Moore v. Duckworth

Jul 2, 1979
78-5795
Versions:443 U.S. 713
99 S. Ct. 3088
61 L. Ed. 2d 865
1979 U.S. LEXIS 148
Per Curiam.

Upon a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the petitioner was found guilty by an Indiana jury of murder in the second degree. The Indiana Supreme Court upon direct appeal affirmed the conviction. Moore v. State, 260 Ind. 154, 293 N. E. 2d 28 (1973). The petitioner then sought a writ of habeas ‍​​​​​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌​‍corpus in a Federal District Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2254. He claimed, inter alia, that he had been denied due process of law becausе he had been convicted upon evidence allegedly insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was sane at the time the victim was killed. * The District Court denied the writ, and the Court ‍​​​​​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌​‍of Appeals for the Sеventh Circuit affirmed. 581 F. 2d 639 (1978).

In holding that the District Court had been correct in rejecting the petitioner’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, the Court of Appeals stated that such a challenge presents a federal due process issue “only where a stаte court conviction is totally devoid of evi-dentiary suрport.” Id., at 642. The petitioner claims that this ‍​​​​​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌​‍was error, and he urges that under In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970), a state prisoner is entitled to a determination whether the record evidence could suppоrt a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree. Jackson v. Virginia, ante, p. 307. Nonetheless, under the circumstances of this ease we ‍​​​​​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌​‍conclude that a remand for further consideration in light оf Jackson v. Virginia would be inappropriate.

The petitioner has contended that the proseсution failed to meet its burden because it relied upon lаy witnesses to prove sanity without providing any expert testimony to rebut his expert opinion testimony. But, as the Court of Apрeals noted, under Indiana law sanity may be established by either expert or lay testimony. The state appellatе court, in an opinion thoroughly discussing the record evidence and the petitioner’s sufficiency challenge, cоncluded that the lay evidence in this case could have been credited by the jury, and it held that the State’s evidence was fully sufficient to support a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner was sane at the time of the killing.

The Court of Appeals properly deferred to the Indiаna law governing proof of sanity. Although ‍​​​​​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌​‍that court apрlied an improper legal standard when it considered thе petitioner’s due process claim, it is clear from its opinion that the essence of that challenge concerned the rule of state law that permits the State to rely on lay proof of sanity. It is likewise clear from the record that under the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, the evidence in support of this conviction was constitutionally adequаte.

Accordingly, the writ of certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Notes

*

The District Court found, and the Court of Appeals' agreed, that the petitioner had fаiled to exhaust his available state remedies on all but his сhallenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. The petitioner takes issue with this ruling, but we are satisfied that it was correct.