plaintiffs in Morales.
The issue in both cases before us is whether the operation and enforcement of
The GR program’s express legislative purpose is to “assist, to the extent practicable,
all
poor and indigent persons residing [in Massachusetts], whenever they stand in need of such assistance.”
Given the program’s legislative purpose of assisting all Massachusetts residents whenever they are in need, we presume that the statute was passed on the assumption that those not between the ages of 18 and 65 would not be needy because they would be eligible for federally funded public assistance programs available within the Commonwealth. Therefore, passage of the statute was primarily an effort to conserve purely state funded GR assets.
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Additionally, the statute operates to classify an individual’s eligibility for GR according to age. Such classifications are valid if they can pass the Equal Protection Clause’s test of rationality. Murgia v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Board of Retirement,
Once a state decides to confer public assistance benefits upon its residents, it has great latitude in how it allocates them. King v. Smith,
One aspect of fundamental fairness, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause . , is that individuals similarly situated must receive the same treatment by the Government. As Mr. Justice Jackson put it, the Government “must exercise [its] powers so as not to discriminate between [its] inhabitants except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of the regulation.” . It is a corollary of this requirement that, in order to determine whether persons are indeed similary situated, “such procedural protections as the particular situation demands” must be provided. United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry,413 U.S. 508 , 517,93 S.Ct. 2832 , 2837,37 L.Ed.2d 767 (1973), (Mr. Justice Marshall, concurring), (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
“Statutes creating permanent irrebutable presumptions have long been disfavored under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Vlandis v. Kline,
In Vlandis v. Kline,
supra,
the Court dealt with a Connecticut statute that created a “conclusive and unchangeable presumption of nonresident status from the fact that, at the time of application for admission, the student, if married, was then living outside of Connecticut, or, if single, had lived outside the State at some point during the preceding year.”
[I]t is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to deny an individual the resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebutable presumption of non-residence, when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and when the State has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination. Rather, standards of due process require that the State allow such an individual the opportunity to present evidence showing that he is a bona fide resident entitled to the in-state rates. Vlandis v. Kline, supra, at 452,93 S.Ct. at 2236 .
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In United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry,
supra,
the Court held invalid, as repugnant to the Due Process Clause, a federal food stamp regulation creating an irrebutable presumption that households, containing a person 18 years of age or older who was claimed as a tax dependent for the previous year by a taxpayer not a member of an eligible household, were not in need of food stamps. The purpose of the regulation was to prevent college students and “hippies”, with access to family resources, from abusing the program. But the operation of the statute proved to be inflexible and barred, without an individualized hearing, legitimately needy households not containing college students or persons with access to family resources. Thus, the Court
“ .
. . conclude [d] that the deduction taken for the benefit of the parent in the prior year is not a rational measure of the need of a different household with which the child of the tax-deducting parent lives and rests on an irrebutable presumption often contrary to fact. It therefore lacks critical ingredients of due process . . . .” United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry,
supra,
Applying these principles to the factual situation in
Ryan,
we find that the presumption created by
Once a person reaches the age of 65, and therefore is eligible for benefits under SSI, his need does not automatically vanish. The fact is that he must wait two to three months before his initial SSI payments begin. Thus, the fact presumed in passing
The statute cannot be justified by the Commonwealth’s interest in conserving its resources. Massachusetts currently has the opportunity, under
Similarly, the statute cannot be justified by the Commonwealth's interest in administrative speed and efficiency. We recognize that myriad administrative problems may arise in providing benefits to these persons for such a short period of time. However, these problems have not prevented the Commonwealth from providing interim GR benefits to SSI beneficiaries who are under 65.
See
p. 92,
supra.
In any event, “the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. In-, deed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy/ government officials no less, and
per4
haps more, than mediocre ones.” Stanley v. Illinois,
supra,
at 656,
We need not dwell upon the statute’s effect on the three female
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plaintiffs who represent class two in
Morales.
They are eligible for other public' assistance programs available within the Commonwealth.
14
Nevertheless, the irrationality of the statute and the presumption it creates is apparent with respect to its effect upon those in Mr. Parzyck’s class in
Morales.
