| Ct. Cl. | Dec 15, 1874
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court:
No objection is raised by the defendants to the claimant’s ■rights to institute and maintain this action as the sole legatee ■ and devisee of William P. Moore, jr., deceased, who was the
The first claim is for the rent of lands and houses taken possession of and leased as abandoned property in a State in rebellion, under the provisions of the Act July 2, 1864, (13 Stat. L., p. 375, §§ 2, 3,) by an agent of the Treasury Department, appointed under the Act March 12, 1863, (12 Stat. L., 820.) This last-mentioned act, which was the first enacted, did not apply to real estate, but was clearly restricted to personal property, which alone could be “collected and sold.” By section 1 the Secretary of the Treasury was to appoint a special agent or agents to receive and collect all abandoned and captured property in any State or Territory of the United States designated as in insurrection against the lawful government of the United States by the Proclamation of the President of July 1,1862, and by section 2 any of the goods or property received or collected by such agent or agents might be appropriated to public use or forwarded to any place of sale within the loyal States; and the proceeds of all sales were required to be paid into the public Treasury.
A right of action was given to loyal owners of such property so collected and sold to recover the proceeds thereof by the following clause of section 3 :
“And any person claiming to have been the owner of any such abandoned or captured property may, at any time within two years after th e suppression of the rebellion, prefer his claim to the proceeds thereof in the Court of Claims, and on proof, to the satisfaction of said court, of his ownership of said property} of his right to the proceeds thereof, and that he has never given any aid or comfort to the present rebellion, to receive the residue of such proceeds, after the deduction of any purchase-money which may have been paid, together with the expense of transportation and sale of said property, and any other lawful expenses attending the disposition thereof.”
The Act July 2, 1864, provides, in section 2, “ that in addition to the captured and abandoned property to be received, collected, and disposed of, as provided in said act, [of March 12, 1863,] the said agents shall take charge of and lease, for periods
The act of 1864 is in addition to that of 1863. It added another class of property to that which the agents appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury were to take possession of. The two acts, being on the same subject, must be construed together, and when so construed the right of action given in the first act applies to the second precisely the same as though it had been repeated therein, and gives to loyal owners the right to recover the proceeds of rents collected from abandoned lands paid into the Treasury by such agents. This principle of construction is suj)-ported by judicial authority. In Holbrook v. Nichols (36 Ill., 161" court="Ill." date_filed="1864-04-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/holbrook-v-nichol-6951414?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6951414">36 Ill., 161) the Supreme Court of Illinois held that an amendment of a former act operated precisely as if it had been added to the prior act as to proceedings subsequent to the later statute. In Rogers v. Bradshaw (20 Johns., 744) the point was taken that a remedy given by a statute of the legislature of New York, passed in 1817, did not apply to acts done under a statute upon the same subject-matter passed in 1820. But the court of errors held otherwise, and the chancellor, in delivering the opinion, says: “All statutes, said Lord Mansfield, (Doug., 20,) which are in ■pari materia are to be taken together, as if they were one law; and in many instances a remedy provided by one statute will extend to cases arising on the same subject-matter under a subsequent statute.” The Supreme Court of New York adopted the same
To the second claim for the proceeds of rosin taken possession of by an agent of the Treasury Department, sold, and the proceeds paid into the Treasury, no defense in law is set up, and the petitioner is entitled to recover the amount set forth in the second finding. The property was collected under the provisions of the Act March 12,1883, and sold in the place where it was collected, as authorized by an amendment of that statute in the Act July 2, 1864.
The third claim is for rosin and turpentine captured on land by the combined naval and military forces of the United States, at the time of the capture of New Berne, in March, 1862. It is found that Commodore Rowan, about that time, shipped a large quantity of rosin and turpentine, seized by said forces at New Berne, to New York and Philadelphia — much more, to each of those places, than was taken from the claimant’s testator— and that the property so shipped to New York was adjudged, by judicial proceeding, to belong to one Ellis. Wo therefore conclude that the latter was not the rosin and turpentine owned by the claimant’s testator, and that his property, the proceeds of which are here claimed, was among that which was sent to Philadelphia. When this property arrived in Philadelphia, in April or. May, 1862, it was libeled in the district court of the eastern district of Pennsylvania as maritime prize. That property captured on land 'is not maritime prize, but, since the passage of the Act March 12,1863, should be turned over to agents of the Treasury Department, to be disposed of as therein provided, was decided by the Supreme Court in Mrs. Alexaner’s Case, (1 Wall., 404.) And the district court in Pennsylvania, as to the property which is the subject of this suit, not regarding it as maritime prize of war, ordered that the proceeds arising from the sale be paid into the United States Treasury. In Cook's Case, (9 Ct. Cl., 388" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1877-07-01" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/shaw-v-united-states-8578172?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="8578172">9 C. Cls. R., 388,) where a district court had taken jurisdiction of a libel for the condemnation of property captured on land by the navy, had condemned it as prize of
In three cases this court has held that an action would lie to recover the net proceeds of abandoned property, captured before the Abandoned and captured property Act (of March 12, 1863) was passed, by virtue of the Act July 2,1864, (13 Stat. L., •375:) Barringer’s Case, (3 Ct. Cl., 358" court="Ct. Cl." date_filed="1867-12-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/barringer-v-united-states-6589760?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6589760">3 C. Cls. R., 358,) Minor’s Case, (6 O.Ols. R., 393,) and Terry & Game’s Case, (8 Ct. Cl., 277" court="Ct. Cl." date_filed="1872-12-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/terry-v-united-states-8577355?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="8577355">8 C. Cls. R., 277.) But in •each of these cases the property was captured or seized after the passage of the Act July 17,1862, (12 Stat. L., 5S9,) and name within the description of property mentioned in that act, •and so by virtue of the Act July 2,1864, (13 Stat. L., § 3, 376,) was held to be included in the provisions of the first section of •said Act March 12,1863, and as to which, by the third section, •a right of action to loyal owners to recover the proceeds thereof is given.
