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Moore v. State
653 N.E.2d 1010
Ind. Ct. App.
1995
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*1 just single We find that there is not remand for a trial on the issues of whether negligent inference that can be drawn from the facts of Sheriff was and whether regarding contributory neg- this Trout’s actions constituted case whether Trout’s actions provocation contributory ligence. constituted negligence. question of Trout’s Judgment part, affirmed reversed in contributory negligence cannot be deter- part, and remanded to the trial court for Rather,

mined as a matter of law. it is for proceedings opin- not inconsistent with this jury to decide whether Trout’s actions of ion. stomping taking got his foot and the toast jam him into the him rendered contribu- RUCKER, JJ„ NAJAM and concur. torily negligent. Accordingly, we conclude genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the Sheriff had knowl-

edge dangerous propensities of Buie’s

was, therefore, negligent failing segre-

gate him and whether Trout’s actions consti- provocation rendering tuted him contribu- MOORE, Appellant- Thomas O. Hence, torily II, negligent. as to Count al- Below, Defendant though summary judgment properly was en- regard tered in negligent to Trout’s claim of treatment, grant- medical the court erred in Indiana, Appellee- STATE of ing summary judgment on Trout’s claim that Plaintiff Below. negligent failing segre- Sheriff was gate Buie from the other inmates. No. 48A02-9310-CR-568. Appeals Court of of Indiana.

B. III Count July 1995. Finally, we address Trout’s claim in granting summary court erred Rehearing Aug. Denied judgment on Count III of his amended com Transfer Denied Nov. plaint in alleged which he the Sheriff pay surgery repair failed to for the

broken nose which Trout underwent after his jail. required

release from A sheriff is

provide pay appropriate for all and nec

essary prisoners. medical care for Hosp.,

Health & 470 N.E.2d at 1360. How

ever, authority Trout cites no and we find no

authority proposition that the Sheriff duty

has to reimburse an individual for expenses,

medical care incurred after the

individual prison, resulting is released from injury

from an that occurred while the indi

vidual custody the care and

Sheriff. The grant summary trial court’s

judgment in favor of the Sheriff on Count III proper. conclusion, we affirm the trial court’s

grant summary judgment on all four of the complaint,

counts Trout’s except amended

for Trout’s claim in II Count that the Sheriff negligent in failing segregate Buie

from the other Accordingly, inmates. *3 Hodson, Halbert,

Samuel Steven J. Cohen Malad, P.C., Indianapolis, & appellant. threat, deadly awith and while armed OPINION knife.” weapon, to-wit: a SULLIVAN, Judge. at 5. Record (Moore) of both At was convicted appeals con- Moore Thomas 0. determined Upon appeal, this court crimes. deviate con- criminal victions erroneously refused to confinement,2 the trial court duct,1 felony, A a class have allowed give instruction which would felony. second B As this Moore’s class option convicting jury explanation is or- additional appeal, some battery as within lesser included offense der. deviate con alleged attempted criminal initially charged with two Moore was State, No. 48AO2-8909-CR- duct. Moore *4 Those counts read as by information. counts 1991) (Memorandum 29, (May Decision follows: Accordingly, upon Rehearing). Petition for disposition attempt the reversed initial I] “[COUNT conviction, while ed criminal deviate conduct CRIMINAL ATTEMPTED intact, and leaving the confinement conviction DEVIATE CONDUCT attempted upon devi a new trial the ordered A FELONY CLASS charge ate alone. conduct I.C. 35-41-5-1 Upon rehearing, we found that further necessary: disposition of was clarification the October, day of about the 8th On or the our earlier decision is “Footnote of Indiana, County, of Madison confinement conviction only allusion to the attempt to D. did com- THOMAS MOORE that con effect whether and states of Deviate Conduct mit the crime Criminal of force ef remain full and viction should get into an by knowingly asking [L.M.] depend upon the outcome of fect will by one which was driven automobile upon deviate conduct retrial MOORE, by striking (1990) D. and By citing Ryle v. State charge. THOMAS Dist., closing automobile door on beating Ind.App., and 2d trans. [her], denied, deadly imply by threatening the use of it our intention threatening supports the convic weapon, knife of record to-wit: a and the evidence For that reason did not tion for confinement. safety if she [L.M.] the life and no reason that there was were of view Thomas D. fellatio on the said perform reprove that require the State to Moore, a sub- which conduct constituted charge. step the commission said stantial toward Deviate of Criminal Conduct. hand, in the context other viewed On the attempted criminal deviate conduct

