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Moore v. Czerniak
574 F.3d 1092
9th Cir.
2009
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 demand, is no there is zero foreclosure. correctly court

Accordingly, the district Buyers, having

held that shown no foreclo- competition

sure of in the market for the product,

tied failed to show the critical per

third element of a claim for a se unlaw- tying arrangement.

ful

AFFIRMED.

Randy Joseph MOORE, Petitioner-

Appellant, CZERNIAK, Superintendent

Stan

OSP, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 04-15713. Appeals,

United States Court of

Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 2005. July

Filed

1093 REINHARDT, Before: STEPHEN BERZON, and JAY S. MARSHA S. BYBEE, Judges. Circuit REINHARDT; Opinion by Judge BERZON; by Judge Dissent Concurrence BYBEE; by by Judge Dissent to Order CALLAHAN; by Judge Dissent to Order Judge BEA.

ORDER majority opinion, concurring opin- The 28, ion, July dissenting opinion and filed on 9397, slip op. appearing and 534 (9th Cir.2008), are withdrawn. F.3d majority opinion, concurring opin- A new ion, are dissenting opinion and filed con- with this order. With the temporaneously opinion, Judge Reinhardt filing of the new deny Judge peti- and Berzon vote to rehearing rehearing and en banc. tions for Bybee grant petitions votes to Judge rehearing rehearing en banc. A for requested a vote on whether to re- judge en The matter hear the matter banc. majority of the votes of failed to receive judges nonreeused active favor of en P. R.App. reconsideration. Fed. banc Judge petitions Graber was recused. rehearing en banc are rehearing for petitions rehearing future denied. No rehearing en banc will be entertained. Creel, Federal L. Office of the Barbara OPINION Defender, Portland, OR, for the Public REINHARDT, Judge: Circuit petitioner-appellant. confession was ob- Randy taped Moore’s Myers, Attorney General for Hardy at the house tained station Williams, H. Oregon, Mary Solici- State the state concedes were means that even (On Briefs); S. Jennifer tor General It does not contest on unconstitutional. Attorney-In-Charge, Collateral Lloyd, finding court’s appeal this the district Unit, Capital Appeals Sa- Remedies involuntary. As confession was lem, (Argued), respondent-ap- for the OR emphati- declared Court has pellee. cally, is like no other evi- confession “[a] Indeed, con- ‘the defendant’s own

dence. probative the most probably fession is that can be admitted damaging evidence ” Fulminante, 499 against him.’ Arizona v. 279, 296, highly imaginative 113 L.Ed.2d Unlike our and creative (1991) (quoting Bruton v. United dissenting colleague, the state does States, evidence, argue possessed other confessions, (1968) aside from the two other (White, J., dissenting)). L.Ed.2d 476 *3 rendered the failure to file the motion Inexplicably, lawyer failed to rec- Moore’s mindful of Ful- fact, perhaps harmless. ognize police that the confession to the was minant^ s that, in command cases such as inadmissible, it was unconsti- though even this, reviewing courts “exercise extreme separate tutional for not one but two rea- determining caution” before fail- sons. ure to move to exclude unconstitutional explanation filing Counsel’s for not harmless, 296, confessions is was, words, in motion his “two-fold.” 1246, challenge S.Ct. the state does not First, thought he such a motion would not any basis other than his statements to in have succeeded because Moore was not others Moore’s assertion that the ineffec- custody gave when he his confession and necessarily tiveness of his counsel under- voluntary clearly his was confession —both mines our in confidence the outcome of the erroneous conclusions: the confession was Here, proceedings. Fulminante’s dictate impermissibly extracted as the result of a because, is all the compelling more unlike promise leniency made the interro- Fulminante, where the challenged con- officers, gating and it was also obtained fession informally par- was made to a not Arizona, violation of Edwards v. 451 U.S. ticularly layman, reliable the confession at 477, 1880, (1981), 101 S.Ct. 68 L.Ed.2d 378 recorded, voice, issue is inis Moore’s own as Moore had asked for counsel before and was made the formal context aof making request the confession but his had police interrogation. Second, ignored. lawyer been Moore’s er- end, In the can there be no serious roneously thought taped that the confes- doubt that Moore’s counsel was ineffective prejudicial sion was not because Moore deprived and that Moore was of his basic had told his brother and his half-brother’s rights constitutional under the Sixth girlfriend about the crime. In both re- Amendment, clearly established in spects, lawyer Moore’s exhibited a remark- Washington, Strickland v. 668, 466 U.S. familiarity with, lack of able or basic mis- (1984). 2052, 104 S.Ct. 80 L.Ed.2d 674 of, understanding controlling principles of court, The state following the same ratio- constitutional inep- law. As a result of his nale advanced the State and Moore’s and, as his crystal affidavit makes titude — counsel, concluded that Moore’s recorded clear, strategic because of rea- police confession to the nonprejudicial was sons—he failed sup- to make a motion to others, prior because of his statements to press the unconstitutionally obtained con- conclusion that contrary clearly Having fession. determined not to file the established law of Fulminante. But for motion, counsel advised Moore that a counsel’s failure to suppress move to felony [they] murder was “the best confession, involuntary there is a reason- circumstances,” could do under the probability able that Moore would not have pled charge. no contest to that pled to felony charge murder but The state makes the same error as would have instead insisted on going to Moore’s counsel. It urges that the failure trial —a trial at which he would have faced to move to taped Moore’s confes- potential sentence identical to that he police sion to prejudicial was not be- plea bargain. received as result of his cause Moore had told two others about the performance objec- Counsel’s fell an below crime, because he had done so. tive standard of reasonableness. Because good rejection The officers had reason for court’s that the state we hold was directing speak claim Moore and Woolhiser to federal constitutional Fulminante, 279, 111 499 U.S. contrary Raymond. Raymond personal had a L.Ed.2d and constitut- working relationship with the investi- application unreasonable objectively an Moreover, ed gating officers. these officers Strickland, investigation been involved in the of a reverse the district we 80 L.Ed.2d Raymond re- charge against murder of the writ.1 and remand for issuance court separate killing. charge sulted from a dropped Raymond cooperated when I. explained with the officers *4 1995, petitioner Randy In December in killing perpetrated self-defense. Woolhiser, Moore, Lonnie his half-brother Raymond testified later that because Salyer allegedly were Roy his friend and him that Rog- Moore and Woolhiser told assault, and kidnapping, involved in the accident, ers’s death was an he believed arresting After Rogers. of Kenneth death police that the officers would do the same county jail, booking him the Salyer they for his brother and half-brother as officers asked investigating police him, they if cooperated had for the same police Moore and Woolhiser come manner he had. questioning. The two were station for day, speaking Ray- next after with interviews were conducted separated and mond, spent Moore and Woolhiser pro- Moore by police different detectives. morning unsuccessfully trying to obtain stopping by about vided a brief statement representation. they legal When called home, waiting while Wool- Rogers’s motor police p.m., police station at 1:10 Salyer Rogers, went in to talk to hiser and promptly ordered them to return for fur- leaving with Woolhiser and Sal- and then “they that if questioning: ther told us we statement, making this Moore yer. After by they were not there 3:00 would come was advised of and invoked his Miranda family get and our like [ ] us— the district court rights. Subsequently, as way they they did it and knew found, were both Moore and Woolhiser —we they what meant.” In accordance with the they speak that released on the condition commands, police officers’ Moore and Raymond their older brother police returned to the station at Woolhiser (“Raymond”), and return to the station afternoon, They day. that without counsel. p.m. following 1:00 dissent, appeal, disregarding by the facts and circum- Fulminantes the state on 1. The commands, by post-conviction harm- stances found the state creates its own version of court, grounds upon or the which that court in this case. It envisions record lessness Moreover, gasp police its decision. in a last that that the were aware of a set based shows conviction, felony effort to save an unlawful the dis- facts that would make conviction of represents regardless sent that counsel failed to move to murder inevitable of the confession fruits, for that also knew these the unconstitutional confession and its counsel strategic own wholly from what his client told ones—that counsel’s facts aside reasons— him, overwhelming clear were that that all the evidence affidavit makes not reasons recognize posits him. We that our dis- was obtained from sources motivated the dissent senting colleague that Moore de- and his believes unrelated to Moore's co-defendant’s convicted, disregarding confessions. Not is serves to be but unconstitutional support arguments as well as the state court there evidence to the dissent's state’s no findings, substituting thinking one's as to the ideal set of facts record wishful not, own, been, hardly the manner in which federal might but are reflected record, analysis appellate supposed to determine no courts are but the dissent's bears arguments appeals. raised resemblance to the issues asked, by Raymond, interrogating officers “But accompanied were and also he did Ziegler. go you[?],” Raymond for girlfriend, Debbie to bat to which Woolhiser’s responded, exactly right.... “That’s I police sta- When the four arrived to him talked and he stood behind his word tion, investigating began officers an- percent probably one hundred and he’s questioning. Moore inter- other round of one of the best friends I have in the very beginning of that rupted world.” request counsel: “You see questioning comments, I, Raymond’s I talk ... until have to be able to After the interro- side, know, somebody my you gating emphasized officers that the police that’s me, go nobody similarly helpful to be able to tell ... I could be to Moore and my they if judgment right don’t trust now.” Woolhiser confessed. Moore first hesitated, then ignored When officers but indicated he would request, willing be to talk. At stating, point, Woolhiser reiterated this one of the know, just Moore, “Okay, you “You we’d like to talk to some- officers told so body, you you’re know.” Moore then a fair going get stated know shake from to, quick possible, alright, verify he wanted talk I us want to that with our “[a]s lawyer,” by Ray- to a which was followed DA that going he is not turn and[sic] *5 request: jam you. mond’s confirmation of that “If around and I him want to tell way maybe get right phone you there was some we could me now on the that can attorney an in here a change your accept for consultation.” mind and he will it. So Eventually, response, road, in police jammin’ okay?” the officers there’s no down the they told Moore and Woolhiser that were The officer then left to obtain the verifica- not entitled to counsel at that time that DA “jam” unless tion would not Moore so they po- long could afford themselves. The as he confessed.

lice promptly proceeded officers then with returned, When the officer he told interrogation. spoken Moore that he DA— had During interrogation, police Deputy actually” offi- “our DA pro- then —and they cers told Moore and Woolhiser that ceeded to elicit Moore’s confession. Be- so, however, go “would to bat for as long doing [them] as fore he extracted sever- truth,” [they] got the to which Moore re- al statements from regarding Moore his sponded: I custody “See that’s what want to hear.” status the voluntariness of the point, Raymond At this interrupted the give. confession he was about to In re- questioning to vouch for the sponse questions, officers’ as- to a series of Moore surances, stating my, agreed that “I know in this with the officers that he had volun- myself, is for saying, tarily station, there was once an police returned to the that officer, look, out, hey, and I said I I custody, want he was not in that police had did something doing something. and been offered in nothing exchange for his confes- this, I want out of I a they want chance. And sion other than that would make a said, okay, Ray, this officer I’ll go to bat ]” District Attor- “recommendation! you. for that your captain.” ney, And officer’s right that he understood his Building account, Raymond’s short, on one of waiving counsel and was it.2 In statement, Although ately gave the officers continued their efforts before Moore his questions, they to obtain answers to their ac- officers stated that if Moore wanted a "court knowledged, attorney appointed after their call to the District [he could] have one at this time,” Attorney, they "wrong” "go that had been but that he earli- if wanted to ahead and officers, informing er Moore that he entitled a talk” with the he could do that in- one; statement, course, lawyer only he if could afford immedi- stead. This conflicts Court, which denied review. State v. explained: officers interrogating one of Moore, Or.App. 951 P.2d 204 everybody on thing is we want main “[t]he (1997), denied, are rev. 326 Or. 953 P.2d you guys know that recording to this (1998). ... this is not an custody ... [a]nd thing.” interrogation type custody thereafter, Shortly petition Moore filed relief, alleging, in- post-conviction he then for state confession that In the recorded alia, he, Salyer, ter that he had been denied effective made, how Moore described lawyer of counsel because his home af- assistance Rogers’s went to and Woolhiser had failed to file motion to his Rogers the two that Salyer informed ter The state court held an evi- his cabin. confession. property from had stolen at which Moore and dentiary hearing that confronted Moore stated Woolhiser him, theft, Raymond Raymond brother testified. re- assaulted Rogers about the appear” that detectives “made it They a car. called him in the trunk of placed that Moore and Woolhiser were not in to a remote wooded Rogers drove then up custody, but that it was clear from the to walk him blindfolded began area and walk, they were not during this circumstances free to point hill. At some leave. He also testified that he advised gun. Moore a loaded handed Woolhiser pair no inten- to confess their involvement in they had explained he they simply Rogers’s were death because understood killing Rogers; tion promised leniency: him by leaving “[B]asi- him going frighten cally I had from forcing [sic] him to find his what deducted what of the hill and top they they climbed the had said was would work way back home. As the four they hill, however, and fell like had worked for me to Rogers [Moore] stumbled *6 Moore, change my in life around.” causing gun his back into result, discharge. Rogers to As a hands that he Moore also testified understood gunshot wound to the died of an accidental an the officers’ statements to be assurance head. charged that his crime would be as an confession, killing felony rather than mur- ap- Moore was accidental Following his that the “left charged one der. He stated officers me pointed counsel with not believing agreed a firearm. He that the D.A. had to felony count of murder with contest, jab us the road.... the de- given [W]hen a of no and was down entered twenty-five years tective went and talked to the D.A. to mandatory a sentence of me, jab I going to make sure he wasn’t to imprisonment, years with five be served they an concurrently sentencing thought agreement a enhancement there was as firearm, going charge in to a to me with accidental for the use of a additiоn were agreed D.A. post-prison supervision.3 term of death and the had to be- life saying cause come back that he appealed Moore his sentence to the Ore- he didn’t Appeals, agree, which affirmed with- did not and that’s what he went gon Court Moreover, explained to there for.” Moore opinion, Oregon out 30, 1995, representation that Act effective June ch. sec. with the state's Moore custody. (codified was not in amended at 1995 Or. Laws 1072 as (2003)) (listing § Or.Rev.Stat. 137.700 crimes 3. Moore was sentenced under what is termed Further, 11). covered Measure under such Approved by Oregon 11." voters in "Measure sentence, eligible "during Moore was not imposed November Ballot Measure 11 imprisonment ... the service of the term of sentences, mandatory lengthy minimum supervision post-prison or for release on reduction, possibility for certain crimes no temporary custody.” form of leave from Id. persons, including felony against murder. findings he no during interrogation, did made what Moore leave, part Raymond Ziegler free to because detec- crime feel told about the evening specific they tives had made it clear on the or as facts to which Salyer the interview that had al- prior might testify. Specifi- able to been ready charged they and that were been cally, the state court not determine did day. going to be booked that simply whether Moore confessed to the laymen two that he had the victim killed evidentiary hearing, After the the state accidentally, or whether his informal con- unpublished denying filed an order court fession all of covered the elements re- petition. re- post-conviction With quired prove felony murder. The gard to the ineffective assistance of coun- state court found that Moore had claim, the state court first concluded sel above, “confessed” to them. Based on the that it was reasonable for counsel to be- the state court held that counsel’s failure to suppress lieve that motion would be to file a motion to suppress taped finding, without merit. In so the state confession did not constitute ineffective as- affidavit, court relied on counsel’s which sistance of Oregon counsel. The Court of asserted that because Moore admitted on Appeals affirmed without opinion and the tape custody that he was not in and “never Oregon Supreme Court denied review. custody,” believed that he inwas there was Palmateer, Or.App. See Moore v. no merit the claim that offi- denied, (2001), 26 P.3d 191 rev. 332 Or. him improperly cers denied counsel in a (2001). 430, 30 P.3d 1184 interrogation. custodial court state questions further found that the officers’ petitioned December regarding custody would have constituted United States District Court for the Dis- person notice to a reasonable that he was trict of Oregon corpus. for a writ of habeas being free to leave and was not held raised, alia, He inter the ineffective assis- custody. result, As a the state court found tance of counsel claim that was denied that there “was filing no basis for a motion the state courts. Adopting magistrate suppress.” It did not mention the invol- recommendation, judge’s findings and untariness claim. district court found that the state court was not in concluding unreasonable

Relying solely on the affidavit of *7 custody Moore was not in at the time of counsel, Moore’s trial the state court fur- counsel, request for but that he had ther reasoned that if even a motion to Rogers’ “confessed to murder based on [a] granted, had been filed and promise” leniency, false of which “ren- would have been “fruitless” because involuntary.” dered confession [his] Nev- previously par- Moore “had confessed his ertheless, the court ticipation concluded that “coun- (Ray- in the crime to his brother Moore) failure suppression sel’s to seek did not mond and another friend [Debbie Ziegler].” this, necessarily objective From fall an the state court con- below stan- prejudice cluded that Moore no dard reasonableness” suffered because Raymond prior because Moore and Moore’s Raymond “[b]oth [Zie- confessions to gler] could have been called as witnesses Moore Ziegler poten- and Debbie and the repeat petitioner’s confession.” It tial testimony Salyer.4 adverse On that regarding Raymond Salyer's 4. We testimony. Certainly, consider issues it makes no Ziegler Moore and opin- Debbie later in our Indeed, appeal. such assertion on until the here, however, ion. We note that the district sponte district court made the sua determina- clearly respect Salyer. court erred with regarding Salyer, party— tion no interested suggest There is no evidence in the record to court, counsel, the state Moore's trial or the that the state could have or would have relied

1099 ultimately corpus. writ of habeas See DePetris v. basis, court held the district (9th 1057, court’s conclusion post-conviction Kuykendall, that 1061 Cir. a constitutional had not been 2001). there findings Factual relevant to, contrary nor an was “neither violation grant deny district court’s decision to or of, v. application Strickland unreasonable petition are reviewed for clear error. Washington.” Garcia, (9th v. 219 See Sоlis F.3d 926 Cir.2000). Because the state appeal followed. This petition federal habeas finding district court’s does not contest the 24, 1996, April was filed after and is there involuntary, was that Moore’s confession governed by fore the Antiterrorism and the state because we conclude (“AEDPA”), Penalty Death Act Effective respect unreasonably court erred with Garceau, § 2254. v. 28 U.S.C. Woodford we reverse. finding prejudice,” its of “no 202, 210, 123 538 U.S. S.Ct. 155 adjudication that the state court’s We hold (2003). AEDPA, L.Ed.2d 363 Under we in a decision of Moore’s claim “resulted may grant only habeas relief when the applica- ... an unreasonable involved to, “contrary state court’s decision was law, clearly established Federal tion of[] of, an application involved unreasonable Supreme Court as determined law, clearly established Federal as deter States,” 2254(d)(1), § 28 U.S.C. United Supreme mined of the Court United court with in- and remand to district or “was on an States” based unreasonable grant the writ of habeas cor- structions of the in light determination facts of the pus. presented pro evidence the State court II. 2254(d); § ceeding.” Wiggins 28 U.S.C. v. Smith, 510, 520, reviews de novo the district This court (2003).5 “[Cjlearly 471 deny petition for a 156 L.Ed.2d estab- court’s decision Salyer against suggested taped would not have testified itself—had that the con state non-prejudicial because of Sal- Moore but would have taken the Fifth Amend- fession was Moreover, ment, light yer’s potential testimony. charges faced trial as he himself on recognition arising Court’s of the Even of the from the same incident. unreliability Salyer of a co-defendant’s testi inherent been convicted before Moore’s trial mony, certainly not have be began, the state would he would in all likelihood taken that, confession, taped lieved without Moore’s challenge the Fifth because he continued to given Salyer’s testimony could have it the way through all when his conviction See, obtaining denied, same chance of a conviction. petition his federal habeas see Illinois, 530, 545, e.g., (D.Or. Lee v. Salyer Belleque, WL (1986) (“[A] code Mar.4, 90 L.Ed.2d 2005). presumptively unrelia fendant's confession Although we can overturn state court’s passages detailing the defen ble as to to, contrary *8 if it or an unrea decision is culpability or because those dant’s conduct of, application clearly fed sonable established product passages may well of the code be Court, by Supreme eral law as determined blame, spread desire to shift or cur fendant's decisions from this court other circuits himself, favor, avenge ry or divert attention to persuasive weight regard are of in to "wheth another.”); Washington, v. see also Crawford particular decision is an ‘un er a state court 1354, 36, 59, S.Ct. 158 L.Ed.2d 541 U.S. 124 application’ Supreme reasonable law, Court (2004) (explaining that Lee v. Illinois "is 177 'clearly ... estab what law is contrary” to modern Confrontation not ... ” Ducharme, v. 200 F.3d lished.’ Duhaime jurisprudence). Under circum Clause these 597, (9th Cir.2000). especially This is stances, 600-01 supposition for the dis it was mere pattern true if the fact of the lower court Salyer suggest that would be trict court to substantially similar to the case decision is inculpatory testimony able to offer sufficient Guarino, being v. 293 decided. See Ouber Moore's for to render the failure 19, (1st Cir.2002) ("To the extent that impor F.3d 26 non-prejudicial. Most mal confession all, however, factually have decided can little doubt inferior federal courts tant of there be 1100 objectively federal law was unreasonable.”

lished Federal law” includes Su 362, 409, Taylor, 120 preme “applicable holdings,” Court’s not Williams 529 U.S. 1495, (2000). Musladin, Carey v. 549 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 389 its dicta. See U.S. 146 70, 649, 653, 127 S.Ct. 166 L.Ed.2d 482 guiding The substantive federal law our (2006). a narrow There need be Su by inquiry supplied is Strickland v. Wash- preme holding precisely point, Court 668, 2052, ington, 466 104 U.S. S.Ct. 80 however—a state court can render a deci (1984), “clearly L.Ed.2d 674 which is estab- “contrary to” or an sion is “unreason lished Federal law” under AEDPA. by application” Supreme able Court law Williams, 391, 529 120 U.S. S.Ct. 1495. “ignoring principles the fundamental es prevail To on a claim of ineffective assis- tablished most relevant [that Court’s] Strickland, tance under of counsel Quarter precedents.” Abdulr-Kabir v. must demonstrate both that his counsel’s man, 1654, 233, 1671, 550 U.S. 127 S.Ct. representation was deficient—in other (2007). 167 L.Ed.2d 585 words, objective that it “fell below an stan- “ ‘contrary A state court’s decision is to’ dard of reasonableness” —and that the de- Strickland, apply ficiency federal law if it fails to prejudicial. the correct 687-88, 692, controlling Supreme authority Court or U.S. at 104 S.Ct. 2052. To prejudice, comes to a different conclusion ... show [from] Moore must demonstrate involving materially a case indistinguish- probability “there is a reasonable that, able facts.” Morgan, unprofessional Pirtle v. 313 F.3d but for counsel’s er- (9th Cir.2002) 1160, rors, (citing proceeding Bell v. the result of the Cone, 685, 694, 1843, S.Ct. have been different. A reasonable proba- (2002)). bility 152 L.Ed.2d 914 A state probability court’s is a sufficient to under- application” decision is an “unreasonable of mine confidence the outcome.”6 Id. 694, if Supreme Court law “the state court 104 S.Ct. 2052. In the context of a correctly identifies governing legal plea bargain, specifically we ask whether principle unreasonably that, ... but applies probability to there is a reasonable but Bell, particular the facts of the case.” 535 for counsel’s deficient performance, pe- 694, U.S. at 122 S.Ct. 1843. The Supreme gone titioner would have to trial rather Court has held that “a federal than accept plea bargain habeas offered Lockhart, court making applica- the ‘unreasonable state. See Hill v. 474 U.S. (1985). inquiry tion’ should ask whether the state 88 L.Ed.2d 203 application court’s clearly established Because Moore’s claim involves the failure cases, claims, similar reference to those decisions unnecessary is For Strickland it is appropriate assessing the reasonableness analysis conduct harmless error under vel non of the state court’s treatment of the Abrahamson, 619, 637, Brecht v. (internal quotation contested issue.” marks (1993). 123 L.Ed.2d 353 Avila v. omitted)). and citation Prior decisions of this Galaza, (9th Cir.2002) 918 n. 7 applying court that make it clear that we are ("We need not conduct a harmless error re- clearly Supreme established Court law that ..., view of Strickland violations under Brecht particular application Court prejudice analysis '[t]he because Strickland binding prece- law is unreasonable constitute itself; complete place there is no for an Otherwise, *9 point. dent on that were an iden- ” (quoting additional harmless-error review.’ following tical case to come before us the Calderon, 1148, v. Jackson 211 F.3d 1154 n. 2 month, we would have to undertake the iden- (9th Cir.2000))); Kyles Whitley, see also 514 analytical again, tical all exercise over instead 419, 9, 1555, U.S. & n. 435-36 115 S.Ct. 131 simply relying just on the fact that we had (1995). already L.Ed.2d 490 ques- done so and had resolved the tion. below, confession, explained For the reasons we also prejudice suppress a Fulminante, 499 governed by conclusion question is hold that the state court’s 302, 1246, 279, 113 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. counsel’s failure to file the motion was not on precedent Court guiding Supreme contrary to prejudicial was Fulminante erroneously an admit- the harmlessness an applica- and constituted unreasonable com- As Fulminante ted confession. tion of Strickland and Hill. mands, “exercise extreme cau- we must that the failure to determining tion” before A. Performance Deficient a coerced confession was suppress move to clearly has Court Fulminante, at 499 U.S. nonprejudicial. single, that “a serious error established 296, 111 S.Ct. 1246. may support a claim of ineffective assis III. including tance of counsel’s fail counsel”— performance suppress. address Strickland's ure to file a motion to We Kimmel III.A, Morrison, In Part we consider prong 365, 383, first. man v. attorney rendered defi- whether Moore’s (1986). 91 L.Ed.2d 305 a failing in to file motion performance cient applying performance prong the deficient Moore’s to dismiss Moore’s confession. alleged of Strickland to cases which the why he did provided two reasons counsel ineffective assistance consists of counsel’s first, a motion: he believed not file such motion, failure to file such a the Court has meritorious, that a motion would not be underlying stated that claim—the second, if he believed that even a purportedly requiring claim suppression- succeed, it would make no motion were to 375, 382, be must “meritorious.” Id. to the outcome because Moore difference 2574; 106 S.Ct. see also Ortiz-Sandoval v. informally lay per- to two confessed (9th Clarke, Cir.2003) above, the state does not sons. As noted (same). However, “the failure to file a suppression that a mo- dispute appeal suppression motion does not [meritorious] Thus, have been meritorious. tion would per constitute se ineffective assistance of performance as to deficient the sole issue Kimmelman, counsel.” 477 U.S. at whether counsel’s conclusion that mo- is 2574; 106 S.Ct. see also id. formal, suppress taped tion to (“Although S.Ct. 2574 meritorious purposeless confession would have been necessary Fourth Amendment issue is “fell light of his two informal confessions of a Amendment claim success Sixth objective an standard of reasonable- below [involving counsel’s failure to file a motion essentially question ness.” Because this suppress], good Fourth Amendment prejudice, performance one of our deficient prisoner claim alone will not earn a federal analysis largely on whether counsel’s turns relief.”). Rather, to satisfy habeas Strick suppress taped failure to move to con- performance prong, peti the habeas land’s affected the outcome of the fession show that his counsel’s failure tioner must conclude, III.B, in Part process. We to file the meritorious motion to Thus, of counsel’s it did. because both objective “fell below an standard of reason filing reasons for not the motion stated Strickland, ableness.” 466 U.S. at erroneous, patently and because the were Where, here, as state detailed, taped gave confession Moore filing suppress, a motion to asserts highly damaging, was we hold meritorious, no even if would have served performance “fell below an that counsel’s and, purpose other evidence useful because objective standard reasonableness” such, possession would establish the same constitutionally deficient. its *10 facts, inquiry respect our deficient ableness” and thus constituted deficient performance, substantially overlaps with and the state court’s performance contrary contrary conclusion to the was inquiry regarding prejudice.7 our applica- Fulminante and an unreasonable affidavit, Moore’s trial counsel his tion of Strickland. two reasons stated reasons and two for his decision not to file a motion to 1. The state has conceded that a mo- (or, it, put his suppress as counsel reasons suppress tion to Moore’s confession “two-fold”): filing for not a motion were grounds on involuntariness would First, counsel that such a motion believed have been meritorious. unavailing” i.e., “would be not meritori- — in custody ous—because Moore “was not urges grounds two on which a gave at the time he the recorded interview motion to suppress his confession would voluntary.” ... statement was first, have been meritorious: that his con- Second, that, counsel believed even if a procured fession during a custodial motion to Moore’s confession interrogation, after Moore had invoked his meritorious, filing were it would make lit- counsel, right to in violation of Edwards v. previ- tle difference because Moore “had Arizona,

