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Moore v. City of Beaumont
195 S.W.2d 968
Tex. App.
1946
Check Treatment

*1 by, able. This was not suit

аgainst It is tax suit the United States. against levied State

involving taxes No employer of within the State. labor levied, levied, nor could have been tax was any Nor was United States. in- Whatever the United States. may have in the

terest the United States

recovery virtue of a contract with corporation, employer and not as an taxpayer. was levied

nor tax corporation private against a

state law Texas,

doing business and suit for re-

covery predicated upon a state relat- law

ing to state taxes. The State is not con- interest, any,

cerned with whatever recovery

United States

by appellee. Appellee corporation was the

only party tax, only who owed the one appropriately protest

who pay- could its ment, obviously proper party to recovery,

sue joinder without the party might other who thereafter recovery.

assert some interest in the

For reasons stated the

the trial court affirmed.

Affirmed. BEAUMONT. v. CITY OF

MOORE 4325.

No. Appeals of Texas. Beaumont. of Civil

Court

April 1946.

Rehearing June Denied *4 agreed $13,772 consideration and the delivered deed deed, January Moore. later 14, 1935, duplicates quoted, hereinafter Beaumont, Sonfield, George M. instrument, immaterial additions. appellant. Moore alleges City appropriated Tatum, Atty., B. Mor- A.W. and J. pur- money municipal “for used it ris, Beaumont, appellee. both of poses.” After completed, transaction WALKER, Justice. Moore negotiations with one into entered brought A. Moore this action R. Gordon for the him to Gordon of a sale $13,772 to recover City of Beaumont royalty, but Gordon raised the convey- for a question, whether the to Moore him a of mineral ance should have been an ordi- authorized City’s airport. He also under the resolu- nance instead aforesaid prayed instru- for cancellation various tion, thereupon informed the conveyance. The trial court sus- ments of *5 City of his intention sell a petition exceptions to and dis- tained Gordon, royalty of this particular and action, and missed the from this by suggested defect Gordon. The appealed. he has agreed objection by passing to obviate this al- necessary to summarize Moore’s It is appropriate by ordinance and thereafter so, legations we do follows: and delivering and another executing deed municipal corpora- is a of Beaumont Moore, agreement performed. and this adopted tion, operating under a charter 7, 1936, January On enacted an pursuant Rule Amendment to to the Home previous ordinance which ratified deed of this state. Vernon’s the Constitution Moore, receipt acknowledged of Moore’s 11, 1929, July Ann.St.Const. art. On § $13,772, mayor, city authorized the and Poole, conveyed Evelyn R. et al. manager city clerk execute de- and and warranty by general a tract of deed general warranty liver Moore another Savery league in A. in the land Jefferson him, conveying agreed deed royalty in- County, containing 275.44 acres. pursuant and to this ordinance afore- purported to and convey fee title strument make, said execute officers and deliver did nothing for indicating the use contained warranty general Moore the dated deed Actually, was intended. which the land 14, 1936, January quoted which is below. proceeds bought paid for with land was duplication this Since instrument is of issued of voted and bonds which had Moore deed to of October acquiring by additions, may certain immaterial gas from Production of oil airport. properly complete be set out as ex- tract, opera- drilling near this lands pression agreement of Moore’s with the adjacent during on lands tions conducted City. It follows: deposits of 1935 indicated valuable “The State of Texas tract, lay Moore within minerals “County of Jefferson purchase a mineral agreed %oth presents: by all men these That “Know pay there- land and to and under City Beaumont, acting by herein upon delivery $13,772 of a sum n through Mayor, City Manager, warranty con- deed from Clerk, duly authorized, hereunto royalty to October veying him. On said County Jefferson, Texas, State Moore a con- City tendered consideration of the sum Thir- royalty, required but he veyance of this teen Hundred procured Thousаnd Seven authority therefor and Seven- be ty-two council, 12, 1935, ($13,772.00) Dollars and on November no/100 by Moore, paid cash R. to it hand A. formally resolution author- by the council receipt hereby conveyance. day of which is On follow- acknowl- ized 13, 1935, edged, granted, conveyed, to-wit, paid sold and November and. ing, sell and presents grant, these does oil royalty and other minerals due Moore, R. A. paid said be lease, unto under the terms ve> Texas, a one- County Orange, State of insofar as it covers above described perpetual royalty in and (¾6) sixteenth money