of an (should that be result conviction retrial) confinement conviction [COUNT II] is, set because should be aside CONFINEMENT CRIMINAL offense of the analysis, an included Ryle B FELONY CLASS charged. [Em- offense as deviate conduct I.C. 35-42-3-3 phasis original.] in a conviction Only if retrial results October, day battery, about the 8th offense of On or the lesser included Indiana, County, remain valid. State of conviction in Madison the confinement i.e., battery, knowingly did con- is so because D. This THOMAS MOORE closing by forcing ‘striking beating the auto- fine her consent without [L.M.] separate by is an offense being [her]’ driven mobile door the automobile into [L.M.] oc- confinement which apart from the D. force THOMAS MOORE Ed.1994). (Burns (Burns Ed.1994) Code I.C. 35-42-3-3 Code and 35- I.C. 35-42-5-1 Ed.1994). (Burns 42-4-2 Code opinion upon rehearing, when forced the victim into our denied re- curred Moore charge quest to vacate confinement the automobile. included It is this sec- lesser offense. from now reaffirm our decision which re- We present appeal arises. We ond trial judgment upon of conviction verses reorganize and restate the issues as follows: charge attempted criminal deviate conduct (1) Moore, upon only. whether, and remand for trial that count in its retrial of trial, Following must trial court trial court committed reversible error in convic- admitting determine whether the confinement of an unrelated offense tion remains whether it must be valid or which occurred eleven months after the herein.” vacated reasons stated charged; offense for which he was (hereinafter, “opinion Record 26-27 (2) whether it error for to be upon rehearing”). retried criminal devi- charge previously ate conduct when he had On remand for a second convicted of- been lesser included again convicted of fense confinement based the same conduct.3 evidence most favorable circumstances; factual judgment driving indicated while impos- around home on Road 32 one o’clock whether the trial court erred morning, closely fol- refusing L.M. noticed car consecutive sentence and in *5 lowing own. she her Because saw red flash- to vacate confinement conviction Moore’s ing lights, police and the car assumed was a as a lesser included offense after this court road, officer, pulled upon rehearing. to the side of she so directed man, stepped out of her A she ear. whom Initially, note that the State has Moore, approached later car identified her argu no brief in opposition filed to Moore’s flashlight, if asking with a she fast knew how Nevertheless, upon appeal. ments we are going. point, she been At that had to presented bound examine the issues car, up against threw her her then into back correctly apply applicable Nash v. law. seat, began strangle the driver’s he where to (1982) Ind.App., State dragged her. She was then out of her car car, and forced into which been Moore’s had I. AN EVIDENCE OF UNRELATED parked her behind own. CRIME car, partially contin- Once inside L.M. trial, Moore’s prosecution At second struggle. get ued to While he tried to her of introduced evidence an attack anoth- car, passenger into the of the side woman, A.L., er which occurred eleven leg. closed the car door her on Moore then original after months offense. seat, got into driver’s held a knife to disputed evidence of The consisted A.L.’s throat, L.M.’s to force her to testimony regarding the sur- circumstances perform fellatio him. L.M. continued rounding rape. her A.L. testified near struggle, escaping from when Moore’s car night September o’clock on of eleven police up pulled behind the two vehicles. driving had been Route she State support To lend further to its Tipton County, pulled in and had side State also introduced evidence that Moore road saw when she a car behind her had been convicted of the of a second flashing lights bright its dim.4 A from A.L., woman, County. in Tipton man, identifying policeman, ap- himself again proached flashlight. Once Moore was convicted at- her car awith He asked conduct, tempted the trial her if she fast going, knew how she was court, perform sobriety in clear violation our if would instructions she field test. point 3. The the State also information filed in Moore’s 4. A.L. stated that one follow- car prosecution second of the criminal appeared lights blinking her to have two red identically charge deviate conduct was worded back in its window. charge. the initial The information was amend- only ed to reflect that middle initial than 0. rather D. crimes, wrongs, or acts in weapon, he blindfold- evidence of other no Although he carried Lannan v. A.L., plastic endorsement her with Indiana since its and restrained ed (1992) Ind., 1334, and car. its exited the handcuffs when she subsequent adoption in the Indiana Rules of passenger placed her Her assailant rule Evidence. That reads: car, spot. and drove another seat of his perform “(b) to force her He then Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Other refused, he upon him. When she fellatio crimes, wrongs, or acts Evidence of other pri- raped repeatedly, her strangled her and prove the character of admissible Although A.L. releasing her. testified or to person in action con- order to show identify her assailant be- that she could not however, formity may, therewith. It face, flashlight in her kept cause purposes, such as admissible for other ultimately indicates that Moore was record motive, intent, plan, preparation, County rape Su- Clinton convicted of identity knowledge, or absence mistake perior Court.5 accident, provided upon request accused, prosecution in a criminal ultimately admitted un- evidence provide notice ad- case shall reasonable exception Rule of Evidence der an to Indiana during trial the court vance of Moore, however, 404(b). alleges good pre-trial notice on cause excuses justification proper possessed no shown, any general nature of such of the He claims the admission the evidence. at trial.” it intends to introduce testimony impermissible charac- that the any fit into which does not ter evidence Lannan, However, did our Su- 404(b). And, in Rule because 404(b), adopt but preme Evid.R. Court was neither an issue there exception to that abrogated an additional to the nor sufficient likeness the defendant previously recognized in had rule which been assault, not have A.L.’s could L.M. which allowed the introduction Indiana: one *6 under “common scheme been introduced the crimes, wrongs, or acts prior of evidence of argues exception He plan” to the rule. or possessed a a deviate show that defendant in error. this fundamental resulted opining Indiana sexual While instinct. previous allow evidence of Additionally, the evidence fallen would henceforth even had crimes, wrongs, contemplation exceptions, or acts the he into one of enumerated Rule, exceptions contained in Federal argues, of Evidence 403 should of those Indiana Rule 404(b), court made clear that the based of Evidence the applied preclude evidence have plan” or it the “common scheme high probability that it would have intended the general rule remain jury. exception to the prejudicial impact upon the a place. agree with Moore that the evidence We admitted, improperly and rape was