The Commonwealth purportedly seeks, through its GR program, to assist all of its needy residents. M.
We are not persuaded by the interests proffered by the Commonwealth as justification for the statute. As discussed previously, administrative speed and efficiency is no justification for the denial of constitutional rights. Nor can the statute be upheld because it tends to preserve the family unit which, in turn, insures proper guidance, support and supervision for minors. 15 These grounds are clearly irrelevant to Mr. Parzyck who is married and legally free of parental support or control.
Furthermore, the statute cannot stand as an attempt to conserve state funds. Such an argument was rejected in Goldberg v. Kelly,
supra,
where the Court held that the additional state expense of holding a due process hearing before the termination of welfare benefits did not countervail “the individual’s overpowering need . . . not to be wrongfully deprived of assistance.”
Normally, we would refrain from discussing a second constitutional issue if the first were sufficient to dispose of the matter at hand. This statute can
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certainly be struck down on due process grounds alone. Nevertheless, we note a disagreement amongst the Justices of the Supreme Court as to whether cases like the present should be analyzed according to the Due Process or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,
supra,,
The Equal Protection Clause of “ . . . [t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to States the power to treat different classes of persons in different ways.” Reed v. Reed,
The stated purpose of the GR program is to aid all residents of Massachusetts when they are in need.
Having concluded that the classification bears no relation to the program’s purpose, we must now ask whether “ . . . the challenged classification rationally further [s] some [other] legitimate governmental interest . ” United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
In Dandridge v. Williams,
Indeed, the Maryland welfare scheme in
Dandridge
was imperfect, but at least it provided
some
benefits to those who were eligible for AFDC.
18
In contrast, the statute before us today categorically denies
any
aid to otherwise eligible residents of Massachusetts solely because of their age which, we repeat, is irrelevant to need. Its effect is, therefore, more akin to that of the statute in United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
supra,
which completely “ . . . exclude [d] from participation in the food stamp program any household containing an individual who is unrelated to any other member of the household.”
In the present case, the underlying premise of the statute’s classification by age is more than “wholly unsubstantiated” — it is plainly incorrect. That is, it was error for the legislature to assume that those not between 18 and 65 are eligible for other public assistance programs, and therefore, are not in need of state GR funds. It is totally unreasonable, in our view, to deny, solely on account of a factual misconception, any GR benefits to many residents of Massachusetts whose need is every bit as great as those declared to be eligible for GR.
We have previously rejected the remaining state interests which allegedly serve to justify this statute. Much of what was said there applies here also. Suffice it to say that none of these interests is rationally furthered by the classification.
To summarize, in Ryan v. Minter, we find that
In Morales v. Minter, we hold that
Judgment will be entered declaring
The requested relief is denied with respect to plaintiffs Hall, Rodriguez and Andino (Morales plaintiffs) and the class they represent. We take no definitive action as to Mr. and Mrs. Morales for reasons contained herein.
So ordered.
Notes
.
The benefits of this chapter shall be available to any applicant who resides in the commonwealth and who is between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five years, . . . provided, however, that students shall not be so eligible either as an applicant or as the dependent of an applicant.
. M.P.A.P.M., c. I, § D, p. 1:
ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR GENERAL RELIEF
The following are the eligibility requirements for financial assistance and medical care under the General Relief program. 1. Age
An applicant must be at least eighteen (18) years of age and not have reached his sixty-fifty (65) birthday. 12. Eligibility for Federally Aided Programs
Persons eligible for AFDC or SSI (Supplemental Security Income) are not eligible for GR. All persons under age 65, with indications of physical or mental disability, who apply for GR, must also apply for SSI within two (2) weeks of GR application. Failure to do so will result in denial of the GR application. Once application for SSI is made and verified, the applicant may be aided by GR while a decision on SSI eligibility is pending. Immediately upon approval of payment by SSI, the GR case is to be closed.
. The SSI program does allow one advance emergency payment to be made to the “presumptively eligible” applicant in an amount not to exceed one hundred ($100) dollars.