property, but that none of the rentals coal, oil, sulphur, and other to all the gas, may paid be extend the terms may be upon and under or minerals begun within may be which well following de- produced ,the from the saved paid terms of said lease to be land, to-wit: scribed tract of R. said A. Moore. It is further under- agreed stood that the Grantee does not the Ashel “275.44 acres out conveyance acquire any right Texas, County, Savery League in Jefferson participate making in the future oil and Airport known as the of Beaumont gas mining on the leases described Tract, by the Ben on the West bounded herein, participate any nor in the making of tract, Irby the North heirs’ 157-acre on future lease or should existing future Railway right-of-way; the B. S. & W. L. reason any become or cancelled East the Gulf Terrace on the Subdi- forfeited, participate nor in any bonus or ; vision and T. & South N. bonuses Grantor herein which the shall re- Railway right-of-way. O. lease, any participate ceive for nor “Delivery made rentals, privilege to be for the of de- (less proportionate part thereof used ferring the commencement well or operative purposes for fuel or on the other wells under any future lease that premises) mine mouth of the or at hereafter executed. any piрe line with the well wells connected, well, tanks, at or in “Nevertheless, it is further understood *6 provided grantee. by to be agreed convey- and that this ais of a (%e) perpetual ance roy- one-sixteenth provision is “It that the here- understood alty oil, gas, sulphur, in and to the coal all payment royal- delivering in for or of such produced and other minerals that be ty Moore, R. his or A. heirs said and from the saved said 275.44 acres of assigns, shall constitute covenant be and land described above. running the binding with land and grantor, or and assigns, heirs if and his “It further provided that this is a con- oil, gas, pro- when such or are minerals veyance the (%e) identical one-sixteenth duced, royalty such shall or royalty delivered mentioned and described the Moore, R. A. his heirs or said to City deed from of Beaumont to assigns, expressly but it understood 17th, A. 1935, Moore dated October R. and nothing herein shall be as obli- construed 393, 407, page Volume recorded gating grantor, assigns, ‍‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​‍or its successors County, Texas, Deed Records of Jefferson oil, operate to drill or otherwise for purpose and this is made for deed minerals, gas, against or other its will. deed, correcting said and not an ad- royalty. ditional City of Beaumont does bind “And itself, assigns, successors and its war- whereof, testimony City “In of Beau- singular and defend rant forever all and mont has caused this instrument said interest said R. A. Mayor, City by Manager, its executed and Moore, forever, assigns, his heirs and. Clerk, -City and its seal there- affixed person lawfully every whomsoever to, this, January, the 14th day A. D. claiming or part or claim same 1936. thereof. “The of Beaumont understood, however, “By (P. “It is that the D. Renfro) above “Mayor an oil described lands now under and gas originally “By (G. executed in favor Petkovsek) H. Joseph Landry, by “City Manager and now held .P. Company, (Seal) Humble Oil & “Attest Refining this subject lease, “(Raymond Edmonds) sale is made to said but Clerk.” “City covers and includes one-half all by of bоnds voted and buy issued agreed thereafter Gordon airport. acquiring subject approval royalty, eventually refused title, Moore’s but says City misrepresented Moore “for conveyance from Moore accept a authority respects. in these does its He defendant that, opinion, his reason charge fraud with deliberate authority to con- had Beaumont no petition alleges by but his statements of land said tract minerals under vey relied, respecting au- on which he passed title no plaintiff and its deed him, thority conveyance to to make property' had whatever by subsequent course of conduct a bond issue proceeds of purchased he himself down to demanded the time did purposes.” Moore voted money, the return show action; on acquiesce in Gordon’s pleaded taken all facts 1936, brought suit September or about mistake, not acted mutual under a district court against Gordon City’s convey only regarding powers performance specific County for Orange purport which the deeds purchase. Gor- contract latter’s convey, regarding but also existence ground where- on the suit defended the don property avail- and nature of interest accept conveyance refusal on he based conveyance. extent effect able Moore, defense was title will be later but of this mistake considered denied relief Moore was sustained city’s representations course by of said against Gordon to now. must be referred conduct February court dated district Perhaps way point giving is, court, Appeals, that Civil Court