Appellant (Moore) commenced this action against respondent (School District) alleging he was damaged as the result of an unreasonable search of his car on school grounds. Four causes of action were submitted to the jury: (1) a civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) a violation of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act; (3) defamation; and (4) false imprisonment. The jury returned a verdict for School District on all causes of action. We affirm.
ISSUES
1. Whether Moore was was entitled to a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict on his § 1983 cause of action.
2. Whether hearsay evidence was erroneously admitted.
3. Whether alleged affirmative defenses were improperly submitted to the jury.
FACTS
On a school day during Moore’s junior year at Wilson High School, a school security guard informed the principal, Allie Brooks, that someone had called the school to report there had been “activity” around the trunk of Moore’s car parked in the school parking lot. Principal Brooks called the City of Florence Police Department expecting a narcotics agent with a dog to sniff out the car for drugs. Agent Freeman arrived but without the dog. It was then decided that Agent Freeman would conduct a search of Moore’s car.
Prior to the search, Assistant Principal Bell came to Moore’s classroom, and escorted Moore to the principal’s office. There, Moore was told about the anonymous tip. Principal Brooks testified that at this point, “[Moore] said, ‘Fine, you can search me,’ and he put his keys on my desk and said, ‘You can search my ear.’ ” Principal Brooks, Assistant Principal Bell, and Agent Freeman then escorted Moore to his car in the parking lot. About this time the dismissal bell rang and Moore was seen by several students. A crowd developed while Agent Freeman searched Moore’s car. No drugs were found. Moore testified he did not consent to the search.
*338 DISCUSSION
Moore contends he was entitled to a directed verdict or j.n.o.v. because the search was unreasonable and therefore violated his constitutional rights. We disagree and find School District is in fact the party that should have been granted a directed verdict on this cause of action.
Section 1983 allows a civil action to recover damages for deprivation of a constitutionally protected right. Under
Monell v. Dept. of Social Services,
In this case, Moore’s theory at trial was that the search conducted by Principal Brooks was unreasonable under
New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
Moore contends the trial judge erroneously admitted hearsay regarding the anonymous tip relayed by the security guard, Paul Jackson, to Principal Brooks.
2
A ruling on the admission of evidence will not be disturbed ab
*339
sent a showing of prejudice.
Manning v. City of Columbia,
Moore claims the trial judge erred in charging the jury on the issue of consent to search and allowing counsel to argue consent. Moore contends consent is an affirmative defense that was not pleaded and therefore should not have been submitted to the jury. We need not determine whether consent is an affirmative defense in this case. Moore can show no prejudice from the charge on consent since School District is not liable on the § 1983 cause of action.
Ellison v. Simmons,
Finally, Moore contends the trial judge erroneously charged the jury on discretion as an affirmative defense to the cause of action for violation of the Tort Claims Act because School District did not plead discretion as an affirmative defense.
The Tort Claims Act is a limited waiver of governmental immunity. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(a) (Supp. 1993). It provides that, subject to limitation, a government entity is “liable for [its] torts in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-40 (Supp. 1993). The Tort Claims Act does not create a new substantive cause of action against a government entity and the trial judge improperly submitted such a cause of action to the jury. Since this cause of action should not have been submitted to the jury, Moore can show no prejudice from the charge that discretion is an affirmative defense to sue a cause of action. Ellison, supra.
Affirmed.