James William Moore appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial following his conviction of one count of burglary.
1. Moore’s second enumeration challenges the sufficiency of the evidence while the third one addresses the denial of his motion for
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directed verdict. We consider them together, as they both deal with the legal sufficiency of the evidence. OCGA § 17-9-1;
Martin v. State,
Viewed with all inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict,
Bowman v. State,
Mrs. Zimmerman called the police while Mr. Zimmerman watched from the front window as Moore, wearing a white baseball cap, walked out of Vic’s driveway directly toward the Zimmermans’ house. He stood momentarily, looked around, and then took off the cap and threw it on the ground near a fence. He then walked down the fence toward Sixth Street and the railroad tracks.
Officers Simmons and Lafferman responded to the “signal 98,” burglary in progress call. Simmons rounded the corner and saw Moore walking down the street right beside the building across from Hildebrandt’s toward Sixth Street. Moore was detained by Simmons while Lafferman proceeded to the rear of the grocery and found Lawson attempting to climb out of a hole in an air conditioning vent with a box of beer and wine. A white ball cap was retrieved by officers from beside the fence next to the Zimmermans’ house.
The owner of the grocery had driven by it on her way home from church about 9:30 p.m. and noticed nothing amiss. Upon arriving after being called by the police, however, she discovered a window broken on the Ellis Street side of the store, in addition to the damaged air conditioner vent. The window had been boarded up on the inside for years and entry could not be obtained there.
Co-defendant Lawson testified that he was in town working with *426 the fair and met Moore that evening at a local bar, where they proceeded to drink until closing time. They discussed getting some “crack and stuff” by breaking into mailboxes to get money and left the bar together. While no mailboxes were plundered, Lawson asked Moore what Hildebrandt’s was and was informed it was a store. Both men proceeded to the drive behind the store, pried open the unlocked gate and entered the alley where Lawson found a pipe and broke out the air conditioner vent. Lawson then got two concrete blocks, stacked them, and crawled through the vent into the store where he assembled the beer and wine in a cardboard box. When he was performing all these acts, Moore was standing there beside him. When, however, he was crawling back out of the vent, Moore was gone.
The evidence was legally sufficient.
Jackson v. Virginia,
2. Moore’s first enumeration is that the court erred in allowing hearsay into evidence in the form of Lawson’s post-arrest statement to Detective Williams which implicated Moore.
As indicated in Division 1, Lawson testified during Moore’s trial and was subject to cross-examination. During this cross-examination, Moore’s counsel attempted to show his self-interest in testifying because a notice of recidivist treatment originally filed against Lawson had been withdrawn. In attempting to do so, she referred to portions of his interview with Detective Williams in which Lawson used “we” in describing the breaking into the air conditioner vent and crawling into the store. During cross-examination, Lawson clarified that only he did these acts, but also stated that “I told him to watch out for me. He said, okay.”
Thereafter, the State called Detective Williams and proffered the entire post-arrest statement of Lawson, pursuant to
Cuzzort v. State,
In the trial court, the objection made to introducing the entirety of the statement was “I would object. It would have to be redacted. Again, we have had . . . Mr. Lawson, testify, and have been able to cross examine him. Unless [the State] is trying to put this in under
[Gibbons v. State,
Pretermitting whether the argument made here regarding hearsay was included in the above objection, the statement was admis
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sible under either
Cuzzort
or
Gibbons
and the best evidence rule is not applicable to this situation.
Boddie v. State,
3. Finally, Moore contends that the trial court erred in charging on parties to a crime.
The objected to portion of the charge was that “[although the indictment specifically alleges the personal involvement of [Moore], and there is no evidence of such involvement at trial, [Moore’s] actions as an aider and abetter, if you so find, in the commission of the crime, allow him to be convicted of the crime.” 1 It is claimed that this portion of the charge is confusing because “aider” and “abetter” are not defined anywhere in the charge.
Initially, we note that no authority is cited for the proposition that these are technical terms or words of art needing separate definition for the jury and no request for such a charge was made by Moore.
Further, to “abet” is generally defined as “[t]o encourage, incite, or help, esp. in wrongdoing,” while to “aid” is generally defined as “[t]o give help or assistance to.” The American Heritage Dictionary 67, 89 (2nd College Ed. 1985). “Terms of common usage and meaning need not be specifically defined in the charge to a jury. [Cits.]”
Philpot v. State,
There was no error.
Webb v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
This is the wording contained in Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, p. 34 (2nd ed.).