Appellants Craig Moore (“Moore”) and Toni Jeanne Labat Moore sued Appellee International Paint, L.L.C. (“IP”) under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (“LPLA”), alleging that Moore developed multiple myeloma due to his exposure to benzene contained in IP’s paints and paint thinners during his work at the Avondale Shipyards (“Avondale”) from 1988 to 1990. In support of thеir claims, Appellants retained Dr. Bhaskar Kura to provide expert testimony concerning, among other things, Moore’s cumulative benzene exposure while using IP’s products at Avondale.
After Dr. Kura submitted his expert report, IP filed a motion in limine to exclude Dr. Kura’s opinion under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
I.
This court reviews rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony for abuse of discretion. Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc.,
Accordingly, we cannot reverse the district court’s decision to exclude Dr. Kura’s
II.
Among the conditions imposed by the Federal Rules of Evidence on the admissibility of expert оpinion testimony is that the testimony be “based on sufficient facts or data.” Fed.R.Evid. 702(b). Under the framework explained in the Supreme Court’s Daubert decision, “Rule 702 assigns to the district judge a gatekeeping role to ensure that scientific testimony is both reliable and relevant.” Johnson v. Arkema, Inc.,
Of course, “[w]hen facts are in dispute, experts sometimеs reach different conclusions based on competing versions of the facts.” FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. Generally, the “fact-finder is entitled to hear [an expert’s] testimony and decide whether ... the predicate facts on which [the expert] relied are accurate.” Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc.,
III.
The district court identified numerous aspects of Dr. Kura’s cumulative exposure analysis that either had no suрport in the record or were flatly contradicted by all the available evidence. In particular, the district court noted the following:
Dr. Kura’s analysis assumed that when Moore was using IP’s products, he was always indoors. In his deposition testimony, which was the only evidence on this point, Moore stated that he used IP’s deck grey paint and IP’s paint thinner outdоors while working at Avondale. On top of his erroneous assumption that Moore only used IP’s products indoors, Dr. Kura also assumed that the indoor spaces where Moore wоrked were always unventilated. The available evidence on this point came from the deposition testimony of Avondale employee Danny Joyce as well аs from Moore’s deposition. Joyce testified that Avondale had an extensive ventilation system, while Moore’s testimony was that the ventilation was good at times and nonexistent at other times. There was nothing in the record to suggest that Moore always worked without ventilation.
Moore worked as both a painter and a sandblaster at Avondale. There was no evidence аs to what percentage of his Avondale work was sandblasting as opposed to painting. Moore also testified that when he was painting, he first prepared the surface to be painted by grinding, scraping, or using sandpaper on it. Dr. Kura’s analysis purported to account for Moore’s work as a sandblaster by allocating 90% (as opposed to 100%) of the hours he spent at Avondale to painting, but it did not account for any of the preparatory tasks Moore testified that he performed.
Moore testified that he always used a respirator while painting, but it sometimes became clogged after an hour of painting. He also testified that when his respirator became clogged, he wоuld get a new one during lunch. Dr. Kura’s analysis assumed that Moore’s respirator always failed within one hour and that he never obtained a replacement respirator.
In addition to the assertions described above, which the district court correctly found to be not only lacking in evidentiary support but also in conflict with all the available evidence, Dr. Kurа made a number of other assumptions that, while not strictly inconsistent with the evidence, had no basis in the record. Appellants argue that “[t]he district court simply disagreed with the professor’s expert judgment about the underlying facts and the weight given to them.” Appellants might have a point if Dr. Kura had identified some reason for assuming the facts he did for his analysis. At his deposition, however, the only basis Dr. Kura cited for many of his assumptions was the absence of any testimony from Moore on that particular point. But, where the primary witness’s deposition testimony reflects “uncertain[ty] regarding many details necessary” to the expert’s analysis, the expert may not “overcome th[e] evidentiary lack” with “the furtive inclusiоn ... of supposed facts not in the record.” Hathaway,
To be sure, reliable expert testimony often involves estimation and reasonable inferences from a sometimes incomplete record. Further, a few scattered errors in an expert report are not necessarily grounds for exclusion. Here, however, the universe of facts assumed by the expert differs frequently and substantially from the undisputed record evidence. Additionally, the expert made numerous assumptions with no apparent underlying ratio
IV.
Fоr the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Notes
Pursuant to 5th Cm. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
. Appellants did not submit a reply brief.