*1 prejudice have been IV. CONCLUSION would not weight of the other given Strickland reasons, foregoing For the we hold that trial. inculpatory evidence offered unreasonably apply the TCCA did not Even without identification of Garza’s clearly an- established federal law as passenger Amador male the cab as the Supreme nounced Court. We shootings, jury on night therefore AFFIRM the district court’s de- voluntary heard Amador’s statement de- nial of habeas relief. have” had he scribing what he “would done shootings and con-
been involved all
cluding that this about the “[i]f stuff they prove can it in
murder is true and
court, my then I take death sentence.” will jury testimony The also heard from Mar- MOORE, Richard L. Plaintiff- tinez, who described Amador’s confession Appellant, detailing happened to her what on the v. night shootings, of the mentioned Ama- prior CO., dor’s statement that he’wanted to do LAFAYETTE LIFE INSURANCE taxicab,” something “crazy involving a Corporation; Michigan an Indiana Tooling Association, testified Amador had written her a Michigan Cor- prison warning letter from her not to testi- poration; Michigan Tooling Associa- fy. jury also heard about the Long Crime Disability Plan; tion Term Stoppers tip that led to Amador’s arrest Michigan Tooling Association Short and Amador’s accurate identification of the Disability Plan, Jointly Term and Sev- guns caliber of the shooting used erally, Defendants-Appellees. Moreover, in custody. once witness Esth- Moore, Richard L. Plaintiff- testified, er Menchaca placing Amador and Appellant/Cross- Rivas at the scene of the abandoned taxi- Appellee, shortly shootings cab after the occurred 4, 1994, early morning January explaining that she previously had identi- Lafayette Co., Life Insurance fied a photo array. Amador from Corporation, Defendant-Ap Indiana pellee/Cross-Appellant, great
Given the weight of additional' evi- Amador, dence say we cannot Michigan Tooling Association, a Michi that, there probability reasonablе but gan Corporation; Michigan Tooling for the admission of the identification evi- Long Disability Association Term dence, the outcome of the trial would have Plan; Michigan Tooling Association Strickland, been different. See 466 U.S. Disability Plan, Jointly Term Short 2052. Accordingly, S.Ct. Severally, Defendants. unreasonably apply clearly TCCA did not 04-1146, 04-1942, 04-1945, Nos. 05-1109. established federal law it when held that argue point counsel’s failure to ade- United States of Appeals, Court quately appeal does not rise to the level Sixth Circuit. Mayabb, constitutional error. See Argued: Dec. 2005. (“When F.3d at 869 we preju- do find Aug. Decided and Filed: error, extension, dice from the trial we cannot prejudice appellate find from an issue.”). predicated
error on the same *8 O’Donnell, Durkin, Mary C.
ARGUED: O’Donnell, Detroit, McDonnell, Clifton & Por- D. Andrew Michigan, Appellant. for Johnson, Miller, & Cummis- Snell tinga, A. Michigan, Elaine key, Rapids, Grand Southfield, Parson, Prokop, Raymond & ON BRIEF: Appellees. for Michigan, Clifton, O’Donnell, A. Gregory Mary C. O’Donnell, Durkin, McDonnell, & Clifton Detroit, Michigan, Appellant. Michigan. for D. An- the state of MTA hired Plain- Miller, Johnson, Portinga, drew Snell & life, tiff in 1971 to all group handle disabili- Cummiskey, Rapids, Michigan, Grand ty, and compensation workers’ insurance Parson, Wilson, Jeffrey A. D. Ray- Elaine for MTA and companies. its member Southfield, Prokop, Michigan, mond & for initially While Plaintiff was hired as a sala- Appellees. employee, ried in 1972 MTA and Plaintiff agreed that Plaintiffs compensation would COOK, Before: CLAY and Circuit come from premiums commissions for Judges; OLIVER, Judge.* District paid signed and a “Memorandum of Un- CLAY, J., (“MOU”) opinion derstanding” delivered the of the to that effect. OLIVER, 449), (p. court. D.J. delivered a responsibilities Plaintiffs taking included separate concurring opinion, in which “complete responsibility for all Group Life J., joined. COOK, 449-53), COOK. (pp. J. Disability insurance for the Detroit delivered a separate opinion concurring in Tooling Association .... handling] all part dissenting in part. questions, problems generally servicing] all participants in OPINION (J.A. 1722.) ....” pro- MOU also
CLAY, Judge. Circuit vided that Plaintiff pay would all his own Plaintiff, expenses. MTA Moore, filed 1099s on Plaintiff Richard L. appeals the income tax purposes. district court’s judgments favor of De- Lafayette fendants Life Insurance Co. MTA operated and Plaintiff under the (“Lafayette”) and the Michigan Tooling MOU until December when Plaintiff (“MTA”). Association The district court signed and MTA a “Consulting Service granted judgment to Defendants on Plain- Agreement” (“CSA”),whereby MTA would tiffs claims Employee under the Retire- pay $75,000, Plaintiff a fixed sum of ment Security Income Act of 1974 monthly installments, and Plaintiff was (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. an “independent deemed contractor.” appeals Plaintiff also the district court’s responsible Plaintiff was partial attorneys’ award of fees and costs taxes, all federal payroll and state all ex- Defendants, along with sanctions penses incurred in Michigan, the state of attorney. Defendant and was accept free to consulting outside Lafayette cross-appeals the award of at- agreements. MTA continued to file 1099s torneys’ fees its favor as too low. For on Plaintiff for income tax purposes. follow, the reasons which we AFFIRM the 1996, Royal Prior to Maccabees Insur- decision of the district court in respects. all provided ance MTA disability life and in- policies. surance Plaintiff rec-
I. ommended to MTA that MTA switch its BACKGROUND provider insurance Lafayette. Lafay- A. Substantive Facts ette became provider MTA’s of group life disability 1996;
Defendant insurance in March MTA is an ap- association of proximately signed companies Application Group member metal-working industry in Michigan. agent. Insurance as a licensed As the Plaintiff is a agent licensed insurance in signing agent, Plaintiff attested: *9 * Oliver, Jr., Ohio, The Honorable sitting Solomon United by designation. Judge States District for the Northern District ultimately that Lafayette determined Policyhold- to the fully explained
I have
Em-
in Active
un-
Employee
“employee”
not a covered
any
Plaintiff was
er
eligible
otherwise
or in a class
рloyment
plan. Lafayette does not
der the ERISA
on the
coverage
for insurance
apply
1,
January
“prior
[the
dispute
any
Contract
Date
Effective
Contract
eligible
effective
was
date] [Plaintiff]
CSA
Company will not be
by the
to be issued
is-
coverages
insurance
group
for certain
any such insurance
apply
for
eligible
However,
..:.
facts
by Lafayette
sued
until
Company unless and
by the
issued
1,1999,
January
[Plain-
that effective
show
Employee becomes
time such
such
were
changed.
with MTA
We
status
tiffs]
apply
for
eligible
a class
member of
until
change in
not aware of this
status
coverage.
insurance
were sub-
claims for benefits
[Plaintiffs]
236.)
(J.A. at
(J.A.
1923.)
at
mitted to us.”
Lafayette
at the time
In March
“[a]ny
em-
policy
The
states
STD
MTA,
polices
insurance
writing
began
commenced on
employment
whose
ployee
compa-
MTA member
employees,
its
policy
date of this
or before the effective
“employee”
nies,
was listed as
Plaintiff
on full time
actively
[sic]”
and is
at work
submitted
statements
premium
plan’s
coverage upon
for
through
eligible
December
From 1996
MTA.
(J.A.
1434.)
on his own
premiums
paid
at
The STD
effective date.
directly
disability insurance
for
coverage
provides
coverage
policy further
Lafayette.
date
starting after the effective
employees
policy
The
defines
policy.
of the
STD
operated
MTA
Plaintiff and
employee in the service
“employee”
2000. Dur-
as “an
1999 and into
throughout
CSA
the costs of
employ-
MTA deducted
terms of
ing
period,
employer
this
whose
of the
(“STD”)
long-
disability
short-term
20 hours
him to work at least
require
ment
(“LTD”)
from
disability
premiums
term
1435.)
(J.A.
policy
The
per week.”
and re-
monthly remunerations
on full
“actively at work
defines
further
insurer, Lafay-
to the
premiums
mitted the
at least
“actually working
to mean
time”
was reliant
asserts that MTA
ette. MTA
employ-
working day at the
per
hours
six
to MTA of
representations
on Plaintiffs
location
or other
placе
er’s
of business
“employee” under
would be a covered
who
employee
requires
where his business
Neither
plan.
of the
the terms
1435.)