ously made a full confession to his brother 378; second, L.Ed.2d that his confes- Ziegler, and to Ms. either one of whom involuntary, having sion was been extract- any could have been called as witness at promise leniency ed as the result of a repeat time to his confession full detail.” made interrogating officers. The hold that We both of counsel’s reasons for state court that a concluded motion to filing the motion—that the motion was suppress on the ground Edwards that, ground, not meritorious on either not have been meritorious because Moore were, if even it would have served no not in custody gave “was when he purpose because of the other confessions— not, however, It statement.” did address were erroneous. Given highly damag- question.8 the involuntariness On federal ing taped nature of Moore’s confession to review, habeas agreed the district court unconstitutionality and the of with the state court with respect confession, we hold that counsel’s fail- Edwards issue but found that a motion to ure to to suppress move the confession suppress would have been meritorious on objective “fell below an standard of reason- ground.9 Critically, involuntariness holding 7. The dissent characterizes our in this raised the state court and therefore that it mandating properly case as that defense counsel must before us. See, suppression file meritorious motion. 1137, 1139, Specifically, 9. the district court e.g., op. found that dis. & 1143-44 1145 n. notes, rejects 10. As the text Kimmelman person posi- reasonable [a] [Moore]'s proposition, and we. so do As our later dis- tion would have concluded that an offer of indicates, 16, 20, cussion see nn. there leniency infra exchange had been extended in may why competent be a valid reason law- subjective- It confession. is clear [Moore] yer might potentially not file a meritorious made, ly believed that this offer was motion, suppression but Moore's counsel of- Rogers’ confessed to murder based on this fered none here. promise. promise false The false of lenien- cy, entirely made believable the continu- why It comparison's is unclear the state court failed [Ray- al references and situation, ground. address the prior involuntariness Never- mond]'s rendered [Moore]'s theless, parties agree involuntary. both that this issue was confession

1103 if challenge not the district would also have been meritorious based the state does Thus, appeal. ground on al- on the that Moore was in custody determination court’s for, and had though ordinarily granted, we would review dis- asked but not been error, findings right prior interroga- factual for clear his to counsel trict court’s However, as correct the dis- tion. because simply accept here we counsel’s error on finding ground that Moore’s confes- this buttresses our conclusion trict court’s that deficient, involuntary and, consequently, performance highly his was sion was we — briefly appended would have set forth in the footnote suppress that a motion to been ground.10 hereto the reasons we that According- meritorious on conclude coun- Edwards ground in an failure to on the ly, engage we will not extensive sel’s file why suppress objectively was also discussion as to motion unreasonable.11 however, note, unsuccessfully 10. We that had the state con- and confessed after he invoked deter- right clearly tested the district court's voluntariness to counsel. The record dem mination, conclude that the dis- we could not contrary, onstrates the however. Moore had erred, erred, clearly let alone trict court had already subjected been to a custodial interro finding that Moore's confession was made gation previous day, a fact the state does response promise to a false dispute. custody He was released from charges against him would be reduced if he only on the that he return condition the fol accidentally killing Rogers. The confessed to afternoon, when, him, lowing police told they repeatedly told Moore that would officers formally he would be booked. Moore was "go to bat for him” if he confessed. More day further informed the next that if he and important, the officers reminded Moore of the Raymond did not arrive at the station on experience Raymond, of his brother whose time, police get "would [them] come ... charges been at their murder had dismissed family way they and [their] not like the instigation Raymond explained when that the station, did it.” At the told Moore accidental, killing Raymond's was and used Salyer already charged been and personal of the events own reaffirmation formally indicated that he too would be ar convince Moore that his treatment would fol- charged day. rested and later that Faced Throughout in the vein. the inter- low same facts, with these it is clear that a reasonable rogation, implied agreed the officers that if he person position i.e., person in Moore’s a— talk, Moore would receive the same treat- prime suspect who knows that he is a in a is, charges ment his brother did—that booked, killing, charged that he will be or, against dropped, him would be more like- murder, placed jail day, later that ly, a lesser reduced from murder to offense. already that his co-defendant had been purported The officers also to clear ar- charged not have believed that he —would rangement Attorney, with the District reassur- Thus, was leave. free to there can be no ing Moore that he would be taken care of as custody doubt that Moore was in fact in when facts, long the truth. as he told Given these confessed, interrogated he was see Yar fully agree we with the district court’s conclu- Alvarado, 652, 661-63, borough v. 541 U.S. implied sion that the officers created an 2140, (2004); 124 S.Ct. 158 L.Ed.2d 938 promise charged that Moore would not be 118, (9th Leyva, United States v. 659 F.2d 120 felony with intentional murder or murder if 1981), Cir. and that a motion to on Rogers's killing, he confessed to accidental ground this would also have been meritori promise "sufficiently and that this com- concluding ous. that Moore was not in pelling to overbear will.” United [Moore's] custody, erroneously counsel and unreason Guerrero, v. States Leon ably post-invocation relied on Moore's state (9th Cir.1988); Haynes Washington, see v. subjective opinion ments and in violation of 503, 513-14, 83 S.Ct. 10 L.Ed.2d Illinois, clearly established law of Smith v. (1963). 97-98, 469 U.S. 105 S.Ct. 83 L.Ed.2d (1984) curiam), (per Stansbury moving sup- 11. Counsel's rationale for not 318, 323, California, press ground Edwards was that Moore (1994). custody interrogated when 128 L.Ed.2d 293 was not in he was *12 failed, grounds motion on two and notwith- failure to file a meritorious 2. Counsel’s Fulminante, standing teaching the clear of confes- suppress to Moore’s motion nature of properly damaging to assess the objective an stan- “fell below sion formal confession. tape-recorded reasonableness” and thus dard of Thus, reject squarely we both rea- because performance. deficient constituted explain counsel offered to his sons Moore’s sup- a motion to Having determined that to suppress, decision not to file a motion confession, filed, had it been press Moore’s the confession unconstitution- and because meritorious, we must now would have been ally police was so critical obtained to whether counsel’s failure file consider to prosecution damaging and so objectively was suppression such a motion Moore, that failure to we hold counsel’s that it was. unreasonable. We conclude suppress file a motion to the confession filing only explanation for not Counsel’s objective “fell below an standard of rea- suppress, to aside from his erro- a motion and, accordingly, sonableness” constituted that a motion lacked neous conclusion such performance. deficient The state court’s merit, suppress- that was that he believed to Ful- contrary opposite conclusion was police ing taped Moore’s confession to the minante and constituted an unreasonable would be futile because Moore had also application Strickland. of to his brother and half-brother’s confessed per- that argues The dissent counsel’s that one girlfriend, and “either of[them] formance was not deficient because as a witness.” could have been called “[ejven assuming the involuntariness of essentially an ar- explanation Counsel’s confession, gave Moore’s counsel a de- gument prejudice: about he did not file why pursuing tailed explanation asserts, suppress, motion to he because strategic was in interest.” Dis. Moore’s doing so would have made no difference in op. “strategic inter- 1145. Whatever light of Moore’s confession to his brother might ests” dissent onto coun- project Ziegler. explain For in and reasons we hoc, thought process post sel’s counsel’s prejudice opinion, section of this infra in explanation,” put “detailed forward his III.B, reject Part we counsel’s determina- affidavit, makes clear these were not formal, that suppressing tion Moore’s upon considerations which he based his taped purpose- confession was suppress. decision not to file a motion to of informal less because the two сonfes- above, explained provided only As counsel sions. decision, that two reasons for both of Counsel’s decision not to file a motion to objectively which un- were erroneous and doubly suppress was erroneous: he both At sug- reasonable.12 no time did counsel recognize gest failed the clear merit of he did not file the motion to 12. Counsel's explanation why police department give he did not came to the I recorded statement. The law as understood move to Moore's confession is set exemplified by rel then and now is State ex entirety paragraphs forth in its 3 and 4 of Loredo, Dept. Or.App. Juv. explanation his affidavit. This follows: is as Smith, P.2d and State v. 310 Or. Suppress. My I did 3. not file a Motion to P.2d 836. doing reasons for this were two-fold. First of addition, however, Mr. Moore all, petitioner’s police, interview with the previously given a full confession his broth- transcribed, taped copy which was Raymond er Moore and to a woman named affidavit, transcription is attached to this Ziegler. Debbie Mr. Moore and I discussed abundantly makes it clear that Mr. was possibility filing Suppress Motion custody. not in He never believed that he unavailing, that it would be concluded custody that he admitted to me place, because in the first he knew he was custody custody gave not in when he and realized he was at the he the recorded time voluntarily friend interview and that the statement was volun- his brothers another he was concerned about success at trial —were suppress because factors counsel set wholly forth in a portion unrelated doing effect so would have affidavit, calculations related to a plea deal or for other “strate- wholly question. different These “strate- reason, and neither the state court gic” gic interests” were offered counsel not district court even hinted that nor explanation of his failure to file the *13 failure to file the motion was counsel’s suppress, solely justifica- motion to but any on such consideration. Nor did based tion of his advice to Moore to enter into any at suggest the state itself so time plea bargain. specific Given counsel’s and, litigation particular sig- of during this explanation for his decision not to a file nificance, appeal. it does not do so on this suppress, motion to that decision necessar- Only dissenting colleague our offers such ily preceded ultimately played a part contention, initially so does this in counsel’s calculations regarding plea directly contrary to appeal and the'facts offer. Those calculations were influenced the record. motion, by his decision on the and are “strategic All the interests” the dissent Thus, good as as that decision.13 we must says might counsel have relied on—name- consider whether counsel’s decision not to ly, regarding counsel’s calculations suppress file a motion to Moore’s confes- likely charges Moore would have faced had “objective sion met the standard of reason- foregone plea probability required he and his competent ableness” counsel.14 tary, place, previ- and in the second he had recorded confession to the that would ously made a full confession to his brother regardless assure a conviction of all else. Ziegler, and to Ms. either one of whom could Such a course of conduct falls far short of any "meticulous, have been called as a witness at time to representation.” informed id. at repeat his confession in full detail. 1143. portion No other of counsel's affidavit offers reason, any reason for his failure to file the motion. 14. For this the dissent's invocation of Appendix Richardson, 759, See B. McMann v. 397 U.S. 90 1441, (1970), 763 L.Ed.2d is mis present suppres- In its effort to counsel's 13. placed. challenge Moore's is not to counsel’s contemporaneous sion decision as with the advice, McMann, plea as was the case in but plea negotiations, the dissent asserts that sup to counsel's failure to file a motion to simply could have "[c]ounsel moved to press. challenge This to the failure to file a suppress a confession at time before the clearly motion is a valid Strickland claim rec indicted, plea” because "Moore was never ognized by Court in Kimmel pled but[rather] no contest to an information Lindsey, See Van v. man. Tran 212 F.3d negotiated part plea.” op. Dis. at (9th Cir.2000) ("The Supreme fallacy reasoning 1144. The of this is obvi- Court has held that counsel's failure to file a ous: no doubt there is Moore’s coun- suppress provide motion to evidence can suppress prior sel decided to the confession (citing basis for claim of ineffectiveness.” entering plea negotiations he Kimmelman)), grounds by overruled on other been able to He need do so. not have “threat- Andrade, Lockyer v. plea negoti- file en[ed] to such motion in the (2003). ations,” id.; 155 L.Ed.2d 144 We have re simply he could have waited for peatedly recognized filed, Kimmelman-type such clearly forthcoming charges to be at Strickland claims ever since Kimmelman was point which he could have moved to Instead, decided, twenty years ago, decided more than see Or the confession. he incor- tiz-Sandoval, 1170; Tran, 323 F.3d at Van rectly, unmeritorious, and, suppression that a motion would be 1156-57; Lewis, Lowry making 212 F.3d 344, v. 21 F.3d after that errone- conclusion, (9th 1994); proceeded plead 345-47 Cir. United States v. ous his unin- Molina, dicted, (9th Cir.1991), uncharged felony 934 F.2d client to murder. throughout pro- and we have done so in cases in which the Counsel's determinations trial, premise pled going cess were based on the erroneous defendant rather than see Palmateer, (9th client would with a his be confronted Weaver injects into counsel’s retrospectively length the remainder quoting passages process affidavit—the were not conse- thought counsel’s failure to unrelated to counsel’s actually contemplat- that are quences that counsel motion—the dissent suppression file the contrary, affidavit ed. To the as counsel’s by equat- the issue attempts to obfuscate clear, if [that] [Moore] makes he “believed file the motion with ing counsel’s failure to guilty of went to trial he would be found proposed plea accept his advice to (as assault, kidnapping, and murder (discuss- at 1142 op. See dis. agreement. codefendant, Roy Salyer, who chose rea- “strong strategic ing the obvious ¶ Appendix an B at option).” trial as forego sup- to take the sons plead feared that if Moore did not Counsel motion”); op. dis. at 1143 pression contest, up he would end with the same no (“[Counsel's the motion forego advice to trial, Salyer received after but sentence *14 based on numerous plea and take the was Salyer exactly received fac- other than these two considerations mandatory twenty-five same sentence: tors.”); (discussing 1144 op. dis. at Measure year prison Oregon’s terms under ... strategic reasons that counsel “obvious 3; Salyer n. v. supra 11. See see also plea”). to take the had to advise Moore (D.Or. 555403, at *1 Belleque, 2005 WL plain, counsel’s affidavit makes howev- As 2005). Mar.4, Therefore, the “severe con- er, not to file the motion while the decision feared, sequences” that as Moore’s counsel separate suppress influenced counsel’s by opposed up to those dreamed the dis- plea, to take the the two decisions advice sent, precisely amounted to the same con- former was not influ- were distinct sequences actually that Moore faced under at by op. enced the latter. But see dis. “negotiated” plea agreement. Given 1143-44. outcome, this the dissent’s reliance on reasoning deficiency the dissent’s plea of counsel’s advice is “reasonableness” apparent all the more once we becomes doubly only counsel’s curious—-not does actually the record. The dissent consult that affidavit make clear his decision re- argues “strategic” that counsel’s decision garding suppress the motion to was unre- reasonable pursue plea agreement a was subsequent plea negotiations, lated to his because “counsel feared severe conse- hardly bargain but counsel won a that if his client went to trial.” Dis. quences “was the best could do under the [he] op. Specifically, at 1142. in the dissent’s as, circumstances,” op. seeing dis. at record, potential version of the the severe admission, by plea bar- counsel’s own possible a “convic- consequences included mandatory in the same sen- gain resulted murder, aggravated tion of [which] thought tence that counsel would be the subjected possibility Moore to the of short, likely outcome of a full trial. imprisonment the death or life penalty just him plea gained nothing, possibility parole.” Id. at without failure to move to added). counsel’s However, (emphasis as is to his client’s detri- dissent, confessions much of the the case with consequences” Judge Bybee “severe that ment. such, Cir.2006); apart Langford Day, F.3d 1380 1386. As from the fact Cir.1997), (9th attorney competence amending reh'g standard of on denial McMann's (9th precursor deficient reh’g en 102 F.3d 1551 Cir. was the to Strickland's banc Strickland, Here, 1996). performance prong, Langford not see as in "the focus is simply attorney's plead guilty; S.Ct. McMann is on an advice to it is case, sup- attorney's regarding inapposite which is about performance] ... to this [the Langford, pression, not advice.

possible defenses.” — --, Mirzayance, gler’s potential testimony, Knowles v. pages see infra short, (2009), 1110-12. In Moore’s counsel 173 L.Ed.2d 251 failed to suppress the confession because he was contrary suggest does not result. ignorant clearly regard- established law Knowles holds that trial counsel need not volition, ing custody, prejudicial and the “reasonably con- pursue defense he effect of a defendant’s confession. The ... almost certain to lose.” clude[s] [is] incorrect, uninformed, and unreasonable explains Id. at 1421. Knowles further decision made Moore’s counsel is far if this is true even the defendant has noth- cry from the Court’s recognition ing by presenting to lose that defense. Id. in Knowles that a reasonable decision entirely inapplicable at 1422. is Knowles counsel as to the ‍​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌​​‍merits of a defense does here because Moore’s counsel did not “rea- not constitutе ineffective assistance.15 sonably conclude” that the to sup- motion attempt The dissent’s to elide the issues press was “almost certain to lose.” Even and obfuscate failing counsel’s reasons for the state has conceded that a motion to to file a critical motion directly contrary suppress Moore’s confession would have to what counsel himself stated under oath. Further, succeeded. Moore’s counsel did So no reader will be misled as to “reasonably” reach his erroneous con- exactly what counsel’s reasons were—and clusion, entirely as he was ignorant failing were not—for to file a motion to *15 law. relevant Had Moore’s counsel been suppress, we attach Appendix as B to the law, reasonably informed about he a opinion complete full and copy of coun- would have learned that Moore was almost objective sel’s affidavit. Even if the of not certainly custody in at the time of his impairing plea negotiations might have confession, 11; supra see note been a strategy reasonable supporting certainly Moore’s confession was almost some other counsel’s decision not to file a 10; involuntary, supra see note and that suppress case, motion to in some other it would, the admission of Moore’s confession simply was not a reason that influenced explained, as Fulminante deeply preju- be Moore’s counsel or that his counsel consid- notwithstanding Raymond dicial and Zie- ered as a basis for his decision.16 Nor has dissenting colleague appears getting 15. Our to op. be- a far more severe sentence.” Dis. because, lieve that Knowles is relevant The 1140. record belies this claim: Knowles, requires strategic justi- the Court no Salyer Moore's co-defendant went to trial on fication for counsel’s decision beside his rea- charges the same that Moore’s counsel be- insanity sonable conclusion that an defense face, Salyer lieved Moore would received Although strategic was certain to fail. a rea- a sentence identical to Moore's. may necessary failing son not be for to make sure, To be we have held that a defense merit, a certainly motion that has no it is counsel’s decision not to file a meritorious necessary when counsel fails a to make meri- may strategic motion constitute a reasonable above, explained torious motion. As Moore's choice where did counsel so in order "not ... forego suppression counsel did not motion upend plea negotiations.” Weaver v. Pal- Instead, strategic for reasons. he offered two mateer, (9th Cir.2006). 455 F.3d One, failing reasons make for the motion. here, rule is That of no relevance however. Two, he believed that the motion would fail. cases, In such the defendant had made clear suppression he believed that was worthless plead in advance that he desired to rather Raymond Ziegler's potential due to testi- trial; thus, go mony. emphasized, than we be- Both reasons were based on counsel's ignorance lawyer's of the law. cause the conduct was motivated wishes, express his client's his decision not to crafting strategic justification a for trial suppression preserve a failings, file motion so as to suggests counsel's the dissent plea negotiations by rejecting strategy. was a Moore "had a lot to lose” reasonable (holding "by going state’s Id. offer because to trial he counsel's failure to file a losing plea agreement lineup risked lenient motion to exclude identifications was them in considerations by grounding or the state court argued, ever the state not, fact, level, lawyer’s reasons that counsel that were suggested, ever acting failing to act. See Kimmel- strategic consideration any such (“The man, argument another 477 U.S. at simply This is mind. clearly for the reveals that colleague has in this case dissenting that our trial record may timely attorney We failed to file a conjured up appeal. Morrison’s first time motion, such judges strategic manufacture not due to appellate not as suppression where, scratch, considerations, because, especially from until the first arguments but here, directly are trial, the facts in the record he was unaware of the search day of theory seeking are contrary to the we to introduce of the. State’s intention parties. evidence.”); behalf of one of the See create on into Tomlin the bedsheet (9th Cir.1994) Woodford, (9th Alcala v. F.3d Myers, 30 (“We Cir.2003) facts not in will not assume justification fail- (rejecting counsel’s for his manufacture a rea- the record in order to unconstitutional suppress ure to move to defen- strategic decision sonable forfthe he did lineup identification evidence—that counsel.”). sug- trial dissent’s dant’s] excluded—where not believe would be to file a that counsel’s decision not gestion that that counsel “did not indicate consid- by strategic motivated motion was object”). not to basis on which he chose plea negotiations concerning erations Tomlin, Here, as in Kimmelman and post hoc rationalization “resembles more record makes clear that counsel failed an accurate de- counsel’s conduct than strategic not for file motion prior deliberations to” scription [his] per- of his ineffective reasons but because Wig- against filing the motion. deciding duties. As counsel himself formance 526-27, gins, 539 U.S. at 123 S.Ct. 2527. a motion was explained, his failure to file solely on his assessment of the mo- based is whether coun Where issue *16 judg- tion’s likelihood of success and his ineffective, was we must performance sel’s Moore’s for- failing suppress ment that to question that on what coun decide based mal, police would taped confession actually for his decisions sel’s reasons light in of the two informal be harmless were, of what reasons he not on the basis allegedly had made confessions that Moore Thus, had for those decisions. could have that laymen. to Because assessment lawyer’s just may second-guess as we not clearly grossly erroneous and “fell below decisions, strategic reasonable tactical or reasonableness,” 2052, objective an standard of Strickland, 689, 466 at U.S. perform- we hold that Moore’s counsel’s actions to may we not deem unreasonable constitutionally under ance was deficient profes of have been “the result reasonable 690, at 104 S.Ct. Strickland. judgment,” sional id. case, suggestion, light In this there is no let alone defendant’s] "in of de [the reasonable evidence, expressed guilty multiple public that Moore a desire plead and avoid sire to trial,

(cid:127)trials”); forego (holding plead guilty or to Langford, at to and avoid 110 F.3d 1387 motion, suppression pursue suppression filing of his meritorious to that counsel’s failure prior to file such a performance to counsel’s decision not a confession was not deficient motion, suggest ever that his ... nor did counsel "insiste[d] where the defendant had filing the motion was that it suppress reason for not he wanted no motions other adversely jeopardized or affected types delay his intended would have to interfere with contrary, plea negotiations. To the counsel’s plea guilty”); v. Wood see also Stankewitz (9th Cir.2004) ford, clear that his reasons for not 720 n. 7 affidavit makes ("An filing nothing do with the attorney's performance the motion had is not deficient Ap- prospective plea negotiations. strategic See ... it reflects a reasonable where[ ] infra ¶¶ wishes.”). pendix B at 3-4. aligns with his client’s choice that

1109 Prejudice B. argument the state’s sole to prejudice “[Pjetitioner straightforward and succinct: long It has been clear that Strick previously had confessed ‘the story’ whole prejudice prong requires no more land’s that he told to his brother and told “show[ing] than a that there is a reason friend, another Ziegler, Debbie ‘what had that, probability un able but counsel’s happened.’ Either of those people could errors, the professional pro result of the have been repeat called as witnesses ceeding would have been different.” this, light confession.... petitioner Strickland, 2052; 104 U.S. S.Ct. failed to show ... prejudiced he was (holding probabili id. reasonable “[a] by counsel’s decisions.” State’s Br. at 18. ty probability is a sufficient to undermine argument state’s mirrors Moore’s outcome”). confidence in the In Hill v. explanation counsel’s for why he did not Lockhart, motion, file the see Counsel’s Affidavit at (1985), L.Ed.2d 203 Court ¶ 4 (concluding that a motion to suppress prejudice confirmed that Strickland’s stan “would be unavailing” because Moore “had context; applies dard plea it held previously a full made confession to his prejudice that context turns brother and to Ziegler, Ms. either one of constitutionally “whether counsel’s ineffec whom could have been called as a witness performance tive affected the outcome of repeat ... detail”), his confession in full plea process.” Id. at 106 S.Ct. 366. as well as the state court’s conclusion as to words,” wrote, “In other “in Court ¶ prejudice, see State Court decision at 6 8 satisfy ‘prejudice’ require order to (“Both Raymond Moore and the friend ment, the defendant must show that there could have been called as witnesses to that, probability is a reasonable but for repeat petitioner’s A confession. motion errors, counsel’s he plead fruitless.”) would have been guilty Affidavit) (citation ed and would have going insisted on (citing Counsel’s omit- ted). Critically, to trial.” Id. point no does the state argue did the state court hold—that —nor very We are confronted here with a counsel’s failure to file the motion was not specific argument by clear and the state as prejudicial because the state had other why the failure of Moore’s counsel to possession evidence its that would have move to suppress taped confession caused accept Moore to rather *17 custody Moore made while in in police go than argument trial. The state’s station not prejudicial. argument was The the state court’s decision are limited exclu- not, dissenting colleague as our it wishes sively to the contention that Moore had were, that the so had much evidence lay persons confessed to two and for that against Moore that Moore’s formal confes reason the exclusion of his formal confes- unlikely sion was to affect the result. Had sion to the police would have made no contention, that been the state’s we would difference to Moore’s plead. decision to briefs, very very have had different differ result, analysis As our is limited to the arguments, ent oral and a very different specific question whether the existence of majority opinion, although not a different an informal lay “confession” to two wit- result. It is not the function appellate nesses makes counsel’s failure to move to however, judges, to decide cases that the formal, suppress taped Moore’s confession Here, parties presented have not to them. police non-prejudicial.17 arguments 17. Were we to pres- consider re- So as not leave the dissent's extensive garding prejudice ap- created ex cathedra on entation of the case it has created on behalf of dissent, peal by unanswered, wholly we would in all likelihood the state we have com- reject A, them. summary Appendix mented in a fashion in 1110 Fulminante, Arizona in argument found, matter of lar as a court