AL.’s Here, arguments with re counsel’s his conviction. reverse was, testimony it gard indicate that to A.L.’s indeed, the common scheme to Evid.R. admitted determining, we look In so 404(b).6 Extrin- exception to Evid.R. 404(b), plan or governed admittance of which has discussion, Penley brief, such as cited in that points The cases Moore indicates At several Schumpert 806, Ind., (1987) "uncharged,” 506 N.E.2d and unre- v. rape of A.L. was an that the (1992) Brief, Dist.Ind.App., 603 N.E.2d 4th How- Appellant’s offense. lated statements, admissibility ever, of evidence treat also reveals both the record counsel, exception. plan or It scheme under the common prosecutor which and Moore’s own disputed evidence from this that we deduce rape of A.L. is convicted of the indicate that was possessed show that Moore Superior was admitted to County Under such Court. in Clinton engage circumstances, plan, and we anal scheme or common be said that A.L.'s it cannot However, rather, was, exception. uncharged ysis with consistent "uncharged,” but may plan scheme or of a common that evidence present case. intent, motive, order to establish be admitted in analyses iden purpose, serve to invoke among must extensive discussion 6. The record reveals counsel, employed evidence has been where tical those prosecutor, and the trial Moore’s exceptions pursuant enumerat appli- to those admitted proper judge regarding the definition 404(b). language Had A.L.s plan exception. in the Evid.R. ed scheme or cation of the common may properly regard sic Chantey evidence be admitted under this we note that In 404(b) per escape custody Evid.R. as the common scheme or police involved an from the (1) plan subsequent it is admitted either: officers’ officers car and prove perpetrator by theft of car. another The court stated that showing proof escape the defendant has prior Kentucky committed of a from operan- penal other crimes with an identical modus institution relevant to “intent di; preconceived plan necessary or as “evidence of a to do what whatever was to remain charged which included the crime.” ... deprive Hardin free and to his intent (1993) Ind., v. State 129. owners of the vehicles the use value of took.” vehicles he 583 N.E.2d at 130. The record discloses that the reasons case, supra, The felony- Webb involved underlying prosecutor’s introduction of murder conviction. Evidence of defendant’s prove were in order to drugs use illegal admitted estab motive, “purpose, [and] intent.” Record at lishing a burglary motive for the which re Generally, proper pur 760.7 these are all sulted the murder. in turn Webb relied crimes, poses admitting for evidence of always Johnson for “motive is rele wrongs, or acts under the “common scheme premise though vant” even cited no Johnson exception. plan” or authority proposition. for the cases seem to utilize the motive terms two alternative bases common clear, loosely. intent It somewhat howev plan may scheme or made more er, where, generally as is most complicated by “motive, the fact that offense, intent is an element of the the State 404(b) purpose” intent or as contained in beyond must establish that element a reason permissible prove viewed way identi able necessary pros doubt. It is not sense, ty. then, proof this a motive for motive, ecution to offer evidence of although particular increases inference do so. identity. of a pur defendant’s WhaRton’s Law Motive and CRIMINAL (15th Ed.1993). § 89 evidence, pose therefore, may be used to achieve the same ultimate conclusion as com event, In any previous whether Moore’s i.e., plan, identity. mon scheme In such motive, intent, conviction was offered to show instance, however, uncharged act need purpose, identity, operandi precon- modus prior. be similar or See EdwaRD J. plan, conclude, ceived we must after examin- conjunction the law in with the evidence IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVI *7 (1994). § 3:16 presented, prior that the introduction of the DENCE conviction is inconsistent with the State’s frequently Motive and intent are and erro purposes. enumerated neously interchangeable viewed as concepts. (1974) 463,