(J.A. at
tobe.”
terms
Lafayette of the
nor MTA informed
“employee”
defines
policy
LTD
of the CSA.
mean:
filed for
September
benefits,
later
then one month
STD
duly re-
employee
full-time
regular,
A
filed the
LTD
MTA
requested
benefits.
records
payroll
on the
corded- as such
of Plaintiff
forms on behalf
request
benefit
work-
regularly
Policyholder, who
the'
La-
same months.
Lafayette
those
of the
duration
through the entire
ing
adjudicate the claims
proceeded to
fayette
week,
work
Policyholder’s
benefits; although there are indications
week,
per
30 hours
not less than
event
Lafayette initially indi-
in the record
terms of
under the
and is insured
the STD
adjudicate
cated that MTA should
Policy.
ultimately
claim,
Lafayette
MTA and
payroll
The clause “on
adjudicate
Lafayette would
agreed that
further defined.
is not
records”
claims.
both
*10
History
opinion
B. Procedural
dismiss and
an
judg-
issued
and
19,
ment
August
on the motions on
2002.
Plaintiff
action in
filed the instant
dis-
trict court on
2001. Plaintiff
October
The district court denied MTA’s motions
alleged that Defendants violated numerous
(of
I,
on Count
dismissed the first three
responsibilities
under
STD and LTD five)
II
against
subclaims
Count
as
policies
MTA’s ERISA benefit
and
Defendants,
both
denied the motion
dis-
prayed for relief in the form of benefits
III,
miss on Count
dismissed Count
asV
due,
costs,
attorneys’ fees and
and statuto-
against Lafayette, and dismissed
VI
Count
ry penalties.
Specifically,
alleged:
against
Additionally,
as
both defendants.
wrongfully
Count I: that he was
denied
the court
concluded
Wilkins con-
STD and LTD
as an MTA-
benefits
discovery
trolled
in the case and therefore
“employee”
covered
under 29 U.S.C.
discovery to
underly-
restricted
Plaintiffs
1132(a)(1)(B);
ing allegations
process
of denial of due
Count II:
fi-
Defendants breached
the withholding of information count.
duciary
respect
duties to Plaintiff with
Plaintiff filed a motion to
on
reconsidеr
to the
plan;
September
2002. The district court
Count III:
if Plaintiff
not
cov-
found the
untimely
exceeding
motion
as
“employee,”
ered
qualifies
for
10-day
limit for motions to reconsider
benefits as a “participating employer”
as set
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
plan;
under the
6(a). The court further found the motion
Count IV: that
pay
Defendants should
merit,
to be without
noting that Plaintiff
attorneys’
Plaintiffs
fees and costs with
did
point
to additional
authority
respect
action;
to the ERISA
facts supposedly left out of the court’s
Count V:
that Defendants refused to
consideration of the earlier motions.
furnish requested information as re-
period
After a
discovery,
of limited
quired by
1182(c);
29 U.S.C.
parties filed
for partial
cross-motions
sum-
Count VI:
estopped
that Defendants are
mary judgment. The district court ruled
from asserting that Plaintiff was not
on
September
these
on
motions
covered under the
and LTD poli-
STD
order,
In its
district
court denied
cies.
Plaintiffs
summary
motion for
judgment
(list
formatting
17-28
not in origi-
V,
on Counts II and further denied
nal).)
request
expanded discovery
conference,
At an.initial Rule 16
under Count
granted Lafay-
I. The court
objected to
application
of the rules set
ette’s
summary judgment
motion for
on
Baptist
forth Wilkins v.
Healthcare
II,
Count
granted
and likewise
re-
MTA’s
Inc.,
Sys.,
Cir.1998),
III II. Lafayette an court afford
district would ANALYSIS for to file a second motion opportunity voluntarily summary judgment. Plaintiff The Determi- A. District Court’s Initial Lafayette on against III Count dismissed nations ERISA Under 30, 2003. September arguments Court, In av- to this Plaintiff final on district court took action The August ers in its 2002 order case counts on Jan- the substantive improperly district court dismissed sub- 2004. court dismissed uary The (c) (a), (b), claims and Plaintiffs Count MTA, reasoning remaining against I Count (breach fiduciary duty) improper- II and MTA, Lafayette, and not was that because ly entirety VI in dismissed Count its un- for claims administration responsible (promissory estoppel). proper MTA not a defen- plan, was der Finally, in a claim for benefits. dant Review Standard of Plaintiff not a concluded court This Court reviews a district of the employee purposes for STD covered in an case de judgment court’s judgment policies granted LTD and and novo, of re the same standard applying on Plaintiffs sole Lafayette Defendant for re view to administrator’s action as remaining claim for benefits the suit. Wilkins, quired district court. See by the in the timely appealed all orders 150 F.3d 615-16. Claims for breaches 26,2004. January case duty promissory estoppel and fiduciary mo- Defendant MTA thereafter filed and are not for denial of benefits claims and and attorneys’ for fees costs tions in addressed the first are therefore coun- 11 sanctions Plaintiffs Rule court, no requiring stance in the district Lafayette filed motion sel. Defendant action or administrator’s deference attorneys’ and costs. Plaintiff fees decision. of the taxed cross-filed review clerk’s costs as Defendants. bill of submitted Correctly Dis- 2. The District Court 21, 2004, Plain- the court denied On June (a), (c) (b), and missed Subclaims La- motion MTA’s and granted tiffs and Count II attorneys’ fayette’s motions for fees II that De alleged Plaintiffs Count costs, ordering pay percent fiduciary their duties fendants breached attorneys’ fees addition of Defendants’ obligations as follows: of costs to Defendants’ taxed bill (a) 2552). and au- addition, found, failed make under Defendants disability term authority thorize short Rule and its both disability pay- long term benefit counsel U.S.C. at a time when plaintiff severally ments jointly be liable should MTA knew Lafayette assessment. percent the 50 and/or enti- should have known he was district court was correct. The al- *12 benefits; to such legedly wrongful tled actions referred to (a) (c) through (b) subclaims all relate to ar- unreasonably Defendants and/or point Plaintiffs denial of benefits and to bitrarily payments in bad withheld remedy the as under knowing plaintiffs claims to same Plaintiffs claim faith the such, valid; I. precluded Count As be is 1132(a)(3) § using allegedly from (c) unreasonably, arbitrarily Defendants wrongful actions under addressable plain- pay bad faith failed to 1132(a)(1). § tiffs a time defen- benefits at when dants] had insufficient information Correctly District Court Dis- actions; justify
to
such
Entirety
missed Count VI in its
(d) Defendant
failed to
a
provide
MTA
plan
written
document and a claims
VI,
Count
Under
claims that
LTD
procedure for the STD and
Lafayette
estopped
MTA and
are
from
policies
as
ERISA
required
asserting that
Plaintiff is not
covered
402
respectively;
§§
and 503
employee under the STD
LTD poli-
(e)
of fiduciary
Other breaches
duties
cies. Plaintiff claims that Plaintiff relied
unknown,
yet
which
but
will become
representations by
Lafayette
on
MTA and
plaintiff through discovery.
to
known
his disability coverage
that
would continue
CSA,
under
the
and in particular
at
claims
Count
under
premium payments
MTA’s
of
II
remittance
brought
were
U.S.C.
Lafayette
1132(a)(3),
to
on
§
Plaintiffs behalf is conduct
“catch all”
ERISA’s
remedial
inconsistent
subsequent position
section.
that Plaintiff
not eligible
for benefits.
The district court reasoned that sub-
(a)
(c)
through
claims
merely
were
restate
This
recognized
promis-
Court has
ments of Plaintiffs claim for benefits. The
sory
estoppel
theory
is a viable
district court
reasoned
Plaintiffs abili
Sprague
welfare benefit actions.
See
ty
bring
to
suit for
payment
benefits
Motors,
Inc.,
Gen.
1132(a)(1)
§
precluded
under 29 U.S.C.
Cir.1998).
estoppel
The elements of an
Plaintiffs suit under the “catch-all” reme
claim are as follows:
dial section for
sounding
those subclaims
(1) there must be conduct
language
or
pay
as
Varity
failure
due benefits. See
amounting
a representation
Howe,
489, 512,
Corp. v.
