77 Neb. 52 | Neb. | 1906
On the 18th day of August, 1889, Robert Moore, a former resident of the state of Kentucky, died intestate in Kearney county, Nebraska, seized in fee of a quarter section of land situated in that county. Thereafter J. W. Grilman was duly appointed administrator of the estate, and administration of the estate was finally closed and the administrator discharged in January, 1891.. During the progress of the administration the right of heirship to the estate was contested between one John F. Moore, who claimed the estate as a half brother of the deceased, and a minor named Daisy D. Moore, plaintiff herein, who claimed to be the daughter and sole heir of the deceased. The minor claimant was represented in the contest by a guardian ad litem, who is her attorney in the present suit. The contest over the heirship was continued from term to term in the county court, and evidence was taken, and the county court found in favor of the alleged half brother and against the claims of Daisy D. Moore. Thereafter the lands in controversy passed by mesne conveyances from John F. Moore to the present defendant, Henry J. Flack,
Plaintiff, in support of her claim of heirship, alleged a common law marriage between the deceased and her mother. This claim, however, is wholly unsupported by competent testimony. The evidence of Mrs. Steele, the mother of plaintiff, shows that she never was married to the deceased; that she never claimed to be his wife while she lived with him"in Kentucky; that, while he visited her frequently and was the father of her child, yet she makes no claim that they lived together as husband and wife, or that he ever held her out to the world as such. What she does claim is that the deceased promised that he would marry her if she would come to Nebraska with him, and that he would get a minister to perform the ceremony, but that soon after arriving in this state he took sick and died without having any ceremony performed. According to Mrs. Steele’s testimony the deceased only lived about ten days after arriving in Nebraska. She further testified that she was drawing a pension as the widow of her former husband (Steele), who was a soldier in the United States army during the rebellion. To our minds this evidence is wholly insufficient to support the claim of a common law marriage between plaintiff’s mother and the deceased, and it will therefore be unnecessary to determine whether or not plaintiff is estopped by the judgment of the county court to again assert her right of heirship in the lands of the deceased.
As. this disposes of plaintiff’s petition, we will now
Witness on cross-examination said that the letter was written and signed in his presence. He also testified that he kneAv that Omie Oney could neither read nor Avrite and that Avas the reason that he read her the note. He said there Avere other things in the note, but not very many, and that he had not thought of the note during the 16 years intervening between the day he read it and the day he gave his deposition. Omie Oney testified that she . could neither read nor write, but that she remembered the contents of the note, just as stated by Gearheart, and that she put the note aAvay in a paper box Avith some other papers, and that it was lost, and she Avas unable to find it. It is clear that the evidence with reference to the bastardy proceeding is wholly insufficient to show an acknowledgment Avithin the - provisions of section 31, supra. So the only question is as to the sufficiency of the testimony of Gearheart and Omie Oney to establish an acknowledg
But, passing from the dubious circumstances surrounding the proof of the writing to its contents, the question arises: Is it a sufficient recognition to create an heirship within the meaning of section 31, supra? The material portion of this note as testified to is: “Take good care of our boy, and call him Thomas Moore, and I will give him a good start some day.”' In Lind v. Burke, 56 Neb. 785, the sufficiency of an acknowledgment, of paternity under this section of the statute was examined into, and, while the question as to whether the instrument must have been acknowledged with the intent to create a right of heirship was not determined, yet it was there said:
“We are satisfied that a writing, to fulfil the requirement of the law * * * must be at least one in which the paternity is directly, unequivocally, and unquestionably acknowledged.” It is further said in the opinion: “It must not be forgotten, in this examination that it is not because the person can be shown to be the offspring, or is
Under the rule here announced, the Avriting relied on is clearly insufficient. The reference to intervener as “our boy” in the note is not a clear and unequivocal acknowledgment of the paternity of the boy. Nor is the request that the child be named Thomas Moore equivalent to an acknowledgment that Kobert Moore was the natural father of the child. Nor is the promise that “I will give him a good start some day” inconsistent Avith any other theory than that the writer of the note was the father of the child. In the later case of Thomas v. Estate of Thomas, 64 Neb. 581, it Avas decided that it was immaterial Avhether or not the writing Avas made Avith the intent to constitute an heirship, but the rule of strict construction of Avritings of this nature, when made, as announced in Lind v. Burke, supra, was not modified.
We are therefore of opinion that the evidence offered by the intervener is insufficient to establish his claim of heirship, and we recommend that the judgment of the district court be affirmed.
By the Court: For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion, the judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.