The appellant, who is an attorney at law, brought this action to recover for professional services rendered in proceedings to establish a ditch. Upon a trial by jury, there was a verdict for the appellees, and, аfter overruling appellant’s motion for a new trial, judgment was rendered on the verdict.
The appellant insists that the court below erred in overruling his motion fоr a new trial. The reasons assigned, and for which a new trial was asked, were аs follows:
First. That the verdict of the jury is contrary to law.
Second. That the verdict of the jury is contrary to the evidence.
Third. Thаt the verdict of the jury is not sustained by sufficient evidence.
Fourth. That the court erred in giving instructions numbered one, two, three, four, five and six asked by defendants (appellees).
The facts, as apparently conceded by the partiеs, are that in the fall of 1888 the boards of commissioners of Tipton and Clinton cоunties established and ordered the construction of a joint ditch, extending from one county into the other. Certain of the parties affected by the order appealed therefrom to the Clinton Circuit Court. The appellees, being among the petitioners, employed the firm of Waugh & Kemp, of Tipton, to resist the appeal and prosecute the proceedings. Mr. Kemр, of said firm of Waugh & Kemp, retained appellant to assist them therein. That thе appellant rendered services is not denied; neither is it contended by аppellant that, he was ever employed by the appellees, thе contention being that if he rendered services at the request of Waugh , & Kemр, who were employed by appellees, he is entitled to recovеr from appellees for the services so rendered.
When a litigant aсcepts the services of an attorney, he impliedly undertakes to cоmpensate him therefor. ■ So when an attorney renders services at the rеquest of the attorney employed by the litigant, the client silently acquiescing thеrein, he is entitled to recover from the client for such services. Brown v. Underhill,
As heretofore stated, it is not contended, neither is it shown by the evidence, that the appellant was ever employed by the appellees, the only question being whether or not they accepted his services under such circumstances as the law would declare created an implied obligation to рay therefor. There is no conflict in the evidence that the appеllees had no knowledge of the appellant’s employment or cоnnection with the cases until after the trial of the cause, but there is a conflict as to
Under the fourth cause for a new trial, in order that it аvail appellant, it is necessary that all of said instructions, numbered one, twо, three, four, five and six, be bad. The cause is a joint one as to all of the instructions, and if any one of them is good, the entire cause fails. That several оf the instructions are good has not been questioned by counsel in their argument. For this reason we can not examine and pass upon the correctnеss of any one of the instructions.
The ninth instruction asked by the appellant, which thе court refused to give, is too broad, and while it states several general legal propositions as found in some of the adjudicated cases, they are not applicable to the facts in this case. The court did not err in refusing to give this instruction.
We find no error in the record for which the judgment should be reversed.
Judgment affirmed.