. Plaintiffs in the
Ryan
case, C.A. No. 74-4898-F, have moved this Court to enter an order, pursuant to
(a) are 65 years of age or older;
(b) have applied, or will apply, for assistance under the SSI program ;
(c) experience, or will experience, delay from the date of application to the Social Security Administration until the date of a determination of eligibility and/or actual . receipt of the first SSI payment; and
(d) would be eligible for GR but for the age restriction imposed byM.G.L. c. 117, § 4 , and M.P.A.P.M., c. I, § D, p. 1, ¶ 1, and p. 4, ¶ 12.
The Court finds that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, that there are questions of law or fact common to the members of the class, that the claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class they represent, and that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. In addition, the Court finds that the parties opposing the class have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class. That is, they have enforced the challenged statute and accompanying regulations in such a manner as to deny plaintiffs, and the class which they represent, benefits under the GR program. Therefore, we find the class action to be maintainable under
. The Court is constrained to address the question of mootness since it is clear at this late date that the two to three month waiting period has expired for named plaintiffs. Sosna v. Iowa,
The Court, in Sosna, however, went on to say that it remains necessary for a case or controversy to exist between the named plaintiff and defendant “. . . at the time the class action is certified by the District Court pursuant to
This case seems to be an appropriate one for the application of the “relation] back” doctrine. Full judicial review by this Court would have been impractical in the relatively short period (two to three months) during which the controversy remained live for any individually named plaintiff. In other words, if this doctrine is not applied here, “. . . state officials will undoubtedly continue to enforce the challenged statute and yet, because of the passage of time, no single challenger will remain [injured] for the period necessary to see . . . [the] lawsuit to its conclusion.” Id.
Consequently, the certification of this class will be said to “relate back” to the filing of the action and therefore, all the requisites of a true case or controversy are satisfied.
. These programs included Old Age Assistance,
. But see, n.3, supra.
. One of the three, Rosa Maria Rodriguez, resides in Springfield’s North End Drug Abuse Residential Center which is funded by state and federal funds. It is unknown whether she receives funds from the Center but others residing there, who are over 18 and have the required financial need, are eligible for GR pursuant to M.P.A.P.M., c. IV, part 3, p. 10.
.
Upon the application of a parent or guardian or any person acting in behalf of the child, or the child himself, the department may accept for foster care any child under eighteen years who in its judgment is in need of foster care.
. We specifically do not discuss those subsections of Section 23 pertaining to children under sixteen years of age. This group is not represented here.
. We note in passing that Mrs. Morales began receiving AFDC because she was pregnant. This was correct under previous decisions of this Circuit. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recently held, in Burns v. Alcala, - U.S. -,
. The defendants in1
Morales
have moved the Court to either dismiss the action or to join the parents of the minor plaintiffs pursuant to
. Similar presumptions, contrary to fact, were held to violate the Due Process Clause in Bell v. Burson,
. These plaintiffs have not alleged that they have been refused foster care. Consequently, we need not comment upon the constitutionality of the statute in that possible situation. Nevertheless, we suggest that the Department advise, in the future, those GR. applicants who fall within class two of the existence of any public assistance program for which they may qualify. Such advice should also include information pertaining to application procedures for these programs.
. These grounds are applicable to a situation which we choose not to discuss this day. See, fn. 14, supra.
. While Mr. Parzyek’s parents have no legal duty to support their son and his wife, they have reluctantly provided them room and board. Support of this type can be considered when determining the size of the GR payment. See, M.P.A.P.M., c. IV, § B, p. 1. Thus, the amount of GR benefits to be paid to many in Mr. Parzyck’s class will be less than the full GR grant. This further underscores the advisability of determining a person’s eligibility for assistance on an individual basis rather than disqualifying him automatically.
. This case must be distinguished from those in which individuals were classified according to subjective expectancies of maturity to perform a certain function. [E. g., age of majority to vote, drink alcohol, serve on juries, or age of retirement.] In those cases a line, however subjective, had to be drawn somewhere. In this ease, the drawing of any line, without reason, cannot stand.
. Before the Court reached the equal protection issue, it discussed whether Maryland’s grant system violated § 402(a) (10) of the Social Security Act,