Moore v. RLCC Technologies, Inc.Moore v. RLCC Technologies, Inc.
This is a direct appeal from a judgment in a declaratory judgment action declaring unconstitutional
Procedural History
Plaintiff‘s husband, аn employee of Manpower Temporary Services, was killed while working on a water pipeline at a plant operated by RLCC Technologies, Inc. In the ensuing wrongful death action against several defendants, plaintiff alleged that the hazards on RLCC‘s unsafe premises and the negligence of RLCC‘s employees combined to cause her husband‘s death. RLCC and its employees asserted the immunity granted by
Plaintiff then filed an amended petition seeking a declaratory judgment that Section 1032 was unconstitutional to the extent that it granted tort immunity to a principal and its employees. By agreement, the declaratory judgmеnt action was severed from the wrongful death action and was tried in advance of the trial on the merits.
The trial court rendered a judgment declaring
The trial court further reasoned that
Hence this direct appeal by defendants to this court under
History of La.Rev.Stat. 23:1032 and 1061
The Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act, originally adopted in 1914, represented a compromise in which the employer was
Conversely, Section 1061 did not purport to grant any immunity to anyone, but rather granted to injured employees an additional source of compensation recovery.4 The original purpose of Section 1061, a provision which is found in the compensation acts of most states, was to prevent an employer from avoiding compensation responsibility by interposing an independent contractor or sub-contractor between himself and his employee. Wex S. Malone & H. Alston Johnson III, Workers’ Compensation Law and Practice, 13 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, § 128 (3d ed. 1994). The Legislature closed that loophole, and gave the injured employee an additional source of compensation recovery, by subjecting any person (called a principal or statutory employer) to compensation liability when that person undertakes work that is part of his trade business or occupation by means of a contract with another or when that person contracts to perform work and sub-contracts a portion of that work to another. Id. at § 121.
Thus, Section 1061 by its terms has always given an advantage to injured employees and has never purported to take any advantage away from injured employees. Nothing in the Act expressly provided, or even suggested, that the principal was entitled to any tort immunity, even if the principal actually had to pay compensation benefits to an injured еmployee.5 The Legislature arguably
In 1950, this court, and not the Legislature, established tort immunity for the principal. Without any discussion of the absence in Section 1032 or 1061 of any suggestion of a legislative intent to grant tort immunity to a principal, or of a principal‘s apparent ability to avoid any compensation liability, or оf the question whether immunity should only apply if the principal actually pays compensation, this court in Thibodaux v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 453, 49 So.2d 852 (1950) rendered a judgment maintaining an exception of no cause of action and limiting the plaintiff‘s remedy against the principal to compensation under the Act.
Despite suggestions that this court reconsider the Thibodaux decision,6 neither this court nor the Legislature reexamined the issue for twenty-six years.
In 1976, the Legislature set out to abolish the so-called “executive officer” tort actions. Because Section 1032 expressly granted tort immunity only to the employer in actions by an injured employee and did not extend tort immunity to employees of the employer, the courts had rеcognized under certain circumstances a cause of action by an injured employee against certain other employees of the employer, who were frequently covered as “executive officers” under the employer‘s insurance policy. See Adams v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N.Y., 107 So.2d 496 (La.App. 1st Cir.1958); Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So.2d 716 (La.1973). When the 1976 amendment to Section 1032 added employees of the employer as persons immune in tort suits by an injured employee, the Legislature also granted statutory immunity for the first time to principals and employees of principals, and the Thibodaux decision was thereby codified.7 See Rowe v. Northwestern Nat‘l. Ins. Co., 471 So.2d 226, 229 (La.1985) (Lemmon,
Burden and Standard of Proof
Statutes are presumed to be constitutional. Accordingly, the party challenging the validity of a statute generally has the burden of proving unconstitutionality. Moore v. Roemer, 567 So.2d 75, 79 (La.1990). The party challenging the constitutionality of a legislative enactment also must cite the particular constitutional provision that is alleged to limit the Legislature‘s powers. Chamberlain v. State Through Dept. of Transp. and Dev., 624 So.2d 874 (La.1993). When the challenging party cites
The threshold issue in the present case is whether the burden of proof on the equаl protection issue rests with plaintiff or with defendants.8
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited, except in the latter case as punishment for crime. (emphasis added).
The first three sentences in Section 3 establish different levels of review or scrutiny of the Legislature‘s actions. The first sentence sets forth a general rule against discrimination and empowers the courts to expand the equal protection guarantee to other types of classifications besides those expressly enumerated thereafter. The second sentence uses absolute language, permitting no discrimination with respect to race or religion. The third sentence prohibits arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable discrimination with respect to six enumerated classifications, but provides no express guidance as to the appropriate level of review. Lee Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution, A Reference Guide 24 (1991).
The third sentence of Section 3 was addressed in Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ. and Agric. and Mechanical College, 477 So.2d 1094 (La.1985). In Sibley, this court held that a legislative classification between medical malpractice victims with slight or medium class injuries, who were entitled to full recovery of damages, and seriously injured medical malpractice victims, who were only entitled to recover a limited portion of their damages, constituted classification based on physical condition. Accordingly, this court held that when such a classification is under review, the classification itself presents a prima facie case of unconstitutionality, and the burden is on the proponents of the statute to prove that the legislative classification substantially furthers an important governmental objective.