The state L.Ed.2d 113 499 U.S. S.Ct. previously “had fact, that because fortiori, is, controlling a case that in the crime to participation his confessed friend,” here.19 both ... and another his brother have been called individuals “could of these Fulminante, the defendant confess- confes- petitioner’s repeat as witnesses informant ed, paid to a prison, while concluded, as a matter of It then sion.” “tough from treat- protection offered who Raymond Moore law, “[b]oth that because confession; he exchange for the ment” called could have been and the friend informant’s wife fol- confessed to the also confession repeat petitioner’s

witnesses to lowing prison. his release from even if suc- suppress,” ... motion [a] (internal 283-84, quota- at cessful, As- have been fruitless.” “would omitted). claimed Fulminante tion marks under court’s decision sessing the state was the confession to the informant AEDPA, prejudice its we conclude at trial vio- and that its admission coerced “an unreason- determination constituted under the Fifth and Four- rights lated his clearly established application of[] able Id. at 284. The state Amendments. teenth 2254(d)(1). § under 28 U.S.C. Federal law” court, the state court supreme not unlike here, that the admission of the de- assumption found the factual granting Even harmless coerced confession was prejudice de- fendant’s underlying the state court’s ie., second confession because an “admissible Raymond and Zie- termination — ... cu- ... rendered the first confession a version of have testified to gler would 296, 111 mulative.” Id. 1246. The S.Ct. determi- informal confession—its Fulminante concluded that state court that counsel’s failure to nation overwhelming evidence ad- “due to the taped preju- confession was not the formal confession, if from the second there previously told duced because Moore dicial confession, jury had not been first girlfriend relative’s about his relative and a basic evi- would still have had same killing in the of the victim participation 297, 111 convict.” Id. clearly Su- dence to contrary was established Fulminante, State v. Indeed, (quoting law. preme Court (inter- (1988)) 602, 611 markedly Ariz. 778 P.2d squarely rejected a simi- Court However, note, here, however, peti legal appeal. is clear that the We that the infra. Judge Bybee's enormously prejudice creative tioner never waived issue of obstacles argument argument are insurmountable some was faces that Moore's confession herein, as reasons we have set forth despite of the prejudicial the existence of the other Appen- well as for the reasons set forth in contrary, To the this issue "confessions.” dix. litigation Where a central to the below. opposing and the party has "raised the issue” court, court echoed the state district *18 argu opportunity party has had an to offer initiative, adding only, own that co- on its Appeals response, the Court of is not ments in "Salyer's willingness demonstrated defendant Supreme prohibited relying on Court from prevented cooperate police” with also the simply party a failed to cite precedent because prejudic- any by from error Moore’s counsel authority support particular "legal that ing his defense. Lake, 817 F.2d their contention.” Lake v. 1416, (9th Cir.1987); Puerta v. Unit significant peti- it that 19. The dissent finds cf. 1338, (9th States, Cir. ed 1341-42 v. Fulminante in tioner does not cite Arizona 1997) (“An argument typically 1137-38, is elaborated brief, op. at 1149-50 n. his see dis. articulately, 1151-52, with more extensive au 15, more equating our reliance on this thorities, nothing appeal ... and there is on precedent with the Court dissent’s that.”). wrong with judicially a new record effort to manufacture omitted). detail, self in in own quotation nal marks Su- described his words voice, and his own his rejected participation in a unequivocally this preme Court killing in response questioning detailed that argument. The Court held because by investigators police trained in the sta- “the two confessions reinforced and cor- tion. would, Such a formal confession ... confession roborated each othеr one question, without far persuasive be more other,” merely the was not cumulative of jury to a than Moore’s statements to two 1246, id. at 111 S.Ct. and therefore lay witnesses —statements that Moore’s harmless, the not concluded that error was Raymond brother and his half-brother id. at 111 S.Ct. 1246. Fulminante girlfriend might might Lonnie’s not proposition that the admis- stands for the recount, willing have been but that ordinarily sion of an additional confession any flavor, would in event have lacked the reinforces and corroborates the others and details, specificity, and completeness of the is prejudicial.20 therefore taped confession. There can be little Here, too, formal the confession to the taped doubt that a of a recording defen- police would reinforce and corroborate the dant’s taken requi- confession with all the But, here, preju- the informal confessions. by site formalities officers and than the greater type dice is far of played jury to a that hears the defendant’s in confessions involved Fulminante. Un- confession in the own defendant’s words Fulminante, like in the unconstitutional (or lips from his own even from a reading simply evidence here did not involve a confession) of a transcript is in no by lay second recitation a second witness way comparable in its impact jury, the of an of an account informal confession. and is indeed far more inculpatory sub- Rather, here the evidence that counsel effect, stance and than a recitation a sought should have to exclude was a layperson of the defendant’s informal and for- taped mal him- which Moore unrecorded account of the incident21 —in confession contention, Contrary (1972), the dissent's we do 92 S.Ct. 33 L.Ed.2d 1 than to 20. per "adopt improper a se the simply rule that those of Fulminante is not correct. Milton, prejudicial.” op. admission of confession is See dis. at 1154 n. 22. In as the notes, op. recognize Dis. We petitioner at 1152. that Fulmi- already dissent made confessions, nante held that erroneous admission aof three full were which held to be review; subject Milton, 373-74, confession is to harmless error admissible. 407 U.S. at 376- not, however, it did hold that such an error is petitioner challenged 92 S.Ct. 2174. The ordinarily contrary, confession, harmless. To the of a admission fourth made emphasized Court that the case "[i]n posing an undercover officer anas incarcerat- coerced ... confession the risk the con- suspect petitioner's ed murder cell. Id. at unreliable, coupled pro- fession is with the 375, 92 In a case in which the impact upon found confession has petitioner already has made three confes- jury, requires reviewing court to exercise sions—one recorded two that determining extreme caution before that the signed writing petitioner— were in admission of the confession at trial was harm- relatively it is clear that a fourth confession Fulminante, less.” 499 U.S. at orally person made to another will not be added). Here, (emphasis for reasons we case, however, prejudicial. present text, explain length in the an such exercise challenged only confession was the full and compels of caution confession, conclusion formal confession that coerced, uncounseled, admission manner, of Moore's was memorialized in let alone in highly formal confession would have been further, taped recording; the form of a prejudicial. infra, discussed unclear whether the two *19 prior have informal confessions would been argument they the The dissent's that facts of adduced at or how trial effective would 21. a taped this case bear closer resemblance to the have been. Moore’s confession would 371, Wainwright, v. 407 facts of Milton have been the full of the account events 1112 formal, case, der sympa- witnesses Strickland. Without

this a recitation confession, taped the case would state’s who un- to the defendant would thetic far weaker. As the have been doubtedly unnecessary reluctant to do be Fulminante, in confession Court held “[a] testimony, to and whose to harm his case 296, is like no other evidence.” 499 U.S. adverse, might extent that it be would 111 1246. The Court S.Ct. Fulminante subject rigorous cross-examination be to weight of a defendant’s emphasized efforts at im- by defense counsel whose A confession: “defendant’s own confession sup- inclined to peachment they would be damag- probably probative is the most formal, tape- Admission Moore’s port.22 ing can against evidence that be admitted certainly have recorded confession would him.... admissions of a defendant [T]he the informal “reinforced and corroborated” himself, from the actor the most come lay two witnesses. reported accounts unimpeachable knowledgeable and source Fulminante, 299, 111 499 U.S. S.Ct. past of information about his conduct.” finding a 1246. The state court’s that Bruton, 139-40, Id. (quoting 391 U.S. at 88 to a recorded confession suppress motion (omis- (White, J., dissenting)) 1620 S.Ct. been to would have “fruitless” original); sion and alteration see also Raymond Ziegler to fact that due (9th Maddox, 992, Taylor v. 366 F.3d 1017 “could as to have been called witnesses Cir.2004) (“[W]e are mindful of the Su- repeat[Moore’s] confession” was without preme as Court’s admonition to the devas- question contrary clearly to established power (citing of confessions.” Ful- tating federal as set forth in Fulminante23 law 1246)). minante, 296, 499 U.S. at 111 S.Ct. probability not The would tape is on When confession recorded felony charge pled to a murder to a played jury, which hears it mandatory twenty-five-year sentence voice, defendant’s own or when the defen- his counsel filed motion to dant’s own words are transcribed and read than taped confession more “sufficient directly jury, the confession is of in the un- far more than undermine confidence outcome” course harmful that recount- 1173, relaling kidnapping Bockting, actual and shoot- (2007). ing, only totally as ac- well as credible L.Ed.2d 1 count, subject challenge on cross-exam- simply ination. treat it as To corroborative Stapleton Wolfe, 23. See v. 288 F.3d grossly disingenuous. (6th Cir.2002) be (holding under AEDPA finding analogous prejudice of lack of under Fulminante). applying prejudice prong, contrary Strickland’s circumstances was case, Stapleton we also that this note court has refused Unlike instant involved wrongful non-prejudicial multiple accomplice hold admission statements rather than However, piece relying of a of evidence even when than one confession. critical more other, Fulminante, substantially similar statements would on the Sixth Circuit held that See, e.g., jury Bockting “Stapleton’s have been admissible. because could have believed (9th Cir.2005) Bayer, accomplice's] [one [the statements and (“Even six-year-old alleged accomplice’s] taped if sexual other statements 'rein- [the ” was, other,’ abuse victim’s] statement to the mother forced and corroborated each sake, admissible, argument’s taped accomplice’s considered admission of the second statements, description Stapleton’s the detective’s of Autumn’s inter- which violated Con- significant coiroborating rights, view was so evi- frontation Clause was not harmless Fulminante, (quoting dence that its admission had a substantial and Id. 499 U.S. at error. 299, 1246). injurious determining Stapleton or influence court effect added)), jury's (emphasis verdict.” amend- also held that the state court had "reached a ing reh’g clearly contrary on F.3d feder- denial decision established namely, grounds rev’d other nom. Whorton v. al Fulminante. Id. sub law”— *20 lay ed witness —a who own taped Critically, witness is confession. the state subject on the court to cross-examination basis made no findings as to the contents accuracy of his or the recollection even Raymond what Moore had told or Zie- bias, veracity, on the basis his or self- gler or they what details might have been the simply jury interest —who tells what Thus, able to at recount trial. the record purportedly the in an defendant said unre- falls far short of establishing po- the corded informal discussion. testimony tential of Raymond and Ziegler would have been sufficient to cause Moore that,

It likely is without benefit of to accept plea agreement— so harsh a formal, tape-recorded Moore’s confession especially Raymond because likely would officers, police would state not have been a hostile witness and there is plea to on been able secure a little evidence that Ziegler could have con- basis of the informal confessions. Even addition, anything.24 tributed In as assuming prosecution noted was confi- already, agreement Raymond plea accepted by Ziegler dent that would have trial, nothing sentence, Moore did it clear reduce his testified at a is far from what as his an those or to co-defendant received witnesses have said what identical mandatory minimum testimony extent their would have been after going sentence jury, it to trial. persuasive although Accordingly, exercising is certain “extreme as Fulminante requires us to caution,” their reports do, second-hand would not Fulminante, nearly damaging have been as as Moore’s 499 U.S. at crime, quest support- 24. In record unlikely its construct a seems it from the record reasoning, ive of that he her interrogation its dissent claims that told much. The transcript only following question do not need to fret about shows “[w]e much what "Debbie, you're Raymond answer: since Moore would have testified had he here and you've story, you listened to their when did been called at trial ... because record “Today.” first Ziegler find out about this?” Raymond’s testimony at contains the state stated, Rogers's also "I didn’t know [about post-conviction evidentiary hearing.” court paper death] until we'd read the However, I still op. Dis. at the time at of the thing.” didn’t know the actual There is no the state neither nor defense counsel had Ziegler further of what record knew. Raymond interviewed in order to determine The dissent asserts that the state court ex- Moreover, what he knew about the events. plicitly found that Moore amade full confes- Raymond testimony offered the that the dis- Ziegler point sion to because it at one stated quotes sent brother's in order to behalf that "[t]he Court believes trial counsel's affi- freedom; help significant win his there are davit” and because that affidavit asserted that that, reasons to believe the context of a a "full had confession” been made. Read in trial, Raymond willing would not have been however, context, the state court declared help Raymond convict his brother. only that it believed the as to affidavit one brother, not but also served as particular assertion it contained—that an advocate Moore and his co-defendant Moore's counsel had reviewed Moore’s state- Indeed, interrogation. before and after the single it every ment—not that believed state- post-conviction hearing, Raymond re- affidavit, ment including contained in the just betrayed he vealed that felt pages those that it did discuss until three Attorney and District as did Moore later when for the first it time mentioned they “go when Furthermore, failed to bat” for him. alleged Ziegler. Moore's confession to subpoe- even if the state case, entirely court ignored state the "rel- knowing Raymond testify, naed him to be a “highly probative” conflicting evant” and evi- witness, unlikely hostile it would consisting Ziegler's dence statements have been able to elicit much of the informa- interrogation, rendering factfinding pro- its tion it from desired him. unworthy cess “defective” and of our defer- Ziegler, regard- Taylor, As for there is no evidence ence under AEDPA. See 366 F.3d at ing precisely what her Moore told about the 1000-01. *21 1114 (1966), in concluding L.Ed.2d 694 that counsel’s 16 conclude cannot we interrogation, police’s the continued for- Moore’s

failure to move which resulted the defendant’s confes- mal, harmless. taped confession was sion, stated, “I the had after defendant of application our The criticizes dissent Fifth,” Fifth not violate the plead the did Fulminante, actually “sup- it arguing that Anderson, at 790- Amendment. from opposite conclusion” ports the exact Miranda that the vio- determining 91. In Specifical- 1153. op. Dis. at holding. our harmless, we did not even lation was not that Fulminante's the contends ly, dissent the consider the other evidence state weight the of confessions description of to tie the defendant to the presented confessions applies Moore’s informal crime, or whether the would confession that, Ziegler as well Raymond and Rather, re- repeated have such evidence. consequently, Fulminante supports the lying a “de- guidance on Fulminante’s formal, taped con- conclusion that Moore’s probably is the fendant’s own confession two prejudicial not because the fession was most ... that can be damaging evidence unique weight. lay also carried confessions him,” id. against (quoting at 792 admitted Id. In advancing argument, the dis- this Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. Fulmi- entirely point sent misses the 1246) (internal omitted), quotation marks case, nante. In that the Court “prejudice we the from concluded of the coerced held that admission pe- cannot be Anderson’s confession soft prejudicial notwithstanding confession was the “confession central daled” because was availability another to a confession conviction,” id. lay witness. Under the dissent’s logic, Anderson, formal, taped As in lay other Fulminante made to a confession ability was central to state’s confession witness have his coerced would rendered plea. a count which to secure nonprejudicial, and his ease confession pled extremely Moore carried an harsh opposite way: would come out the his have mandatory minimum a result sentence as affirmed, not would have been conviction passage of the recent of a state ballot that, course, But was reversed. There at least a measure. is reasonable of Fulminante. outcome that, probability had his confession to of Fulminante is police Indeed, application our suppressed, Moore have been would fully with this court’s recent en consistent going to trial rather than insisted Terhune, banc decision Anderson v. did, which an pleading to offense to he (9th Cir.2008) (en banc), F.3d an AED- it that carried with so severe offense involving PA confession obtained in case year same mandatory sentence —the Fifth violation of the defendant’s Amend- Measure 11 sentence that co-defendant Anderson, ment we right silence. Salyer going to trial.25 In received after unreasonably considerations, held that the state court had light of these rea- law Mi- applied clearly established sonable conclusion is that Moore has es- Arizona, randa v. tablished Strickland prejudice.26 sup- point involuntary 25. 26. The dissent misses the when it ob- After confession was pressed, might serves the state well have that "Moore obtained lowest sen- offered Oregon felony generous plea bargain. tence under law need not available more Moore op. rejected any all Dis. Without show that he would have murder.” Moore's plea bargains might pro- and the evidence state have offered. confession other Hill, duced, likely enough not have con- it is that there a reason- would been Under of, charged felony probability chosen victed or even mur- able that he have der, actually bargain he rather would faced some lesser trial over the but charge. Accordingly, we need not consider offered. *22 never mentioned upon by or relied the arguments in its regarding prejudice. state is the Our task on habeas to examine Further, the dissent creates and relies court’s under the standards state decision upon testimony inevitably that it assumes by AEDPA. The court established state case, have supported would the state’s sup- failure to to that counsel’s move held any without in the evidence record as to confession was not press taped the availability substance or of such testi- for sole reason that he had prejudicial the or, mony, even important, more its admis- lay two also confessed to witnesses. decision, sibility. have, reviewing following that we law, analysis the based our on the decision in No court this case has undertaken the by and the made the state arguments itself factual inquiry necessary formidable to de appeal. argued on The state before the the admissibility termine in some —and court, court this district and consistent stances, substance —of the upon evidence court, argument

with its state and which the dissent The relies. record dis decision, consistent with state court’s the closes little about how and when most of performance that Moore’s counsel’s was state, this evidence became known to the prejudicial one and one for reason it making impossible for us to determine only: Ray- reason Moore confessed to is, whether evidence as seems a likely, who Ziegler, mond and could have been the poisonous “fruit of tree” —a product of witnesses, thereby rendering called as Moore’s confession. To make this deter suppression prac- no the confession of would us require mination to find a multi significance. supra, tical As discussed tude of facts for appeal, the first time on a argument wholly in merit lacking is function we are equipped neither nor and the state court’s conclusion that Moore permitted perform. to See McNary v. by not prejudiced counsel’s failure to Ctr., Inc., Refugee Haitian suppress a objectively file motion to 888, 112 (1991) L.Ed.2d 1005 clearly unreasonable under Su- established (observing appellate that a federal court preme permits Court law. Fulminante no and factfinding “lack[s] record-devel law, such construction and such a capabilities oping of a federal district any misconstruction is unreasonable under court”). standard. apart Even from concerns inap- about conclusion, To opposite reach the propriate appellate factfinding, we simply again develops dissent once set of its own decline base our on arguments decision facts and its own arguments arguments — theories the state has never of- that were by never conceived of the state fered, and which it therefore has forfeited. court, suggested nor before state It work great prejudice peti- court, court, or a district this set of facts tioner were we to affirm the denial of his arguments petitioner to which the has petition habeas of such specu- the basis an opportunity never had respond. arguments lative and assertions offered for presented case now on the behalf state’s time a first member of this court— the first has been time created its arguments and able, talented, assertions to which entirety extremely our occasion, no experienced colleague; opportunity, it on has had or is based rea- testimony respond. of witnesses and evidence son to Without indication prejudice attorney whether suppress Moore could also establish had his moved to his con- by showing probability that he reasonable fession. plea bargain would have obtained better court); may raised assertions not district as to evidence from the state what may Serv., that evidence why also A-1 Inc. v. possessed have see Ambulance failure counsel’s rendered County Monterey, F.3d 337-39 harmless, simply impos- it is the confession (9th Cir.1996) legal (declining consider respond to petitioner sible for theory develop further require that would “arguments.” state’s “evidence” record). ment of factual *23 of prior disapprove decisions Our case, raise In this the state’s failure to Indeed, prece under our practice. such the failure argument below that counsel’s dent, the doubly forfeited the state has suppress taped to move to the confession prejudice fact-bound alternative theories of other than the was harmless reasons dissenting colleague that creates our two existence of the informal confessions Not the on its behalf. did advances argu- precludes considering us from that by not any such contentions state forfeit no appeal. ment on this Moore has had it forfeit raising appeal, them on but first the opportunity to introduce evidence on failing ed in federal court these theories question parts of of the crucial which to them in district court. See raise the now for the state case dissent creates 106, 120, Wulff, 96 Singleton v. the poisonous are based on “fruits of (1976) (“It 2868, is 49 L.Ed.2d 826 S.Ct. any opportunity tree.” has he had Nor rule, course, general that a federal any challenge to contention the state an issue appellate court does not consider ob- might advance such evidеnce was Stone, below.”); passed upon v. not Kimes tained independent connection with Cir.1996) (“The (9th 1121, 84 F.3d 1126 confession, any prose- or to examine an issue raised decision to consider not might testify cution witness who to that discretionary, and such an issue below is Finally, as of the effect. some evidence it prejudice should not be decided if would record, is not in the he not had even has party.”). the other Court opportunity challenge to the dissent’s rule “is explained has this forfeiture may parties actually essential order that have assertion that such evidence ex- to all opportunity offer the evidence ists. they which believe relevant issues arguments The state these forfeited competent the trial alone tribunal by failing second time to raise them before equally decide” and that “it is essential Stewart, this court. v. 401 F.3d Stuard not litigants may surprised order that be (9th Cir.2005), rejected squarely 1064 we appeal by on final issues decision there of notion that this could ar- court create upon they had no opportunity which it did raise guments for state that not to introduce evidence.” Hormel v. Helver in an appeal. (holding on See id. at 1067 719, ing, 312 U.S. 61 85 going AEDPA case that are not “we (1941). L.Ed. 1037 The forfeiture rule argument construct an for the state sua (sometimes erroneously called the waiver sponte, depriving counsel [the defendant’s] rule) equally arguments, factual applies it”). fair respond of a chance to We assertions, legal not theories that were ordinarily arguments not will not consider Inc., DDR, urged 407 Gieg below. See v. brief, party raised in its opening (9th Cir.2005) (hold 1038, 1046 n. F.3d 10 especially so would doing prejudice where ing appellees argument had waived opposing side. United v. See States below); Bricklay Int’l raised Union of (9th Ullah, Cir.1992); 976 F.2d ers & Allied v. Local Union Craftsman 28(a)(9), (b). Jaska, R.App. Inc., see also Fed. P. “We F.2d 1404- Martin (9th Cir.1985) vigor against factual rule with (finding apply waiver of some defendants; us, no less criminal we should be before we hold that Moore has estab- in applying against govern- vigorous prejudice. lished Strickland Ziegler, ment.” United States (9th Cir.2007) J., (Kozinski, dis- Conclusion banc) rehearing from denial of en senting