of misrepresentations, alleged Moore appeal 122 S.W.2d acquire and own trial court judgment of the affirmed same, convey lands and sell and and on October judgment dated tjhe alleged further lands owned 25, 1939, Supreme Court dis- January capacities, were held different to- application for writ of Moore’s missed wit, public, privately, for the trustee rehearing motion Moore’s error. corporation, for use as a on Feb- Supreme overruled Court *7 question herein, all times in the to-wit, Subsequently, on or ruary 1939. own and capac- did hold lands in each demanded of Moore about March ity; City’s power sell to and con- money by writing that City in public vey trust lands held in for namely, $13,772, City, with to the him subject (which to limitations were him; interest, but the be refunded ; specified) but that had the same any him pay and refuses to still refused power convey to sell and by lands held it original peti- his He filed part sum. of privately private as had an or individual a September 29, on this action tion in corporation. power contract, summary will do acquire property convey and to sell and but Moore under- alleged; facts same was founded Section 5 of its representations on plead various taken charter, alleged Moore as which follows: during him made to “Section 5. General (1) The Powers. city, and negotiations with original his perpetual City of Beaumont shall have suc- afterward; matters must be these and cession; right government; of local self in more detail. stated seal; corporate may may use be sue and substance, equity having in all courts of law and alleged, that in sued Moore Gordon, court, jurisdiction; may contract and the trial and con- suit with, implead Appeals, impleaded that the tracted and be held Court Civil courts, and all matters conveyance ultra vires all such to him was whatso- ever; acquire property simple may was inconsistent in fee because or purchase, interest estate airport, lesser land for or use with devise, effect, appropriation, lease by gift, had, dedicated or lease been it purchase privilege purchased. any it with mu- had been with funds may sеll, lease, hold, proceeds nicipal purpose; stated, man- were As these fundsv real, or personal City purported convey him the age and control such any royalty purchase. all rules and Yet if property and make undertook to mixed or resolution these a technical regulations given ordinances instruments be and fully struction, carry out required they might with may be seem inconsistent to; conveyance, allegations just deed the any provisions referred all bequest appears or gift or any from the face said or in relation to deeds will may provision by which it Moore dealing lease and the were with all perform tract of land acquire property; supposedly and render Such lease. expe- services, conveyed public “perpet- deemed deeds would not and public royalty” strictly legal ual ain dient, sense property condemn valid; city use, and lease instead Moore would within without same; acquired hold, royal- such have manage and control interest in the lease ty governed City’s possibility and an proceedings to interest in condemnation force in refer- reverter which au- would have vested controlled the law him ¼6 n tomatically nonpartici- condemnation title to ence pating companies and the assess- fee railroad on the termination way of therefor; However, obviously damages and shall said did lease. Moore ment himself; obligations all the duties intend to and we subject to contradict may properly respect- said allegations pertaining to or incumbent treat his now ing city’s corporation, representations not in city, conflict to him as be- charter, and shall provisions of consistent with existence of immunities, powers, rights, enjoy having all been directed toward possessed now privileges franchises convey granted herein city and interest enjoyed purportedly conveyed said on face Certainly, his deeds. conferred.” it was Moore’s say intention purported that he buy Evelyn R. said that the deed Moore purported convey to him a City, conveying Poole al. to the the air- et royalty not rights burdened with in the tract, port did not show what the land public to have the used airport. for an for; purported convey to be used title simple, and in fee when Moore and alleges representations simi- purchase negotiating were quoted lar to those above were made himto represented to sale of the when he informed the “the defendant was seized Moore that objection Gordon’s first title, we simple possessed of the title to said fee allegation note an this occasion the encumbrances, tract of free all City represented himto “That tract of legal prevent- *8 impediment there no existed by held was private Defendant in its minerals, (the) de- ing the sale and that proprietary capacity.” Furthermore, he ready, willing fendant was able and to exe- says finally rejected that