In the middle of the spectrum are laws that fall within the express prohibition set forth in the third sentence of
At the other end of the spectrum are laws that do not classify individuals on any of the enumerated bases. These laws are subject to the minimal standard of scrutiny for every statutory classification—that is, the classification must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Whenever a person disadvantaged by a lеgislative classification not enumerated in Section 3 seeks to have the classification declared unconstitutional, that person has the stringent burden of demonstrating that the classification does not suitably further any appropriate governmental interest.
Plaintiff argues that this action falls within the ambit of the intermediate review level recognized in Sibley and thus shifts the burden to defendants to prove the constitutionality of the classification. Contending that the 1976 amendment to Section 1032 set up separate classifications of employees according to their employment affiliation, plaintiff argues that this classification violates
Even if one accepts that the 1976 amendment to Section 1032 set up a classification which discriminated between employees based on their employment affiliation, there is no express prohibition in
This court rejected a similar attempt to achieve elevated status for employment affiliation in Parker v. Cappel, 500 So.2d 771, 774 (La.1987), which involved an equal protection challenge to the workers’ compensation laws excluding most sheriff‘s deputies from the Act‘s coverage. The plaintiff in Parker argued that she suffered discrimination in her workers’ compensation claim because her decedent was affiliated with a political subdivision, i.e., the sheriff‘s office. Disagreeing, this court held that “[p]olitical ideas or affiliations do not refer to an individual‘s choice of employment or employer, but instead refer to basic rights to freedom of beliefs and freedom of association, with respect to government.” Id. at 774 (citing Lee Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 La.L.Rev. 1, 10 (1974)).
The term “affiliations” in Section 3 clеarly refers to political and religious affiliations. While plaintiff contends that this court has extended “affiliation” to include “biological affiliation” in cases involving illegitimates, this court in Pace v. State, Through La. Employees Retirement Sys., 94-1027 (La. 1/17/95), 648 So.2d 1302, 1305 (La.1995) clearly indicated that the basis for according preferential status to illegitimates is the express reference in
Equal Protection
In order to analyze an equal protection challenge, it is helpful to make three basic inquiries. The first inquiry involves identifying the challenged classification. The classification means the distinction made between one group and another or the basis on which one group is treated differently from another. The classification here, according to plaintiff and the trial court, is between statutory employees and direct employees.
The second inquiry involves idеntifying the person who suffers the discrimination. According to plaintiff, the employees of employers who contract with principals are being disadvantaged because they (like other employees) are barred from tort recovery against the direct employer who is liable for compensation, but (unlike other employees)
The third inquiry involves determining the Legislature‘s purpose for the classification. On this issue, the placement of the burden of proof is critical. As discussed above, the placement of the burden of proof and the determination of the appropriate level of scrutiny depends on where the challenged classification falls in the spectrum for analyzing equal protection challenges under
The Legislature‘s purpose in establishing classifications must be considered in the context in which the legislation was enacted. Plaintiff‘s arguments, therefore, must be considered in the context of the 1976 amendment to Section 1032, in the light of the historical background of that section and Section 1061 outlined earlier in this opinion.
Plaintiff‘s primary argument is that an injured statutory employee is disadvantaged because he or she is denied recovery in tort from either the direct employer or the principal, while the direct employer is liable in compensation and the principal is not, as a practical matter. To emphasize this unfairness, plaintiff points out that an injured statutory employee cannot recover in tort from principals whose employees cause a workplace injury, but can recover in tort from other contractors or subcontractors whose employees cause the same workplace injury. The gist of plaintiff‘s arguments is that an injured statutory employee is disadvantaged by the 1976 amendment because principals, in reality, receive the advantage of tort immunity without the disadvantage of compensation liability.
Plaintiff‘s arguments are premised on the unsupported assertion that the 1976 amendment to Section 1032 granted the benefits of statutory immunity in tort to the principal who does not truly bear any corresponding responsibility for compensation to the statutory employee. This is factually incorrect. The principal, in fact, is statutorily exposed to primary compensation liability. Whatever the remoteness of the possibility that the principal will ever be called upon to make compensation payments or will not be reimbursed for payments made, the fact remains that the principal who has been granted the same tort immunity as the employer has the same compensation liability as the employer under the statute. In effect, the 1976 amendment to Section 1032 recognized the employer-employee relationship established in Section 1061 between the principal and the statutory employee.9
Thus, undеr the appropriate level of scrutiny, we conclude plaintiff has failed to prove that the 1976 amendment to Section 1032, granting tort immunity to a principal who is primarily liable by statute for compensation, does not suitably further any appropriate governmental interest.10 The choice of granting absolute tort immunity to the principal, whether or not the principal actually pays compensation, may be unwise or may grant heavy favoritism to one side of the compensation balance, but the power to make that choice is vested in the Legislature subject to applicable constitutiоnal restraints.
Moreover, this court has previously approved the constitutionality of the 1976
[I]n the area of economics and social welfare, a legislature does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some reasonable basis, it does not offend the constitution simply because the classification is not made with mathеmatical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.