(citation omitted). inexplicably counsel failed to The state fail- court’s file a motion motion that recognize that Moore’s confession ure to —a easily unlawfully, along was obtained with its and could have been based on either of on other the state’s exclusive reliance grounds, two each which was meritori- prejudice, “confessions” to establish result- ous and each of which would in all likeli- making any ed in court’s not determi- hood have suppression resulted all, of, or what parts nation as whether his confession its fruits. The state now the evidence which the dissent *24 does not contest finding the that Moore a un- relies as result of the was obtained prevailed would have on one of them—that was thus lawful confession and inadmissi- his confession involuntary. was The rea- A, at Appendix infra, ble in evidence. See by sons offered counsel for his conduct Nor, reasons, 1119-20. for similar as we (and were both limited and unmeritorious noted, did have the district court under- bear no resemblance to the sug- reasons any inquiry. Although take such it seems dissent). gested the His inexcusable the on likely that evidence which the dis- failure to move to exclude the confession (to sent the that it at relies extent exists afforded the state opportunity pros- to all) as a of principally was obtained result ecute Moore on the basis of the most confession,27 cannot Moore’s we determine damaging inculpatory evidence that can be here. no de- those facts Because factual against defendant, introduced a and there- termination has ever made as to the been exact a plea to no-contest egre- tree” poisonous “fruits of and because gious of felony offense murder with a man- offer, has failed repeatedly the state to datory twenty-five-year sentence. We thereby forfeited, any argument has that that prejudiced by conclude Moore was his unproven potential evidentiary some case counsel’s failure file suppression to might as a whole have rendered counsel’s that, per- motion because counsel’s performance non-prejudicial, deficient we fell objective formance below an standard cannot and do not here consider dis- reasonableness, of he received ineffective evidentiary analysis. sent’s extensive assistance of counsel under Strickland. A Rather, determining we are left contrary ruling necessarily would consti- weight whether difference between the application tute an clearly unreasonable Moore’s statements his brother and Supreme established Court law. Neither girlfriend his half brother’s and his formal susceptible Fulminante nor Strickland is taped that confession is such of an objectively interpretation, reasonable the exclusion of our the latter undermines erroneous, though even support that that would confidence Moore would have entered a a plea into so harsh determination that agreement. perform- Consider- counsel’s ing only arguments that properly competent are ance in this case was or that example, 27. For the first two dramatic sen- Moore's counsel inferred these facts from dissent, Bybee Judge tences of in which statements his client made and from case, purports confession, to describe the facts of the Moore’s half-brother’s both of parrot provided by the statement Moore's were likely which inadmissible. It is for this against counsel his effort to defend that himself reason the state did not of the offer charges incompetence. appears It that arguments Judge Bybee now makes. contrary to was a harmless prejudice no result confession suffered Moore law as clearly established Court representation. his set forth in Fulminante. the state request, Ignoring whether the con- that, to consider likely court failed for failure It is but counsel’s involuntary ground on motion, fession was suppression would file Moore by improper prom- his will was overborne plea agreement entered into the not found, court leniency. The district ises of no to a required plead him to contest however, confession was that Moore’s with a man- felony charge murder severe involuntarily. Because state made twenty-five-year sentence' —the datory that determination challenge does by a sentence received co-defendant same that a motion has conceded appeal, result, As our after trial. confidence grounds involuntariness suppress on Accordingly, outcome undermined. the merit Despite meritorious. have been cor- is entitled to a writ of habeas motion, Moore’s counsel failed of such permit him to pus directing the state to “probably the move to what was him from withdraw release probative damaging evidence most we custody.28 Accordingly, reverse Ful- him,” against be admitted [could] district court and remand the issuance minante, 111 S.Ct. 1246 of the writ. Bruton, (quoting *25 and Remanded. Reversed J., (White, He not dissenting)). did any strategic the motion for fail to make A APPENDIX simply but because he understood reasons the Appendix In we will this discuss persons told two other that Moore had col- dissenting and theories that our facts day question in happened had on the what league has created and advanced on behalf that as the and concluded a result admis- relied of the state —facts and theories not taped of formal confession to the sion his court, by on not the by suggested the state that the police would be harmless. Given court, argued in the district not state and highly prejudicial, failure in fact coun- was by party to court this either —facts objective fell an stan- sel’s conduct below an theories advanced for first time of dard reasonableness and therefore was judge, all the appellate in contravention of “deficient” under Strickland. contrary A Here, appellate procedure. rules of we objectively an decision would constitute why, will had not explain even the state clearly application unreasonable estab- preju- the alternative forfeited theories lished Court law. it, dice dissent creates for we would court held that Moore was not state reject them the merits. by his conduct be- prejudiced counsel’s co-defendant, respect Moore’s With two lay cause informal confessions to wit- Salyer, although the district court believed nesses could have been introduced. so, “apparently provided that detectives he doing the state court erred unreason- crime he took ably. taped that with the details of the when Its determination challenge right. holding Having been 28. The not habeas is his dissent condemns our as Moore, writ, having granted can for “accomplished” anything for Moore determine withdrawing possible whether is in his speculating quite is that himself "[i]t responsibility having prevailed is to interest. Our sole Moore will be worse off for best op. at It is this determine Moore's constitutional here.” Dis. whether place paternalistic judgments rights have been violated in a manner court's to make holding "good” granting AED- a.particular about is warrants habeas relief under whether bring we party. Moore made a choice to PA. That have done. course, location shooting “undisputed” only them to the where became after occurred,” in plead there is no evidence the rec- Moore had decided to no contest. conveyed object The fact ord as to what information he did not gave never a sworn state- factual made Salyer them. assertions the state’s at- testified, ment, torney never plea colloquy, never and was cross- at his he after (be- way no of decided not contest simply charges examined. There knowing precisely Salyer’s testimony doing cause so not what would have served been, especially purpose under no might hope- have but would also have been impor- examination. More less with stress cross his formal confession the rec- tant, ord), explained that, 4 of as we footnote does not mean without Moore’s fruits, opinion, Salyer illegal it is almost certain confession its state would not testified Moore in would against prove have been able to the asser- beyond еvent but have taken Fifth tions at reasonable doubt trial. instead, facing Amendment as he too was More important, nearly all of the evi- Rogers’s trial for his involvement dence the dissent discusses would have fact, Salyer ultimately death.29 In been inadmissible trial because it de- appellate post-conviction tried and his directly rived indirectly either from proceedings long did not until end after involuntary Moore and Woolhiser’s confes- gone date on which Moore would have sions. In particular, authorities pled. Salyer to trial had he not See learned about the existence and identities (D.Or. Mar.4, Belleque, 2005 WL 555403 of the Ziegler’s witnesses Woolhiser and 2005) Salyer’s (denying pe- federal habeas who, insinuates, the dissent residence — tition). could Salyer’s have been called to testify argues “ranting raving” The dissent that the state’s felo- plan and the trio’s *26 ny “airtight” Rogers murder case was even with- scare illegal result of the —as out confession police, his confessions. is also It from the confes- alleged to Raymond police confession and Zie- sions that the learned about the gler, testimony “multiple allegedly and the of co-defen- who witnesses” saw 1147, Moore, op. dants. at 1148. This Salyer, Dis. is and arrive Woolhiser at simply goes This on at and to Rogers’s so. dissent later return residence.30 damning all of length op. police gun, about the facts that Dis. at The the 1148. found too, are or in “undisputed” “indisputable” agreed during this because Woolhiser the facts, Many “undisputed” interrogation case. of these unlawful police the show however, by appear “exactly” be drawn the dis- it was where located. And while sent from the factual the regard- basis state of- the record no explanation contains car, plea colloquy ing fered at Moore’s how police sen- the located the which See, tencing. e.g., evidence, at op. physical dis. 1147-48 contained additional (“[T]he California, plates license had been highly they car’s cov- likely seems facts, ered duct tape.”). over with These did so using supplied by information the course, ability put issue, Salyer day Of without the interrogation The before the at 29. stand, on the the state not have been pres- guy” told that “some was any might able to introduce he statements home, Rogers's ent outside motor but never made, previously doing have as so would have presence commented on the identities or of right violated Sixth Moore's Amendment any other witnesses. cross adverse See examine witnesses. Bruton States, 123, 127-28, v. United 391 U.S. 88 1620, (1968). S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 20 476 1120 1079, (9th 316 1092 Cir. they Woodford, the out v. F.3d had “let cat

defendants after 2003) obtained confessions involuntary (“[I]llegally by giving their bag” of the ones, voluntary than may less reliable be confessions. using coerced and thus confession filed a motion to Had Moore’s counsel process.” trial violate due another’s can ground the state concedes suppress on the 1147, Cooper, (citing Clanton meritorious, that motion suc and had (10th Cir.1997) (“[A] may person 1157-58 ceeded, all highly of this probable, which is challenge government’s against the use likely been excluded evidence would given him of a or her coerced confession poisonous tree.” See as “fruits of the Clanton, by person.”))); see another also 471, States, 371 Wong Sun v. United U.S. (collecting cases 129 F.3d at 1158 similar (1963). 407, 441 9 L.Ed.2d 83 S.Ct. First, Fifth, Sixth, from the and Seventh involuntary of confessions—includ fruits Circuits). Furthermore, is no evi there promises those that are extracted with ing record, nor dence the assertion leniency. may not be admitted at trial. — eye physical that the prosecution, States, Kastigar v. United 406 U.S. See re witness evidence on which the dissent 453, 441, 1653, 212 32 L.Ed.2d inde through lies was obtained source (“We (1972) ... immunity hold from pendent illegal from the confessions use use and derivative is coextensive with the confes the connection between against scope privilege self- was sions and evidence “so attenuated Immunity .... from the use incrimination Sun, dissipate Wong as taint.” See testimony, compelled well as evidence (quoting 83 S.Ct. 407 therefrom, directly indirectly derived States, v. United 308 U.S. Nardone protection required by affords [the (1939)) L.Ed. 60 S.Ct. prohibits prosecu Fifth It Amendment]. (internal omitted).31 quotation mark using compelled torial from authorities ”); testimony any respect .... also see much of suggestion The dissent’s Patane, 630, 644, United States v. on it relies evidence which to construct (2004) 159 L.Ed.2d hypothetical “airtight” case state’s (“[T]he (plurality opinion) requires Court “solely made based statements physical fruit of exclusion of actual Moore, admissibility nev- which has *27 ”); ly coerced statements.... United questioned” unsupported by er been is the Gonzalez-Sandoval, States The op. record. See dis. at n. 13. (9th Cir.1990). 1043, 1048 Thus, a success by statement Moore to which the dissent ful trig motion to would have alludes, to the which he made the gered poisonous “fruits of tree” the confession, evening before his does not doctrine, rendering inadmissible all evi nearly as contain much information as as a dence obtained result of Moore’s con only makes out. Moore that dissent stated fession. Salyer con- talking going “was about and [Rogers] in at the fronting Nor would Woolhiser’s confession— about break [Rog- to during which coer- cabin and he also wanted talk to was obtained same it.” box and took interrogation ers] cive Moore’s.—or its fruits about boom who rav- against Douglas nothing “ranting be See He about and admissible Moore. said question is 31. That evidence the could have or unlawful is that state confessions independent would have obtained from impossible highly speculative and to deter- sources tainted the infor- that would be appeal. at this time mine previously mation obtained as a result of the ing,” nothing “scarfing] [Rogers] Establishing out about critical evidence was dis- committing [robbery],” another of ever independently covered of the confessions nothing about the existence number of or have would if not presented serious insur- the defendants witnesses who observed problems. purposes mountable For of this fur- Rogers. their visit Moore planning appeal, however, habeas the most impor- that, upon Rogers’s arriving stated ther tant point is the state made no at- home, guy” motor confronted Wool- “some separate tempt any admissible evidence hiser, away” but Woolhiser “walk[ed] evidence, patently from the excludable “over motor Ac- [sic] towards to home.” no court ever undertook task. aAs statement, cording Salyer “was result, we cannot now consider the ques- talking about stuff [Rogers] the stolen determination tion or make a on appeal, ____ [T]hey punctured tires purposes assessing case, the state’s stayed approximate- at the motor home for any of the “evidence” referred just or ly enough 15-20 minutes time to dissenting our colleague is admissible. At point two no drink beers.” did Without the fruits of Moore and Wool- plates covering discuss car’s license confessions, hiser’s prosecution would did tape, duct nor he mention “other have had difficulty tremendous meeting people,” beyond person the one who con- high burden it In faced. view of Woolhiser, being present Rog- fronted case, weaknesses in the state’s Certainly nothing highly home. he ers’s said that, him, unlikely kidnapping Rogers, beating about absence of his own trunk, shooting confession, him in putting him. recorded Moore would have fact, doing he so. pled felony denied murder. We thus cannot have confidence that the outcome evidentiary problems that a success- have been the same had counsel suppression ful motion would created filed a to suppress. motion for the state are therefore quite severe. *28 B APPENDIX *35 the majority opinion, which Ex- does so. BERZON, Judge, concurring: Circuit cept for references to footnote ten’s Judge I concur in Reinhardt’s result and holding voluntariness in elsewhere opinion.

almost all of his text, fully I concur in the remainder of the opinion. pivotal questions simply are wheth- er Oregon state court was unreason- particular, I in Judge concur Rein- able in its determination that Moore did why hardt’s discussion of Moore’s counsel’s (1) representation receive deficient failure to move to suppress his confession (2) prejudiced counsel that his case. Be- Moore, believe, prejudiced in I has, forfeiture, cause the state acknowl- Lockhart, 52, extent that Hill v. edged that Moore’s confession was invol- 366, (1985), 106 S.Ct. pro- 88 L.Ed.2d 203 untary purposes appeal, for the of this I here, proper prejudice vides the standard see no reason to reach that issue de novo. Moore has fulfilled for the reasons which I Judge therefore do not concur footnote ten of Reinhardt I supplies. sepa- write landscape, pleading path through lar however, that I believe to note

rately, prejudice badly wrong. also demonstrate was Strickland guilty, Moore could v. Wash- directly Kimmelman, instead, more under Strickland deal with counsel’s 104 S.Ct. ington, 466 U.S. landscape— proper legal failure to create a (1984), Kimmelman v. L.Ed.2d case, file a failing in this by, for instance Morrison, 2574, 91 suppression meritorious motion. plainly (1986). Under Kimmelman L.Ed.2d Below, I discuss Kimmelman/Strick- Strickland, have court could state detail, in more prejudice land standard reasonably prob- if it were prejudice found why the Hill standard is not neces- explain failure to file a meritorious able that the here, and conclude sary disposition jail an increase in time motion led to under either prejudiced that Moore instance, a loss of through, for Moore— standard. bargain leverage. plea uses Kimmel- Analysis Judge Reinhardt

While I. ineffective- Strickland’s man to address and Kimmelman a. Strickland Judge Bybee he and de- prong, ness both Strickland, Moore “must show Under prejudice straightforward from the part that, probability that there is a reasonable prejudice prong as inquiry of Strickland’s errors, unprofessional but for counsel’s Kimmelman, applying the used in instead proceeding of the been result On examination standard used Hill. 104 S.Ct. 2052 different.” 466 U.S. however, the narrow set of Hill deals with added). prejudice (emphasis This stan- larger plea within the context cases one, ordinarily gov- generic dard is advised the defendant which counsel (which of counsel cases. erns ineffective assistance may poorly- have been take a ill-informed) See, go e.g., Henry, rather than negotiated or Wilson *36 trial, (9th Cir.1999) challenges this (relying and the defendant on Strickland to 988 (rather instance, than, pre-trial § advice for a 2254 state the standard 28 U.S.C. plea process) as case). motions that bore on the assistance of counsel ineffective counsel. To show ineffective assistance of elements of the ‍​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌​​‍Strickland standard Two Hill, the defendant must prejudice under important: particularly are gone that he would have to trial allege First, need show a “reason- for the counsel’s bad advice. As Hill save possibility” of a different outcome. able of ineffective speak does not the context Strickland, 694, 2052; 466 U.S. at 104 S.Ct. pre-trial motions regard assistance with Wilson, F.3d at 988. 185 a they may partic- and how affect whether Strickland, Second, applying the Su accepted, prejudice ular offered is its “any preme Court has established here, not be met even if it standard need jail actual time has Sixth amount of as an alternative means of is available v. significance.” Amendment Glover Unit showing prejudice. differently, Put Hill States, 198, 203, 696, 121 ed 531 U.S. S.Ct. that, provides practice once motions (2001). held that 148 L.Ed.2d 604 Glover discovery legal landscape, set have term flow from prison “if an increased did a judged showing can without prejudice be established petitioner an error has different ultimate outcome for the defen- 200, at 121 dant, prejudice.”1 a Id. particu- if counsel’s advice to take Strickland Thus, 202, Indeed, very it was at 121 S.Ct. 696. conclusion was so obvious that U.S. this likely clearly even before the unanimously and the established the Court reached it Glover, point. Court decided Glover. government 531 conceded 1131 Hamlin, 696; based, Argersinger prejudice see also standard to the full S.Ct. trial 25, 32, 37, 2006, 92 context, 407 U.S. and no appears why reason (1972) (holding L.Ed.2d Sixth case, should be so limited. this as the right applies any Amendment to counsel course of pretrial proceedings and “imprisonment case where even for a brief open, trial parallel question remained 37, at period” possible); is id. 92 S.Ct. filing whether of his meritorious York, (quoting Baldwin v. New 399 suppression motion would have affected 66, 73, U.S. 90 S.Ct. 26 L.Ed.2d 437 plea bargain negotiations, with the (1970) im- (stating prospect “the probability” “reasonable that the outcome prisonment for however short a time will of negotiations those would have been be viewed as a seldom accused more favorable to Moore. ....”) ‘petty’ (emphasis trivial or matter Moreover, directly Kimmelman answers added)). objection primary my dissent’s anal- Accordingly, if Moore can show a “rea- ysis, that a Hill rests on line of cases that probability” sonable that absent his coun- limit petitioner’s a habeas authority to performance ineffective he would sel’s challenge, on constitutional other leading obtained a verdict to less grounds, that preceded guilty errors then, in prison, applying time Strickland plea, provided that guilty plea itself Glover, prejudice he has satisfied the entered with advice of counsel who of the ineffective assistance of coun- prong constitutionally Hill, was not ineffective. sel test. 56-59, 366; at U.S. 106 S.Ct. see also Kimmelman makes clear that the usual Dis. op. upon 1156. The cases which analysis applies the context Strickland the dissent relies and which Hill cites— lawyer’s incompetent failure to file a Richardson, McMann v. principally, Kimmelman, timely suppression motion. 90 S.Ct. 25 L.Ed.2d 763 383-91, 106 Specif 477 U.S. S.Ct. 2574. (1970), Henderson, and Tollett v. ically, Kimmelman stated that to show (1973)— 36 L.Ed.2d 235 suppression motion con prejudice did not deal circumstances in which text, the defendant must demonstrate pre-plea the asserted constitutional viola- “that probability there is reasonable tion was assistance counsel verdict would have been different ab ineffective *37 regard to pre-trial practice, op- the sent excludable evidence.” Id. at posed to constitutional violations 106 S.Ct. 2574. We have read Kimmel prosecution. court or the As to the latter establishing preju man as show “[t]o violation, variety pre-plea of constitutional dice under from a Strickland failure to file motion, petitioner we assume that the must show that had effective [the defendant] ... granted, had the motion been in determining is assistance counsel reasonable that there would have an been whether or not to viola- challenge those Wilson, outcome more favorable to him.” manner, timely in a tions and so consider 185 F.3d at 990. any challenge part such waived as of the guilty plea. explains Kimmelman Kimmelman, course, question very where that is not the case—where the was whether the defendant would have advising counsel who is the criminal defen- a different at trial received verdict had the constitutionally dant is ineffective in set- evidence been a suppressed. Absent meri- motion, ting legal background pro- for later torious the evident answer to that query ceedings, is no. But Kimmelman not because he or she fails to file does outcome-oriented, essential, motions, pretrial restrict its Strickland— meritorious and Hill b. Strickland frequently will be review collateral an accused through which only means apply this basic Strickland Rather than A right to counsel.... can effectuate Kimmelman, analysis through lens to rec- ordinarily be unable layman will rely on Bybee Reinhardt and both Judges and to evaluate ognize counsel’s errors satisfy language in Hill: order “[I]n ...; performance professional counsel’s requirement, the defendant ‘prejudice’ will consequently a criminal defendant prob- a reasonable must show that there is repre- that he has not been rarely know errors, that, he ability but for counsel’s until after trial or sented competently pleaded guilty would not have usually consults another appeal, when he trial.” 474 going have insisted on Indeed, an ac- lawyer about his case. Judge Bybee insists 106 S.Ct. 366. that he has a will often not realize cused provides that Hill’s standard the exclusive claim until he meritorious ineffectiveness analysis for all ineffective assistance cases proceedings, review begins collateral Reinhardt as- involving plea. Judge a trial counsel if he retained particularly appropriate that Hill is the stan- sumes appeal. on direct convincing and makes a case dard 378, 106 477 U.S. at S.Ct. trial for his gone Moore would have but words, In other where there is ineffec suppression counsel’s failure to file the continues to advise the tive counsel who motion, thereby meeting that standard. past point at which it would defendant however, analysis propose, I On ordinarily proper to make constitu be is no need to focus on whether the there challenge, regarding tional the usual rules Essentially is met. our Hill standard challenge Kim timing of such —in problem deciding whether it is melman, the rule that Fourth Amendment standard, prejudice which deals with Hill challenges must be made at trial or on plea bargain varieties of ineffective some during collateral chal appeal, direct cases, assistance or also the Kimmelman Powell, lenges, see Stone standard, impact which deals with the (1976); 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 motions, that the failure to file meritorious here, challenges pretrial the rule directly controls here. Neither case is must be made before potential evidence facts, point on its as Hill was different (or pleading guilty preserved for later case, plea bargain kind of while Kimmel guilty plea)— in a challenge conditional a trial. But the Kimmel man involved apply, premises upon cannot because the generally is the Strickland standard man! they which rest are absent. “The Sixth one, applies therefore in the applicable Amendment mandates that the state bear here, assuming that first instance even constitutionally risk of deficient assis provides Hill an available alternative counsel,” tance of not a defendant who Quarterman, Abdul-Kabir v. route. rights because of coun Cf. cannot forward his *38 1654, 1671, U.S. Kimmelman, incompetence. 477 U.S. sel’s (2007) (holding that a state L.Ed.2d 585 379, 106 at S.Ct. to,” “un “contrary court decision is or an Thus, and Kimmel- under Strickland of,” application clearly-estab reasonable man, dem- prejudice, to show Moore could “ignore[s] if it the fundamental lished law plea bargain that outcome onstrate by Supreme principles established [the improved upon by filing been precedents”). most relevant Court’s] that suppression the meritorious motion considering critical in whether What is was not filed because of ineffective assis- is that Hill varies the applies of Kimmelman tance counsel. prejudice applied involving standard could be to a case generally applicable Roe, guilty plea, permit fact, is a appeal. where there decision to in articulat of even where there application Strickland very ed the difference between Hill-type that, trial, the by choosing no indication is is, cases—that advice cases—and cases conviction or would have avoided petitioner such as this one. The Court stated in Roe indicates that lessened his sentence. Hill cases, that most a defendant’s claim “[i]n proves if prevail simply Moore can he of ineffective assistance of counsel involves gone to trial had his confes- he would have performance during counsel’s the course of nothing But in Hill suppressed. sion been legal proceeding, a at either trial or on pleaded guilty a who precludes petitioner appeal.” Id. 120 S.Ct. 1029. In meeting ordinary Strickland from contrast, Roe, Hill, like in “unusual standard. alleged that counsel’s deficient perform commonsense conclusion is con- This arguably judicial ance led not to a proceed by governs firmed Hill cases in which Hill. ing disputed reliability, but rather to the binary face a choice between defendants forfeiture of a proceeding itself.” Id. at trial, guilty going and con- pleading 483, 120 S.Ct. 1029. cludes, essence, situation, in in case, present however, The binary is not the defendant need not meet the usual like Hill and Roe. Refusing plead no prejudice showing

Strickland standard contest to the charge filing murder before that he would have been better off in a motion to suppress his confession would gone terms of outcome had he to trial. necessarily not have set Moore on a course 59-60, 106 S.Ct. 366. But See Rather, for trial. it would have set him on suggest analysis not this Hill does (on preliminary a course for sup- motions only governing be the one all need pression motions for flowing evidence from Instead, bargain cases. Hill created an and, the confession perhaps pretriаl other to claim additional means ineffective assis- claims) and, then, plea negotia- for further counsel, alleged tance of even when the tions once the motions were resolved. af- might ineffective assistance not have Thus, if Moore could show a reasonable adjudication ultimate guilt fected the probability that he would have obtained applies the sentence. It when the facts plea bargain attorney better had his choice, binary create such a and the as- confession, moved to as I prejudice simply foregoing serted can, demonstrate below that he he would trial, regardless probable of the outcome special prej- need assistance of the a trial. Instead, if udice rule Hill. he can meet Court’s discussion of Hill ordinary prej- Kimmelman/Strickland Flores-Ortega, in Roe v. standard, my udice that is under sufficient (2000), 145 L.Ed.2d 985 rein- approach. understanding. forces this That case in- differently, prejudice Put a bit stan- to file a volved counsel’s failure notice binary for dard Hill sets out choice thereby forfeiting pro- an entire appeal, circumstance is a narrow statement of the just ceeding as the ill-advised defendant in general standard set out Strickland and Again, Hill forfeited trial. the two choices prejudice inquiry Kimmelman. The appealing appealing, were between and not can, defendants Moore’s situation prejudice so could be evaluated on *39 result, terms, in Furthermore, be stated Hill but need nowhere those terms. does Strickland, not be. Defendants in such circumstances Roe state that Hill limited but still, only special prejudice ultimately, choosing that the rule of Hill are between trial, using provide support time cases do not for Hill going to but the pleading and longer. choice in such circum- available for the is as the exclusive standard period credibly Maj. can “show at 1105-06 n.14 op. Such defendants stances. See that, cases). but probability a reasonable there is That (discussing such we errors, [they] would not have for counsel’s in applies assumed that Hill sometimes on guilty and would have insisted pleaded justify not the motions context does aban- Hill, trial,” going doning the usual Kimmelman/Strickland plea bargain in response in approach that context.2 they might But originally offered them. initially designed for the Hill was different, agree- take a better well circumstances, I can no present see in engages if counsel mo- competent ment in a why petitioner reason case such as improve position practice tions to meet the this one cannot at least choose So, there is no reason the defense. while prejudice regular Kimmelman/Strickland specialized language in such to use Hill’s standard. cases, is still satisfied. It Hill’s standard sensible, however, to address is far more Prejudice c. and Prosecutors directly, by gener- applying such cases inquiry. al Kimmelman/Strickland I argues approach The dissent that the in “place[] describe would federal courts any way pre- The case law does not instructing prosecutors the role of state understanding this limited of Hill. I clude ... im- plea negotiations,” how to conduct Bybee Judge am aware of no case—and plicating op. federalism concerns. See Dis. why Kimmel- cites none—that addresses inquiring at 1157. It also contends that apply do not cir- man Strickland competent into defense counsel whether today. cumstances like those we consider lever- improved could have defendant’s Many plea cases address the Hill situa- age plea bargain to seek a better runs tion, apply and so the Hill standard direct- against general wisdom that are courts ly, having no reason to Kimmel- address ill ... prosecutorial suited to “review deci- cases, it man and Strickland. Some other (as sions,” true, thereby raising separation pow- Judge is assume Reinhardt does op. ers issues. See Dis. at 1157-59. today) applies that Hill also in the motions involved, place have no plea bargain context when a is as These concerns whatever context, in the advice these the current context. well as but case, preju- then-applicable I note that if Hill is read to limit the dants in that under state law, only attempt con- dice standard in motions context to the could their trial, question proba- rendering proceed- whether there is a reasonable fessions at the two bility pursued ings effectively synonymous. that the defendant would have See 397 U.S. 772-74, proceedings taking further court rather than 90 S.Ct. 1441. It is now constitution- why proceed- ally required judge jury plea, there is no reason that a rather than a trial, admissibility ing suppression be rather than a decide the of a confession. See should hearing. guilty plea id. at S.Ct. 1441. But if a A forfeits not defendant judicial proceedings, probability a that he merits trial but other can show reasonable hearing evidentiary hearing concerning not have before a such as an forfeited issue, voluntary. judge confession was on the save for his counsel's whether McMann, Hill, opportunity by pleading underpinnings advice waive that one of the certainly justification focusing guilty, provides no I would read the ''trial” reference in trial, еvidentiary forgoing forgoing encompassing that hear- rather than on Hill as ing, just proceedings, assessing prej- which as connected to the trial other court when hearing resulting guilty plea as would be a mid-trial udice from a infected itself similar kind. ineffective assistance of counsel. The defen-

1135 may at “[pjrosecu- op. the dissent that be difficult. Dis. 1157. Unlike agree I however, Judge Bybee, I think particularly ... are ill-suit- do not torial decisions judicial oversight.” op. asking Dis. courts consider these matters ed for broad poses “impossible an (quoting question.”3 United States v. Redon- See id. at 1158 (9th do-Lemos, 1296, First, prejudice inquiry 1299-1300 always 955 F.2d is Cir.1992), all, grounds, asking, on other counter-factual —we are after overruled 1508, Armstrong, v. 48 F.3d “is a probability States whether there reasonable United Cir.1995) (en banc)). (9th that, n. Prose- unprofessional 1515 5 but for counsel’s er- is, broad, indeed, rors, al- proceeding cutorial discretion the result of the v. though Wayte different,” Strickland, not unfettered. See have been 466 U.S. States, 598, 607-08, 470 105 694, United at 104 generally S.Ct. 2052—and oc- (1985). So, L.Ed.2d 547 if S.Ct. years curs after the fact if it has reached my ap- correct Judge Bybee were So, appellate objection an court. is give right federal courts the proach would uniquely plea bargain directed at the plea bargains charging dictate and deci- I inquiry suggest, critique but is instead a sions, I would share his concerns. prejudice inquiry generally. of the in nothing