516 U.S.
116 S.Ct.
fact;
material
(1996);
(citing Corp., 516 at party U.S. asserting estoppel (1996)). S.Ct. 1065 reasonably justifiably must rely representation his detri- ment MTA. Plaintiff was self-ac- knowledged expert ment. welfare benefits cov- for MTA. Plaintiff erage admitted that he (list formatting Sprague, 133 F.3d policy at issue MTA like- sold in original). explained policy terms to MTA wise estoppel occur when a Typically, actions officers, including the term on covered em- actual fiduciary misrepresents plan Plaintiff admitted that ployees. he was meaning in a where terms situation *13 “go guy questions the to” for insurance plan ambiguous. the itself is See id. companies. by held MTA and its member under an 404. Plaintiffs cannot recover 1031-32.) (J.A. at Plaintiff had worked in estoppel theory misrepresentations years. for over 30 the insurance Under unambiguous, contradict written which MTA, 1972 MOU Plaintiff and between reliance on the plan terms because their questions Plaintiff handled all and claim unrea subsequent representation would be problems for life and group MTA’s disabil- id. court found sonable. See The district ity plans. Any by insurance reliance promis that Plaintiff had failed to base his representations by Plaintiff on MTA man- claim on that the sory estoppel premise agement going coverage, insurance Because, in plan ambiguous. terms were therefore, would have been unreasonable determination, Plaintiff the district court’s under the circumstances of this case allege plan did not that the documents acknowledged light superior Plaintiffs granted the ambiguous, were district policies on expertise specific insurance on judgment for Defendants Plaintiffs at issue. promissory estoppel theory.1 say This is not to that an insurance
This Court can affirm a district court on prevail can in an “expert” never any supported by the record. See basis estoppel theory, under promissory action City Mgt. Corp. Corp., v. U.S. Chem. Cir.1994). by that Plaintiff did reasonable reliance Plaintiff F.3d require allege representation documents from properly would some- as Plaintiff was ambiguous, specific knowledge were insofar with better or more one arguing meaning “employee” Plaintiff, over or at from someone than least Nonetheless, Plaintiff plan. under Plaintiff have reasonably who believed to prove prom- cannot at least element of one knowledge. specific Under better more issory Defen- estoppel respect with to each case, circumstances of for exam- this prevail. dant and therefore cannot had ple, Lafayette known terms relationship MTA Plaintiffs under his Plaintiff cannot show that reliance represented to Plaintiff the CSA and then any alleged misrepresentations by MTA under plan, that Plaintiff was covered reasonable, management required was as theory promissory estoppel by Supreme Court and this Circuit. facts Under the of this might be viable. 403; Sprague, Gregg See case, however, Lafayette did not know the Int’l, Transp. Am. 343 F.3d Workers of terms, (6th Cir.2003). and therefore did not the CSA Plaintiff admits “employee” know whether Plaintiff was an being knowledgeable about more insurance plan. infra, Part coverage anyone manage- than under the See II.C. Con- issues Judge Judge partial join conclusion on Cook’s insists that this Cook could Oliver’s dissent not, promissory estoppel Court’s the merits of Plaintiff’s determination that Plaintiff claim, fact, ERISA, infra, promissory estoppel is “employee” see inasmuch merely theory recovery deprives jurisdiction an alternative un- this Court of over Judge der ERISA benefits claim. case. We therefore fail to see how Plaintiff's any sequently, alleged representations cision, such as an lack alleged of due Lafayette while Lafayette were not made process afforded the administra- (criteria of the “aware true facts” two alleged part. tor or bias on its This claim), promissory estoppel for a also means that prehearing dis- Plaintiff assert promisso- therefore cannot covery at the district court level ry estoppel Lafayette. procedural be should limited to such challenges. Properly B. The District Court Limited Id. Discovery Scope for the Re- argues alleged because he maining Claims Under Wilkins process Defendants denied him due argues the district court benefits, his claim adjudicating scope improperly limited the of discovery was entitled to discovery into his denial of remaining his benefits breach of argues benefits claim. Plaintiff that his duty fiduciary disagree. claims. We *14 case is distinct from the action Wilkins 1) because, among other things: the claim- 1. Standard Review of ant in that case did not allege violations of This Court reviews the district 2) process, due there was no confusion in court’s conclusions applicability as to the of the case Wilkins about which documents Putney Wilkins de novo. v. Medical Cf. actually constituted the applicable ERISA Mut., 111 Fed.Appx. Cir. 3) plan, and there was no confusion in 2004) (unpublished opinion). Wilkins about who was the adminis- Applies 2. Wilkins to All ERISA Bene- trator. Cases fit Plaintiff While is correct about the Wilkins, this Court per- clarified the factual dissimilarities between Wilkins and scope
missible
in an
discovery
case,
his
these
do
dissimilarities
not make
action in federal district court. 150 F.3d
the Court’s instructions in
any
Wilkins
at 618-19. This Court instructed district
applicable
less
to the case at bar. Plain
courts to follow a two-step process
adju-
tiffs arguments about
inapplicability
dicating an ERISA benefit action:
all
Wilkins
come back to whether Plaintiff
action,
As to
merits of the
had
opportunity
present
sufficient
evi
district court should conduct a de
dence and arguments to Defendants and to
solely
novo review
upon
based
respond to Defendants contentions—in es
record,
administrative
and render
sence,
process
all due
issues. The Wilkins
findings of fact and conclusions of
panel foresaw
pro
occasions which the
accordingly.
law
The district court
cedural process of
all
gathering
pertinent
may consider
parties’ arguments
may
information
have broken down at the
concerning
proper analysis
administrative
level and directed the
evidentiary
materials contained
courts to permit discovery in those cases.
record,
in thе administrative
but
Wilkins,
(“The
at 619.
district
may not admit
or consider
evi-
court may consider evidence outside of the
presented
dence not
to the adminis-
only
administrative record
if
trator.
evidence
is
support
offered in
procedural
of a
chal
may
2. The district court
consider evi-
decision.”)
lenge to the administrator’s
If
dence outside of the administrative
discovery
alleged procedural
if
into the
record
de
evidence is of-
in support
procedural
supports
plaintiffs allegations
fered
of a
fects
challenge
denial,
to the
process
administrator’s de- due
then a district court is
enough
more
evidence to determine whether
discovery
into
obligated
permit
claim.
plaintiffs
of a
areas
had
substantially
substantive
been
denied
process
If
finds that due
id.
a court
See
procedural protections. There is
ERISA’s
however,
denied,
appro-
then it is
was
inconsistency
no
between the district
further
deny
court to
priate
the district
holding
actions
court’s
and this Court’s
areas,
discovery
or else
into substantive
Moreover,
only logical
Vanderlock.
circumvent the directive
plaintiff could
reading of this
instructions in Wil-
Court’s
by pleading
process
a due
merely
Wilkins
process
is that until a due
violation is
kins
id.
problem. Cf.
established,
colorably
at least
additional
beyond
rec-
discovery
the administrative
Applied
Properly
8. The District Court
plaintiffs
into a
denial of benefits
ord
Wilkins
impermissible.
Wilkins was
permitted
The
court
dis
district
properly followed.
actually
covery into whether
was
due
district
process.
denied
Properly
The District
C.
Court
Grant-
dis
expand
court will not
noted
“the
Summary Judgment
ed
Defen-
covery until
a denial
proven
it is
such
dants on Plaintiffs
Claims
process occurred.”
of due
Fiduciary Duty
Breach
entirely
order
consistent
This
1132(c) Monetary
Penalties
intent
letter of Wilkins.2
*15
argues
the district court
ruling on
district court’s
argues
the
high
granted
summary
Defendants
improperly
held Plaintiff to а
Wilkins somehow
un
requires
duty
than this Court
fiduciary
er standard
on
of
judgment
his breach
(See
(“In
PI. Br.
nei
1132(c)
23-24
der Wilkins.
§
conclude that
claims. We
this
nor Wilkins did
ther Vanderlock
properly
court
found that
the district
the al
require
plaintiff prove
Court
of
present
Plaintiff had
evidence
failed
process
per
it
leged denial of due
before
process
or
breach
a due
violation
either
con
discovery
both
expanded
mitted
addition,
fiduciary
the dis-
of
duties.
of
of
evidence outside
sideration
additional
its
trict court did not abuse
discretion
record.”).)
find
the administrative
We
refusing
grant
29 U.S.C.
penalties
argument
without merit.
1132(c).
§
found,
of
as a matter
panel
Vanderlock
law,
court
evidence before the
the
1. Standard
Review
of
action
plaintiff
that the
in that
established
summary judgment
This Court reviews
substantially
proce
had been
denied the
Image
Co. v.
novo. Eastman Kodak
de
by
afforded
ERISA.
protections
dural
Inc.,
451,
Servs.,
n.