Id. at 484. Continuing, this court commented on the limited nature of judicial review:
We do not decide that the legislature‘s formulation of the exclusive remedy rule is wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic objectives that Louisiana might ideally espouse, or that a more just and humane system could not be devised. Conflicting claims of morality and intelligence are raised by opponents and proponents of almost every measure, certainly including the one before us. But the difficult economic and social problems presented by workеrs’ compensation programs cannot properly be resolved by this Court. Our federal and state constitutions may impose certain procedural safeguards upon systems of workmen‘s compensation, but they do not empower this Court to second-guess legislators who are charged with the heavy responsibility of regulating the social obligations that exist between the employee, the employer, and the public.
Id. at 484-85 (citations omitted).
Bazley, as noted above, involved co-employee immunity, while the present case involves statutory employer immunity. Nevertheless, the constitutional equal protection analysis in Bazley is equally dispositive of the issue presented here.12
While the extending of absolute immunity to an entity that almost never pays compensation may be unwise and arguably unnecessary to achieve the purpose of assuring compensation availability to injured workers, this is a legislative, and not a judicial, choice.
We thus conclude that the trial court erred in declaring
Access to Courts
The other basis cited by the trial court for declaring Section 1032 unconstitutional was the access to courts guarantee of
All courts shall be open, and every person shall have an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice, administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for injury to him in his person, property, reputation or other rights.
Bazley is likewise dispositive of this issue. In Bazley, this сourt rejected the argument that the limitation of tort recovery resulting from co-employee immunity was a violation of Section 22, reasoning:
This provision, like the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, protects an individual‘s access to the judicial process. Where access to the judicial process is not essential to the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right, the legislature is free to allocate access to the judicial machinery in any system or classification which is not totally arbitrary. The legislation under review does not substantially alter a claimant‘s access to the judicial process, and, therefore, it does not contravene the access to courts guarantee of our state constitution. Bazley‘s complaints that he has been denied the right to sue in tort for full recovery of his injuries, and that he is discriminated against with respect to other plaintiffs who may bring such suits, actually raise the same substantive due process and equal protection issues which we have already resolved.
397 So.2d at 485 (citations omitted).
We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in relying on
Decree
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court declaring
Notes
A. When any person, in this Section referred to as the “principal“, undertakes to execute any work, which is a part of his trade, business, or occupation or which he had contracted to perform, and contracts with any person, in this Section referred to as the “contractor“, for the execution by or under the contractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken by the principal, the principal shall be liable to pay to any employee employed in the execution of the work or to his dependent, any compensation under this Chapter which he would have been liable to pay if thе employee had been immediately employed by him; and where compensation is claimed from, or proceedings are taken against, the principal, then, in the application of this Chapter reference to the principal shall be substituted for reference to the employer, except that the amount of compensation shall be calculated with reference to the earnings of the employee under the employer by whom he is immediately employed. The fact that work is specialized or nonspecialized, is extraordinary construction or simple maintenance, is work that is usually done by contract or by the principal‘s direct employee, or is routine or unpredictable, shall not prevent the work undertaken by the principal from being considered part of the principal‘s trade, business, or occupation, regardless of whether the principal has the equipment or manpower capable to performing the work.
B. When the principal is liable to pay compensation under this Section, he shall be entitled to indemnity from any person who independently of this Section would have been liable to pay compensation to the employee or his dependent, and shall have a cause of action therefor.
Except for the second sentence of Paragraph A which was added in 1989, and the addition of Paragraph B in 1926, Section 1061 has remained virtually unchanged since the adoption of the Workers’ Compensation Act in 1914.
A. (1)(a) The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or his dependent on account of an injury, or compensable sickness or disease for which he is entitled to compensation under this Chapter, shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representatives, dependents, or relations, against his employer, or any principal or any officer, director, stockholder, partner, or employee of such employer or principal, for said injury, or compensable sickness or disease;
(b) This exclusive remedy is exclusive of all claims, including any claims that might arise against his employer, or any principal or any officer, director, stockholder, partner, or employee of such employer or principal under any dual capacity theory оr doctrine.
(2) For purposes of this Section, the word “principal” shall be defined as any person who undertakes to execute any work which is a part of his trade, business, or occupation in which he was engaged at the time of the injury, or which he had contracted to perform and contracts with any person for the execution thereof.
B. Nothing in this Chapter shall affect the liability of the employer, or any officer, director, stockholder, partner, or employee of such employer or principal to a fine or penalty under any other statute or the liability, civil or criminal, resulting from an intentional act.
C. The immunity from civil liability provided by this Section shall nоt extend to:
(1) Any officer, director, stockholder, partner, or employee of such employer or principal who is not engaged at the time of the injury in the normal course and scope of his employment; and
(2) To the liability of any partner in a partnership which has been formed for the purpose of evading any of the provisions of this Section.
The underscored language in Subsections A and B, and all of Subsection C, were added by the 1976 amendment, which also added the “intentional act” exception to exclusivity of remedies.
Subsection A(1)(b) was added by a 1989 amendment.