But Further, Kimmelman/Strick- plea bargain process while the approach implicates land such matters. complex, is so is trial. To answer the question prosecutor is not what prejudice context, question the trial one what a “fair” charged, should have nor' weight present must consider the of the Rather, have been. plea bargain should evidence, jury, the views of the the choices whether, but for counsel’s question and, yes, of the prosecutor. defense assistance, a defendant would ineffective See, courts, undaunted, e.g., Yet do so. negotiate in a position have been better Landrigan, Schriro v. 550 U.S. It, therefore, prosecutor. with the con- 1933, 1943-44, S.Ct. 167 L.Ed.2d 836 coun- cerns (2007) (considering defendant’s defense capital whether a de choices, judgment, sel’s counsel’s defense prejudiced by fendant was his counsel’s actions, not, in counsel’s defense evidence); mitigation failure to introduce instance, prosecutor. first that of the That 362, 396-98, Taylor, Williams v. requires this assessment some consider- (2000) 120 S.Ct. 146 L.Ed.2d 389 position ation of the defense counsel’s with (concluding preju that a defendant was regard prosecutor’s case is inherent diced counsel’s failure to investigate any prejudice inquiry, whether under background, which would have resulted general Hill or the more framework of evidence); mitigation Lopez additional Strickland, Kimmelman does not (9th Cir.2007) Schriro, asking question an convert into assault (holding that defense counsel’s failure prosecutorial discretion. object preju to medical evidence did not that, defendant). acknowledge points say I as the dissent dice the I cannot out, analysis instance, assessing, jury whether a Kimmelman/Strickland plea bargain leverage differently of the defendant’s is would have ruled on a death “counter-factual,” sentence, Landrigan, will be conducted “in see Williams, cases, 1943-44, 1933; years most after the decision to 127 S.Ct. 396-98, challenged plea bargain,” offer the and U.S. at is so obvi- may inqui- reasonably proba- 3. One reason the dissent think the rather than whether it was ry portrays question is so difficult is that it ble that secure such an defense counsel could would, prosecutor as whether the offer a bet- arrangement. 1156-57, plea bargain, op. ter see Dis. *41 trial, substantially influ- and so would have whether a de- deciding easier than ously rath- go Moore’s decision to to trial enced plea bargain- in a would be better fendant offered, so particular plea er than take the characterizing as to warrant ing position obviously, given even more too—-and question “impossible” latter as plea-bargain- nature of risk-assessment to answer. courts improved leverage his ing have —would Nor, matter, inquiring into a for that negotiate plea bargain with reduced bargaining leverage self- plea defendant’s therefore a “reason- jail time. There is evidently determining than wheth- harder probability” able Moore has suffered that, probability a reasonable er “there is im- as to the actual sentence prejudice errors, he would not have but for counsel’s and it was unreasonable of the posed, guilty and would have insisted on pleaded prejudice here. state court not to find Hill, at going to trial.” There, too, inquire we must S.Ct. 366. II. Conclusion of the defendant’s ease strength into the given by Judge For the reasons Rein- prosecutor likely and the sentence in hardt as well as for the reasons set forth (albeit trial, sought at rather concurrence, this I conclude that the state part bargain). than of a That unreasonably court failed to determine again, particularly is not easier inquiry, that counsel’s failure to file meritorious plea bargain leverage question. than the suppression constituted deficient motion sum, My point, Leaving is this: aside rep- performance, and such deficient entirely out-оf-place constitutional prejudiced According- resentation Moore. raises, objec- problems the dissent ly, agree Judge I with Reinhardt that we prejudice inquiry tion that outlined petition for habeas grant should Moore’s “counter-factual,” may here is some- corpus. apply, times be difficult to does not distin- inquiry guish prejudice this from other BYBEE, Judge, dissenting: Circuit regularly carry sorts that we out. It is Randy Moore and others beat Kenneth not, view, my a sufficient reason to bled, him, Rogers stripped until he bound it. abandon tape, placed him in him in the trunk duct car, location, of a drove him to a remote Application d. hill up and forced him to march I agree Judge As Reinhardt gunpoint. marching Rogers While Moore’s counsel was ineffective because he woods, through Rogers— Moore shot suppression failed to file a meritorious mo- accidentally, through temple. he said— tion, so, good and had no reason not to do brother, Ray- to his older Moore confessed all that whether remains determine is mond, step-brother’s girlfriend, and his prejudiced Judge this failure Moore. Re- what he had done. He Ziegler, Debbie ably explains why inhardt Moore meets police, corroborating then talked to I, prejudice Hill’s standard for assum- already evidence had obtained. standard, ing proper Hill is the concur indicted, he negoti- Before Moore could be application of it. Moore also meets the plea bargain ated a under which Moore which I standard Kimmelman/Strickland obtained the lowest sentence available un- applies, essentially believe for the also Oregon felony der law for murder. Judge same reasons that Reinhardt ex- counsel, experienced an defense Moore’s plains sup- in the context of Hill. Just as attorney, accept recommended that he pressing the confession would have sub- that he explained offer. Counsel did grounds think stantially strengthened Moore’s case he and, majority’s if reliance on even he could Fulminante is confession formal *42 First, it, twice remarkable: Moore Raymond Ziegler and does not suppressed have Fulminante, even cite nor was it confession cited “repeat[Moore’s informal] could circumstances, court, court, any the district state or the the in full detail.” Under Second, party. majority’s the other the thought he had secured best re- counsel Oregon peated The insistence that “a confession get he could for Moore. is like deal undoing. no other evidence” is its own agreed. and the district court courts negotiated plea because he Counsel knew so, majority: at- says Not majority bring what cannot itself to constitutionally ad- torney offered deficient admit: Moore had confessed to two other accept Moore to vice because he advised people police, before he confessed to the suppress he moved to plea offer before their plainly confessions were admissi- police. to the The ma- Moore’s confession independently damaging. ble and jority pre- reasons that Moore would have and, process In the suppress, second-guessing vailed on a motion to know- coun- confession, sel, courts, Oregon without his and the ing the state was district court, going majority clearly would have insisted on establishes a pleading guilty felony proposition: trial rather than dramatic After Kimmelman Morrison, 365, 2574, majority murder. The dismisses counsel’s v. 477 U.S. 106 S.Ct. (1986), explanation go that there was no reason to 91 L.Ed.2d 305 Strickland v. Wash- 668, 2052, any ington, trial in event because the state had 466 U.S. 104 S.Ct. 80 (1984), confession to L.Ed.2d 674 a second confession—Moore’s and Arizona v. Fulmi- nante, when a Raymond Ziegler- by ignoring suppress motion to a confes- — “meritorious,” findings potentially state and the district court’s and sion is counsel’s findings: majority failure to file the entering its own The motion constitutes defi- prejudicial that “it is far from clear what those cient and conduct if finds there is said,” any possibility filing witnesses would have and wonders the motion would testimony “to what extent their would have have caused defendant to choose a trial jury.” Maj. Op. plea. majority’s principle to a over the The persuasive been Furthermore, majority applies regardless many con- of how witnesses cludes, witness, to, Raymond many “a hostile a defendant has confessed how was unlikely testify it is would co-defendants are available to [the state] [so] defendant, against any have able to elicit much of the infor- other evi- been Maj. mation it desired from him.” Id. at 1113 dence available the record. See Op. According majori- n. 24. at 1109-17. to the ty, any grounds moving if counsel has majority only not entered its own The a confession and there is fact, it found its own law as findings possibility gone the defendant would have case, AEDPA-governed well. this trial, the suppression failure to move for majority Oregon holds that state is, prongs satisfies both of Strickland. It “contrary” decision was court’s and, absolutely, absolutely, prejudi- error in Arizona v. Fulminante that statement cial. “a confession is like no other evidence” and majority’s probative damaging position is “the most evi- is unfathomable. against supported by that can admitted de- Not is its conclusiоn not [a dence be 279, 295, 111 authority, 499 U.S. S.Ct. Court see Hill v. Lock fendant].” (1991) hart, (quotation 113 L.Ed.2d 302 omitted). (1985), Maj. Op. L.Ed.2d 203 it contradicts the marks citation See 1093-94, 1102, 1110-11, 1112, Indeed, holdings. contrary 1117-18. Court’s “clearly unreasonably applies established clearly established proposition law, as determined the Su- “In our view Federal McMann v. Richardson: States.” 28 preme on reason Court of United guilty based defendant’s 2254(d)(1); Carey § plea U.S.C. see also ably competent intelligent advice is an Musladin, 649, 654, open ground to attack on the (2006); Murphy, Clark v. misjudged the admissi 166 L.Ed.2d 482 may counsel (9th Cir.2003). For an bility of the defendant’s confession.” 397 *43 claim, 1441, counsel the 759, 770, 25 L.Ed.2d ineffective assistance of 90 S.Ct. U.S. (1970). And, clearly gov- established Federal law that if we needed further 763 evidence, majority’s opinion Washington, contra erns is Strickland v. the (1984), 668, 2052, AEDPA 104 L.Ed.2d 674 the most recent S.Ct. 80 venes Court’s — decision, two-step inquiry. a “In Mirzayance, U.S. which sets forth Knowles -, --, 1411, 1420, representa- 129 S.Ct. 173 order to establish ineffective (2009): tion, a Court has nev the defendant must” overcome “[T]his L.Ed.2d 251 pursue “highly demanding” “prove counsel to standard and required er defense ev defense, ery regardless incompetence prejudice.” of its mer both Kim- claim or melman, 381-82, it, viability, realistic chance for success.” 477 U.S. at 106 S.Ct. going Counsel cannot be faulted not 2574.1 just majority a our court

trial because majority that counsel defi- finds “nothing thinks he had to lose.” Id. at grounds: cient on two Moore’s statement fact, everything Moore had suppressed, should have been lose—he could have faced far more severe first, and, involuntary because it was sec- He charges penalty. and even the death ond, because it was obtained violation of got good advice from his counsel and a Oddly, the Miranda. district court’s find- good Oregon. deal from ing that Moore’s confession was involun- below, tary challenged by is not explain For the reasons I I would state appeal, agree majority and I with the judgment affirm the of the district court question of voluntariness therefore is denying respectfully I writ. dissent. properly Maj. Op. before us. See I. WHETHER COUNSEL’S that, pre- 1102-03. I note were the issue CONDUCT WAS served, persuasive argument a could be DEFICIENT given made that the confession was in fact review, may only voluntarily. inexplicably2 On AEDPA we issue a Since state — corpus pressed appeal, writ of habeas when the state court —has not this issue on I Kimmelman, prong, 1. To meet the first "the meritorious. See 477 U.S. at defendant 382, And, 375, representation must show counsel’s fell 106 S.Ct. 2574. to meet the second, objective an below standard of reasonable defendant show that there "[t]he must ness,” Strickland, 687-88, that, probability 466 U.S. at 104 is a reasonable but for coun 2052, errors, "strong pre S.Ct. and overcome the unprofessional sel’s result of sumption performance that counsel's falls proceeding would have been different.” range Strickland, professional within the 'wide tance,’ Kimmelman, assis 466 U.S. at 104 S.Ct. 2052. ” 477 U.S. at Strickland, finding 2. The court its of invol- (quoting district based S.Ct. 2574 466 U.S. at 688-89, 2052). implied promise leniency untariness on an When the habeas Yet, police allegedly gave petitioner alleges that the to Moore. that his counsel was ineffec words, prom- tive to use Moore’s own the officers because of counsel's failure file mo tion, sufficient, necessary, "[njothing helping but means ised him other [than] no showing [they] to recommend condition for a successful of incom best could.” This offer leniency attorney inadequate petence would have been to the district is that motion be, It that Moore has deficient conduct. cannot as the assumption on the proceed holds, majority today was in- that his confession because counsel demonstrated However, motion, voluntarily given.3 could have filed such a he must argument concerning contrary, forfeited its have filed the motion. To the state does not appeal confession on recently Moore’s Court held that an the sub- that the state has conceded mean attorney is not even deficient if he declines issue, majority merit of the stantive pursue strategy despite being there majority’s it does. Thus assumes “nothing by pursuing to lose” that strate — both that claims that the state concedes gy. Mirzayance, Knowles v. unconstitu- taped confession was -, & n. 1093-94, tional, and that a Maj. Op. at (2009).4 L.Ed.2d 251 Counsel “is not re motion to the confession would to have a tactical quired reason —above successful, Maj. Op. are been beyond a appraisal reasonable of a misleading. unwarranted and prospects claim’s dismal for success” for *44 declining pursue to a course of failed action. Id. conceding Even that the state has anything, at 1422. If finding, involuntariness I Knowles is a more challenge to extreme case than cannot concede that counsel’s failure to Moore’s because the necessarily constitutes Court found that suppress move to counsel Knowles was to establish that “all of the attendant circum is the assertion that Moore’s confession was " 'the will stances” indicate that defendant's inadmissible. Id. 1117 n. 27. I will not " prolong my at the time he confessed.’ dissent with was overborne further discussion of 503, 513, claim, Haynes Washington, except v. 373 U.S. the Miranda to note that there is (1963) (quoting argument S.Ct. 10 L.Ed.2d 513 substantial merit in the state’s Illinois, Lynumn custody 83 Moore was not when he invoked and, (1963)); therefore, right 9 L.Ed.2d 922 seе also his to counsel Miranda Guerrero, And, apply. certainly, United States v. did not the state (9th 1988) ("An interrogating agent's appli- Cir. courts' decision is not an unreasonable promise government prosecutor any Supreme to inform the cation of Court decisions. suspect's cooperation about a does not render involuntary, subsequent a even plead statement 4. Knowles involved a defendant who by promise accompanied guilty when it is a to rec guilty insanity not and not reason of ("NGI”). leniency by speculation coop strategy ommend Id. at 1415. Counsel's was effect.”). positive a second-degree eration will have The to a seek murder verdict in the trial, stage record demonstrates that the could not first of a bifurcated and an NGI However, promised anything have other than a recom stage. verdict in the second Id. leniency certainly jury evidently rejected mendation of could insanity the evidence of —and charges promise not a reduction of stage the defendant offered in the first of the —because formally guilty Moore had not been booked or trial because it found him of first-de- charged gree when he made his confession. murder. Id. at 1415-16. Because the proffered defendant’s evidence in the second stage 3. has The conclusion that state forfeited of the trial would have been identical to argument concerning stage its the voluntariness of the evidence offered in first —before jury Moore's confession relieves us of the obli- the same advised the defendant —counsel gation pursue plea. Miranda to discuss the issue. It is not not to the NGI Id. at 1420-21. Court, inquiry holding our even relevant to rest of that counsel was not —not deficient, majority's] "buttress[the conclusion that stressed that counsel "is re- not performance highly quired [counsel's] was defi- to have a tactical reason —above Maj. Op. beyond appraisal cient.” at 1102-03 & n. 11. The a reasonable of a claim's majority's prospects discussion of Miranda claim in dismal for success for recommend- resolving ing dropped altogether.” 11 is thus double that a weak footnote claim be dicta— unnecessary the Miranda claim is to the ma- Id. at 1422. The Court noted that counsel decision, jority’s way carefully weighed options and its discussion is had before beyond charge making our under AEDPA. Likewise an informed decision. Id. at 1417. strong plea client not to contest and that a despite advising his

not deficient advantageous guilty is the most course. only possible his defense—the pursue truly nothing Knowles defendant 767-69, Id. at Of these contrast, Moore’s counsel elected lose. situations, say: the Court had this to move to the confession not to later for collat- petition [A defendant’s] ulti- he its merits and its because doubted asserting eral relief that a coerced con- Additionally, though, unlike mate effect. plea fession induced his is at most a defendant, Moore had a lot to the Knowles admissibility claim that the of his confes- losing he a by going lose: to trial risked mistakenly was and that sion assessed agreement getting a far plea lenient ... erroneously since he was advised sentence. Had counsel de- more severe plea unintelligent was an and voidable plea waiting while layed negotiating Constitution, however, act. The does suppression charged Moore to be so pleas guilty not render so vulnerable filed, might have cost motion could be plea .... In our view defendant’s plead to such a opportunity guilty reasonably competent based on charge. minimal If counsel in Knowles an intelligent plea open advice is not despite having nothing deficient ground may attack on the that counsel lose, surely Moore’s counsel was not defi- misjudged admissibility of the had much to lose. cient when his client defendant’s confession. Whether a unintelligent of guilty is and therefore Indeed, majority’s proposition runs *45 vulnerable when motivated a confes- nearly forty years counter to of directly erroneously thought sion admissible in precedent, established Court matter, depends evidence as an initial Richardson, starting v. with McMann 397 retrospec- not on whether a court would 759, 90 25 L.Ed.2d 763 U.S. tively consider counsel’s advice to be (1970). in The Court McMann considered right wrong, but on whether that involving the counseled those situations range compe- advice was within the allegedly put defendant who attorneys tence demanded in crimi- proof except prior to its ... for a State nal cases. might against confession that be offered (second 769, 770-71, Id. 90 S.Ct. and probability him.... At least the of the added). emphasis third being permitted State’s to use the con- as evidence sufficient to con- fession McMann is on all fours with Moore’s vince him that is too claim.5 Moore trial State’s case asserts coun- majority my pose, 5. The laments that "invocation of defendants cannot be left to the mercies misplaced” Further, McMann ‍​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌​​‍v. ....”). Richardson is because incompetent counsel al- challenge plea "Moore’s is not to counsel’s though McMann was decided before Strick- advice, McMann, as was the case in but to Hill, those two cases were built land suppress.” failure to file a motion to cоunsel's upon and reaffirmed McMann. "In the con- Maj. Op. enough, n. 14. True guilty pleas, text of the first half of the Strick- styled challenge claim in McMann was as a to Washington nothing land v. test is more than plea. the voluntariness of a But the McMann attorney a of the restatement standard of Court treated the claim as one of ineffective already competence set v. forth in Tollett McMann, assistance counsel. See Henderson McMann v. Richardson.” Hill ("[D]efendants facing 90 S.Ct. 1441 Lockhart, 52, 57-58, felony charges are entitled to effective (1985). 88 L.Ed.2d 203 McMann in- competent [The] assistance of counsel.... part formed the creation of the first of the good matter ... be left should sense two-part in U.S. at test Strickland. See and discretion of the trial courts with the ("[T]he proper 104 S.Ct. 2052 standard right guar- admonition that if the to counsel pur- attorney performance reasonably anteed the Constitution is to serve its is that of custody in failing to file a motion when he and his brothers ineffective sel was and that he voluntarily Moore’s confession and another friend came to pled felony no contest to would not have police department give the re- competent assis- if he had received murder corded statement.... Although filing the

tance from counsel. place, the second previously [I]n he had good might motion seem like suppression full made a confession to his brother now, accepting the state’s tactical move [Raymond] Ziegler, and to Ms. [Debbie] do, bargain strategic thing was the plea either one of whom could have been knew at the time. knowing what counsel at any repeat called as witness time to Indeed, obligation explain counsel’s in full his confession detail.... light trial in of a offer is far risks of Moore, explained com- Counsel majority’s more nuanced than the new would, petent there counsel was mandatory scorched-earth-litigation strate- possibility might charge the state carefully trial counsel has gy. Moore’s aggravated Moore with murder because by affidavit his reasons for not explained victim this case had been as- [t]he filing suppress: the motion to saulted, bloodied, tape, bound with duct fail state- [Moore’s] I did not to review car, placed in the trunk of a taken to an many I read it times police. ment to the location, isolated rural marched into the length it at detail and discussed bound, woods while still and shot. Fur- He to me Mr. Moore. affirmed with thermore, extremely the victim had an true, that it accu- that it was large protruding abdominal hernia for rate. always which he wore a truss. I dis- Suppress. My I not file a Motion to did possibility cussed with Mr. Moore the doing reasons for this were two-fold. charged aggra- that if he were ever with all, First of interview [Moore’s] jury might, vated murder that the after taped which was and transcribed police, *46 taking into account all of the facts of the abundantly ... makes it clear that Mr. case, conceivably that he find had en- custody. was not in He never Moore gaged helpless “torture” of a and custody that he was in and believed admitted to me that he realized he was somewhat disabled victim. indirectly guilty. plead Court If McMann means effective assistance. The rec- client anything, ognized v. it means counsel's advice on as much when it stated in McMann that admissibility of a confession is unrea- guilty plea

Richardson that a cannot be at- simply judges sonable because two federal inadequate legal tacked as based on advice disagree years with it later. 'reasonably compe- not a unless counsel was attorney’ was not 'within tent and advice majority that it cites two cases holds range competence of demanded of attor- establishing recognized out as that we have ” McMann, neys (quoting in criminal cases.’ “Kimmelman-type Strickland claims ... 770-71, 1441)); U.S. at 90 S.Ct. see also 397 pled cases in which the defendant rather than Kimmelman, 377-78, 477 at 106 S.Ct. going Maj. Op. trial.” at 1105 n.14. These Hill, McMann); (citing 2574 474 U.S. at 57- best, provide, support cases weak for the 366; Day, Langford 106 S.Ct. accord majority’s assertion that McMann should not (9th Cir.1996) (apply- cases, 1386-87 analysis inform our here. In both we Hill, McMann, ing interpreted by as in case concluded that the defendant’s claim of inef- alleging of counsel ineffective assistance fective assistance failed because the decision suppression various strategic based on failure to file not to file the motion was a one or Indeed, motions). question forgoing in McMann because the defendant insisted on Palmateer, question identical: and the here are whether the motions. See Weaver v. Cir.2006); (9th Langford, reasonably competent attorney F.3d foregone suppression and advised F.3d at 1386-88. motion murder,[7] reasons, go and and would ping, counsel feared For this and other charges. if client went to At no time dur consequences his trial on those severe trial: ing our association did I ever tell Mr. only always claimed his actual he should do. I ex

Mr. Moore Moore what accident, the victim was an shooting carefully to Mr. Moore as as I plained doubt there was never smallest but thought could what I the result would be during kidnap[sic] occurred option of his actions if he chose one or with an assault. We dis- began which another. felony murder rule. length cussed at murder, aggravated A conviction of fact that length also discussed at We course, subjected would have Moore any yet he had not been indicted for im- possibility penalty of the death or life possible conduct and that it was prisonment possibility pa- without the an came down from the when indictment 163.105(l)(a). § role. See Or. Rev. Stat. up grand jury, charge it could be for strength facing Given the of the evidence ... aggravated murder.... Moore, surprising it is not to learn that great length I discussed at with Mr. “attempt and counsel Moore decided to “aggravated Moore the definitions of possible secure the best of the resolution murder,” “murder,” “felony mur- counsel, nearly case” or that who had I Mr. that if der.” did tell he experi- three decades of criminal defense charged aggravated were murder ence, thought plea “was the best we if jury decided that murder had could do under the circumstances.” been committed under REV. [OR. strong strategic These and obvious rea- 163.095(e), § in the course of or ] STAT. forego sup- sons to take the maiming as a result of intentional pression protected motion are under torture, impossible that it was not Strickland, see 466 U.S. might aggravated he be convicted of (“[Sjtartaric respect- choices must be murder.... they ed these circumstances if are based frankly I if believed we went to trial he professional judgment.”), especially be- assault, guilty kidnap

