81 Cal. 195 | Cal. | 1889
Lead Opinion
This action was brought to cancel two deeds and a bill of sale made by plaintiff, on the ground of mental impairment, undue influence, etc., at the time of their execution. The findings and judgment were in favor of plaintiff, and defendants appeal from the judgment.
Some exceptions were taken to rulings of the court about the admissibility of certain evidence, but these exceptions were afterward withdrawn. The plea of the statute of limitations was practically disposed of when the case was here before on a demurrer to the complaint. (Moore v. Moore, 56 Cal. 89.) The complaint set up all the facts upon which the plea of the statute could be based, and this court held that the plea was not good; and as the court found those facts upon sufficient evidence in favor of respondent, we must hold that the defense of the statute of limitations has not been maintained.
There is, therefore, only one question—argued elaborately by appellants—to be disposed of, and that is,
The undisputed facts in the case are so strongly in favor of respondent that the evidence on the disputed facts would have to be very strong in favor of appellants, indeed, to warrant this court in overturning the judgment of the court below. These undisputed facts are as follows: Respondent was married to William H. Moore (now deceased) in the summer of 1871. They resided on a farm of deceased called “ the Moore Ranch,” situated a short distance from the town of Santa Cruz. At the time of their marriage the deceased was a widower, and had four minor children, — two boys, Frederick W. and Charles, and two girls, Alice and Stella, who are defendants and appellants herein. Respondent and the deceased lived very happily together, and he was a kind and affectionate husband. She had been a school-teacher, and had no blood relations in that part of the country, and had only a slight acquaintance with any of the adult relatives of deceased. Down to the moment of his death, deceased was a man of strong constitution and robust health. He almost daily visited the town of Santa Cruz, and respondent always looked for his return with pleasure. On the thirtieth day of October, 1871, he went to Santa Cruz, intending to return the same day, as usual. On the afternoon of that day he was shot and instantly killed, and his dead body was immediately brought home to respondent.
There is no real attempt to dispute the fact that respondent was deeply shocked and agitated by this sudden and startling calamity (although, as might well be expected, there is some conflicting testimony as to the extent of her mental prostration). On the day after the death of deceased, the appellant, Thomas W. Moore, a brother of deceased, visited respondent at her home, and professed great sympathy and solicitude for her in her distress. The body of the deceased was buried on No
The disputed facts — all found by the court in favor of respondent—are mainly about the extent of respondent’s prostration, and her ability to know what she was doing and to act intelligently for herself. Her evidence was to the effect that she was shocked and terrified by the sudden death of her husband and the manner of it, — the effect being deepened from her condition of pregnancy; that for two successive days'and nights she watched and moaned by the side of the dead body with
Considering all the undisputed facts, and particularly the unusual haste with which and the extraordinary circumstances under which the respondent was induced to forever give away such large and valuable property rights, we see no good reason to disturb the conclusions at which the lower court arrived.
The judgment is affirmed.
Sharpstein, J., and Thornton, J., concurred.
Hearing in Bank denied.
Dissenting Opinion
I think that the evidence in-this case is wholly insufficient to sustain the findings of the superior court as to the defense of the statute of limitations, and therefore I dissent from the order denying a rehearing in Bank.