504 U.S.
466
Technical
Accident
v. Provident
&
Vanderklok
Life
(1992).
2072,
10, 112
fore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable
der ERISA
preponder-
could find
[fact-finders]
recognized
This Court
equitable
has
an
plaintiff
ance of evidence that the
is enti-
claim a
participant against
ERISA
[judgment].”
tled
Liber-
to a
Anderson v.
plan fiduciary arising out of 29 U.S.C.
Inc.,
242,
ty
247,
Lobby,
477
106
U.S.
S.Ct.
1132(a)(3)
§
a fiduciary
when
misleads a
(1986).
2505,
433
by
F.S.B.,
889,
testimony
to statements
Defendants
897
F.Supp.2d
v. Fin.
(W.D.Tenn.2004).
no exact time reference. Plain-
contain
cites
only time reference
statements
tiffs
for breach
To establish a claim
meeting.
at a “December 1998”
made
duty
alleged misrep
on
fiduciary
based
(See
273,
J.A. at
Defendant MTA’s
coverage
an
concerning
resentations
deposition
in a later
witness testified
plaintiff
a
must
plan,
employee benefit
took
meeting
place
December
show:
day
signed
one
after
(1)
acting
a
that the defendant
addition,
deposi-
CSA.
elsewhere
his
it
when made the
fiduciary capacity
testimony,
tion
Plaintiff asserts that he
challenged representations;
within moments of its
signed the CSA
(2)
[representations] consti-
these
him,
discussing
its
presentation
without
misrepresentations;
material
tuted
disability
effect on Plaintiffs
terms
its
coverage
The district
with Defendants.
(3)
on those mis-
plaintiff
that the
relied
subsequent
court refused
consider
representations to
detriment.
[his]
support
Plaintiff in
affidavit submitted
Armstrong
Corp.,
v. Pirelli
Tire
James
judgment
as an
summary
of his motion
Cir.2002).
439, 449
“Wheth-
F.3d
pursuant
Penny
unreliable affidavit
misrepresentation was
er an affirmative
Serv.,
United Parcel
question of law and
a mixed
‘material’ is
(6th Cir.1997) (noting
“party
that a
cannot
material
misrepresentation
fact.
[][A]
of material fact
genuine
create
issue
it
likelihood that
if there is a substantial
affidavit,
motion for sum-
filing an
after a
employee
mislead
reasonable
would
made, that
mary
has been
es-
judgment
decision
making
informed
adequately
sentially
deposition
his earlier
contradicts
(internal
if
retire.” Id.
and when to
about
testimony”). Plaintiffs late-filed affidavit
omitted). Finally,
quotations and citations
and received
sought
states that Plaintiff
misrepresenta-
on the
plaintiffs reliance
Defendants,
sign-
prior
from
assurance
Parks, 345
must be “reasonable.”
tion
CSA, that
would not
ing the
CSA
897;
F.3d at
Gregg,
F.Supp.2d
cf.
disability coverage.
Plaintiffs
affect
(requiring
plan administra-
defendant
ex-
reliance on financial
tor show
its
court’s
alleges that the district
reasonable).
perts was
deposition
testimo-
reference to
unjusti-
incomplete
ny
was somehow
correctly
conclud-
b. The district
*17
fied,
for Defen-
and asserts that counsel
no
issues materi-
genuine
ed that
dants,
had
taking
deposition,
the
somehow
as to
lia-
al
existed
fact
Defendants’
the al-
obligation to establish when
the
misrepresentations
bility
alleged
for
(See
were made.
misrepresentations
leged
by
made
misrepresentations
No
were
i.
that
argues
further
PI. Br.
Plaintiff.
to Plaintiffs
prior
either Defendant
improperly
court
discounted
the district
CSA
signing
the
affidavit.
Plaintiffs
found that Plaintiff
The district court
assertions that some
Plaintiffs
any
put
forth
evidence
had failed
the
counsel had
burden
how Defendants’
Lafayette
misrepresenta-
or
made
MTA
alleged
of Plaintiff when
pulling out
of the
to Plaintiff
the effect
about
tions
made are without
misrepresentations were
“employ-
as a covered
on his status
CSA
summary judgment stage,
théAt
merit.
of the
signing
to Plaintiffs
CSA.
prior
ee”
putting
evi
had the burden
Defendants
to Plaintiffs
court referred
The district
the district
argument
before
Plaintiffs
dence
testimony,
which
deposition
had
ii.
which showed that Plaintiff
Plaintiff cannot show reasonable re-
any
on
alleged misrepresenta-
liance
genuine
failed to establish a
issue of mate-
by
tions MTA
signed
after Plaintiff
rial fact. See Fed.
56. De-
R. Civ. Proc.
the CSA
this,
respect
any
did
fendants
with
mis-
representations
allegedly made
alleges
misrep
Plaintiff
that MTA
before
CSA,
disability
resented Plaintiffs
signed
eligibility
Plaintiff
by pointing to
signed
by
benefits after Plaintiff
the CSA
deposition
Plaintiffs
testimony and
deducting premium payments from Plain
(See
470-71.)
lack
dates therein.
J.A. at
monthly
tiffs
remitting
remunerations and
The burden then shifted to Plaintiff to
premiums
Lafayette.
these
show evidence in
the record from which
any
found
district court
reli-
reasonable trier of fact
find
could
on
by
by
ance
Plaintiff
statements made
Defendants
misrepresentations
did make
unreasonable,
personnel
MTA
would be
prior to Plaintiffs signing of the CSA.
when Plaintiff
self-acknowledged
was the
Plaintiff does not do this.
expert
coverage
welfare benefits
MTA. Plaintiff admitted that he sold the
Instead,
points
Plaintiff
to his
policy at issue MTA
and likewise ex-
late filed affidavit and defense counsel’s
officers,
plained
policy
terms MTA
“failure” to
al
establish
dates
including the
on
employees.
term
covered
leged statements. We find
dis
Plaintiff admitted that
“go
he was the
to”
correctly
trict court
excluded the affidavit
guy
questions
by
insurance
held MTA
from consideration because it cannot be
companies.
its member
Plaintiff had
deposition
reconciled
testi worked in
30 years.
insurance for over
mony that
signed
Plaintiff
the CSA within
began
Plaintiff
his insurance career as an
receiving
moments of
asking
it and without
Casualty.
underwriter for AETNA
Plain-
any
beyond
questions
“who ... wants
tiff
originally
hired MTA in 1971 to
1059.) Further,
this?”
the dis manage
programs.
MTA’s
insurance
correctly
trict court
found that Plaintiff
signed
When
and MTA
an MOU
had
to put
failed
forth sufficient evidence
Plaintiff continued to handle all
summary judgment.
to survive
questions
problems
and claim
for MTA’s
cannot
establish
for the alleged
date
group
and disability
life
insurance.
misrepresentations, and Defendants’ evi
correctly
We find that the district court
dence
indicates that
discussions
toas
that any
concluded
reliance
Plaintiff on
disability
Plaintiffs continued
if
coverage,
representations by MTA management per-
оccur,
such discussions did
took place after
sonnel
toas
effect on Plaintiffs
CSA’s
signed
the CSA.3 Plaintiff there
disability coverage would be unreasonable
fore could not have
alleged
relied
these
light
undisputed position
of Plaintiffs
misrepresentations in signing
CSA.
management
vis-a-vis MTA
on insurance
*18
additionally argues
general
3. Plaintiff
that
as-
nothing
lied. These statements do
more than
by
management
year
speak
sertions
MTA
management's
in the
to
at
desire
the time the
CSA,
leading up
upon
to the
that
Plaintiff's
were
statement
made to
Plaintiff's
maintain
status,
change
coverage
coverage.
retirement or
represent
his
The statements do not
CSA,
under the benefit
would remain the
that
subsequently
which Plaintiff
same, materially misrepresented
signed, actually
eligibil-
Plaintiff's
maintained Plaintiff's
disability
argument
ity
fact,
benefits to Plaintiff.
general
This
for
In
benefits.
assur-
very generality
fails due to the
specific agreement
of the state-
any
ances do not
to
refer
upon
purportedly
ments
which
arrangement.