would be found obviously seeking cause Moore was so “to (as ping, and murder codefen expense agony save himself the of a dant, Roy Salyer, who trial an chose perhaps trial and also to minimize the I option),[6] presume but did not to tell penalty might imposed.” he Moore what he I Mr. should do. *47 McMann, 767-68, at U.S. 90 S.Ct. him thought told what I the result would added). (emphasis majority’s The be of the various choices he had before opinion sweeps away. all of these factors him. I explained to Mr. Moore that if he majority advising Had the been Moore at to accept chose not the offer which the time, they might have to a him, come differ- expected State had made to I that ent conclusion. But even attorney charge accepting the district would him degree, kidnap majority’s morning-after with assault in the first that conclusion Moore, Salyer proceed justified 6. Unlike chose to to nation and would an intentional murder, guilty kidnap- charge. Rogers trial and was found of murder Moore shot ping, burglary, Salyer gun discharge and assault. See v. revolver—a that not un- 555403, (D.Or. Belleque, at . 2005 WL *1 less it had been cocked the shooter. Fur- 4, 2005). thermore, March Rogers temple, was shot in the as if executed, back, he was and not in the Very strong might expected slipped 7. circumstantial evidence be if he had and fallen contra- shooting” expla- dicted Moore’s "accidental backward onto Moore. admissibility weighs during ation defense counsel “misjudged plea counsel confession,” McMann, negotiations. paragraphs Two entire defendant’s affidavit, 14, paragraphs 13 and at 90 S.Ct. Moore is discuss at 770- how Moore was more worried about habeas relief. See id. entitled to plea agreement that was offered 1441. to his 90 S.Ct. brother, Woolheiser, Lonnie than he was limits its consideration of majority The agreement.8 his own plea about Another para- to a mere two explanation counsel’s paragraph entire establishes that trial trial affidavit and graphs of the counsel’s at great length counsel “discussed whether many of the reasons refuses to consider try it was best interest [Moore’s] gave pursuing that trial counsel for (em- press early the ease to resolution.” going instead of forward with plea bargain added). phasis majority’s The assertion strategy. majority trial The preparation no suggestion, “there is let alone that trial counsel of- erroneously believes evidence, expressed that Moore a desire to justify fered two reasons to his advice trial, plead guilty and avoid or to forego (1) to Moore: because he concluded Moore filing of his suppression meritorious in custody was not the time of the motion, prior to counsel’s decision not to (2) giv- confession and because Moore had motion,” suppression] Maj. file Op. [a people. a full confession to two other en n.16, ignores reality 1107-08 of the 1101-02, 1093-94, 1100-01, Maj. atOp. See record evidence.9 majority summarily n. 12. The 1104-05 & meticulous, there is no evidence that This kind of repre- concludes informed sentation, early provided by the case to an press attorney Moore wanted who and, therefore, resolution trial counsel had decades of criminal defense experi- ence, strategic repre- could not have made a reasoned does not “show that counsel’s suppression objective choice to not file the motion so sentation fell below an standard Strickland, upend plea negotiations.” ... of reasonableness.” as “not 466 U.S. Palmateer, 2052; McMann, 972 at Weaver (9th Cir.2006); 767-71, Maj. Op. at 1104-05. at important- see More ly purposes appeal, of this the state portions The extensive of the affidavit court’s decision that it did not constitute already quoted make clear counsel’s representation deficient was not an unrea- take the forego advice to the motion and application clearly sonable established consider- plea was based numerous holdings federal law as determined than two But ations other these factors. of the Court. Maj. Op. por- at 1105-07. And other see plea majority’s attempt coun- parse tions the affidavit demonstrate front and center in both sel’s advice on to take the negotiations were whether first, trial Trial two Moore’s and counsel’s mind. into distinct whether decisions— confession, file a motion to reported counsel that Moore indicated his *48 second, against accept a co-defen- whether to the offered willingness testify dant, surely type plea bargain ig- is the of eonsider- an almost willful which —reflects negotiations plea trial whether the occurred before 8. The affidavit indicates counsel properly Moore that the offer to him informed or after trial counsel advised Moore that a independent made to of the offer unlikely suppression to suc- motion would be brother. ceed or would otherwise be useless. The rec- press reflect that Moore wanted to ord does claims, Maj. Contrary majority’s to the see early for an resolution. 1104-05, Op. at the record does not reflect meritorious, the to be lest the court the record evidence and determine norance of representa- criminal defense realities of find that counsel “failed to rec- appeals of Maj. 1104-07. As coun- Op. tion. at See ognize the clear merit of that motion” or clear, Maj. Op. makes see sel’s declaration of properly damaging “to assess the nature B, to file the App. sup- the decision not formal confession.” tape-recorded the to take motion and the decision pression Maj. Op. at 1104. necessarily informed each other. plea the majority’s application of Strick- fact, affidavit demon- In trial counsel’s standard does not accord with the land two decisions—whether to strates defending realities of a criminal defendant. suppress file a motion to and how to advise competing Defense counsel must balance contempo- made plea Moore on the —were a selecting strategy: factors when defense indicted, was never but raneously. example, for the likelihood of success on nego- no contest to an information pled he suppress, the motion to the likelihood of part plea. simply tiated as of the Counsel prevailing given at trial the other available a confes- could not moved evidence, the deal that the state is offer- any plea, time before the unless the sion penalties that a ing, potential defen- majority to find ineffective means counsel deal, by taking dant can avoid an offered file threatening for not such motion and, course, own plea negotiations. defendant’s wishes. gave “wide latitude” to Strickland counsel majority’s approach The net effect of the unhelpful judicial to avoid nosiness in pernicious: deciding Instead of whether is negotiations: objective conduct fell an counsel’s below reasonableness, majority particular standard No set of detailed rules for asks the motion had merit and whether satisfactorily can counsel’s conduct take collapses step the entire first of Strickland variety account of the of circumstances Maj. question prejudice. into the See or the range faced defense counsel (“[0]ur atOp. inquiry respect legitimate regarding decisions how best performance substantially deficient over represent Any a criminal defendant. laps inquiry regarding preju with our such of rules would interfere with set dice.”). so, doing largely ignores constitutionally protected indepen- strategic reasons detailed in coun obvious dence of and restrict the wide counsel sel’s affidavit that counsel had to advise making latitude counsel must have in plea, dispositive Moore to take the and the tactical decisions. question becomes whether the motion to Strickland, 688-89, 466 U.S. 104 S.Ct. suppress had merit. Paired with the ma requirement 2052. A counsel defense jority’s unprecedented reading of Arizona any potentially file meritorious pre-trial Fulminante, being or risk incompetent motions found (1991), Maj. Op. 113 L.Ed.2d 302 see will plea negotia- collateral review skew (‘Fulminante prop at 1111 stands tions promoting where considerations an osition the admission of additional negotiation include whether defendant ordinarily prej confession ... therefore If, suppress. will file motion to re- udicial.”), infra, which I address detail rule, sponse majority’s new counsel implication is that the motion had if motions, file all must defense counsel loses merit, obligated bring then counsel was bargaining chip certainly and will almost it, irrespective of other considerations much cooperative prosecutor. face a less strategy. It forces defense counsel to *49 if And defense counsel loses motion to suppress file motions to a cоnfession panel that a in much judges might suppress, federal later counsel will be a weaker majority, the udice as a result. Unlike the when he returns to bargaining position cases, however, In those I do not believe that has negotiation table. Moore nearly always be prejudice. deal will To demonstrate post-motion demonstrated Strickland, pre-motion deal.10 worse than under 466 U.S. at prejudice 2052, petitioner a must show 104 S.Ct. all leapfrog over majority The would probability is a reasonable that “there sup- the motion to considerations'—if those that, unprofessional er- but for counsel’s merit, bring counsel must then press had rors, (even proceeding the result of the would think it will if counsel does not interests). have been different.” Id. at 104 S.Ct. Strick- the client’s best serve Lockhart, not allow progeny simply its do 2052. In Hill land and 57-59, of deficient conduct presumption this new 88 L.Ed.2d 203 sup- (1985), potentially a “meritorious” Supreme applied whenever Court Strick- filed— might motion have been pression guilty pleas” land the context of “[i]n proceedings governed least of all habeas satisfy ‘prejudice’ that “to re- held by AEDPA. quirement, the defendant must show that that, probability

there is a reasonable but errors, for counsel’s he would not have majori- short, agree I with the In cannot guilty and would have insisted on pleaded thorough representation ty that counsel’s 58-59, going to trial.” Id. at 106 S.Ct. 366. performance. Even constituted deficient There is no reason to believe that Moore of Moore’s assuming the involuntariness fact, gone have to trial. confession, gave expla- counsel a detailed against strong Moore was so state’s case plea was why pursuing nation irresponsible that it would have been for interest. We can sec- strategic thinking lead into he counsel to Moore decisions, have counsel’s but we ond-guess might gotten a better deal from a that those decisions concluding no basis for jury than he received from the DA. As I deficient, alone constitutionally let were here, explain by declining plea of felo- law, as clearly established Federal ny taking mandatory murder and mini- Court, compels announced twenty-five mum of years, Moore risked finding. such a getting a life or even death sentence. II. COUNSEL’S WHETHER Against A. The Evidence CONDUCT PREJUDICED

MOORE A straightforward application the Hill that Moore cannot ineffective, standard demonstrates Even if Moore’s counsel was any preju- that he has suffered if he establish Moore is entitled to habeas relief prej- that he has suffered dice.11 This conclusion flows from two can demonstrate counsel, Moreover, if, majority effectively line defense of his as the bottom 10. plea agreements reputation, will not seek own always today, defense counsel must holds against accepting will bar- counsel suppress a confession or risk a claim move to gain. This makes no sense. counsel, there is no of ineffective assistance of second-guessing game. end to the If counsel Judge argues Berzon in her concurrence motion, moved to and lost on that option meeting that Moore had the then, by majority’s reading, counsel must prejudice either Strick- standard under through appeal. and take an see the case trial further, and, or Hill that he land/Kimmehnan appeal, then he must file And if he loses on Concur- meets both of those standards. See argu- habeas—all that he can be in the best ring Op. so I address her at 1129-30. II.C, position negotiate plea bargain. ments in Part infra. *50 know, First, home, him you could have and make walk simple facts. the state testify that Raymond Ziegler here, and to called after he freed himself. This kidnapping his role in the Moore confessed course, kidnapping is the that’s involved slaying Rogers. of Kenneth We do and they in this case because took him some- Ray- much about what not need to fret against [D]uring where his will.... this would have testified had he mond Moore time, Lonnie a little period who is does, trial, majority at as the been called just good boy rowdier —he’s a but he’s 1097-98; at 1112 Maj. Op. (sug- see at id. rowdy. drop He’ll at the of a fight little gesting Raymond Ziegler and “would un- possession hat. He had in his a .22 doubtedly unnecessary to do be reluctant magnum pistol Rogers in which Mr. had (“[I]t case”); at harm to id. [Moore’s] given previously- given to him or trad- — [Raymond far from clear what and Zie- ed, Randy, I’m not which. sure And extent gler] would have said or what they pushing Rogers up while were Mr. testimony persua- would have their been hill, muddy, kind of during it’s (“Critical- ....”); jury sive to a id. at 1113 winter and we have a lot of red mud ly, findings no the state court made as there, Randy down had taken the revolv- Ray- the contents what Moore had told er from Lonnie at the time he had Ziegler they mond or what details it, Rogers taken Mr. had slipped back- trial”), might have been able to recount at on the mud gun wards and the dis- Raymond’s because the record contains I’m charged. not sure of all the exact testimony post-convic- at the state court basically hearsay. details because this is it, evidentiary hearing. Raymond tion It’s what was stated court and it’s that, confirms before he took his brothers they basically what had told me after the police station where their confes- too, incident, in, I took them before recorded, sions were Moore cоnfessed to way or on the in. him the happened. details of what Here is it, oath, Raymond how described under added). (emphasis majority thus is the state court: disingenuous in stating that state “[t]he [Roy Salyer] got back from [W]hen Tex- court found that Moore had ‘confess- as and Rogers discovered had bur- [that Raymond Ziegler ed’ to” but did not Salyer’s home, glarized Salyer] showed specific findings concerning make the con- up over at Lonnie [Woolhiser’s] house confession, Maj. Op. tent of that Randy morning where was that [Moore] particularly because trial counsel’s affida- couple and ... there was a cases of beer vit—which the state court credited-—-stated and started drinking basically, that Moore had made a “full confession to my understanding ... instigated them brother Ziegler.” and to Ms. The rec- and, it, going up they into put spank- least, clearly Raymond, ord showed that ing their other friend because friends do knew what happened because Moore told process not rob friends. And in the him about the details. With this testimo- this, guess, I to make an example and ny, reasonably the state court concluded put Rogers some scare into Mr. so he failure on the of trial part counsel thing again, they did not do this prejudice would not have resulted in taped blindfolded him to duct him and counsel, court, Moore. Trial the state put him in trunk of the car and took recognized Ray- the district court all remote, him place out to a that’s a little mond could have testified about what gentleman not a lot. The a large guy concerning size Moore told him the murder. and didn’t walk much and stuff. record, And him their intent was to leave there In its selective treatment of *51 Woolhiser, Moore, by virtue of Salyer, and this testi- ignores irresponsibly majority kidnap- in the felonies of their involvement mony. assault, guilty felony were ping confession to Second, even without It Oregon equally under law. murder case the state’s Ziegler, Raymond and that had no affirmative indisputable Moore have air- likely been Moore would against Thus, felony to convict Moore of defense. that the case “would emphasize I tight. murder, was all that the state needed to do counsel airtight” because have been likely part Rogers’s kid- prove that he took the state’s strength of judge had and that the murder furthered the napping Neverthe- put it on. before the state case kidnapping. show, felony murder less, I the case for at all. one not have been hard. The was not difficult This would Roy Salyer and Lonnie state had both Oregon of the section 163.115 Under have custody, and both could Woolhiser Statutes, was a Rogers’s killing Revised testify part that Moore took been called by a if “it committed felony [was] murder court found that in the attack. The state or at- committed] ... who person, had also confessed to Moore Woolhiser as- [kidnapping or tempted] to commit Raymond Moore as their older brother in the death occurred] sault] [the girlfriend, Debbie well as to Woolhiser’s crime in furtherance of the course of and all of these witnesses Ziegler.12 Since attempting committing or person [was] good relatives or were Moore’s close Moore, that undisputed It is to commit.” friends, testimony likely would their have Rogers’s went Salyer, and Woolhiser very been credible. beaten, home, that he was Rogers that was yet And this scratches the surface and that he was tape, with duct bound testimony to the they damning of the available trunk of the car thrown into the location, they Rogers’s Before left for borrowed, prosecution. a remote driven to Moore, residence, Salyer, that and Woolhiser indisputable It is temple. in the shot explicitly that Moore’s great The state court found majority spends a deal of time 12. affidavit, including para- confessions discounting the value of these two trial counsel's what the witnesses would by speculating graph explaining on that no motion to "Ray- It finds that Ziegler Raymond would not have done. or was filed because likely a hostile wit- would have been testify, mond was truthful. have been called to could unlikely 1140-41, state] that noted, [the and that "it is ness” already supra at As see to elicit much of the have been able would clearly states that Moore admitted affidavit Maj. Op. from him.” it desired information Ziegler. Contrary making a confession to full speculation, and & n. 24. This is raw at 1113 assertions, Maj. Op. majority’s see testimony Raymond actually belied it is ruling that & n. the state court’s 1112-14 patently provided the state court. It is also Ziegler did not conflict Moore confessed of what Because the broad outlines absurd. interrogation transcript: be- with the Just i.e., Rogers very clear happened were Ziegler of the murder on the cause learned home, bound, kidnapped, in his was beaten interrogation day does not mean that and shot in the taken to a remote location interrogation. of it at the she learned state needed to head while still bound—the majority, I find it remarkable felony very little to convict Moore establish years question, after the incidents in twelve Focusing made murder. on statements knowing any parties of the in- and without questioning, the Ziegler during initial volved, Ziegler Raymond and can divine what is little evidence majority states that “there they thinking and what would or were any- Ziegler contributed could have it remarkable that have done. I also find thing.” Maj. Op. at 1113. But state aside, majority with almost no brushes finding Ziegler court did not rest its discussion, findings court's factual solely the state repeated Moore's confession could concerning confessions. questioning. these made at the statements she drinking Ziegler’s had been others at either the blood or the hair was ever scien- tested, Salyer “ranting tifically inspection and rav- residence. visual of the *52 Rogers suggested may broken into his hair that it ing” about how had have been the victim’s, long cabin and slashed his tires. This was who had hair that he wore in prompted Rog- ponytail. what the trio to head to ers’s residence —to confront him about the So, summarize, even without Moore’s robbery and to scare him out of ever com- police, to the or his confession confession witnesses, mitting another one. Four in- Raymond Ziegler, Moore or Debbie or cluding Ziegler, observed this entire inter- testimony co-defendants, the the action and then observed the trio drive off prosecution testimony had from multiple Salyer to confront a car Rogers —in witnesses, well unchallenged as as state- had borrowed from another one of the (1) Moore, ments from that: An intoxicat- guests. Salyer ed ranting raving had been and Rogers’s Rogers

When the trio arrived at resi- about how had stolen from his dence, (2) tires; people other were there. These cabin and slashed his Moore had Moore, Woolhiser, people witnessed Salyer and left with and confront Woolhiser to (3) arrive, Salyer Rogers; and at least one of those Rogers’s the trio arrived at residence, people spoke with what they Woolhiser about and that soon thereafter (4) they doing there. Rogers; were Another was able were alone with the trio identify all Rogers’s three defendants from a returned from togeth- residence photo lineup. people These Rogers would also er. was found murdered the next testify point day. have been able to that at Salyer clearly this Woolhiser and were plates involved, the car’s they was, license had been covered gun knew where the tape. Shortly over with duct after the and blood and hair were found the trunk arrived, people defendants these all drove of the car that the trio had borrowed. The away, leaving Rogers Moore, alone with police prove could that Moore had lied Woolhiser, Salyer.13 about what transpired had when he went Rogers’s residence. Add testimony the highly inculpatory There was also physi- Raymond Ziegler, and the case is day cal evidence in this case. The before airtight. The felony state’s murder case confessed, Moore Salyer police led against Moore could hardly any have been location of the they revolver had used. stronger unless the murderers police were unable to it in find brought along a camera crew. dark, but Woolhiser led them back to the same area day, Moreover, the next at which point the evidence was such they weapon. recovered the When Moore could have been variety tried for a used, found the car that the they trio had of other crimes instead of or in addition to trunk, found blood in the felony as well as hair. murder. Had Moore not pled to Although murder, the record does not felony state that DA could have tried exception lineup With the they identifica- tions after had finished their dinner. Af- tion, prosecution house, could establish all of the arriving gave ter at the station Moore paragraphs by facts in the relying last two description largely of events that was accu- Moore, solely on statements made the ad- up point rate until the that Woolhiser and missibility ques- of which has never been Salyer began beating Rogers. day, The next day interrogation tioned. The before the asking Woolhiser admitted to owner of case, police approached issue in this anything they car if he had could use to they eating Moore and Woolhiser while were Rogers up, responded tie to which the owner restaurant, pair at a agreed local and the tape. that he had some duct ques- come station house answer murder, fathom—that the state had a rock- car- cannot which aggravated against case Moore and his best shot life solid imprisonment, of life a sentence ries However, deal. pa- strike possibility without imprisonment majority’s opinion completely formal fails role, death. See or Stat. Or. Rev. Likewise, almost of this evidence 163.095(l)(e), to consider 163.105. §§ n struck. implications for the deal Moore tried for other its have been Moore could (“Without See, Maj. at 1121 homicide, e.g., Op. any of which criminal types of ], ... confession[ fruits of imprison- Moorefs] of life carry a sentence would 163.115(5)(a). have had tremendous prosecution § In addition ment. See id. *53 high the burden it faced. difficulty meeting and Moore could charge, homicide to the in with In of the weaknesses the state’s charged been view likely have also case, that, in highly unlikely Final- the ab- crimes, including kidnapping. it is other confession, being charged of his own recorded of Moore’s sence ly, possibility the in pled felony forefront counsel’s have murder. crimes was Moore would with such with any the confidence that he discussed We thus cannot have mind when As counsel testified: the outcome would have been the same Moore. suppress.”). a motion to felony mur- had counsel filed length at the discussed We length at also der rule. We discussed majority’s parts opinion of the formal yet been indict- that he had not the fact appendix, majority as well as its the also possi- that it was any conduct and ed for record; my reading of the these criticizes an indictment came down ble that when example, lack force. For criticisms any jury, it could be for grand from majority questions my placing reliance mur- up aggravated to ... charge Woolhiser, testimony Salyer on the of and .... der any evidence in the record as to “without Mr. great length at with I discussed of availability the substance or such testi- “aggravated of Moore the definitions or, mony, important, even more its admis- murder,” “murder,” mur- “felony and in sibility,” Maj. Op. (emphasis at 1115 Mr. that if he I did tell Moore der.” in own original),14 contrast to its reliance aggravated murder charged were by the state on arguments on “the made that murder had jury and if the decided First, Moore, it is not appeal,” id. at 1114. under been committed Rev. Stat. [Or. state, the burden of estab- who bears 163.095(e),in of or as a § the course ] prejudice; his lishing that he has suffered torture, maiming of intentional or result in record failure to address evidence might that he impossible that it was not making it in ignore does not entitle us to aggravated murder.... be convicted of utterly It is for us to our decision. absurd witnesses, pretend obviously and put on blinders All of this evidence—the testimony damning evidence—such as the gun, Moore’s confession to tape, duct pled guilty— Moore and his of codefendants who others —were known to Indeed, majority simply does exist.15 They counsel. knew what hesitation, manufacturing strange apparently, in particularly no criticism seems 14. This Moore, arguments behalf who did new light extensive discussion that ma- of the impor- appeal not cite on the two cases most why, opinion, Ziegler jority provides in its majority’s opinion, Kimmelman tant good Raymond made and would not have Fulminante, any argument make relat- See, e.g., Maj. Op. prosecution witnesses. majority on which the bases ed to the theories 1-12; supra at 1145 n. 11. see also ("The Maj. Op. at 1116 its decision. But see (sometimes erroneously called majority’s on this score rule 15. criticism forfeiture rule) arguments, applies equally to waiver hypocritical because it has seems all the more so; expect arising guilty pleas: petitioner does not us to do he from himself must show “that there is a specifically Salyer’s addresses the issue of reasonable that, errors, Second, probability but for counsel’s testimony his brief. the record Salyer pleaded guilty he would not have little doubt that and Woolhis- leaves admissible, going would have insisted on to trial.” testimony er’s would have been Hill, available, 106 S.Ct. 366. The Salyer adequate: Both Supreme Court reaffirmed Hill Roe v. imprisoned by Woolhiser were the State of Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. Oregon, they easily produced so could be if 1029, 145 (2000),stating: L.Ed.2d 985 necessary.16 As to the substance of their Hill, we testimony, complete [i]n even if it were not as considered an ineffective police, their formal assistance counsel claim based on confessions to murder, allegedly counsel’s deficient felony Moore been on trial for advice re- garding consequences entering prove precious state needed to few details guilty plea. Like the decision whether day’s of the events to secure a conviction.17 here], appeal [presented the decision But important point the most is this: *54 (i.e., trial) plead guilty whether to waive we are reviewing Where the state court’s and, with the rested defendant like this an denial of ineffective of coun- assistance case, might counsel’s advice in Hill have claim, it irresponsible sel would be for us judicial caused the defendant to forfeit a apprise not to review the record our- to proceeding to which he was otherwise selves of what likely counsel knew. We entitled. only can speculate testimony as to what 485, Id. 120 S.Ct. 1029. The Court actually the witnesses would have offered proceeded to cite Hill for the proposition actually had this gone case to trial. But it “when, that in connection with a guilty ignore is naive for us to the other evidence plea, gives regard- counsel deficient advice in the record. defense, a ing potentially valid affirmative majority’s opinion The correctly quotes the prejudice inquiry depends largely on the applicable standard of prejudice for whether that affirmative might defense succeeded, ineffective assistance of counsel claims have leading a rational defen- assertions, legal factual majority's and any theories that claim that of the evidence I cite below.”). urged were not To borrow from above flowed involuntary from “Woolhiser’s majority opinion, "recognize [my] I that confession[],” 1119, Maj. Op. at and is there- colleague[s] believe[] Moore deservеs to simply wrong fore inadmissible is because [get penalty], disregarding a less harsh but the Woolhiser testify could have been called to [appellate] arguments as well as the state directly. findings, court substituting record and own, hardly one's is the manner in which Illinois, majority 17. The cites Lee v. 476 U.S. appellate supposed federal courts are to de- 530, 545, 2056, 106 S.Ct. 90 L.Ed.2d 514 appeals,” Maj. Op. termine at 1095 n. (1986), proposition testimony by for the may appellate judges "[w]e not as manufac- "inherently] co-defendants is unreliable].” scratch, arguments ture such especially from Maj. Op. See at 1098-99 n. 4. This citation is where, here, the facts in the record are misleading applica- both because Lee involved directly contrary theory seeking we are law, hearsay implicated tion of which is not parties,” to create on Maj. behalf of one of the by Salyer potential and Woolhiser's testimo- Op. at 1108. Roberts, ny, and because it relied on Ohio v. 56, 66, majority’s 16. inadmissibility argument— The 100 S.Ct. 65 L.Ed.2d (1980), argument longer good an only that Moore which is no law. himself makes See and, then, passing Washington, even with reference Crawford Salyer (2004). to for the same The reason. 158 L.Ed.2d 177 —fails First, simply is not relevant. on to trial.” Id. at going to insist dant counsel not have the benefit of this did then, knowledge discussing at the time he was majority’s position, The that, but probability plea bargain is a reasonable with Moore. there Additional- sup- to move to his counsel’s failure ly, certainty one cannot infer with how confession, taped Moore would press in a one defendant will fare trial from how murder, felony in- pled have to but And, Salyer a fared. different defendant going would insisted to trial. stead have good is not a test case of what would have that it is majority speculates likely the gone to happened had Moore trial because been unable secure state Salyer pulled not the one who the two bargain “only” with confes- plea trigger; who it was Moore marched Ken- catalogued and other evidence sions Rogers up neth the hill and it was Moore proposition, this support of above.18 who held gun Rogers shot that we know majority points out don’t Thus, through temple. every there is certainty Raymond and Ziegler what expect susceptible reason be trial, so would have testified to we can’t charges to more serious harsher testimony would know that their have been sentence and little reason think that accept plea to cause Moore sufficient charged only Moore would be with the Maj. at 1113-14. bargain. Op. Salyer. Maj. Op. same crimes as at 1107 not have the Moore’s counsel did benefit Moreover, majority n. 15. uses Moore’s majority’s ipse power; dixit when Salyer’s similar sentences as evidence offer, he advising Moore on the *55 got by of the raw deal Moore a accepting the judge his case on the basis of evidence However, plea bargain. plea bar- thought the had and the he state likelihood gain twenty-five years of is no harsher testifying. various witnesses No one of Salyer than the sentence received. If Sal- prescient certainty how a trial knows that, fate yer’s suggests anything, it is at out, so and play will a defendant his coun- least, by accepting the Moore did no worse weigh options and sel must their decide plea bargain the than he would have done plea prefera- the a is certainty whether gamble being by going to the one takes tried. trial. The that majority ble to claims prejudice Moore suffered because a less majority makes much The also of the culpable co-conspirator, who not pull did Salyer fact that to trial and received went trigger, the received the same sentence. the same sentence as Moore did from his Maj. Op. at 1119. How this constitutes bargain: twenty-five years.19 Maj. plea prejudice beyond 1114-15. me. Op. at 1107 This is n. majority ly satisfy taped 'prejudice' that if that The claims Moore's "in order to the