But in the case at bar the rosin and turpentine of the claimant’s testator were captured March 2, 1862, were taken1 into a State not in rebellion, and libeled by the civil authorities in April or May, 1862. This was two months at least before the passage of the Act July 17, 1862, making provision for the seizure and disposition of the property of persons engaged in rebellion against the Government of the United States, and this property came within none of the provisions of that act. That •act described the property of certain official persons, of whom the claimant’s testator was not one, and of others who, being •engaged in armed rebellion, should not, within sixty days after public warning and proclamation made by the President, cease to aid, countenance, and abet the rebellion ; and it authorized
The construction contended for by the claimant would lead to the result that we should apply to this property now in controversy the third section of the Act March 12,1863, which is not in terms extended, while the first section of that act, which is extended, and through which alone the third section becomes operative, if at all, could not possibly apply to it.
In our opinion the Act July 2, 1864, was not intended to be-so far ■ retroactive in its operation as to give to parties a right to recover from the public Treasury all the money that had been paid into it from the beginning of the war on account of captured property seized before Congress made any regulations in.
We recognize the !< humane maxims of the modern law of nations which exempt private property of non-combatant enemies from capture as booty of war,” (Klein’s Case, 7 C. Ols. B., 243, 13 Wall., 128" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1872-01-29" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/united-states-v-klein-88442?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="88442">13 Wall., 128,) and the constitutional provision that Congress has power to “ make regulations concerning captures on land and water,” (Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, par. 11.) But until Congress makes the necessary regulations and confers the authority, this court has no jurisdiction to compel the United States to refund money obtained contrary to those maxims. Before Congress made regulations and enacted laws in relation to the seizure and disposition of the enemy’s property, all property so seized became vested in the United States by the rigorous rules of earlier warfare, which were justified on the ground that the power and the resources of the enemy were weakened and those of the captors strengthened thereby. And now that Congress has made some for returning the proceeds of captured and abandoned property, in specified cases, this court, with its limited power, can take no jurisdiction beyond that which is clearly and expressly given by statute.
The conclusion which we have reached is that the claimant is entitled to recover on the first and second findings $13,497.50, for which amount judgment in her favor will be entered.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
I dissent from the opinion read. I think the petitioner is entitled to recover for the 2,000 barrels of rosin, &e., specified as the third item in the statement of facts.
When the rosin was captured in March, 1862, North Carolina had been declared to be in a state of rebellion. But in that and the other disloyal States there were many loyal persons, who were of right entitled to the protection of the Government in person and property as the return due to allegiance ,* for they were citizens of the United States, and no action of their States could exclude them from that citizenship or the rights consequent on it. In these circumstances the Government adopted
And this policy grew out of the circumstances stated. It was not created by the Act March 12,1863, for that act was only the remedy and the means of carrying into effect the policy. Now certainly this case is within that policy, for the owner of the property captured was loyal aud its proceeds are in the Treasury, and the only objection to the recovery is that the property was captured before the Act July 17,1862, or the Act March 12, 1863, was passed. But remedial statutes may be and are extended to transactions anterior to their enactment, and where the case is within the policy but not within the letter of the statute, that may be so extended by construction as to bring the case within the equity of the statute. The old example of this is that given by Mr. Dwarris, of the case of a devise of a jointure in lands, made long before lands were devisable in England, and when of course such a devise had no legal effect. But after lands were made devisable in England by the statute of Henry YIII, this devise of the joint-ure was supported under that statute as being within its equity. ' And the decision has been held authoritative, and ever since followed in text-books and decisions, and I think this case, in which the property was captured from a loyal citizen and its proceeds paid into the Treasury, is within the equity of the statute of 12th March, 1863, and the policy it was intended to carry out.
All previous statutes related to crime and the property of criminals, and were not in pari materia with the third section of the Act March 12, 1863, which related exclusively to loyal owners who had kept their loyalty in disloyal States. And I think the admitted policy of the Government precludes the inference that the purpose of its legislation was to secure to such loyal owners their property captured after, and to deprive them of their property captured before, 12th March, 1863.