See v. 262 Initially, Robinson State Ind. agree with Moore’s contention transfer, (upon 317 adopting N.E.2d 850 that no identity issue as in existed present case, rationale of the Court of in Appeals Robin by which the could State intro- (1974) 833, son v. Ind.App., State 309 N.E.2d duce evidence that he used a similar modus 850, motive, seq., holding et that opposed operandi as to commit the L.M. assault. In- intent, crime). deed, not an apprehended scene, is element of a Moore was at the Therefore, Chanley State, statement v. attempting State to introduce the (1991) Ind., 126, evidence, (citing 583 N.E.2d 129 agreed Webb that identity was not at (1983) Ind., 180, v. State 453 testimony N.E.2d which issue. A.L.’s was not admissible turn unsupported cited an identity. statement establish See v. Street State (1970) (1991) 465, Johnson v. State Ind. Dist.Ind.App., 1180, 254 260 5th 567 N.E.2d 782) (extrinsic always 1185, N.E.2d that “motive is relevant trans. denied offense testimo- may may ny aof crime” or is dispute not be not where relevant was whether an occurred, accurate reflection of law. identity rather than See also been admitted those ex- at 765. Record any we would reach an identical conclu- ceptions,

sion.

1017 disregarded. Schumpert, supra, Court it be To the perpetrator); also must see (where may be as identity is established extent that Hardin construed N.E.2d at Gibbs, means, court should exercise its inconsistent with we deem Hardin other prior pronounce- against controlling admission of crimes because it the later discretion evidence). ment.8 By imagination no stretch of the could the Likewise, disputed testimony can have been ad- evidence of Moore’s conviction pos prove be