18. suppressed, requirement, had the the defendant that confession been state must show that, plea probability there is may bargain. have a better a reasonable but for offered Moore errors, Op. pleaded Maj. possibility n. 26. This counsel’s he would not have 1114-15 is guilty going unlikely and would have insisted Considering the both and irrelevant. Hill, evidence, trial." 474 at weight speculative U.S. 106 S.Ct. 366 of the it is added). (emphasis unlikely that the state would offered plea bargain a Moore different one of multiple suppressed. Salyer years been More- twenty-five confessions sentenced to was over, murder, negotiating possibility ninety the lost kidnaping, a more for months for sev- assault, plea enty twenty-two bargain, favorable which I do not believe for months event, burglary, here in does not months all of which ran concur- exists constitute rently. Salyer Belleque, WL prejudice any Supreme under Court v. 2005 authori- See (D.Or.2005). Supreme ty. unequivocal- The Court has held at *1 not, thing. majority’s It did much was more such This is clear: There evidence, per easily suggests, adopt se characterization enough than admissible of a con- improper that the state, rule admission by the to convict Moore obtainable Fulmi- fact, least) prejudicial;20 (at especially fession felony murder — nante explicitly improper held that recog- court importantly, as the state most subject of a nized, admission confession is Raymond likely testimony See analysis. error con- harmless Ziegler. and Debbie When we Moore 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246. Nor the fact does against the surfeit of evidence sider Moore, that found that Court plain it is that was coun- of the issue in admission confession at accept advice to not deficient sel’s advice. Fulminante prejudicial compel was good it prejudicial, very but was here. may same result Moore not have received lesser than who sentence his codefendant went The fact Moore’s confession trial, potential but he did avoid a death probative prej- police was does not make why good There is reason sentence. Indeed, it say udicial. is fair to Strickland requires us to defer counsel’s formal, tape-recorded confession majori- on-the-ground judgments over interrogation gave their “ ” ‘post hoc rationalization.’ Maj. ty’s own probably probative room more than Smith, Wiggins (quoting Op. confession, Fulminante’s which made to he 510, 526-27, they a friend while were both incarcerated. (2003)). short, there is no L.Ed.2d quotations majority All of the to think that one brick in removing reason from Fulminante to establish pulls wall the state’s of evidence would have probative damaging, value of confes- subject Moore to to a high- caused himself no “[a] sion—that confession is like other trial and no stakes therefore reason (alteration evidence,” Maj. Op. at 1112 any prejudice. conclude that he suffered original), that a confes- “defendant’s own probably probative sion is most Majority’s B. Reliance on Fulmi- damaging evidence that can admitted be *56 nante him,” id., against that admissions “[t]he Ultimately, majority opinion the rests on himself, a come from defendant the actor premise that the state court’s decision knowledgeable unimpeach- the most in an application resulted unreasonable past able of information his source about Fulminante, Arizona 111 conduct,” id —are were statements that (1991), case, a 113 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 302 Fulminante originally made Court that does not I once again, Moore note about confessions like those Moore made even cite. According i.e., majority, to the Raymond Ziegler to that those are “Fulminante stands for the proposition parties testify made to third who then Thus, that the admission of an additional confes Fulminante about them court. ordinarily sion suggest reinforces and corroborates does not alone hold—that —-let prejudicial.” the others and is prejudiced therefore Moore was confes- because his Fulminante does no sion to Maj. Op. fact, at 1111. police suppressed. was not majority attempts pended a says, 20. The to conceal its mis- sentence that "Fulminante Fulminante, assuring characterization of its proposition stands for that the admission per that a adopt readers it does not se rule ordinarily ... of an additional confession is improperly that are admitted confessions prejudicial.'' Maj. Op. therefore at 1111. If prejudicial. Maj. Op. 20. at 1111 n. That is a rule, adopt per does not it sentence se make, remarkably contradictory claim to dangerously comes close. opinion majority's ap- footnote 20 of the is would have entered fidenee that Moore opposite conclusion— the exact supports it Maj. Op. plea agreement.” so Raymond into harsh two confessions that Moore’s law approach 1117. misstates the at This damaging to already were so Ziegler at ways. least two of his confes- that the admission his case him no further do police sion First, Fulminante says nothing about own By majority’s logic, harm. weight of the two determining the relative Raymond and Zie- confessions to Rather, says that harmless confessions. evidence” and “like no other were gler analysis wheth- applies error determine probative and “probably the most were erroneously an admitted confession is er against [Moore].” evidence ... damaging Fulminante, at harmless. U.S. at 1112. Maj. Op. 1246. The Fulminante Court S.Ct. found the admission of first confession majority implica- to avoid tries harmless, to be not because it was not by comparing own argument of its tions one, weighty more than second but value of Moore’s confession the relative unique relationship of a between because Raymond confession to his veracity the two confessions—the of the majority Ziegler. The states by the second was bolstered existence lawyer thought ... “Moore’s 298-300, Id. the other. at prejudicial not be- taped confession was Here, relationship no such exists.21 had told his brother and his cause Moore girlfriend about crime.” half-brother’s Second, Fulminante concerned ap- According major- Maj. Op. at 1094. plication of harmless error after a trial had would, ity, confession “[s]uch formal place, guilty plea taken not after a persuasive question, be far more without entered, question as here. The un- been jury than Moore’s statements to two to a Supreme clearly der established Court majority at 1111. The lay witnesses.” Id. precedent thus not whether wе are con- is courts’ “determi- concludes the state fident that Moore “would have entered was that the confession harm- taped nation agreement,” Maj. Op. into plea so harsh a clearly contrary established less that, Moore at but whether can show Fulmi- Supreme Court law as set forth to file the suppression but for the failure 1118; Id. see also id. at 1110 nante.” motion, pled would not have but (“[The state determination that court’s] going insisted on to trial. No would have failure to formal counsel’s clearly es- prejudice other standard of prejudicial be- taped confession was law guilty tablished Court in the Moore had told rela- Hill, previously cause 58-59, See context. *57 girlfriend about his tive and relative’s 106 S.Ct. 366. But see Maj. Op. at 1113 the killing the of victim participation (“[T]he record falls far short of establish- contrary to clearly was established Su- ing testimony Ray- that potential the law.”). majority’s In the preme Court mond and would suffi- Ziegler have been under Fulminante mind, question the accept to to cient cause Moore so harsh “determining ”); down to whether the id. agreement comes .... at plea 106 S.Ct. (“[W]e weight of only determining difference between the Moore’s 366 are left to and weight his his half- statements brother whether the difference between the girlfriend taped and his formal to his and brother’s of Moore’s statements brother girlfriend to is such that the his and his formal police confession the half-brother’s taped to the is such that of the latter undermines our con- confession exclusion that, Op. flatly majority’s my opposite way,” Maj. thus under 21. The accusation logic, have come the incorrect. Fulminante "would out Thus, here, of the latter undermines our 1246. where the exclusion S.Ct. unlike against exceptionally that Moore have entered the case Moore confidence would confessions, If without plea agreement.”). strong so harsh a we even his “both into verdict, dealing jury recognized with a the ma- the court and the were trial State objection jority’s prosecution that a “confession is that a depended successful believing probably probative damaging jury the most the the two confessions.” added). admitted against that can (emphasis question evidence be Id. The before Fulmi- carry Supreme would more force because the Court was whether [Moore]” impossible prejudiced by credit improper “it is know what nante was ad- jury gave confession.” of the first trial in weight mission confession at Fulminante, 292, 111 light properly 499 U.S. at S.Ct. con- admitted second (internal (White, J., dissenting) quo- fession. The found that Court omitted). because, and citations But prejudice tations we are Fulminante suffered dealing with a here. bargain unique The under the of that circumstances reasonably compe- case, is whether a question jury likely would not believe (to Sarivola) attorney tent would have advised Moore confession second Donna evidence, differently when already faced with this made if it been had not heard so, and, (to if whether that Anthony led about the first confession Sa- rivola). to go pleading 298-300, to trial See instead id. at 1246. S.Ct. guilty. simply facts of Fulminante are if even we ap-

Yet assume Fulminante to those analogous presented here. its plies, facts are so from those different Moore’s confessions do not the same need presented here that to suggest background it is absurd kind that Ful- explanation it supports proposition the minante’s confession to Donna Sarivola re- court’s clearly quired Raymond state determination violated Ziegler because were federal strangers established law. Fulminaiite way was not to Moore in of murdering eleven-year-old convicted his Donna was to Sarivola Fulminante. Un- stepdaughter. circumstances, He made two confessions: der only made sense Sarivola, Anthony one a fellow inmate that Fulminante would have confessed him, who befriended and another to already Donna her if he had confessed her Sarivola, Anthony’s wife. Ray- Fulminante had husband. confessions to accomplices, no physical Ziegler “the evidence preceded mond and his confession from scene and police, other circumstantial and the confessions were not evidence would have way been insufficient to in the same linked that Fulminante’s Fulminante, convict.” 499 U.S. at confessions the two were.22 Sarivolas contrary, 22. On the the confessions in this sense that all confessions corroborated 372-73, each other. Id. at To bear far case more resemblance to the confes- majority distinguishes that the extent Mil- Wainwright, sions Milton v. ton because Moore’s confession issue was (1972), 33 L.Ed.2d 1 the .case confession, my point. formal it misses that the Fulminante as an Court cited exam- *58 Op. Maj. See at 1111-12 n. 21. The Fulmi- ple of a case where confessions were made nante Court held that admission of the confes- independently challenged of each other. The prejudicial, though sion was even a second confession in to a Milton was made admitted, was confession also because the posing officer who was as a fellow murder credibility strongly of each confession was suspect incarcerated with the defendant. The easily and each related could be attacked in- separate had previously defendant made three Milton, dependently. This was not in the case and, confessions that were not related con- accordingly, preju- the Court did not find dice; prison, similarly, he made in fession other than in the it is not the case here. majority’s Ray- in Fulminante. The to his brother Court older Moore confessed had once does this stan- Raymond reading simply himself not meet mond because Moore situation and been in a similar dard. Moore Ziegler and

wanted his advice. friends; house he was at her good were Prejudice The Concurrence’s Stan- C. Rogers, he left to confront with her before dard afterwards, and

he to her house returned ar- Judge concurring opinion Berzon’s mur- Rogers’s he at her house when was satisfy to gues that Moore could choose Moreover, in the reported der news. was un- prejudice prong either the Strickland Ziegler not have the Raymond and did directly Hill or under Strickland der to lie Donna Sarivola incentives same through lens of Kimmelman. applied Fulminante, here there did. Also unlike However, Concurring Op. at See 1129-30. example, the duct was other evidence—for Berzon views the Kimmel- Judge Rogers, and the blood tape to bind used appro- as more framework man/Strickland in the corrobo- and hair found trunk-—to resolving priate for this case because Hill testimony Ray- rate of the the details plea governs prejudice determinations given.23 would have Ziegler mond concerning counsel’s advice on bargains regardless of how Fulminante Finally, to take the plea, whether after “motions an read, certainly does not hold that is legal practice discovery have set to to file a motion attorney who declines at landscape.” Id. 1130. On the other challenged in favor suppress the confession Kimmelman, hand, Strickland and her plea to a on the advising of his client take view, “deal with counsel’s failure to create confes- presence of the second basis of the legal landscape by, exam- proper [for a — ac- the Fulminante Court sion—which failing plainly to file a meritorious ple], admissible, Fulmi- was see knowledged Judge motion.” Id. at 1130. suppression 298, 300, 302, nante, concludes that the Kimmelman Berzon assistance. provided 1246—has ineffective context, standard, per- applied plea by to be show- returning prejudice I to common theme mits established by close properly had ing I do not that the defense counsel my of dissent. believe legal landscape prior cor- reading shaped of Fulminante is majority’s However, might wrong proceedings, if am the defendant plea rect. even I correct, bar- AEDPA this have obtained more favorable majority is under prosecutor. Id. at 1131. permit grant gain from enough is not us may attempts so if the she to draw is only relief. We do The distinction habeas itself, any but contrary precluded by decision Hill also state court’s “clearly weight in both precedent law established” the vast that was simply majority Anderson v. Ter- did not discuss of the additional claims that present that was before the state evidence (9th Cir.2008) (en banc), hune, F.3d 781 prejudice Its entire discussion of is court. reading Fulmi- supports its remarkable basically single sentence: “The confession Maj. Op. cites at 1114. It nante. See Anderson, was central to the conviction.” proposition that a habeas Anderson for sup- provides at 792. no Anderson ... applying Fulminante need "not con- court reading majority’s port for the broad Ful- present- evidence sider the other the state majority's reading If minante. crime, wheth- ed the defendant to tie correct, and Fulminante it would Anderson repeated er would have such the confession the Fulminante rule harmless swallow Maj. Op. an That is erroneously evidence.” 1114-15. analysis applies admitted error *59 Anderson, reading which confessions. inappropriate of of appeals courts and the district courts. can challenged be a plea after is the advice “legal landscape” argument Her particular is inter- to enter a plea, for all other “established,” esting but has never been defects are by plea. waived the To be established, clearly sure, much less by the Su- Strickland is not irrelevant to the preme Hill; Court. It analysis also raises substantial under explic- the Hill Court concerns about separation itly adopted federalism and the in Strickland standard the powers. of guilty hold, context of pleas. “We there- fore, that two-part Strickland v. Wash- The concurrence’s critical mistake is its ington applies test challenges guilty failure to principles consider fundamental pleas based on ineffective assistance of governing the appeal guilty pleas. of A Hill, counsel.” 474 U.S. at 106 S.Ct. criminal defendant who entered a plea has 366. But process of applying Strick- generally waives right challenge de guilty pleas Hill, land to was set forth in Instead, fects in pre-plea proceedings. and there is no reason to use a different a defendant who plea “may has entered a prejudice analysis than that established in independent thereafter raise claims re Hill. lating deprivation to the of constitutional rights Hill, ‍​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌​​‍prior entry occurred of the Court wrote that many “[i]n guilty plea. may only cases, He attack guilty plea ‘prejudice’ inquiry voluntary and intelligent character closely of the will resemble the inquiry engaged guilty plea by showing by that the advice he in courts reviewing ineffective-assis- received from counsel was not within the tance challenges to convictions obtained standards set forth McMann through Rich [v. trial.” Id. 106 S.Ct. 366. ardson, “[Wjhere 759, 770-72, 397 U.S. 90 S.Ct. alleged error of counsel is a (1970) 25 L.Ed.2d 763 ..., ].” Tollett v. failure to investigate the determina- Henderson, 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. tion whether the ‘prejudiced’ error the de- (1973); 36 L.Ed.2d 235 see also fendant causing him to plead guilty McMann, 770-71, go rather than to trial will depend on the (“Whether plea guilty is unintelli likelihood that ... [counsel] have gent and therefore vulnerable when moti ... change[d] his recommendation as to vated a confession erroneously thought plea.” Id. But this inquiry only goes admissible in depends evidence ... not on to the question of whether the advice to whether a court would retrospectively con plea enter prejudice i.e., caused — sider counsel’s advice to be right wrong, whether the defendant would not have but on whether that advice was within the pled guilty with better advice—not wheth- range competence demanded of attor prosecution er the might have offered a neys in cases.”); criminal Ortberg v. plea agreement. different Put differently, (9th Cir.1992) Moody, 135, 137-38 accepting even Judge Berzon’s proposed (“Petitioner’s nolo plea pre contendere distinction between the advice to enter a cludes him from challenging alleged plea consti process of creating legal tutional violations that prior occurred landscape occurs, which plea bargaining entry Tollett, of that plea.” (citing 411 if a defendant pled still would guilty 1602)). 266-67, atU.S. or nolo despite contendere trial counsel’s unprofessional in crafting errors the legal With that principle fundamental pleas landscape in entered, which the mind, it becomes obvious that pro- Hill then there is no prejudice. constitutional vides the appropriate standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance Judge response Berzon’s that Hill did in the plea context. only thing not deal with the creation pre-trial land- *60 States, 598, 607, did, 105 S.Ct. Concur- United Kimmelman see scapes while (1985); 1131-32, why 84 L.Ed.2d 547 see also only highlights ring Op. Estradar-Plata, States v. the correct one. Un- United standard is the Hill (9th Cir.1995) (“[TJhere con Hill, a is no if it reasonable to advise der right plea a bargain, defi- to and the plea, a there is no stitutional take defendant plea a is bargain has unrea- whether to offer If counsel been decision conduct. cient (cita advice, prosecutorial of pro- we a matter discretion.” then giving sonable omitted)). To complicate would tion further ask the defendant ceed to whether anyway. Judge proposed In other Berzon’s counterfactual plea taken the have second-guessing all of will be words, analysis, about the this Judge Berzon’s concerns conducted, cases, years after the are ad- most landscape adequately pre-plea challenged step plea in the of decision offer the bar first Hill. dressed may Political or gain. winds have shifted for to follow good is reason us There may have prosecutor a new taken office. Judge Ber- in these circumstances. Hill Permitting petitioner a habeas to demon “legal have land- would us zon consider prejudice simply by showing that a strate bargain ask “the scape” plea whether plea bargain might different have been upon improved would been outcome calls impossi offered for an answer to an suppression filing of the meritorious question, will have of ble the effect filed because of inef- motion was not unsettling negotiated scores of state con Concurring assistance of counsel.” fective victions, encouraging litigation, needless way have no of evalu- Op. at 1132-33. We creating printing a in the press mass having been ating prosecutor, whether the courts corpus. federal for writs habeas suppress, motion to forced to answer the this plea Judge be to offer a new Were side effect of willing even would method, it perhaps be to- prosecutor much less whether the Berzon’s bargain, But “improved” “plea an are at least two addi- would have offered lerable. there First, places it problems. Id. tional federal bargain outcome.” in the instructing pros- courts role of state that a multiplicity Given factors ecutors' —members of state executive offering a prosecutor must consider when plea negotia- branch —of how to conduct that a bargain, highly it is doubtful tions, much time a prison or least how court, reviewing prosecu- a state federal prosecutor permitted is to offer if the state particular plea a tor’s decision to offer proceed reprosecution af- decides to with necessary even the tools bargain, has corpus writ of habeas To ter the issues. posture prosecu- what bargaining decide mildly, kind of with put this interference hypothetical take in the face of a tor would a state executive branch function raises suppress. deciding motion to When what substantial federalism concerns. Cf. particular criminal plea bargain offer States, v. Printz United defendant, example, prosecutor might (1997). 138 L.Ed.2d 914 willingness of the defendant consider Second, cooperate, past criminal and related the federalism defendant’s resources, pres- Judge approach impli- Berzon’s history, department problem, high separation powers poten- public profile from the cates sure emotionally Wayte beyond cases. tial effects far the current case.24 charged See judg- Although us on of a state court's the current case does not involve before review judiciary’s ment, a direct of the constitu- Judge prejudice analy- extension novel Berzon's powers coequal branches of tional vis-a-vis sis, adopted, apply if also would to review government federal because this case

1158 Conducting type inquiry this of very into wheth- breadth of the inquiry ... er a plea bargain better would have been require government would that the di- require judicial vulge available would the kind of minute details process about the scores, prosecutorial hundreds, review of which perhaps decisions that of courts uniformly charging have almost decisions are shunned. made. The court previously We have would also have to validity described the reasons consider the of avoiding judicial various rationales review of the advanced for plea partic- decisions, ular bargaining charging which decision: would en- deeply mesh it policies, into the prac- charging Prosecutorial plea bar- procedures tices and of the United gaining particularly decisions are ill-suit- Attorney’s States Finally, Office. judicial ed for broad oversight. court would have to second-guess the place, first they involve exercises of prosecutor’s judgment variety of judgment and discretion that are often cases to determine whether the reasons difficult to in a articulate manner suit- advanced therefor a subterfuge. are judicial able for evaluation. Such deci- normally Redondo-Lemos, sions are United States v. made as a result of 955 (9th Cir.1992) (foot careful F.2d professional judgment 1299-1300 as to the evidence, strength omitted), notes and citations availability overruled on resources, grounds, other visibility of the United States v. Arm crime (9th strong, likely and the F.3d 1515 n. deterrent effect on Cir. 1995) (en banc); particular Wayte, defendant see also and others similar- 607-08, ly collect, situated. 105 S.Ct. 1524 (recognizing Even were it able to the “broad discretion” understand and balance all of these fac- afforded the execu tors, a tive to court would evaluate such nearly readily find factors is “not impos- lay susceptible sible to guidelines analysis down kind of to be fol- by prosecutors competent undertake”); lowed courts are future cases. United States prosecutors We be left with v. Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) F.3d knowing prosecute when judges (“Courts not having generally time no judge. place interfer ing a prosecutor’s discretion whom to Assuming problems guidance these prosecute, file, what charges to and wheth and understanding could be overcome— er to engage plea negotiations.”). and it unlikely is that they could be— there an added constitutional sure, consid- To be prosecutorial discretion, in- eration based on peculiar relation- cluding the negotiate discretion to ship between the Office of the United bargains, give does not the executive Attorney States and the federal district branch license to violate a criminal defen- courts: The United necessarily States is dant’s due process rights, and courts wide- party every presented criminal case ly agree prosecutor that a cannot hide to a district court. It would raise seri- discriminatory motives under guise separation ous of powers questions prosecutorial discretion. See United —as well aas host of virtually Arenas-Ortiz, insurmounta- States v. practical ble problems (9th Cir.2003) (“One the district important re- —for inquire court to into supervise prosecutorial discretion, striction on how- inner workings of ever, the United States At- is that ‘the decision whether pros- torney’s Office. may ecute not be unjustifiable based on an convictions, federal § either under 28 U.S.C. 2255 or on direct review. I fail to see how could be race, religion, or other such as

standard ” prosecution’s looking at the done without (quoting United arbitrary classification.’ instance.” Id. at 456, 464, 116 “in the first decisions Armstrong, 517 U.S. States *62 (1996)) (inter assistance of In an ineffective 1134-35. 134 L.Ed.2d trial, a where the removed)); following claim counsel Redondo-Le quotations nal to the court (“Given question posed counterfactual mos, signifi the at 1299 jury might a evaluating what concerns charging and prosecutor’s of the cance done, presented the have at least evidence decisions, offend it would bargaining plea it was jury legal and the instructions to have them justice notions common for review. con- throw, are available given a coin of a dart the basis made on situation, trast, there is plea bargain in a arbitrary capricious other toss or some about other deals the no record at all what say that thing it one But is process.”). might have offered.25 prosecution the feder of either branches the executive prosecute cannot governments al br state whether, If, contrast, question in “the is through methods there are selectively, for assistance, a ineffective but for counsel’s such judiciary can evaluate the which position in a better [be] would defendant different, far entirely It anis claims. Judge prosecutor,” the as negotiate with bothersome, district thing to instruct more on, the test later id. at articulates Berzon bargain plea “the ask whether courts to entirely would the new standard improved upon have been outcome un- Numerous cases decided swallow Hill. suppression the meritorious filing of also be characterized as der Hill can at 1132-33. Concurring Op. motion.” failure to create “dealing] with counsel’s inquiry into require analysis would That by failing to take legal landscape” proper has this court questions precise Op. at Concurring action. strategic some which the avoid and courts should said See, Weaver, 455 F.3d at 970- e.g., 1130. judicial from likely protects Constitution Cir.2006) (9th coun- (applying Hill to Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d intrusion. See investigate mental defect failure to sel’s at 1299-1300. defense); 110 F.3d at 1386-87 Langford, alleging guilty plea in case (using Hill by claiming that responds Berzon

Judge counsel based on assistance of courts ineffective inquiry that type this is motions). suppression various failure to file in ineffective assis- undertake regularly sup- meritorious filing potentially And Concurring claims. See tance of counsel always strengthen de- motion will considering pression Rather than at 1134-35. Op. (at position bargaining actions, fense counsel’s Judge Berzon prosecution’s ruling is potentially until a adverse “the least would focus on approach that her says down). If that a choices, possibility handed counsel’s and defense defendant’s plea bargain might more favorable and defense judgment, counsel’s defense if a meritorious potentially offered But if the been Id. at 1135. counsel’s actions.” sufficient to estab- was not filed is plea “the bar- motion is whether question posed guilty prejudice after improved lish Strickland would have been gain outcome every plea bargain virtually suppres- plea, filing the meritorious upon relief. be, country open now to habeas motion,” is says ought id. as she sion presented by looking evidence at the swer problem is avoided under note that this I defendant on habeas and the question trial counsel prejudice: If the Hill standard of discussions and the defendant's review about have insisted the defendant would is whether depends prejudice standard The Hill taking plea, choices. going to trial instead of prosecutor’s considerations. not at all on a reasoned an- question amenable to is within proper apply context, Viewed standard of guilty plea Hill other AEDPA, “[sjome review under it was not an unrea- say than to ... other cases application sonable Court law (as Judge assume today) Reinhardt does Oregon for the courts to evaluate Moore’s also applies Hill the motions con- claim under Hill. The case fits squarely plea bargain involved, text when a within the rule of Hill: Moore asserts that well inas the advice context.” Id. From his trial counsel failed to advise him that a that, despite the absence of ap- case suppress might motion to be successful. plying proposed her guilty distinction to a advice, On the basis of that Moore pled no case, she inexplicable draws the con- felony contest to the charge of murder. clusion that provide “these cases do not *63 considering Other courts such claims have support using for Hill as the exclusive uniformly looked to Hill for the correct standard in such circumstances.” Id. standard.26 Given that the federal courts Supreme The Court would have had dif- have been applying prejudice Hill’s re- ficulty being more clear than it was in Hill quirement to situations similar to the one proper prejudice about the standard for case, presented by this it is difficult to see said, guilty pleas. hold, therefore, It “We how a state court should have to been able two-part Washing- Strickland v. divine this kind of extension of Strickland applies ton test challenges to guilty to and Judge Kimmelman. preju- Berzon’s pleas based on ineffective assistance of dice standard is not clearly estab- counsel. law; guilty the context of Supreme pleas, lished Court it is also con- ... to satisfy ‘prejudice’ trary requirement, to all other authority. federal I the defendant puzzle therefore over must show that there a Judge Berzon’s ob- jection that, probability I do reasonable but any not cite to case for coun- errors, holding that sel’s reading her he would prejudice pleaded not have Hill, precluded by guilty standard is see would have insisted going Concur- to 1134, ring Op. at for all the trial.” The cases she cites Hill Court did not recognize applying the Judge Kimmelman standard oc- Berzon’s distinction pre- between curred after a trial and did landscape not involve the trial setting ineffective assis- plea context. She respond also fails to to tance claims and guilty advice to enter the numerous I claims, cases have cited which plea point and she cannot to a See, Merchant, 780, e.g., Gilbert v. 488 say F.3d cannot Davis has shown 'a reasonable (7th Cir.2007) ("[G]iven 791 that he that, was con errors, probability but for counsel's he plea, victed based on his own Gilbert was pleaded guilty not have and would " obliged complete the demonstration of have going insisted on (quoting to trial.’ prejudice by showing that had his confession Hill, 59, 366)); 474 U.S. at 106 S.Ct. Hibbert suppressed, been reasonably likely it is that he Poole, 225, v. F.Supp.2d 415 232-33 gone would have plead to trial rather than (W.D.N.Y.2006) (applying prejudice Hill Hill, 59, guilty.” (citing 474 U.S. at 106 S.Ct. determination counsel advised defen when 366)); Salazar, 852, United v. States 323 F.3d plead guilty dant to before court ruled on (10th Cir.2003) 857 (applying Hill to deter motion); suppression United States v. Haw pled mine if guilty defendant who "should be kins, 825, (S.D.Ill.1997) F.Supp. 973 828 pursue claim”); allowed suppression ("Even if counsel's failure to file a motion ... 1386-88; Langford, 110 F.3d at Banks v. unreasonable, the evidence Hanks, (7th Cir.1994); 41 F.3d 1189 alleged defendant has not ... that he would Lockhart, (8th Hale v. 903 F.2d 548-50 pled differently Cir.1990); Carasis, had the motions been United States v. filed, (8th succeeded.”); Cir.1988) ("[BJecause they and had later 616 Fried Davis' Gamble, lawyer unreasonably forego filing F.Supp. did not man v. suppression client, (D.Mont.1995). motion on behalf of his we anyone majority The grants since Hill that has else. court single federal Court tells us corpus done so. Until Moore writ of habeas orders otherwise, fore- distinction is proposed her permit the state either to to with- Musladin, Carey closed Hill. See plea him. Oregon draw his or to release 649, 654, 166 L.Ed.2d surely will allow Moore to withdraw his (“Given (2006) holdings the lack of him to hilt. plea prosecute then ..., it cannot said that from be this Court does, it will be Oregon When under no ‘unreasonably] applied] court state obligation to offer Moore kind of a ” (quoting law.’ clearly Federal established deal, if bargain, it has it does decide 2254(d)(1))). § 28 U.S.C. obligation plea bargain no to offer Moore dis- argument is a concurrence’s got he as attractive as what this case. implicitly to extend Hill guised attempt may to seek the It even decide death preju- of Strickland’s permit satisfaction Oregon if were penalty. And even to offer demonstrating that a simply prong dice deal, plea a new Moore’s counsel must might ob- more favorable have been reject every filed until he has conceiva- Judge Berzon couches Although tained. can. After pre-trial today’s ble motion he *64 giving argument her defendants decision, no attorney conscientious defense what is proving prejudice choice of under accepting should even consider a plea as the difficult commonly perceived more good bargain deal—no matter how and rather proving standard than Strickland no matter what other evidence the prose- Hill, approach actual- under her prejudice potentially cutor has—if there are “merito- ly opposite effect: Instead of achieves the rious” motions that can be filed. being that he required demonstrate and, Oregon given try will Moore his guilty but have pled would not have friends, trial, family would confessions to and avail- going insisted on Moore that he required be to demonstrate eyewitnesses, able and other incontrovert- might plea a more favorable have obtained evidence, likely will ible Moore be found attempt This misconceives agreement. that, he is guilty likely murder. For plea bargaining, potentially the nature of in excess receive sentence well sepa- of federalism and principles violates quite possible he It is bargain negotiated. ignores Supreme and powers, ration of having worse off for Moore will be how to precedent Court on conduct prevailed anyone Nor is it clear here. following plea agree- prejudice inquiry actually after benefit from else Moore will agree ments. if I were to that an Even fact, today’s In defendants ruling. whose ambiguity relationship about the between negotiate plea agreements counsel cannot Hill, existed, Kimmelman, and Strickland exhausting pre-trial until after their mo- AEDPA job it is review to not our likely are worse off for the tions be resolve it. majority’s effort. liberty-enhanc- Today’s not a decision is III. CONCLUSION actually It ing hamper decision. will de- join anything majority I has cannot ability to avoid trial and fense counsel’s stated, I I written. the reasons For And our negotiate agreements. deci- majority to be on the wrong believe the unnecessary. plainly sion is so law, I believe it fails facts and the murder, felony or worse. He guilty state court’s decision the to accord the prosecutor a fair on the took deal from At the deference that AEDPA commands. counsel. Justice was competent advice of day, it is not clear end what for us up- There is no reason accomplished, for Moore or served. majority has orderly justice end the administration of in guessing acts defense engaged counsel Oregon way. in this in prior to the pleas. defendants’