Plaintiff
re-
Correctly
Court
Con-
8. The District
was not an
argues that he
issues. Plaintiff
to
Plaintiff
Had Failed
expert on ERISA.
cluded That
undisputed
Plaintiff
undisputed expert on
be an
Material
need not
Genuine Issue
Create
undisputed
ERISA, however, to be the
Fact as to Whether
Was
Plaintiff
in or
knowledgeable person operating
most
Adjudi-
Process in the
Denied Due
on
issues.
with MTA
welfare benefit
His
cation
Claim
this
in his brief to
Court
Plaintiff admits
court found that de
The district
to answer
that
Plaintiff was unable
when
prop
initial confusion as to the
spite some
question
employee or member’s
an MTA
documentation,
lack
er ERISA
benefits, Plaintiff would refer
on welfare
some
summary plan description, and
initial
Lafayette. Plaintiff does
questions
such
to
Lafayette
MTA and
disagreement between
refer such
not
that Plaintiff would
assert
adjudicating
responsible
as to
for
who
questions to a member of
unanswerable
claim, the
was ulti
Plaintiffs STD
Lafayette, not
management. Were
MTA
mately adjudicated
any
without
substan
MTA,
Plaintiff that
represented
to have
to
procedural
tive
to Plaintiffs
impairment
“employee”
Plaintiff was
covered
rights. The
court concluded that
district
CSA,
reliance
of the
Plaintiffs
terms
opportu
full
Plaintiff had been afforded a
light
of Plaintiffs
might be reasonable.
any and
to
nity
present
all evidence
however,
superior
knowledge,
insurance
of Plaintiffs claims
Lafayette
support
any
representations
Plaintiffs reliance
disability
that Plaintiff could have
management
be unreason-
MTA
would
appeals process
of an
advantage
taken
able.
so.
Plaintiff have chosen to do
should
that La-
in. Plaintiff has failed to show
proce-
argues that numerous
Plaintiff
fayette
misrepresentations to
made
any
“deprived [Plaintiff]
defects
dural
signed the
Plaintiff after Plaintiff
that
be
process
assurance
would
some-
CSA
(Pl.Br.47.)
arbitrary.”
thing other than
forth
put
fails, however,
does
how these
Plaintiff
show
Plaintiff
Lafayette
knew the terms of
evidence
procedural
prejudiced Plaintiffs
defects
prior
application
CSA
in front of
ability
put
desired evidence
argues
disability benefits. Plaintiff
adjudicator, Lafayette.
the claims
Gener-
Lafayette
going
knew that Plaintiff was
ally,
recognized in
the courts have
arrangement
operate
consulting
under a
procedural
violations entail sub-
cases
beginning
knowing
but
with MTA
some useful
stantive remedies
when
relationship
MTA was
that Plaintiffs
Kent, 96 F.3d
purpose would be served.
change
not the same as know
going to
any,
point
Neither does
ing
relationship.
terms of that
new
or to the
Court
evidence
briefs
he could not recall
Plaintiff testified that
he
argues
court
district
which
of the
Lafayette
copy
with a
providing
Lafayette had
placed
have
before
would
any evidence
Without
CSA.
opportunity.
given
Plaintiff been
of Plain
Lafayette
knew
terms
prej
he was
argues that
CSA, any alleged
tiffs
under the
status
adjudication
Lafayettе’s
udiced
by Lafayette could not
misrepresentations
a claim. Under
Plaintiffs STD
made. The
negligently
even have been
MTA,
Lafayette
Agreement between
correctly granted
district
therefore
for STD
to administer claims
agreed
MTA
judgment
Lafayette
on Plain
summary
however,
MTA,
Lafayette
*19
asked
benefits.
fiduciary duty/misrepresen
tiffs breach
administer
claim
STD
Plaintiffs
to
tation claim.
benefits because
a feared conflict of
requirements can result in
remand by
a
interest due to Plaintiffs close association the reviewing court to the administrator.
ultimately
Lafayette
agreed
with MTA.
to
VanderKlok,
See
Generally, for Lafayette’s basis an administrator’s determination that comply failure to procedural with ERISA “employee.” Plaintiff was We find *20 it dispute MTA does not did Plaintiff mation. clearly placed very that the letter denying summary plan description as why Lafayette was a produce as to not on notice court, benefits. ERISA. The district required however, in refus- exercised its discretion clearly very af- Similarly, Plaintiff was monetary as penalties author- ing to assess any Before appeals procedure. forded 1132(c). In § reach- ized under 29 U.S.C. had been claim decision on Plaintiffs decision, ing its district court noted reached, adjudicator to forwarded a copy that Plaintiff had received Lafayette’s copy counsel summary plan in if policies, relevant not the used connection “Grievance Procedure” LTD The Griev- Lafayette’s policy. descriptions, expertise that Plaintiffs in with per- a contact Procedure established against any ance field benefit counseled wish- any claimant procedure son and prejudice a result of a lack of finding as coverage determination. ing to contest summary plan descriptions, that Plain- Moreover, July Lafayette’s letter of not, fact, any tiff had demonstrated benefits, by stat- denying concluded summary plan from prejudice lacking the ing: descriptions. disagree with you your client Should may This Court has said that courts long-term our conclusions that neither any or lack thereof in prejudice consider disability bene- disability short-term nor 1132(c) penalties § deciding whether are you may certainly, prior paid, can be fits Bartling, warranted. See 1068. any grievance to formal the institution firmly find that the evidence does not We us, provide with the written us a “mistake has made.” establish that been your opinion any informa- basis Id. therefore affirm the district court’s We supporting your tion belief us writ- grant monetary penalties under refusal it. ing and we will consider 1132(c). § Plaintiff does not contend any attempted that he to submit additional d! THE COURT COR- DISTRICT Lafayette attempted evidence he JUDGMENT RECTLY GRANTED grievance procedures formal institute IN OF DEFENDANTS ON FAVOR Lafayette’s policy outlined documents BENE- PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR held Plaintiffs counsel. FITS Plаintiff was full We find that afforded the district court argues opportunity present and fair his claims concluded that Plaintiff was improperly Lafayette. Without for benefits to “employee” under ERISA a covered from precluded that Plaintiff was evidence was not entitled to benefits therefore evidence, or that Plaintiff submitting such plan. applicable under the an ad- prevented undertaking from Plaintiffs claims for appeal,
ministrative Review Standard of must fail. process due violations review a denial of bene
Courts Court Did Not Abuse challenged District fits U.S.C. A Refusing its Discretion novo, Grant 1132(a)(1)(B) § de unless Monetary Penalties Under fiduciary gives plan administrator or 1132(c) § U.S.C bene discretionary authority to determine the terms eligibility fit or construe V, Plaintiff Under Count asserted 1132(c) & Rubber Co. plan. Tire Firestone under 29 U.S.C. 101, 115, Bruch, S.Ct. requested infor- U.S. MTA for failure furnish *21 438 (1989). parties
common court conducted that: ERISA: significant no control a. MTA exercised party a hired determining whether his performed over how Plaintiff general employee is an duties, Plain- CSA described agency, law consider common we contractor;” “independent tiff as an hiring party’s right to control the required significant represented b. Plaintiff skill to that he had “incorporated duties, perform his counseling receiving himself’ and that he was pay- finding Plaintiff an employ- ment “until end of contracts that ex- ee; pire 12-31-00.” MTA, c. Plaintiff had an office at While We find the district court’s factual he of his covered much own ex- findings clearly are not erroneous. We penses; further agree with the district court that appear require d. MTA did the balance of the supports evidence *23 MTA; Plaintiff work on at to site conclusion Plaintiff not does meet the e. While MTA and Plaintiff worked to- definition of an “employee” under the com- gether years, many they did so self-representation mon law. Plaintiffs under a contractual relationship, Security the Social Administration com- is changed which in December 1998 pelling. in conjunction When viewed signed; when the CSA was 1099s, of responsi- the issuance Plaintiffs f. CSA, Under the of MTA terms taxes, bility payroll for his own and refer- right did not assign have addi- ence to Plaintiff as “independent an con- Plaintiff; tional duties itself, tractor” the CSA Plaintiff not g. Plaintiff significant had discretion employee common law and therefore ineli- work; over how long when and gible an plan. under ERISA benefit pursuant h. Plaintiff paid was to the independent CSA as an contractor E. The District Court Did Not Abuse and had to remit his own taxes and Awarding its Discretion Partial security payments; social Attorneys’ Fees Under 29 U.S.C. i. appeared Plaintiff free to hire assis- 1132(g)(1) Against § Plaintiff and chose; tants if he so in Sanctioning Plaintiffs Counsel j. Plaintiffs services were essential to argues Plaintiff that the Court’s conclu- regular MTA; business of sion that Plaintiff is not a common law k. eligible Plaintiff not was for “em- employee, and a “partici- therefore not ployee benefits” in the normal pant” ERISA, in a results determi- course of pursu- MTA business and nation that Plaintiff lacks statutory stand- CSA, ant language of the and ing this Court therefore lacks provided
which for remittance of the jurisdiction § 1132(g)(1) under 29 U.S.C. balance due under the CSA in the against to award fees In Plaintiff. of event Plaintiff’s extended illness alternative, argues incapacity; the dis- medical and trict court abused its discretion award- l. Plaintiffs tax treatment indicated ing attorneys against fees pursu- employee, not an be- addition, § ant to 29 reported 1132(g)(1). cause MTA U.S.C. Plaintiffs re- attorney muneration Plaintiffs argues 1099s and that the W-2s. district court abused its discretion in sanctioning (J.A. 103-10.) In addition to the Na- Plaintiffs attorney holding the attorney factors, tionwide the district court also jointly severally liable with Plaintiff considered Plaintiffs representation of his Plaintiff, for the award of fees. employment status on a security social dis- attorney, Lafayette ability forms, also take issue application. benefit In those with the district court’s Plaintiff asserted that he was “self-em- calculation ployed” “president reject man awarded fees. arguments [a] one We these company.” Plaintiff further in turn. in a under the statute. involved suit See Review Standard of § 1132(g)(1). 29 U.S.C. the terms of
This Court construes
de novo.