not construed preconceived plan mitted evidence of a preconceived plan which included an sessed a An un- which included the instant offenses. upon assault L.M. In order that defendant interrupted requires transaction preconceived plan to possessed a commit an conjunction “ crimes be committed in with each offense, plan ... ‘must be so related in other; here, separated the eleven months character, time, place commission as incidents and we note as well that the events plan which to establish some embraced both place separate took counties. subsequent activity criminal prove evidence was admissible Hardin, supra, charged crime.’” and the plan. or to establish a common scheme at 129 v. (quoting 611 N.E.2d Malone State 1347). (1982) Ind., 1339, 441 N.E.2d specifically enu Because intent was plan exception been preconceived has further purpose for which the State merated Lannan, supra, limited 600 N.E.2d at testimony,9 A.L.’s we must deter introduced required that the crimes consti which properly mine whether was admitted for ” “ ‘uninterrupted an tute transaction.’ See purpose. previ In order for Hardin, supra at 130. purposes be ous crimes to introduced showing possessed requi that an accused Street, at supra, 567 N.E.2d crime, he site intent to commit the instant court a different incarnation of enumerated specifically place must his intent issue: plan the common scheme or which 404(b) exception in Evid.R. will “The intent identify focused but rather beyond goes when a available defendant court, possible several factors. The Street merely denying charged culpability (1989) Ind., v. cited Gibbs particular affirmatively presents a claim of 937, 939, to extrinsic the effect that offenses intent.” Wickizer “intent, motive, prove be admitted Ind., 799. That accused identity by showing defen- purpose, or presents a defense which denies commission dant other offenses with a similar committed suffice; entirety of an act in its will not pro- operandi.” The court in Street modus affirmatively presented intent is order that complex analysis: posed a more “extrinsic issue, in effect admit as an an accused must state of offense evidence introduced show act, profess but to the commission of mind, intent, motive, is, purpose,” contrary to that he acted with some intent have does not to show distinctive characteris- by the under which he required statute “signature” tics which would constitute *8 (1994) Dist. charged. 2d See Fisher branch, identity but must the Ind.App., similarity some in order to demonstrate defense, police introduced a To In his Moore admissible. 567 N.E.2d at 1184. the be Street, shortly after the incident. Appeals a statement taken extent that Court of deci- Hardin, sion, he L.M. Supreme It contained statements is inconsistent with 404(b)." Id. first of Rule similarity” from a tion in the sentence 8. The "some test drawn omitted). (Footnote type analysis has Gibbs-Street been criticized "spurious plan” doctrine. Edward J. Imwinkel- § 3:23 though is Uncharged even 9. We address the intent issue ried, Misconduct Evidence (1994). This observes that doc- commentator encompassed scheme or within the common not testimony not have suffi- exception trine allows evidence which does plan under which A.L.'s admitted, operandi proper pur- similarity exception re- cient to meet modus is a because the previous reality quirement pose "the of evidence of and concludes that for admission per wrongs enumerated permitting proponent introduce or acts as are to crimes courts 404(b). prohibi- language of Evid.R. propensity in violation of the phone itself, Similarity, had met of a at a booth front roller and of not to will suffice rink, home, him that she had invited to her render evidence admissible under the com- purpose. and that he followed her for that mon plan exception scheme or to Evid.R. 404(b). Instead, stopped proffered He stated that he and L.M. had both evidence must converse, along genuinely order to proper purpose road she relevant to a invitation, Wickizer, revoked her earlier but that she within rule. contained See su- voluntarily pra, had him his followed to car 626 N.E.2d 795. order to further discuss issue. Moore As has Moore demonstrated that they begun stated that had to kiss when L.M. AL.’s within fits neither branch of suddenly picked up attempted a hammer and plan the common exception scheme to Here, explicitly hit him. and un- 404(b), Evid.R. nor within the excep equivocally denied that he had forced her rule, tion to the are left with conclu car, any way, into his that he had hurt her in sion impermissible that it constituted charac he had her force ter evidence which was for introduced perform fellatio him. purpose showing that Moore acted in con possess requisite In order to formity particular with a That trait. this intent commit case, however, inquiry. does not our end conduct, a knowingly defendant must or in yet obligated We are determine wheth tentionally engage in conduct which a sub erroneously er the admitted evidence re causing step person stantial toward another quires “appears reversal because it inconsis perform or submit to deviate sexual con justice tent with substantial or affects duct. At point I.C. 35-42-4-2. no did Wickizer, rights[.]” [Moore’s] substantial engaged Moore admit that he in the acts Hardin, supra, 800; 626 N.E.2d at see also alleged, doing possessed but that in so he supra, 611 N.E.2d at 132. required; instead, inimical intent to that The record reveals that there were no denied that the acts had ever occurred.10 witnesses the incident other than Moore circumstances, light Under these and in Thus, and L.M. essentially the trial boiled requires fact that Wickizer our narrow down credibility to a contest—L.M.’s version exception, construction intent of the events versus Moore’s version. In- complete denial that he to force deed, only independent evidence which act, perform any L.M. to let one alone de existed would to support have tended conduct, fined as criminal sexual deviate did events, Moore’s version of the rather than specific not amount to intent. 626 L.M.’s. William Cowart testified near admitted, N.E.2d at 799. The evidence here midnight, parked he had seen Moore’s car rape, had been convicted of can front of the roller rink while Moore walked purport fit not to within the confines away pay phone. Although from the L.M. exception. the intent does stops way testified that she made no on her apply to allow admission of A.L.’s testi home, Cowart observed a red Sunbird

