Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On the afternoon of March 14, 1957, the S. S. Grel-rnarion was berthed at Galveston, Texas, taking on a cargo of wheat from a pierside grain elevator owned and operated by the city. The wheat was being loaded directly from the elevator into the ship by means of a spout. Thе petitioners were longshoremen engaged in “trimming” the wheat as it was received in the offshore bin of the vessel’s No. 2 hold, which was then about three-quarters full. A last “shot” of grain was. called for and was released into the bin. The grain in this last shot hаd been treated with a chemical insecticide, and the petitioners were injured by fumes from the chemical, made noxious by concentration in the closely confined area where they were working.
The petitioners brought thе present suit against the City of Galveston and the owner of the vessel to recover for their injuries.
The factual issues bearing upon the alleged negligence of the City and shipowner were determined in their favor by the District Court. Specifically, the court found that the City had not itself applied the fumigant to the grain in question, and that nеither of the respondents knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the grain had been improperly fumigated at an inland point by someone else.
Of greater significance in this litigation is the issue which prompted our remand to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration. Briefly stated, the question is whether, upon the facts as found by the District Court, it was error to hold that the Orelmarion was seaworthy at the time the petitioners were injured.
In the Mitchell case, supra, we reversed a judgment for the defendant, because the District Court and the Court of Appeals had mistakenly imported concepts of common-law negligence into an action for unseaworthiness. There the jury had erroneously been instructed that liability for unseaworthiness could attach only if the alleged unseaworthy condition was “there for a reasonably long period of timе so that a shipowner ought to have seen that it was removed.”
In the present case the Court of Appeals was of the view that the trial judge’s determination of the Grel-marion’s seaworthiness at the time the petitioners were injured was in no way inconsistent with our decision in the Mitchell case. We agree. The District Judge did not, as in Mitchell, hold that unseaworthiness liability depends upon the shipowner’s actual or constructive knowledge. He did not, as in Mitchell, indicate that liability may be excused if an unseaworthy condition is merely temporary. Rather, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, the trier of the facts found, upon substantial evidence, that “the cause of the injury was not any defect in thе ship but the fact that the last shot of grain which was being loaded was contaminated . . . .”
The trial court found, upon substantial evidence, that what happened was an unexpected, isolated occurrence. Several years before there had been three, or perhaps four, incidents involving injury to longshoremen from grain which had been -fumigated by the city itself. But at the time the present case arose the city had adopted a series of safety and inspection measures which made completely innocuous the grain which it fumigated, and
A vessel’s unseaworthiness might arise from any number of individualized circumstances. Her gear might bе defective, her appurtenances in disrepair, her crew unfit. The method of loading her cargo, or the manner of its stowage, might be improper. Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co.,
Affirmed.
Notes
Petitioners of course received compensation and medical treatment under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq.
“14. I find that neither of the respondents knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that this quantity of grain, which had been improperly treated with an excessive amount of fumigant, was in the elevator or loaded aboard the Grelmarion; and that (for all the evidencе shows here) the respondent city, in the operation of its elevator, had never received knowledge of a prior instance where chloropicrin- or other fumigants applied at inland elevators had adhered to the grain sufficiently long as to present danger after receipt by the elevator.
“15. I find that the respondent city was not negligent in failing to know or learn of the presence of this quantity of grain within its elevator, in failing to make some additional inspection therefor, or in any other particular. The record shows without dispute that careful and painstaking inspections and examinations were made under governmental authority when the grain was received, and 'again as it was disbursed by the elevator, which in the present instance failed to detect the presence of the remaining traces of fumigant in this quantity of grain. I find that had additional inspections been made by the respondent city, there is no reason to believe that such inspections would have been more successful.
“17. I find that the Grelmarion’s cargo spaces were of customary design and construction; that they were clean, and in all respects ready to receive the wheat; and had been surveyed and approved prior to loading. No fumigation for weevils was made aboard the vessel, and none was necessary. ... I find . . . that her Captain, crew, agent, or other representаtives were not negligent in any particular.”
“Careful consideration of, and reflection on, the claims and arguments of the opposing parties, in the light of the record and the controlling authorities, leaves us in no doubt that, as to thе charges of negligence, there is no basis whatever for the attack here upon the findings as deary erroneous. Indeed, we are convinced that, under an impartial and disinterested view of the evidence as a whole, the findings are well supported and wholly reasonable.”
The District Court and the Court of Appeals, without discussion, proceeded upon the assumption that the petitioners belonged to the class to whom the respondent shipownеr owed the duty of providing a seaworthy vessel. This was correct. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
Ibid.
“. . . While the Grelmarion’s cargo spaces were not equipped with forced ventilation systems, I find that only very rarely is this the case on grain vessels, and that it is not necessary or customary. . . .”
“The finding heretofore has been made that the noxious gases and fumes were introduced into the bin with the last ‘shot’ of grain, and resulted from a fumigant that had been improperly applied, and that had adhered to the grain аn unusually long period of time. Under these circumstances, I find that the admission thereof into the bin of the vessel did not cause the Grelmarion to become unseaworthy, the vessel and all its appurtenances being entirely adequatе and suitable in every respect.”
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
The District Court found that the libellants were injured in 1957 as a result of a release into the hold of a “shot” of grain that completely closed the hatch opening, which was the only source of ventilatiоn for the hold in which they wTere working. This grain had been treated by chemicals for weevil infestation; and the noxious fumes from those chemicals injured libellants.
The vessel’s cargo spaces were not equipped' with a forced ventilation system. Grain vessels, the District Court found, rarely are so equipped; and it concluded that forced ventilation is “not necessary or customary.” If this were an isolated instance of fumigated grain releasing noxious gases, no claim оf unseaworthiness could be maintained. But this was not an isolated instance. Of the wheat loaded through this elevator, some 8 to 10% was fumigated by the city. Wheat is commonly fumigated either in the elevators or in railroad cars. When the fumigant is properly applied, the gases and fumes are dissipated so as not to be dangerous or harmful after 24 to 48 hours. The District Court found, however, that to the knowledge of the owners of the vessel several recent
A vessel without a forced ventilation system would be seaworthy if this injury were an unexpected, isolated occurrence. But I agree with Judge Rivеs of the Court of Appeals that the vessel and her appurtenances were not “reasonably fit for their intended use” (