Jordan v.
ERISA statute
self-
argument
We find Plaintiffs
both
Fund,
Teamsters
Mich.
Welfare
Conf.
serving and incorrect.5 Were the Court’s
Cir.2000).
207 F.3d
on the
factual determination
merits
a district
Court reviews
This
“employee”
Plaintiffs status as an
deter
attorneys’
fees and costs
court’s award
“partic
minative
Plaintiff was a
of whether
1132(g)(1)
§
for an abuse
under 29 U.S.C.
statute,
ipant” under
our mer
1132(g)(1)
discretion. See
U.S.C.
its determination would render Plaintiff
(“[T]he
may allow a
court in its discretion
statutory standing
without
and this Court
attorney’s
fees
costs
reasonable
jurisdiction
all,
to hear
case at
without
”).
Similarly,
....
this Court reviews
inapposite
Supreme
prec
a result
Court
impose sanctions
court’s decision to
district
edent, despite Judge Cook’s conclusion to
attorney
for abuse
discretion.
contrary
partial
her
dissent
*24
§
28
1927.4
abuse of
“[A]n
U.S.C.
See
case.
court has
when the
discretion exists
firm conviction
the definite and
“participants”
a.
and Fire-
ERISA
judg
a
error of
court made
clear
district
stone
weighing
in
rele
upon
ment
its conclusion
Labor
Sec’y Dep’t
v.
vant factors.”
of
of
Plaintiffs action for benefits arises un-
(6th Cir.1985).
King, 775 F.2d
669
1132(a),
§
29
which enables a
der
U.S.C.
plan
to
“participant”
benefit
enforce the
Authority
Had
to
2. The District Court
provisions ERISA. The Act
substantive
Against
Impose Attorneys’ Fees
“participant”
“any
as
elsewhere defines
employee
or former
of an em-
employee
argues
Plaintiff first
the district
eligible
ployer
may
... who
or
become
is
authority
impose attorneys’
to
court lacked
type from
any
receive a benefit of
an
to
court had
against Plaintiff because the
fees
employee
plan
benefit
which covers em-
“employee”
an
that Plaintiff was not
found
”
....
29
ployees
employer
of such
U.S.C.
ineligible
under ERISA and was therefore
1002(7).
§
that was
alleges
he
an
an ERISA cause
to recover bеnefits under
disability
of MTA when his
be-
employee
argues that the district
of action. Plaintiff
who
gan, making
“employee
him an
...
is
as
court’s factual conclusion
”
....
a
eligible to receive
benefit
an
means that Plain-
“employee”
status as
“participant”
a
under ERISA
therefore
can not
a
“participant”
tiff
be
argues that
standing
with
to sue. MTA
which authorizes the award
1132(g)(1),
“independent
an
contractor”
Plaintiff was
attorneys’
participant,
fees
not
“employee.”
an ERISA
an
beneficiary,
fiduciary
plan
or
Appeals
for the
"Any attorney
person admitted to
5. The United States Court
4.
or other
explicitly rejected
Ninth Circuit has
such
any
conduct cases in
court of the United
argument
presents
self-serving
any Territory
or
thereof who so multi-
States
Mgrs.
See Credit
Assoc.
So.
here.
Calif.
plies
proceedings
case unreason-
in
Co., Accident Ins.
F.3d
Kennesaw
&Life
ably
vexatiously may
required
be
1994) (”[I]t
unjust
would
Cir.
be
costs,
satisfy personally the excess
court to
[plaintiff]
insulate itself
liabili
permit
from
attorneys’
expenses,
reasonably in-
fees
attorney’s
simply
ty
[he]
fees
because
of such conduct."
U.S.C.
curred because
prevail
evidence to
produce
sufficient
failed
§ 1927.
claims.”).
[his]
statutory
Judge
standing
Cook cites Ward v. Alternative
under the term “partici-
115-18,
Delivery
pant.”
Systems,
Health
Id.
was not an employee, Plaintiff lacked receive information about plans. benefit standing to sue and that this Court there- To say that a ‘participant’ is person jurisdiction. Rather, fore lacks Plaintiff who begs question claims to be onе the had a colorable claim that he anwas em- who a ‘participant’ is and renders the defi- ployee and that he was therefore covered 1002(7) § superfluous.” nition set forth in Logic the statute. dictates the Id.; 1002(7) 29 see also U.S.C. (defining federal courts be able to reach ques- “any participant as or employee former tion. employee an employer ... who is or Supreme may The eligible Court addressed this become a issue receive benefit of in any type Firestone Tire and an employee plan Rubber Co. from benefit Bruch, 101, 109 ”). at Supreme U.S. S.Ct. 948. The .... The Court was therefore Firestone Court question requiring addressed the appeals the court of to address litigant claim be par- “employee definition of must an or particularized more
the
in the statute.
ticipant
employee”
participant
available
a
is
former
as
de-
statute,
in
fined
the ERISA
deter-
case,
the
remanding
Supreme
a
mining “participant” status
court must
view,
our
“[i]n
further noted that
Court
do more than take the claimant’s bald as-
naturally
‘participant’
term
read
follow, however,
It
sertion.
does not
in,
reasonably
or
employees
mean either
a
claim benefits which revolves around
in, currently
covered em-
expected
be
a
question
litigant
of whether
is or was
employees
...
former
who
ployment
“employee”
an
devolves into
expectation
... a
of re-
have
reasonable
standing
a
employment or who
issue alone.
turning to covered
a
claim to
have
colorable
vested benefits.”
Firestone,
Supreme
Since
Court has
Rubber,
U.S. at
Firestone Tire &
revolving
claim-
ruled on a case
around the
(internal
and cita-
quotations
S.Ct.
employee.
status as an
See Nation-
ant’s
omitted).
Supreme
The
Court ex-
tions
wide,
at
503 U.S.
S.Ct. 1344. The
further
on its definition even
panded
parties
posture
Nationwide was
noting that:
very
case
posture
similar tо the
that he or she
order to establish
“[i]n
The
plaintiff
bar.
former insurance
benefits,
‘may
eligible’ for
become
agent for defendant Nationwide. After
claimant must have
colorable
agen-
plaintiffs
Nationwide terminated the
(1)
prevail in a
he or she will
suit
cy,
plaintiff brought
suit under ERISA
(2)
benefits,
eligibility re-
or that
to enforce the terms of a retirement
in the
quirements will be fulfilled
future.
eligibili-
claimed
plaintiff
under which
This view attributes conventional mean-
ty.
pro-
Id.
ry standing
questions converge.
only
and merits
This “standard is met
where the
678, 681-82,
Hood,
plaintiffs
plausible
v.
66
claim ‘has no
founda
See Bell
327 U.S.
(1946).
773,
clearly
prior
intertwined federal McCotter, 790, v. 793 Eubanks 802 F.2d action, cause of should assume Cir.1986). jurisdiction the ease and decide over Supreme recently has ex- Court Hood, on the case merits. Bell v. 327 panded premise on the of Bell v. Hood 678, 681-82, U.S. 66 S.Ct. 90 L.Ed. emphasized that the courts not ex- must (1946) subject .... question “The subject jurisdic- concept tend the matter jurisdiction matter merits will and the tion, which deals with the of cases “classes normally be considered intertwined falling ... adjudicatory a court’s within provides where the statute both [same] authority,” capture other instances subject the basis of federal court matter which a court dismiss or should refuse
jurisdiction and the cause of action.”
Ryan,
take
case. See Kontrick v.