mony. parked just behind Moore’s He car. testified previous

While have trial the car was identical to one similarly, identically, evidence, been committed belonging to L.M. From this incident, present to the jury we find the court’s could have inferred that Moore and Fisher, astute supra, apropos observation L.M. had conversed meeting to their to our discussion: “Minimal connection with the shoulder of State Route Had proper purpose admitting previous previous *9 rape been prop- conviction excluded, erly sexual does not might misconduct alone make the such evidence have placed admissible.” 641 N.E.2d at 108. L.M.’s in a light. different (1994) very required 10. This case is unlike Butcher v. State one to that for conviction un- 855, denied, There, reh'g Dist.Ind.App., 1st 627 N.E.2d der the statute. the defendant did not example instead, deny which offers an daughter; excellent of a case in had he touched his " ” resist,’ which the found court the defendant have he asserted that he 'couldn’t or was forced, will, specifically placed by asserting against his at intent issue touch her. Id. at 858. AND II. RETRIAL DOUBLE Additionally, the record reveals that spend time de- considerable JEOPARDY was forced to underlying rape convic- fending the facts negate possibility the Because we cannot retrial of the crimi- 11—somuch so that tion again, will we neces- that Moore be retried charge largely amounted nal deviate conduct challenge pro- the sarily address Moore’s Not upon the of A.L. to a second trial argu- His priety the trial itself. of second extensively only he cross examine the did I.C. hinges upon the claim that both ment concerning her the of attack- witness 35-41-4-3(a) (Burns Ed.Repl.1994) and Code er, testimony from also elicited but Moore principles jeopardy barred the sec- of double crime, police investigated that ánd who entirety pre- trial in its because Moore’s ond girlfriend, whom from his ex-wife and both of vious conviction and sentence for the lesser in that trial. In- served as alibi witnesses of still stood. included offense confinement deed, dan- precise manifests the the record Since the confinement conviction based guard wished to ger Supreme our Court upon same factual circumstances and was Hardin, swpra: against in criminal deviate con- included predicated rule is “The rationale for this charged, any as he claims that retrial duct precept every upon our fundamental charge subject him the deviate conduct would only required to de defendant should for, upon, punishment multiple trials against specific charges In filed. fend same act. un instances where evidence trial, is at a charged misconduct admitted Jeopardy Clause The Double forced to refute these defendant would be Fifth Amendment to the federal Consti against as allegations as well defend punishment one for tution bars more than If a court were specifically charged. (1991) same offense. v. State Warner indiscriminately admit of criminal 1307, However, Ind., 579 N.E.2d charged, activity beyond specifically upon charge a is retrial of defendant on the defense would be then burden Indeed, once a necessarily “punishment.” intolerably enlarged and the court would ac vacated the conviction of an court has effectively negate process pre the due is grant person cused to new system of sumption of innocence that our placed position had never been in a justice every accused.” 611 accords to upon Causey v. charge all. See tried Malone, (citing supra, N.E.2d at 127-28 (1971) 795, 797. 256 Ind. 266 N.E.2d State 1345-46). 441 N.E.2d at situation, permissible. In retrial is See such facts, per- light foregoing we are (1990) Hastings Dist.Ind.App., v. 1st rape con- suaded that introduction of Moore’s It is trans. denied. impact very probably viction had substantial upon premised conviction has been where a upon jury’s verdict. insufficiency that retrial of the evidence Although the trial court we find that Warner, supra at barred. when it allowed reversible error committed heavily upon Buie rape, Moore relies jury to hear evidence A.L.’s denied, Ind., reh’g necessarily con Moore’s additional address both convictions subject proposition since that he to retrial tentions: same factual circumstance arose from the attempted criminal deviate conduct and, in- having of the lesser been convicted charge, court erred in its refus that the trial offense, he cannot be retried for conviction cluded al to vacate Moore’s confinement greater criminal deviate greater offense after he had been convicted of However, misplaced. reliance con conduct. offense duct, impos convicted both Murder and Con- Buie was and that trial court erred court held spiracy to Commit Murder. The attempted criminal a sentence act element of a con- run that “where the overt charge to consecutive deviate conduct offense, charge underlying spiracy is the charge. the confinement identify her *10 not Moore as attacker. Specifically, reveals that A.L. could the record 1020 remaining

