367 S.E.2d 239 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1988
Olin Moore III brings this appeal from his conviction and sentence of driving under the influence of alcohol. Held-.
1. Phillip Crow testified that his van was struck in the rear by a
The arresting officer, R. A. Tribble of the DeKalb Police Department, testified that on April 27, 1987, at approximately 11:30 p.m. he received a radio dispatch for a hit/run accident in front of T. J. Applebee’s. He went to the scene, met Crow and others, and made some investigation, later driving to a service station at Buford Highway and North Druid Hills Road. The officer estimated the distance from the hit/run scene to the service station at one-half block. He “encountered” a white convertible and appellant who was “standing by the vehicle when I pulled up.” The officer did not “encounter” anyone else there with the vehicle and appellant. He motioned for appellant to walk toward him and noticed his gait was unsteady and, as he got close enough, smelled the odor of alcohol. He placed him under arrest (in the back of the patrol car) and read appellant the implied consent warning. The officer concluded that appellant was drunk but gave him no field test at the scene. The officer asked appellant whether he owned the car but has no recollection of asking appellant whether he was driving, and appellant never volunteered that information. Officer Tribble then turned appellant over to another uniformed officer who transported him to the DeKalb County jail. Officer Tribble made no inquiry of the service station attendant nor did he go inside the building to see if anyone there may have been an occupant of the car. Officer Tribble explained: “I was in a non-screened unit and I could not secure [appellant] and leave him without the possibility ... of allowing him to leave the scene again. [Also,] I believed from the indication given to me by . . . Crow at the . . . Shell station that he was indicating that he was pointing to [appellant] and saying, yes, that’s the one, which gave me the indication that he was identifying [appellant] and the vehicle as the hit and run.”
“At the close of the State’s evidence, appellant moved for and was denied a directed verdict of acquittal. Appellant presented no evidence. He contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his
2. Appellant’s second enumeration of error — that the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s objection to appellant’s evidence that the automatic suspension of his driver’s license for refusal to take the implied consent test had been rescinded by the Department of Public Safety — was abandoned at oral argument in light of the holding in Sheffield v. State, 184 Ga. App. 141 (1) (361 SE2d 28) (1987).
3. Appellant’s final enumeration assigns error to the trial court’s refusal to give three written requests to charge relating to circumstantial evidence. “The record clearly shows that the charge as given by the trial court amply covered the principle of law contained in [appellant’s] requested instruction [s]. Accordingly, [appellant’s] contention it without merit because ‘(w)here the charge actually given substantially covers the principle articulated in a request to charge, the failure of the trial court to charge in the exact language requested is not error.’ [Cits.]” Burrell v. State, 171 Ga. App. 648, 651 (320 SE2d 810) (1984). E.g., Swann v. State, 169 Ga. App. 429 (1) (313 SE2d 131) (1984); Russell v. State, 160 Ga. App. 290 (4) (287 SE2d 286) (1981); Howard v. State, 153 Ga. App. 171 (3) (264 SE2d 704) (1980). The recent holding in House v. State, 184 Ga. App. 724 (4) (362 SE2d 429) (1987), does not require a different result.
Judgment affirmed.