Gordon his conveyance cute a with a collateral same City thereof, title the was informed and of warranty.” alleged fur- contract by the reason advanced Gordon for ac- his “relying upon representa- ther such that tion, plaintiff and the “assured that (he) agreed purchase (¾e) per- to tions conveyance said and said collateral contract oil, petual royalty gas, to all the and sul- warranty respects in all legal.” was agreed phur, and other minerals—and coal Moore indicates expressions that similar ' ($13,772) pay cash City therefor — by times, were made to him the at later delivery proper general execution and of a but does show when these statements warranty deed.” petition alleges werе made. His he that not to make the a party chose his allegations must be These construed Gordon, apparently against suit because the deeds. Texas Moore’s Rules of Civil 59; Procedure, want to become a party Rule Co. did not Southwest Stone Commission, “such course was Tex.Civ.App., 173 and suit calculated to v. Railroad plead convey produce beneficial results.” The City 325. Moore these was exhibit; Gordon, of his against suit and he refers them and informed ances says city clerk on the trial thereby them that testified of that construes and effect ery purchase price inten- Moore’s said been have case. It seems interest, City con- and for such other and fur- generally that allege tion relief, ther convey- general special, both law and its held out sistently treated equity, prove and in him- that to which he valid, alleges being and he ance as City self entitled.” presented his demand when he by him as money paid return of the for the Moore has carried the effect of royalty, and the for the consideration respecting “mutual mistake the title of there, demand, then and his refused ac good defendant” deal farther than it time, position City took the the first tually goes, all pleading but his need do— vires was ultra royalty transaction go beyond prayer general if he need $13,772 was recover the right to that his mistake; relief—is to show the it is limitation, barred court’s function to determine the effect reject- propositions on these would stand here, especially so where mistake ing his demand. largely the mistake is one of law. le- briefly various now refer We shall following The raised the defenses exhib- parties which gal theories by exceptions to Moore’s action to Moore’s pleadings. ited petition: very fully several petition states Moore’s conveyance to Moore ul- (1) The rights as what legal conclusions vires, and tra therefore void because the his deeds He treats are. been dedicated to use an air- void, in Moore and this court’s port inconsistent said He be void. holding them to Gordon as with this use. cove- recovery under a right claims title, (2) power to warrant The covenants warranty, nant of title, convey and to warrant the de- 1297, R.S.1925. implied Article pends upon, by, does not run is limited consideration failure of a total claims He title; power convey beyond and as $13,772, pleads a constructive for his power convey did not have money. also He favor of in his trust Moore, royalty to it did not have the of action allege a cause purports Moore, alleged to make the warranties received. money had and warranties are therefore unen- allegations arguendo These forceable in action. considered, matter course (3) evi- foregoing matters were our determination controlled which has recovery dently pleaded in bar of Moore’s allegations of rights Moore’s parties’ city. express In bar on an contract determine facts, must for this court is, implied recovery, any other show those rights as facts Moore’s $13,772, refund the obligation accordingly. be, grant relief rights to year statute of limitations. two raised the support any recovery prayer will Moore’s Opinion. under the entitled he to which petition exceptions Moore’s sub- not, many in so He has alleges. facts question, stantially raise the whether words, re- ground alleged a mistake as *9 cause of action alleged a Moore the exist- lief, pleading shows fact but his did, that cause if he whether mistake, that he and we note a ence of years was barred two of action basis, follows: that as relief on prayed for judgment Our nec- statute of limitations. prays in alternative further “Plaintiff essarily depends upon assumption an that of the defend- of the fraud by reason that allegations true. Moore’s out, because of the set hereinabove ant opin I. We will first state our parties hereto with mistake mutual City’s regarding the effect con ion of said of the defendant to title respect to the veyance to Moore. We hold that this con any recover land, in event plaintiff, should absolutely void; veyance not defendant, rescind- and from Moore title vested with deeds all of in- cancelling vacating ing, airport, although in- in the not the interest herein, for recov- involved struments