where has a for argues the State obtained conviction that the confinement con- Conspiracy based the commission of the attempted viction affected his conviction of act, underlying offense as overt criminal manner. deviate conduct another may subsequently pursue prosecution not a that, Specifically, Moore maintains since his underlying for at offense.” 633 N.E.2d standing, confinement conviction remained Buie, therefore, proposi- for the stands effectively precluded counsel was from re- may tion subsequently prose- that one not be jury upon questing that the be instructed an an cuted for offense which was included in confinement, lesser offense which was fac- earlier conviction. does not Buie address tually charge. Appel- included within the greater a reprose- whether offense be suggests lant’s Brief at 10 n. 1. He that his upon cuted after a reversal when a conviction attempted conviction of criminal deviate con- place. offense remains in This included inherently duct is therefore flawed. precise why, was the reason in our decision upon rehearing, we stated that in the event agree argu cannot with Moore’s We upon attempted of a new conviction crim- that it improper ment would have been for inal charge, deviate conduct the included con- request counsel to the instruction on confine finement conviction must be vacated. Indeed, ment as a lesser included offense. Here, evidentiary deficiency no ex request a such an instruction would have isted. once at Moore’s conviction of only by preserve been the method which to tempted criminal deviate conduct had been alleged. .an error like that See Nehi Bever by overturned this as one court age Dist.Ind.App., Co. v. Petri 4th law, evidence, though lacking he was (error 78, 82, N.E.2d trans. denied subject upon at charge to retrial alone giving pre or refusal of instructions must be Indeed, the behest of the State. trial). objection Since, by by served at conviction of Moore’s confinement remained argument, Moore’s we assume that such a standing appeal after does not offend the nonexistent, request we find issue principles jeopardy. only of double It was be without merit. attempted after the criminal deviate conduct jeopardy conviction valid double con Finally, sentencing pres- issue Moore surfaced; only cerns would have it was non-issue, essentially ents because we point possibility existed that hereby reverse Moore’s conviction of at- subject punishments Moore multiple tempted conduct, and its arising single from a course of conduct. Further, concomitant sentence. the issue addressing possibility, we re retrial, because, could not arise after as not- previous iterate our assessment. If Moore is ed, upon convictions both confinement upon convicted retrial of criminal lesser included offense of conduct, charged, deviate as the confinement subject criminal deviate conduct would merges to conviction become lesser includ multiple punishment for the same ed offense. It is clear as the offenses act, prohibitions against and would violate charged, only are confinement served as jeopardy. double As this is the the means which Moore possibility does not exist that two sentences commit the deviate conduct. See McDonald be imposed will after a third or that (1987) Ind., run either sentence will consecutive to the (trial sentencing did court not commit error other. attempted battery where conviction sub conviction). sumed confinement Should Accordingly, Moore’s conviction for at- stand, would, indeed, both convictions tempted criminal deviate conduct is reversed subject multiple punishment vacated; and, and ordered while convic- same occurrence. stands, yet tion for confinement this will merge remain so does with Though argument centers subsequent subjected proceed- his concerns that he been conviction further has act, multiple punishments single ings. for a also