I respectfully dissent. I CALLAHAN, Judge, Circuit with whom Several salient facts control this case KLEINFELD, BYBEE, TALLMAN, panel’s and undermine the findings of defi- BEA, SMITH, and N.R. Judges, First, Circuit cient performance prejudice. join, dissenting rehearing from denial of en we should focus on the proffered reasons bane: by counsel for not filing sup- a motion to press, not because the motion would not I respectfully dissent from the order successful, have been but because the rea- denying rehearing en banc. panel’s sons bear on the real in issue this case: opinion fails to follow the standard for attorney whether the rendered ineffective determining ineffective assistance of coun- by counseling assistance accept Moore to sel set forth Supreme Court the plea bargain. The first two reasons Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. (1) were that Moore did not think he was (1984). 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (2) in custody, and Moore previously particular, it fails to follow Court made a full brother, confession to Ray- guidance on deference and improperly con- mond, and a woman named Debbie Zie- flates the distinct concepts of deficient gler. Jordan, Affidavit of Kim 1-2. pp. performance prejudice, holding, es- reason, The third which is also set forth sence, incorrectly, that because coun- attorney’s affidavit, is that Moore af- performance deficient, sel’s it was also firmed to counsel that the confession he prejudicial. Furthermore, majority *65 given had to police was accurate.1 fails to accord the state court decision the deference the Supreme Second, Court has held it is any evaluation of counsel’s deci- due under the Antiterrorism and Effective sions should take into account quantum Penalty Death (AEDPA), Act of 1996 28 of evidence that counsel could reasonably 2254(d)(1). § U.S.C. See Knowles v. expected Mir- have prosecutor gath- have — zayance, -, 1411, ered, even if Moore’s confession sup- were 1419-20, (2009). 173 L.Ed.2d 251 pressed. We persuasively As set by forth should have reheard this case en banc Judge Bybee dissent, in his recog- counsel correct departures these from the Su- nized that prosecutor very had a preme guidance Court’s strong, and to ensure that if air-tight case, not regardless of panel’s opinion not give rise to a wave Moore’s confession.2 When these essen- post-conviction of new petitions tially second- undisputed considered, facts are 1. Counsel's affidavit states: the shot was an accident rather than a premeditated act. I do not recollect material statement of p. Jordan Affidavit 5. police report fact in the with which Mr. Judge Bybee notes: disagreed. Moore always Mr. Moore Under Oregon section 163.115 shooting claimed his actual of Re- of the victim Statutes, Rogers’s vised accident, killing felony was a was an but there was never the murder if "it person, [was] committed smallest doubt it during that occurred ... attempted] who committed] or to com- kidnap began which with an assault. [kidnaping mit or assault] [the death oc- pp. Jordan Affidavit 2-3. She further states: curred] the course of and in furtherance of Mr. guilty Moore believed that he was person the crime the committing [was] rule, felony murder under the murder al- attempting undisputed to commit.” It is that though very he felt that it was unfortunate Moore, Salyer, and Rog- Woolhiser went guilty and lamentable that he was since he home, beaten, Rogers ers’s that was that he always firing maintained that the actual tape, was bound with duct and that he was (9th Cir.2008) J., (Bybee, dissent- 1176-77 to file a motion decision counsel’s he admitted that had held the ing). on a mistak- Moore though based even suppress, law, single through was neither shot of the and had fired understanding gun en his death.3 prejudicial. temple, causing nor Rogers’s unreasonable hardly lack of intent claimed Furthermore, the other evi light thought and his counsel compelling, reasonably expected that counsel dence not to alert malpractice” have been “would im it is legally, gather prosecutor might be possibility that he Moore to the charge recognize portant murder. See charged aggravated Coun felony-murder. pled to was Moore Thus, counsel pp. Affidavit 3-4. Jordan that Moore would had to be sel’s concern reasons, com- very tactical even good had murder, which aggravated charged with be reasons, advising Moore to pelling him to subjected potentially felony- charge plead no-contest imprisonment. or life penalty the death 1128,- Czerniak, murder.4 F.3d Moore v. See testify have been able to that at they would also the car had the trunk of thrown into location,

borrowed, plates point had been a remote this the car’s license driven to indisputable tape.....There temple. It is with duct was in the covered over shot Woolhiser, Moore, Salyer, virtue of inculpatory physical highly evidence in also kidnaping confessed, in the felonies of involvement day their before Moore this case. assault, felony murder un- guilty of were Salyer led to the location of the revolv indisputable equally Oregon law. It is der they police were had used. The unable to er Thus, affirmative defense. had no that Moore dark, them it in the but Woolhiser led find murder, felony all Moore of to convict day, area the next at which back to the same prove he took needed to do the state weapon. po point they Whеn recovered mur- Rogers’s kidnaping and that the part in used, they lice found the car that the trio kidnaping. furthered the der trunk, well as hair. blood in the found hard. The state not have been This would Czerniak, 1128, 1181-82 Roy Salyer and Lonnie Woolhiser had both J., (foot (9th Cir.2008) dissenting) (Bybee, been called to custody, and could have both omitted). *66 to their older brother had also confessed hiser good place Moore in a sion of the facts fails to Raymond as well as to Woolhiser’s Moore light: they Ziegler.....Before girlfriend, Debbie walk, point during Woolhiser At this Moore, some residence, Salyer, Rogers’s left for gun. ex- a loaded handed Moore drinking with others Woolhiser had been killing they intention of plained that had no "ranting Salyer was Ziegler's residence. at simply going frighten Rogers; they were raving” Rogers had broken about how leaving top the hill and by him on of him his tires. This into his cabin slashed way As forcing him to find his back home. Rogers's head to prompted the trio to what hill, however, Rogers the four climbed the robbery the confront him about residence—to Moore, causing back into stumbled and fell committing an- of ever and to scare him out witnesses, discharge. As a gun his hands to including Ziegler, the one. Four other result, gunshot Rogers accidental died of an interaction and then ob- this entire observed Rogers— wound to the head. drive off to confront served the trio Moore, at 1133. Salyer had borrowed from an- in a car that guests. of the other one Salyer panel went to residence, cites the fact that 4. The Rogers’s at When the trio arrived year twenty-five the same trial and received people wit- there. These people were other suggesting arrive, that Moore Moore, Woolhiser, as Moore as sentence Salyer nessed plea bargain. See from his did not benefit spoke people with least one of those and at assertion, Moore, n. 15. This 534 F.3d at 1143 doing they there. what were Woolhiser about Moore, however, not the fact that overlooks identify all three defen- was able to Another weapon and fired the Salyer, the murder people held photo lineup. These from a dants substantial, The fact that Moore had if ground attack on the may counsel compelling, not to accept plea reasons the misjudged admissibility of the bargain felony-murder very makes plea defendant’s confession. Whether a majority’s opinion difficult to reconcile the guilty unintelligent and therefore Supreme opinion Court’s recent vulnerable when motivated a confes- Mirzayance. case, In that erroneously thought sion admissible holding Court overruled our that counsel depends matter, evidence an initial had rendered ineffective assistance of on not whether a court retrospec- counsel withdrawing guilty by tively consider counsel’s advice be (NGI) of insanity plea reason after the right or wrong, but on whether jury Mirzayance convicted first-degree advice was within range of compe- murder because the defendant had nothing attorneys tence demanded of in criminal Mir- pursuing lose from plea. the NGI cases. zayance, Here, howev- (footnote 770-71, 397 U.S. at 90 S.Ct. 1441 er, counsel, by arranging for Moore to Ruiz, omitted). Court, in reversing plead no-contest to felony-murder, spared Ninth Circuit’s holding required facing possibility Moore from of the impeachment evidence to first be disclosed penalty death in prison. life aWhile before a plea agreement would be held twenty-five year prison may appear term voluntary, Constitution, “that observed sentence, to be a long the finite nature of in respect to a defendant’s awareness of the term presents significant advantages circumstances, relevant does not require to Moore. Moore saves his life and is complete knowledge of the relevant cir- assured of prison release from when he cumstances, permits but a court accept completes twenty-five year term or is a guilty plea, with accompanying its waiver early parole released good or for behav- of various constitutional rights, despite ior. Unlike the situation in Mirzayance, various misapprehension forms of under where the defendant would not have been which a might defendant labor.” 536 U.S. if worse off pursued counsel had the NGI Here, 122 S.Ct. 2450. regardless of plea, here, a failure accept the plea propriety po- his confession to the bargain subjected could have Moore to a lice, Moore was all informed of the circum- trial aggravated murder with the possi- stances of underlying crime, and his bility of the penalty imprison- death or life reasonably counsel understood that ment. state had more than sufficient evidence to panel’s concern with the motion to convict Moore even without his confession. suppress rather than also fails to to McMann and Ruiz there are Pursuant Richardson, appreciate McMann v. *67 grounds no disturbing plea of 759, 1441, 90 S.Ct. 25 L.Ed.2d 763 no contest. (1970) Ruiz, and United States v. 536 U.S. 622, 122 S.Ct. The Supreme Court repeatedly L.Ed.2d 586 has stat- (2002). McMann, In Supreme the ed that “proper Court the attorney measure of reasoned: performance simply remains reasonable-

In our ness under prevailing professional norms,” view а plea defendant’s of guilty reasonably “(jjudicial based on competent that scrutiny of per- counsel’s advice is an intelligent plea open not to deferential,” formance must highly be and Thus, single Rogers. shot that Salyer killed being charged aggravated with murder. did not face the same risk as Moore did of court that counsel’s failure indulge strong pre- thought state to must that “a court conduct with- reasonable, counsel’s falls sumption that file a motion to was suppress range profession- of reasonable in the wide and it also that the motion found would Mirzayance, 129 S.Ct. al assistance.” have been because Moore had “fruitless” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688- 1420 (quoting Raymond to and previously confessed Deb- 2052). that accepting Even 104 S.Ct. Ziegler. Moore filed bie Id. When his sup- filed a have motion counsel should the district petition, federal habeas court grant- have press, that it would been and also found that there was no ineffective ed, against ease would the of assistance of counsel because Moore’s overwhelming accordingly, and remained prior potential confession and the adverse plead no-contest to counsel’s advice testimony Salyer. of Id. at 1135. was defi- felony-murder neither charge of prejudicial. cient nor Raymond’s panel argues The that Ziegler’s testimony not have been as II powerful Moore’s confession. See id. at Furthermore, own coun- our views of true, panel not Whether or does only tangentially are rel- competence sel’s question: not answer the critical whether panel recognizes, may “we evant. As the it was the state court reasonable for only when grant habeas relief the state light Raymond’s determine that in of to, ‘contrary in- was court’s decision Ziegler’s potential testimony, as well as all of, application unreasonable volved an connecting the other evidence Moore to law, Federal as deter- clearly established kidnaping shooting, the motion to Supreme Court of the Unit- mined suppress “fruitless.” would have been In on an unreason- ed States’ or “was based light of the other evidence available the facts light able determination prosecutor, fact that Moore had admit- in the presented State court evidence the underlying ted he committed 2254(d).” Moore, proceeding.’ 28 U.S.C. (and others), crime to counsel Mirzayance, 534 F.3d at 1136. possibility charged that Moore could be AEDPA, Supreme noted that under Court aggravated murder addition felo- determinations of ineffective assistance forego ny-murder, counsel’s decision to entitled to double deference. counsel are “ question at 1420. ‘is suppress motion to and to recommend a court the state whether a federal believes felony-mur- charge no-contest to a under the Strick- court’s determination’ der, certainly was a reasonable decision. incorrect but whether land standard ‘was It follows under the Court’s was determination unreasonable —a ” Mirzayance, reading of AEDPA substantially higher (quot- threshold.’ Id. panel when concluded even ing Landrigan, Schriro court’s that the state determination motion 167 L.Ed.2d 836 would be fruitless incor- (2007)). Moreover, “because the Strick- rect, it should nonetheless have deferred standard, general land is a standard objective- to that it is not state has even more latitude to rea- decision because court that a has sonably Mirzayance, determine defendant *68 ly unreasonable. See 129 Mirzayance, satisfied standard.” Here, the reasons S.Ct. at 1420. for well 1420. at S.Ct. Judge Bybee in his dissent articulated panel’s the state court’s and opinion, Here, hearing court held a the state the district court’s determinations petition and de- post-conviction Moore, ineffective F.3d at The Moore did not receive assis- nied 1134. relief. panel’s tance of counsel if not correct are performance nonethe- conflation of the and clearly less not unreasonable.5 prejudice prongs of the Strickland stan- dard for ineffective assistance of counsel

Ill and its failure to follow Supreme the panel’s The erudition cannot hide the guidance Court’s on deferring to counsel problematic nature of its decision when the and to the reasonable determinations of case is reviewed on its stark facts. In state courts and district courts. 1995, participating Moore admitted to in Finally, equally important, the prac- kidnaping the of Rogers subsequently implications tical of our failure to take this told at persons during least two case en banc are significant. panel The kidnaping he had fired the single shot that opinion creates out of whole cloth a new Rogers. had killed managed Counsel area of potential habeas relief where de- plea secure a no-contest to a charge of fense counsel is faced with a “Morton’s felony-murder that twenty- resulted Fork” —a choice between equally two un- Now, year prison five term. some four- pleasant Filing alternatives. a motion to years later, majority teen would vacate suppress might prose- have weakened the the conviction and sentence because coun- hand, possibly, cutor’s but not necessarily sel failed to file motion to probably, or even resulting in prosecu- Moore’s confession to police. This offering tor a better deal. However ac- confession, however, was made after cepting bargain when pro- offered Moore had persons. confessed to two other tected the defendant exposure from to a Moreover, Moore and his counsel did not much harsher sentence. As if labeling as coerced, think that his confession had been ineffective defense counsel’s resolution of questioned Moore has never the verac- impossible such an dilemma weren’t bad ity of his confession.. enough, panel opinion also sanctions panel argues that a sup- motion to federal habeas relief on this basis even press the confession should have been strategy where the foregone has been de- made and would have been successful. clared “fruitless” a state court. We But Supreme under the opinions Court’s should have taken this case en banc to McMann, 770-71, 397 U.S. at 90 S.Ct. ensure that panel’s opinion does not 1441, Ruiz, 536 U.S. S.Ct. give rise to a post-conviction wave of new and Mirzayance, such a petitions guessing second defense counsel’s determination does not entitle Moore to every forbearance. Rather, (a) relief. he must show that counsel’s overall performance, particularly BEA, whom, Circuit Judge, with plead advice to felony- no-contest to KLEINFELD, TALLMAN, CALLAHAN, murder, (b) deficient, was per- counsel’s BYBEE, SMITH, and N.R. Circuit formance and advice prejudicial, Judges, join, dissenting from the order (c) the state contrary court’s determination denying petition rehearing en banc: was objectively unreasonable. The under- lying facts this ease simply things do not One of two sup- must be true. Either (1) port such determinations. majority’s We should have conclusion that Randy taken this case en banc to correct prejudice Moore suffered depends on some Mirzayance, 5. 52(a); Court com- Rule Civ. Proc. Anderson v. Bessemer ”[b]ut, appeals may 573-574, mented: courts City, not set aside a findings (1985).” district court's factual unless 84 L.Ed.2d 518 ... 129 S.Ct. at findings clearly those are erroneous. Fed.

1167 fective assistance counsel was unreason appellate creative highly and egregious able, majority con- in part, at least because record is fact-finding which to his Moore’s confessions devoid of evidence about which details of cludes inculpatory a friend lacked and in divulged brother the crime Moore his confes (2) detail; majority invented a has Ziegler Raymond and Moore. sions new, rule that counsel’s virtually per se Czerniak, F.3d 1131 Moore v. 534 sup- motion to file a meritorious failure to (“Moore’s (9th Cir.2008); at 1147 n. 21 id. confession to the a defendant’s press confession would have been the taped to re- petitioner a habeas always entitles ----”); at full account of the events id. Strickland, many no matter how lief under (“[I]t is far from clear what those confesses to. people other the defendant would have said called to [if witnesses case, rehearing was warranted In either ....”); This, n. 24. testify] id. 1148-49 join fully I panel’s error. correct the charitably put, imaginative appellate is from the order dissent Judge Callahan’s fact-finding possible only by ignoring made banc, rehearing sepa- but write denying en in the some inconvenient facts record. my concern with the rately emphasize counsel, contrary, To the Kim court’s majority’s treatment of state Jordan, given averred Moore had “full”1 factual determinations. Ziegler Raymond to both and confessions facts, Randy briefly, are these: The Moore. Jordan used this word—“full”— Moore, accomplices, two Lonnie along with three times his affidavit. Jordan’s Salyer, assaulted Ken- Roy and Woolhiser probative statement is some of the most up, him threw him in Rodgers, tied neth evidence we could have of the extent and car, him to an the trunk of their drove content of these confessions—counsel’s him, spot, blindfolded marched isolated based, knowledge part, is at least in woods, ‘accidentally’ then him into the defendant, communications temple point-blank him in the shot is, all, performance after Jordan’s we are felony pleaded guilty Moore range. evaluating. now to 300 months’ murder and was sentenced The state court credited Jordan’s affida- the fact imprisonment. Despite Raymond vit and found Moore and “[b]oth man, being trigger Moore confessed to [Ziegler] the friend could have been called once, twice, times, three not not but repeat petitioner’s as witnesses to confes- fact his coun- despite the told suppress sion. A motion to would have true, that these confessions were sel so, In doing been fruitless.” the state despite the fact that the state court found portion court even cited to the of Jordan’s would have been that motion describing affidavit the confessions as fruitless, majority holds that Moore’s “full.” sup- failure to file a motion to counsel’s press separate one the three confessions majority finding The first concludes this constituted ineffective assistance of coun- court did inadequate because state Washington, sel under Strickland v. expressly prior find that the two con- not 80 L.Ed.2d cramped fessions were “full.” This read- (1984). contrary long- ing is both incorrect and controlling regarding standing, precedent majority concludes state court’s every finding of implied findings. inef- “[N]ot determination Moore did receive (1984). University Dictionary Complete every “2." detail <a Riverside Full: full of the incident>.” Webster’s II New account *70 on the record in infi- contentions. As Moore’s habeas counsel fact need be stated clarity.... When a state explained, “Nobody Raymond nite detail and knows what a a hearing Moore, trial court holds on motion [Roy] Ziegler, Salyer Mrs. or motion, on the suppress evidence and rules ignorance would have said” at trial. Our may district court assume that federal entirely on this score is caused Moore necessary court the the state found facts consequences, and he must bear ” support the state court’s decision.... aspects inquiry, all of the Strickland Goldsmith, Knaubert v. proof. Moore bears the burden of Wood (9th Cir.1986). Visciotti, 19, 25, v. ford (2002). case, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 The state says majority, such fact, made, reasonably of had it been would court finding could have inferred the Taylor have been unreasonable under falsity present of Moore’s claims Maddox, (9th F.3d 1000-01 Cir. Ziegler Ray confessions to and brother 2004), ignored because the state court details, mond lacked critical and hence “highly probative” and “relevant” evidence force, probative from his failure to offer that contradicts Jordan’s statement evidence to buttress them. Moore, Ziegler heard a full confession. majority ignore was not free to “highly proba 534 F.3d at 1149 n. 24. This findings complete- state court’s as to the consists, tive” and “relevant” evidence Raymond ness of Moore’s confessions to entirety, Ziegler’s its police statement to Ziegler point unless could to record that she had not heard the details of showing evidence such findings com- day Moore’s confession until the of the pleteness objectively to be unreasonable. police interrogation. Ziegler That heard 2254(d)(2). Here, § 28 U.S.C. the panel Moore’s confession for the first time that simply has substituted its own view of the day hardly proves she didn’t hear the con facts for that Doing state court. so police fession until she was in the interro especially this case is troubling. As is itself; gation interrogation room did proceedings, often the case in habeas begin until the late afternoon. Moore the petitioner provided record has is thin ample opportunity to confess to her many gaps and leaves be filled

before he arrived at police station. finder of fact. But we cannot do so our- Even Moore’s Ziegler’s briefs describe selves; that is the role of the state courts statements about when she heard the con and, circumstances, appropriate under “ambiguous” fession as and “equivocal.” federal district It court. is never our role. important As as the evidence that is in panel majority’s expressed If the doubts as to the record fullness of Moore’s about the fullness of Moore’s confessions Ziegler confession to is the evidence that unnecessary decision, are then the provided isn’t. Moore has not shred rehearing need for is all the more obvious. support evidence to his claims that his case, If majority such is the has creat- Ziegler confessions to and to his brother new, ed a virtually per se rule that Raymond detail, lacked inculpatory failure to file a sup- meritorious motion to Ziegler Moore did not confess to prior to press a defendant’s confession to the police interrogation, Ziegler or that always prejudicial. If the existence of Raymond would have been reluctant separate, two independent, mutually example, witnesses at trial. For have, not, confessions, corroborating proof by way given persons could but did offer of affidavits or from to whom the Ziegler personally declarations defendant was Raymond close, present corroborate his is insufficient to establish harmless *71 all, error, After a “confes little will be. SANCHEZ; Sanchez; R. E. C. Arizona v. no other evidence.” is like

sion Rodriguez; Figueroa, S. 279, 296, Fulminante, S.Ct. Plaintiffs-Appellees, (1991). 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d majority correctly observes multiple CANALES, Sergeant; confessions there were also LAPD James Wesley Woo; But the differences between Fulminante. Ruben Gonzalez Wil- Lantz; Rede; Ronquil- are stark. The liam Max Alex this case and Fulminante lo, Defendants-Appellants. giv- was confession Fulminante second (2) (1) individual; to a single to a en: No. 06-55584. stranger, virtual whose connection Appeals, United States Court fact that was the Fulminante was the she Ninth Circuit. (3) officer; to a investigating wife of the Argued and Submitted Nov. 2008. credibility made dubious person whose report Fulminante to the by her failure July Filed 2009. that, by the fact after Ful- authorities and confessed, voluntarily associ- minante she despite disgust with him her stated

ated (4) actions; person to a who re- ‍​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌​​‍the confession to authorities under

ported suspicious circumstances. Id. at

highly Here,

298-99, 111

twin confessions to close associates—one testimony them his own brother —whose jury would have had little reason to

doubt, single little bear resemblance

confession Fulminante. if, appeal, might

Even on direct we con-

clude that Moore’s counsel’s failure to file motion to the confession to the

police entitled Moore to relief under

Strickland, credulity to it strains claim contrary

that the state court’s decision was

to, of, an application unreasonable

Fulminante decision. reasons, per-

For these and the reasons by Judges Bybee

suasively set forth

Callahan, I respectfully dissent from the rehearing en banc.

denial notes part in the attack. testify that Moore took Moore and Wool- court found that The state description ver- panel’s of Moore’s 3. Even

Case Details

Case Name: Moore v. Czerniak
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Jul 28, 2009
Citation: 574 F.3d 1092
Docket Number: 04-15713
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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