977 was, use City purported an airport, land for with and .the the land terest which he a sense, in judg- purpose that deal. that dedicated to We hold further to this extent, Gordon, namely, that ment v. council of this court in until Moore lawfully determined not the issues to abandon the S.W.2d did determine land us; for airport, City use as an were not could now before those issues not purpose use land proceeding. which, The fundamen- for other raised fact, as question presented Moore v. Gordon interfere with tal matter use airport. land for good was whether had and mer- Moore Cartwright which Beaumont v. Matthew chantable interest Gordon Land & to the title Improvement Co., Tex.Civ.App., rightly did S.W. bought. The court held 589; Gordon, not; Tex.Civ.App., Moore v. purchased Gordon free of However, recognized S.W.2d roy- 239. it is tendered encumbrances he was both need al- which decisions not alty burdened with a servitude made ways purpose use the land enjoyment royalty depend for for acquired; which originally it was it contingency, namely, abandonment of the particular held in use City. prin- each that can be airport by the Statements of abandoned. hold further that the We ex- ciple opinion in the were made handed City’s power ercise of the which, to abandon a use down v. Gordon unless in Moore land is not limited сourt, as a tract referred to issues then before the whole; must allowed support be to exer- might holding that Moore’s deeds practical void; way, in a cise absolutely agree accord- were but we not do arise;, may principles circumstances relevant law'should and if the that all discovers be that carried that far. our par- land is needed opinion rights of concerning the acquired, the land then the limiting appeal ties to this involves land, Gordon; need not continue to use all in Moore statements made v. land, purpose. That express our views in we shall therefore sold; needed it can was so- of decision regarding full detail rules City Abilene, Sayles held in Tex.Civ. judgment depends. which our App., Tex.Com.App., 290 S.W. affirmed respecting effect of Our conclusion 295 S.W. 578. Moore is based deeds to following reasoning: proper point At this we think to inter- polate regarding certain comments the de- acquire (1) power to in Beaumont cisions v. Matthew Cart- simple fee title to under Section Improv. wright Land & Co. and Moore v. provisions charter relevant and the applied for a Gordon. writ of er- City of Stam- See Article R.S.1925. case, application ror at- in his Tex.Civ.App., 144 King, ford tacked in the statements Beaumont the- indeed, power, seems limiting case and in his the use to- case implicit statutes which authorized the City may put bought which the airport. Therefore, City to establish an proceeds. fully We bond considered: Poole, Evelyn from the deed to the R. agree both decisions with the deter- actually simple fee et al. vested title made mination therein fundamental" tract, airport purported as that, principle; however, not agree, we do do. ought applied principle rigor- ously Moore v. Gordon (2) City acquired indicate.. the land Briefly, purchased Evelyn Poole, we think that land pur- et al. R. necessarily bond funds is devoted the- pose establishing thereon. *10 purpose which the bonds effect, for voted alleges, in land were that this prohibit any proceeds (at of which least far as to which for with had so use bonds in fact of purpose issued the inconsistent with use been voted and the land is Therefore, purpose) airport. bond because a acquiring during an the diversion amounts, purpose period city of the land different council of such a time the proceeds. city proper of Beaumont diversion the deemed to to a bond Moore: 978 deprive pro- City ability the the land to using held that exercise