1021 five, J., part on the of’ Moore. KIRSCH, [and] intent concurs. analysis center on the Accordingly, the must HOFFMAN, J., separate dissents with admitting the for the propriety of opinion. by proponent of the reasons set forth HOFFMAN, dissenting. Judge, evidence.12 (1993), Ind., respectfully I The threshold 626 dissent. In Wickizer v. State explained question prosecu- second court that: whether Moore’s N.E.2d conduct was barred tion for criminal deviate 404(b) “The intent Evid.R. jeopardy. by principles of double IND. goes a defendant will be available when (1982 Ed.) provides § CODE 35^1-4-3 beyond charged culpa- merely denying the part: pertinent bility affirmatively presents a claim of “(a) prosecution is if A barred there particular intent. When a defen- prosecution alleges particular contrary former of the defendant based in trial a dant intent, statement, for commission of opening by the same facts and whether witnesses, same offense and if: cross-examination of State’s case-in-chief, by his presentation or of own prosecution resulted in former by offering may respond evi- the State acquittal or a conviction of the defen- an crimes, wrongs, (A or acts to dence of dant conviction an included offense prove genuinely relevant to the extent greater acquittal of of- constitutes an at time of the intent defendant’s fense, subsequent- even the conviction is charged must aside.).” The trial court offense. ly set to admit or ex- then determine whether Moore’s conviction this Court affirmed Once depending upon such evidence clude factually included lesser offense of probative ‘its value substantial- whether confinement, acquittal that action constituted ly outweighed danger prej- unfair greater offense. See Schiro v. State of the udice, issues, of the or mislead- confusion (funda- (1989), Ind., 533 jury, of undue ing the or considerations rule jeopardy mental double that conviction delay, presentation of cumula- or needless acquit- constitutes of lesser included offense tive evidence.’” offense); greater Buie v. State tal of cf. (where Ind., present (1994), Id. 799. un- 633 N.E.2d placed opening his intent at issue his derlying overt act element offense constitutes Moore contended that victim conspira- statement. conspiracy charge, conviction party, him to follow her to a invited cy underlying offense based on commission of notify lights to her that he was his flashed subsequent prosecution for as overt act bars voluntarily offense). lost, she entered car underlying Had this Court re- an him. then initiated attack that she for a trial as to all versed and remanded rape matters, that Moore was convicted Evidence finding that sufficient evidence substantially same circumstances presented for conviction would have al- regard- directly contention refuted Moore’s greater charge retrial on the as well as lowed present case. intent any appropriate lesser offenses. Wickizer, Further, the trial court acted with- majority’s Under disagree I with the determining pro- that the admitting in its discretion analysis propriety of the evi- pursuant value of the evidence of the unrelated crime to Ind. bative dence of unrelated 404(b) substantially outweighed danger of adopted Evidence Rule which (1992), Ind., placed his prejudice intent unfair once Lannan Although I that the second requested at issue. believe admission testimony by trial Moore for the victim of for which jeopardy, the admis- purpose, mo- conduct violated double Moore was convicted to “show (404(b) Further, with Indiana's rule disagree 6 in the 1339 n. 11 consistent I with footnote intent, motive, activity admissible to that evidence of criminal majority opinion intent, motive, identity, "prove purpose, or com- purpose the common scheme are subsumed into Lannan, plan”. plan exception. 600 N.E.2d at mon scheme See *12 sion evidence of the unrelated crime was error.

I would vote to reverse conviction on jeopardy grounds.

double

Christopher PETERSON,

Appellant-Defendant, Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

STATE

No. 45A03-9403-CR-108. Appeals

Court of of Indiana.

July Sept.

Transfer Denied

Case Details

Case Name: Moore v. State
Court Name: Indiana Court of Appeals
Date Published: Jul 18, 1995
Citation: 653 N.E.2d 1010
Docket Number: 48A02-9310-CR-568
Court Abbreviation: Ind. Ct. App.
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