Texas,
Clark v.
County,
Tarrant
443, 455-56,
U.S.
S.Ct.
(5th Cir.1986) (citation
736, 742
(2004)
(distinguishing
L.Ed.2d
between
omitted).
],
Tucker
[v.
Williamson
subject
jurisdiction
issues of
matter
explained
we
rules).
processing
claims
This Court re-
purpose
by indirectly
no
is
ar-
served
cently
reflected the Kontrick distinction
guing the merits in
the context
Recoveries,
Gunter,
Primax
Inc.
jurisdiction.
economy
federal
Judicial
plaintiffs
which a panel held that a
is best promoted when the existence
1132(a)(3)
properly
under ERISA
right
directly
federal
reached
claim,
dismissed
failure to state a
and,
exist,
no claim is
where
found to
subject
not for
jurisdiction,
lack of
matter
the case
is dismissed
the mer-
plaintiff sought legal
when the
relief and
a general
its.... Therefore as
rule a
the statute authorized
ac-
equitable
claim cannot
be dismissed
lack of
(6th Cir.2006).
tions.
519-20
433 F.3d
subject
jurisdiction
matter
because of The Primax Recoveries
further held
panel
the absence of a
federal cause
ac-
that because
possessed
the district court
tion.
subject
jurisdiction
case,
matter
over
*27
[404,]
Cir.1981],
645 F.2d
415-16 [5th
though
plaintiff
even
the
failed
state a
The basic reason for this
is
rule
obvious.
claim,
possessed
authority
the court
full
If
jurisdiction
federal
turned
the suc-
attorneys’
award
prevailing
fees to the
of
plaintiffs
cess
of
federal cause
ac- party under the ERISA statute.
at
Id.
tion, no such case could ever be dis- 520. The Primax panel cited to Steel Co.
missed on the merits.
Env’t,
83,
v.
Citizens
Better
523 U.S.
exceptions
1003,
The
(1998),
the rule of Bell v.
118 S.Ct.
Plaintiff next that the dis court rendered its decision for MTA’s fees § under both Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. 1927 deterring trict is color- improperly court authority. The district court rendered its by awarding par able claims for benefits Lafayette’s decision fees under its 28 attorneys’ against tial fees Plaintiff. § authority. 1927 11 U.S.C. While Rule argument Plaintiffs without is merit. § 1927 are alternative sanctioning presumption While there is no award of schemes, possesses require each its own attorneys’ prevailing party fees to the NASCO, Inc., v. ments. See Chambers action, Gregori, an v. see Schwartz 32, 43-44, 2123, 501 U.S. 111 115 S.Ct. (6th 1116, Cir.1998), 160 F.3d 1119-20 (1991) 1927, § 27 (finding L.Ed.2d objective district court’s was not to deter 11, power Rule court’s inherent plaintiffs bringing from colorable claims concert). impose sanctions exist in This benefits, unnecessarily but from ex may impo Court affirm the district court’s panding complexity scope litiga sanctions, however, sition of if we find Finally, tion. the district court considered counsel’s conduct ei sanctionable under King that the fourth factor was inapplica § ther Rule 11 or may because we ble, and that the fifth factor favored De any affirm the grounds district court many fendants because of Plaintiffs sub- supported City Mgmt. the record. claims or duplicative were either lacked 251; Corp., 43 F.3d at see also Ridder merit. City Springfield, 109 F.3d 299 Cir.1997) This Court is not left with “definite (affirming attorneys’ award of and firm conviction that the district pursuant fees 1927when under award judgment.” improper). made clear error of Rule was We have reviewed Plaintiffs briefs to the dis- a. untimely Sanctions were agree trict court and with the district court Bule 11 relatively unreliable, that the briefs were Rule an revised sanc unreliability that continued in Under Plaintiffs tions under only appropriate Rule are addition, briefs to this Court. when a party made aware of the offend pursue continued against claims both ing document as filed with the court and Lafayette and MTA when the record had opportunity has an filing. withdraw the become clear that one or the other comm, Fed. R. advisory Civ. Proc. 11 *29 attorneys’ § Defendant’s fees. The holding. district 1927 See infra.
447 § N. 1927 sanction. See Trust its a 28 U.S.C. court did abuse b. The district Muller, 616 789 F.Supp. v. Co. sanctions imposing discretion (N.D.Ill.1985). This Court is not left with § 1927 the a “definite and firm conviction that provides: Section of judg a clear error district court made admitted attorney person or other Any ment.” the any court of cases conduct any Territory thereof United States or Attorneys’ Fee 5. The Size the of the multiplies proceedings who so Award Was Reasonable vexatiously may unreasonably and case in the alternative argues Plaintiff satisfy per- by the court required be of that of the district court’s award the size costs, expenses, and the sonally excess submitted fees was unreasonable. MTA reasonably be- attorneys’ incurred fees accountings monthly hourly invoices with such conduct. cause of hourly rate accompanied attorney held § has 1927. This Court U.S.C. charges. requested total amount MTA’s that: $166,000. The district approximately § question under 28 U.S.C. the charges La court found these reasonable. attorney “multipliefd] Plaintiffs whether however, only fayette, a total submitted and unreasonably ... proceedings at accompanying amount and an affidavit vexatiously.” An affirmative answer testing to the amount’s reasonableness. finding questiоn require does not of Lafayette requested a amount total faith, recklessness, subjective bad $75,000. court likewise The district about attorney an does impropriety; conscious Concluding amount reasonable. found this to burden not have carte blanche and counsel unnec that Plaintiff by pursuing claims courts federal scope complexi and essarily expanded the (see he are frivolous Jones should know by approximately ERISA action ty (6th F.2d 1225 Corp., Continental court ordered percent, district Cir.1986)) .... held jointly Plaintiffs counsel Plaintiff and TRW, 799 Div. Haynie v. Ross Gear severally percent of both and liable Cir.1986). 237, 243 Lafayette’s submitted fees. MTA’s and therefore, is whether inquiry, Our portion of the bill to no points that Plain support in record there is Plaintiff avers by MTA which submitted attorney “multiplie[d] proceedings tiffs charge. Rath represents unreasonable unreasonably vexatiously.” ... er, argues district against Plaintiffs district court’s sanction “careful matter give court failed finding the court’s as supported findings” counsel is “discrete analysis” and make of attor § the award dis supporting of bad faith 1927 sanction. We required for supra. neys’ against Plaintiff. See court held counsel agree. fees The district found for the same conduct specifically jointly responsible The district court tactics, mis the court’s award litigation underpinned “Plaintiffs counsel’s which Plaintiff, eharacterizations, conduct pursuit attorneys’ fees relentless in the court referenced positions satisfies which the district untenable claims accompanying may opinion hold A court memorandum 1927.” find awarding We therefore severally fees.6 attorney jointly order party’s percent of award of 50 attorneys’ the district court’s fees opposition’s for the liable foremost, found, presented a claim for While colorable district first and 6. The litigate good faith. did not that Plaintiff *30 448 manner,
Lafayette attorneys’ fees a rea verted to in a perfunctory MTA’s unаc award, pursuant companied by to the some at developed sonable district effort (in argumentation, are deemed waived.” findings court’s factual that Plaintiff and omitted)); quotation and unreasonably ternal citation see multiplied Plaintiffs counsel Central, Cook, v. also North Inc. litigation same amount. We Re/Max (7th Cir.2003) (find 562, Fed.Appx. 64 565 findings the district court’s satis believe ing party’s arguments attorneys’ as to fees fied trial this Court’s instructions appeal); waived for lack of development on provide explana courts “clear and concise Corp., v. AON 415 F.3d awarding at tion^] [their] reasons” cf. Taubenfeld 597, (7th Cir.2005) (applying waiver torneys’ Gettings v. Bldg. fees. Laborers analysis party’s 310, (6th Cir.2003). allegations of lower 300, Local 349 F.3d court in the attorneys’ error award of Plaintiff further in a argues, fees); v. E.I. DuPont Griggs de Nemours perfunctory way, that the district court Co., (4th 440, Cir.2004) & 385 F.3d awarding Lafayette erred fees to when (same). perfunctory argument Lafayette yet had to submit detailed hour and failure to elucidate relevant case law ly charges constituting a of its breakdown to a argu therefore amounts waiver of this argues fees.7 Plaintiff that such doc on appeal. ment “logical prerequi umentation would be a ” establishing site un ‘reasonableness’ 6. The District Court Did Not Abuse (Pl.Br.67.) der 1927. Plaintiff fails its Discretion the Amount Fees law, support this statement with case Lafayette Awarded to and further to any fails cite relevant Lafayette cross-appeals dis legal authority requires which this Court trict attorneys’ court’s award its fees as to overturn a district court’s award of at too low. Inasmuch as the amount awarded torneys’ fees in the an hourly absence of by the district court was on premised bill. Plaintiffs one argument sentence by Lafayette, amount submitted and the this effect therefore to pre insufficient fact the Plaintiffs claim for benefits was at argument appeal. serve “[The against least colorable Lafayettе, we appeals] courts of are not self-directed cross-appeal find that this is without merit. legal inquiry research, boards of but essentially legal questions arbiters of pre III. sented and argued parties.” See CONCLUSION Airlines, Inc., v. Am. Cruz 356 F.3d (D.C.Cir.2004); 333-34 Energy reasons, Indeck foregoing For the AFFIRM we Servs., Co., Inc. Energy Consumers the decision the district court in all (6th Cir.2000) (“[I]ssues respects. ad benefits, arguments Plaintiff asserted number of upon “near and made strained based Defendants, against frivolous” claims both misinterpreted such citations.” Plaintiff refused to dismiss claims one Defendant or another it once became clear proper which was the Defendant normally party seeking attorneys' While (e.g., provide the claim for failure fees under ERISA should submit detailed upon request), documentation and Plain- statements, hourly billing see Adcock-Ladd v. tiff unnecessarily prolonged litigation by filing Sec'y Treasury, 227 F.3d pursuing arguments unreliable briefs and Cir.2000), present proper Plaintiff's failure rejection by even after their the court. argument to unnecessary this Court makes it addition, the district found that Plaintiff us to reach this issue here. "improperly quotations took out of context *31 documents and
OLIVER,
concurring.