v. Gordon public within the discretion deposits sug benefit duce minerals from pur- gests is bond ultra absolutely from the vires and the land void. land diverts As Waterbury Laredo, said in production City is inconsistent pose v. where 565, 68 city (as 81, page 84, regard had 5 purpose bond if the S.W. at use for pur- contract which works on restricted constructed a water ; power to airport bonds) regulate pas and this must charges made for chased with sage ferries; contract, deter- on before the its “Such a be where it occurs so certainly land, valid, although municipal leased divest the mines abandon produc- government conveyance and only conferred discretion lease only taking upon legisla lessee’s it—a discretion necessarily tion thereunder character, property, body for otherwise tive in possession which can of his such interrupt the bond City by contract, could use not surrender bind or itself not produce minerals purpose in order to freely may exercise whenever become effect, go In could money. make necessary. much So of the contract seems voted money ac- business into the oil clearly to us invalid.” toAnd the same ef However, voting the quire airport. an fect, see: Water Texas & Gas v.Cо. operate require City to did not bonds Cleburne, Tex.Civ.App. 580, 21 S.W. come, regardless all time to airport for an 396; page Sayles at of Abi circumstances; po- future lene, Tex.Civ.App., 290 page S.W. operating power cease air- tential (affirmed Tex.Com.App., ; 578) 295 S.W. airport, and port, doubtless to move Teague Sheffield, Tex.Civ.App., operation temporarily. suspend 420; S.W.2d 417 at of Bren then, may exercise of How, these un- Co., v. Brenham ham Water 67 Tex. adjusted powers to the un- doubted S.W. 143 at pages 148-149 and at page 150. by the necessity abiding bond doubted think purpose land? We using the The exercise pow of the aforesaid by keeping adjustment made is to be expressed er to abandon can be way proceeds represents the the land mind that which shows attempted purpose definite voted for a of bonds power. exercise the An unconditional con purpose, to another devoted not be veyance attempt such an shows powers ortght exist and that the aforesaid City necessarily must abandon its use. public, in behalf of exercised However, ordinary gas oil and lease requires public benefit from that what not; the lessor retains right does to use powers is not to be these the exercise except the surface as modified neces determined, primarily, at least fact lease, sities of the lease such a con substantially can its increase that the alone, represents only sidered agree proceeds roy- a mineral by the income ment to abandon. Our in this land. alty logi- what think a we is founded case principles The foregoing apply to principles of these application cal generally, lands including fee us. record before acquire lands which a mineral value. The however, power course lease our ar return to To mineral which affeсts power applica to abandon use lands gument: The principles, these tion of for which it is itself and somewhat limited appli all of affected to determine that the land acquired, or principles. City’s pow cation use and devoted to not be need expressed er lease in Article sold, necessarily shall R.S. unnecessary following discretion; language: exercise of a “Cities involves the organized stated, discretion must be chartered or exercised towns Texas, behalf, public by special when the laws or bene public Therefore, any agreement charter, own or oil requires. Act or min fit fact, lands, as a matter of shall although eral express necessarily in mineral language, oil lands will for the *11 least in 1267 did not which Article city, but shall fee lands town benefit of such or alley not forbid de- lease mineral any street or the purposes to lease for such city, velopment; power this was not or and that public square or in town or said contingent person valid by any to the of a any existence therein dedicated city; mineral public covering lease said land. in or and no uses such town thickly set- shall be drilled within well power from existence of results this town, any city nor within portion tled or simple the following (a) Fee matters: residence.” private two feet of hundred (b) power ownership by City; general specifies a literally, this statute Construed convey lands, which to its is vested may be exercised power lease which to charter, quoted City under 5 of its Section hold, how- city We whenever the desires. 1267, R.S.1925, (c) above: with Article power, at ever, this is a subordinate general power convey which the should to acquired pro- with regarding least lands construed; general power is a certain oonds voted for ceeds of construed, conveyance ‍‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​‍so a it authorizes further); goes (and before us no the case land; mineral a interest in a tract of intend legislature did (d) City’s power that all to determine power to make city vest a statute to pur- necessary land is not City’s agreements prevent the which would acquired poses for which it was and to sell public and when exercising, behalf part land not needed for that of said requires, public interest the discretion purpose. to the use such or to abandon continue say general power We that when the to purpose for which it ac- for the was convey, expressed in Section 5 the char- quired; power lease can and that the to 1267,express- ter is with construed Article lawfully not be exercised until the power lands, ing a to mineral lease au- use, aforesaid to determined abandon convey thorizes in- a mineral may not be nec- part or land as such power terest in land. a tract use, only regard- then essary phase power lease to con- a acreage to be ing which is abandoned. vey. National Avis v. First Bank Wich- Ar- construction of It realized that this Falls, ita 141 Tex. 174 S.W.2d 255. power affects lease ticle effect, power convey is, lands; serious- mineral interest in the min- the minerals or City’s ability ly to exercise limit the erals, rights and also certain in- surface