Moore v. StateMoore v. State
Donnie W. MOORE
v.
STATE of Mississippi
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
*667 David G. Hill, Hill & Lewis, Oxford, for appellant.
Edwin Llоyd Pittman, Atty. Gen. by Deirdre McCrory, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
Before ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and PRATHER and ANDERSON, JJ.
PRATHER, Justice, for the Court:
Donnie Moore was convicted as an habitual offender for manufacturing a controlled substance, tо-wit: less than one kilogram but more than one ounce of marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance as defined in
From that conviction, Moore appeals assigning as error the following:
(1) The trial court committed reversible error by allowing into evidence an oral inculpatory statement not previously disclosed to the defendant.
(2) The trial court erred in denying Donnie Moore a new trial based on the testimony of Raymond Wilson and Sarah Brown.
(3) The trial court erred in sentencing the defendant as an habitual criminal under
We affirm.
I.
On Sеptember 26, 1983, Donnie Wayne Moore gave law enforcement officers his written consent to search the premises at 414 Fifth Street in Marks, Mississippi. Located on the proрerty was a "shotgun" type house with an additional room attached to the top, back portion of the house. An external stairway led to the additional room.
The house wаs owned by Donnie Moore, who inherited it from his mother. However, the lower portion of the house was occupied by Essie Mae Joiner, a renter. During his mother's lifetime, Moore оccupied the additional upstairs room, but it is disputed whether he was occupying the room the day of the search.
As the law enforcement officers were searching the upstairs room, one officer, peering through a window, discovered several marijuana plants growing in the backyard of the house. Donnie Moore was subsequently arrested and indicted as an habitual criminal for manufacturing a controlled substance, to-wit: less than one kilogram but more than one ounce of marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance as defined in
Moore was convicted and sentenced to serve a term of twenty years without probation or parole in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Additionally, he was fined $30,000. From that conviction and sentence, Moore perfects this appeal.
II.
Did the trial court commit reversible error by allowing into evidence an oral, inculpatory statement not previously disclosed to the defendant?
During the direct examination of Officer Lawrence Knighton, Knighton explained what took place after the marijuana was discovered. His testimony is as follows:
A. Well, Donnie Moore was behind me, just about a couple of feet behind me, when Investigator McCloud wаs taking pictures of the marijuana, and Donnie Moore made a statement, and the statement was
BY DEFENSE COUNSEL: (Interrupting) May we approach the bench?
BY THE COURT: Yes, sir. (CONFERENCE AT THE BENCH BETWEEN THE COURT & ALL COUNSEL, OUT OF HEARING OF THE COURT REPORTER.)
BY THE COURT: The objection will be overruled.
Q. (By the D.A.) Officer Knighton, I think you have testified that Donnie Moore was several feet behind you
A. yes, sir
*668 Q. that Bubba McCloud, the investigator with the Highway Patrol, was taking photographs of what was behind the metal mesh, or that little fence out there in the back yard?
A. Right.
Q. That appeared to be marijuana. All right, go ahead and state what you observed or heard at that time.
A. Donnie Moore made a statеment, and the statement was, "I don't know what to say when you can't grow a little homegrown."
This Court held in Franklin v. State,
III.
Did the trial court err in denying appellant's motion for a new trial?
Appellant contends he should have been granted a new trial because of two newly discovered witnesses. A hearing on his motion for new trial was held May 15, 1985, eight months after Moore's conviction. The Court heard testimony from two witnesses Raymond Wilson and Sarah Brоwn.
At the end of the testimony, the trial judge commented that the supporting documents of appellant's motion were defective. However, the judge further ruled on the merits of the case, holding that the newly discovered evidence did not meet the requirements for granting a new trial.
In Smith v. State,
To warrant the granting of a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must appear that the evidеnce is such as will probably change the result if a new trial is granted, that it has been discovered since the trial, that it could not have been discovered before the trial by the exercise of due diligence, that it is not material to the issue, and that is not merely cumulative, or impeaching.
Townsel also recognized that the determination of whether new evidence would probably change the results of a new trial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.
The thrust of Mr. Wilson's testimony was to prove Moore did not live in the house where the marijuana was found. The jury heard similar testimony at trial from Irene Jones and Sally Jones. The jury also heard testimony from Essie Mae Joiner that she had given prior statements that the marijuana was hers. Mrs. Joiner recanted her prior statements at trial claiming she had beеn pressured by Donnie Moore to make the statements.
This Court believes the testimony of Mr. Wilson would add little additional substance in a new trial. As for the new testimony of Mrs. Brown, the most that cаn be inferred is that she overheard Essie Mae Joiner admit committing perjury.
Perjured testimony does not in itself give rise to a new trial. The determination of whether a new trial should be granted must be made by the trial judge on a case by case basis, taking into account all the relevant facts and circumstances. Smith v. State,
In the present case, the trial judge implicitly found the petitioner failed to sufficiently *669 prove рerjury or that, even if perjury was proven, the result of a new trial would be different. This Court holds that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion.
IV.
Did the trial court err in sentencing the defendant as an habitual offender under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-81 (Supp. 1986)?
After his conviction, Moore was sentenced under
On appeal, Moore attacks the sufficienсy of the two Iowa convictions claiming they do not show a knowing and voluntary waiver on their face of Moore's constitutional rights. The trial judge held, and this Court agrees, this case is сontrolled by Phillips v. State,
Moore submits there is not a single word on the face of either of the Iowa convictions indicating he understood the nature and consequences of his guilty pleas. A portion of the Iowa convictions, identical except for the crime committed, reads as follows:
Defendant appears in person, is informed of his rights, ... and, with his attorney, states thаt he is informed against in his true name, waives formal arraignment, waives time to plead, and pleads that he is guilty of the crime of [crime to which Moore pled guilty] as charged in the information.
Judgment of guilty.
There upon, the defendant is informed by the Court of the nature of the crime to which he has pleaded guilty, his plea of guilty, and is asked whether he has anything to say why the sentenсe of this Court should not be pronounced against him. It appearing to the Court that no legal cause is shown or appears why the sentence of this Court should not be pronоunced against the defendant.
This Court holds the prior guilty pleas sufficiently show on their face that Moore entered the pleas knowingly and voluntarily. Therefore, we find no error under this assignment.
Having found no reversible error the Court holds that the conviction and sentence of Donnie W. Moore should be and is hereby affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
WALKER, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE and HAWKINS, P.JJ., and DAN M. LEE, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.