policies
plan
constituted
Judge,
District
claim,
promissory estoppel
the
dismissed
join
Clay’s
I
affirm
Judge
opinion
Plaintiff filed a motion
reconsideration
court,
district
ex
the decision
the
ing
regarding other issues which were ad-
II.A.3,
which
regard
in
Section
cept
order,
in the court’s
but did not
dressed
estoppel
promissory
discusses
challenge
finding
poli-
that the
the court’s
because,
separately
I
unlike
write
claim.
plan
or
cies were
documents
raise
alter-
Clay,
trial court’s
Judge
I would affirm the
Thus,
argument
ambiguity.
native
on
estoppel claim
promissory
of the
dismissal
ample
opportunity
had
reason
and
trial court
ground
on
same
the
relied
the
argument
the
throughout
raise this
dis-
upon
which
upon: failure to state a
proceedings,
trict court
but did not. Since
the trial
granted.
could be
Before
relief
argument
Moore never raised an
about
court,
promissory estop
Plaintiff based his
below, may
ambiguity
he
not do so now.
upon Defendants’
pel claim on his reliance
Ninety-Three
States v.
Fire-
See United
that
and on the fact
the
representations
(6th Cir.2003)
arms,
414, 424
330 F.3d
plan
not
policies in issue were
insurance
repeatedly
(holding that
court has
“[t]his
though Plaintiff had
Even
documents.
arguments
held that
it will not consider
with,
of,
intimately familiar
and was
copies
first
appeal
raised for the
time on
unless
argue,
he did not
as
policies,
insurance
the
the
will
our failure to consider
issue
result
court,
the
that
term
argues
he
before this
justice.”).
plain miscarriage
in a
plans,
used in the
was am
“employee” as
I
not reach the merits of the
would
trial
that
the
court found
biguous.
claim,
Judge Clay
opinion.
does in his
plan
policies
LTD and
were
docu
STD
squarely
The issues he addresses were
Corp.,
Musto v. Am. Gen.
ments. See
court,
thus,
the
there
before
district
and
(6th Cir.1988).
The trial
lawyers
no incentive for the
focus
Sprague
court further found that under
arguments on the evidence
law
their
388, 404
Corp., 133 F.3d
Gen. Motors
bearing on those issues.
(en
Cir.1998)
banc),
plan
where written
exist,
estoppel
a promissory
documents
COOK,
concurring in
Judge,
part
Circuit
plan
unless
docu
claim cannot succeed
the
part.
dissenting
ambiguous.
are
Id.
Plain
Because
ments
agree
I
much of the lead
Though
with
argue
ambiguity
there was
tiff did not
points.
I
two
respectfully differ on
opinion,
documents,
plan
the court dismissed
First,
join Judge
I
concurrence
Oliver’s
estoppel claim.
his
dismissing
estoppel
promissory
Moore’s
court,
wholly
At the trial
failed
employed
grounds
claim on the
argument
alternative
raise
Second, the determination
district court.
ambiguous, even
plan documents were
employee
not a
that Moore is
common-law
briefing
Sprague
face of
on
Defen-
(and
leads me to
“participant”)
thus not
strong
from thе
suggestions
dants
statutory
that Moore lacked
conclude
on the
hearing
at the oral
motion
standing,
accordingly that the district
policies
plan
were
docu-
jurisdiction
insurance
over the merits
court lacked
claims, including
fees
supplemental
filed
of his ERISA
ments. Plaintiff even
certain
argument,
costs.
after oral
and before
brief
addressing
court issued
order
whether
its
Moore
Concluding
I. Effect of
Was
existed,
legally sufficient
documents
Employee
not a Common-Law
to raise an alter-
but that brief also failed
Moreover,
majority’s application
argument
ambiguity.
agree
I
native
employment in Na-
multi-factor test of
insurance
after the court ruled
Darden,
(1998).
Co. v.
503 U.S.
This
tionwide Mut. Ins.
court confirmed
ter, (6th Cir.2006) (character- curring signed after he the CSA.
izing the claim dismissal a under 29 1132(a)(3) II. Fees § improperly
U.S.C. sought relief, legal relief, rather than equitable Just as the jurisdic- district court lacked claim, failing to state rather than failing tion to consider the merits of Moore’s support jurisdiction the court’s —-and claims, jurisdiction so too it lacked dispute where there was no over whether attorneys’ to award fees under ERISA. plaintiff “participant”). was a To see 1132(g)(1) only Section allows a court to so, consider that the district award fees and “by par- costs actions fiduciary dismissed duty Moore’s ticipant, beneficiary, or fiduciary.” Be- (Count II) and failure to furnish above, cause Moore was none of the (Count V) information claim on the merits jurisdiction district court did not have over without relying on its later conclusion that fees), Moore’s Count IV such (seeking he was a “participant.” not Even under over the defendants’ motion for fees under Bell, reading the majority’s question ERISA. I would thus vacate the district “participant” whether Moore was a court’s award of fees Moore. jurisdictional could still be because the Because the district court held Moore’s merits of such claims did not converge jointly severally counsel statutory liable with standing. § 1132(g) for the penalty, Moore holding The same is true of Moore’s claim for jurisdiction that the court was without benefits, which the district court did re- award fees under ERISA would seem to solve on the basis that Moore not was remove the basis for that sanction. if “participant.” For the district court had However, because the district court sug- found that a “participant,” Moore was gested independent an basis for Moore’s inquiry. would have ended the court’s I liability, counsel’s It would remand still would have had to assess whether question Moore employee eligible appro- was whether sanctions were definitions, relief plan’s priate under 28 (given U.S.C. Rule that defendants’ majority’s conclusion I would also untimely).
11 motion was whether Moore question
remand a non- similarly liable on
himself
ERISA basis. America,
UNITED STATES
Plaintiff-Appellee, Defendant-Appellant. COLEMAN,
Sean
No. 04-4393. Appeals, Court of
United States Circuit.
Sixth July
Argued: 10, 2006. Aug. and Filed:
Decided notes a proper defendant for some of Plaintiffs (1993 amendments) (“[A] party cannot de subclaims, despite the communication of lay serving its Rule 11 motion until conclu legal authority relevant and clear for the ....”) sion of the ease This Court held as dismissal of one or defendant the other to Bidder, (“A much in party Plaintiffs counsel. The district court did must now serve Rule 11 motion on the not abuse awarding its discretion in attor- allegedly offending party twenty- at least ney fees’ Plaintiff. days one prior to the conclusion the ease judicial rejection of the offending con The District Court Did Not Abuse A tention.”). parties dispute do not its in Sanctioning Discretion Plain- the Rule 11 motions were made after the Attorney tiffs disposition summary judg of the case on argues the district ment. Therefore sanction under Rule court abused its discretion in holding constitutes abuse of discretion. We attorney jointly severally find, however, the district court’s pay liable Plaintiff to percent proper sanctions were under its alternative