practical pri- power way available to in the thereto; cidental and under valid oil However, Article 1267 individuals. vate gas lease the will be vested City a chance give not enacted estate and surface money. bargains to make catching possibility reverter or- interests Legislature believe, instead, that We dinarily remaining to lessor City should have thereby that the intended Certainly a lease. only protect itself loss power to convey convey authorizes did public benefit which the lands and these and revert- surface estate inconsist- put use require time, er interests at one the sаme development. mineral ent with true, person. being one and the same acquire an Authority to at least can make valid two by Chapter Acts granted the land, veyances, than for less all each Legis- the 41st Session of Called the First one the lessee covers work- by Chapters which, lature, amended in the minerals and interest one Leg- of the 47th the Acts and 609 of covers all that vendee which is left 1269h, appears Article Ver- now islature, general power If land. nothing There Tex.Civ.Stats. non’s far, convey goes this is no reason there which would af- various any of these acts why be restricted to these two it should City’s power to abandon use of fect instances, go it must reason far airport. land for an particular of, enough say, to authorize person interest one the reverter had the (3) We hold under the to another. Ac- convey royalty, power to abstract *12 last that to make the the air- cordingly, power city the would have move since the to port. justi- the conveyances might derived from mentioned is There be other reasons fying airport convey, him in power believing and since that that general to the specula- power expressly made would not been be moved. Doubtless tion existing lease, price we think would affect vendee contingent upon the the an thus, pay would power enough City’s willingness to authorize broad that is sell; pay before lease is ex- but if the royalty conveyance vendee wants price royalty and take with ecuted. burdened contingency might that or city power to abandon City’s The might particular not abandon the use of the purpose for the needed use land not land, why we see no reason he be should acquired would which the land privilege doing. denied the so The en- support City’s sale and respecting roy- tire matter the sale of such purchased pro royalty; in with lаnd of a alty be, seems one to be which can bonds; city’s deed would ceeds properly ought to be left to ex- the lawful city’s expression enough inten city ercise of discretion. council’s power. Ownership to exercise that tion royalty by vendee would However, (4) principles here with con consistent requiring city keep tofore stated in purpose for the tinued of the land use purpose land, mind the in using bond acquired; there is agreements forbidding city coun why reason be inconsistent no it should limiting cil their discretion in to act that use. The with nature public behalf, requires us to hold that an enough interest in is well shown minerals oil gas all covering lease of the land Smith, Schlittler v. acquired proceeds of bonds invalid Smith, 543, and 141 Tex. Brown production if gas of oil and be in will 43. A 174 S.W.2d owner consistent a matter fact with con surface, power or use has no lease tinued purpose land for use of the the land owner interfere acquired, which it was said lease is be, any way. might might or it not accompanied a lawful determina would an im be true that the courts raise tion, existing, then there to abandon favor, requiring plied obligation said use. the land owner to lease land under ap- There is no room in such a case circumstances; obliga but such an certain ply City’s power to abandon of un- use could be raised tion necessary parts land, and the lease using land for while can supported power. not be thereby agreement purpose bond the royalty accompanied by be attached to to aban lease is would Unless the particular present of the land par use and this a don the determination abandon a necessarily land, represents invalid in ticular would be use of the City’s legisla permit agreement entry a restriction on fact an volves powers. same reasons invalidat requires, tive the lessee when the lessеe lease, deprives gas hereinafter thus council an oil of their shown, implied agree invalidate this would abide the bond using discretion, legislative the vendee would title Thus take of their ment. subject contingency public behalf, be exercised in con might use, city might, or not abandon its tinue or abandon where cases purchase the land. would thus that use is inconsistent with His mineral de use might justify velopment. certainly but the facts speculative, true under lease, If facts speculation. ordinary known to the an where the lessee has suggested privilege entering oil field when he wishes vendee airport develop adjacent so to do. involved not be in the might ordinary form; reasonably appeal, con the lessee agree not airplanes flight of into to enter event occurs, and out until some but un clude specified dangerous only would become and less the event is the will *13 council, tice the here- city such extent pleasure pleading of the shown, their inafter neces- in mind the having council much lease as deprives sity If trial ordinary proceedings lease. an further discretion as does can alleged by council court. The lease hold that the we are to prevent nothing will tains some unusual agreements provisions, not make to deter- which change discretion the conclusion reached of their exercise abandoned, and requires on aban- be pleading. mine whether use shall Moore’s necessarily hold, we must do then donment of whatever we so lessee are airport may mentioned leases It is productive. the above sub- hold that to stantially amount for a invalid; ordinary because said leases “unless lease” prohibited agree- years, nothing primary less than the approximately term of five is, opera- provided pro- lessee’s except following ment—that as modified use city’s bе inconsistent with the tions will : visions

as fact. a matter of for oil or “The Grantee shall drill covering operations

An an entire gas proceed oil on lease hereunder airport presupposes operations which will a well the above land and until unless operation (300) with continued feet brought be inconsistent three hundred within produce airport. line which shall of a of this land barrels of (200) much as two hundred applied to When these rules pipe per day thirty (30) con- line oil city’s lease to us the record before possible indicating days, thereby secutive Joseph presumptively is at least Landry P. land. production on herein leased place, void. In the that lease covered first “Upon completion well within three of a airport; recite the entire Moore’s deeds land, (300) feet of this as above hundred now “The lands are above described mentioned, shall, with reasonable Grantee gas originally ex under an oil and lease promptness, begin, dil- reasonable Joseph Landry, and ecuted in favor of P. prosecute good in a workmanlike igence, Refining now Humble Oil & held drilling a well for oil on manner the place, Company.” In Moore’s the second granted in herein an honest effort to land plead fully lease more than failure to other of such minerals in discover oil or excepted he has done has not been quantities, which well paying shall be an must therefore city, assume we discovery well on well to the such offset referred to in that the lease Moore’s deeds land, drilled within three other shall be ordinary gas is an lease. In oil boundary (300) feet of the line of hundred place, showing third there is no Moore’s granted. herein petition Landry the lease to was ac companied by oil, discovery a determination abandon gas, “Prior sul- rather, airport; quanti- effect of that phur paying or оther minerals contrary. pleading is to the as- granted, herein Gran- ties pointed below, immediately lines, ís out has light any construct shall not tele- tee full, pleaded lease in and the lines, the Landry phone pipe lines or other services of alleged by af instrument shows without written con- kind whatsoever any firmatively that deter herein Grantor first had and sent from the airport, pur mined abandon the obtained. well, ports, airport. cover entire oil, sulphur gas, or other “In the event respecting This conclusion finds the va- in pay- produced hereunder minerals are lidity support in Moore v. Gor- of the event, quantities, ing Grantor don, Tex.Civ.App., 122 S.W.2d 239. requested so agrees when Grantee property that por- of its from pleaded Landry all has lease remove full; we and it be that should herein leased land of the tion productive pleading in thereof within proven defendant’s determin- to be six consider request, exceptions date such (6) the effect Moore’s months request writing be in shall de- petition. Section At which Tex.Jur. rate, thought proper to Grantor.” we to no- livered sors represent assigns, op- provisions sensible to drill or otherwise These oil, practical adjustment use to erate for gas or other minerals minerals, against development of adequate its will.” is made Reference lease; Landry hold as a might valid we could is declared discovery subject lease, of valu- that on but one-half of matter of law *14 land, deposits payable royalty within the the the able mineral that is under lease there, Moore, conveyed and that reason and provisions could then to follow alone, develop- commonly the land mineral which in such devote to instru- found ments, ment; holding. we can not make that confirming City’s right exclusive the purpose necessity to abiding production The the min- lease the land for voted, erals, City’s for which bonds the lаnd the the exclusive to bonuses were proceeds leases, the and having been rentals under such future and bonds, might very require City’s right payable well con- the to all said rentals un- purpose land for der Landry tinued use of the the to the lease. facts, which it had been devoted. The provisions assumption These show an course, way; might tend other but un- the valid, Landry that lease and the was a free, is the less the council’s discretion assumption. transaction based on that Had power to its consider the council has lost valid, the Landry the lease to act accordance therewith and facts therein, the royalty have owned reserved the public as the bond true possibility thereunder, reverter Perhaps requires. these matters interest the surface estate in the burdened with depend how 1267 should on Article be con- lease; deeds would have Moore’s stated, is strued. As it our heretofore conveyed Moore roy- to lease opinion power which that lease is alty and an interest reverter which expressed granted, in this statute was not automatically would have vested him with city a give catching bar- chance nonparticipating title to a roy- free l/16th protect money, make but to gains or alty on termination of the lease. It was city against pub- from which loss least therefore at surface intention of require the council to lic benefit did parties precisely deal with those in- another use. devote to Certainly terests. deeds these tend to show, propose alleged, Moore in final as effect judg- render We do lease; Landry bought Moore question attempt- ment on convey royalty ed to possible him us and is at least is not it was before rights public any duty free of that facts exist dehors record which public by validity to the council. of that lease. affect the We peti- do hold that on the faсe of Moore’s parties complete- It is evident that presumptively tion, Landry lease void is ly city’s power law, mistook the under the appears nothing the face conveyance, prop- effect of by the shows alleged city which lease erty interest was available con- lease to be valid. veyance. from, The conclusion drawn petition that- Landry Moore’s lease principles mind, (5) these With void; absolutely therefore interest, what now be determined royalty or had no reverter interest there- acquired any, under deeds Moore convey Instead, under to to Moore. city. from the land, retained fee title and final deed from Moore’s second the only convey burdened above; duplicates quoted first City’s right to with the continue to use the respects. immaterial except in deed airport until land for an a lawful deter- granting clause of in- mination was made Under the abandon that these use. struments, City purports convey Exactly interest was conveyed under Moore deeds. fee interest /16th scope land, to warrant title primary grant- thereto. It fell within “nothing herein those provided that shall clause of reading instruments “ * * * obligating grantor, granted, its follows: sold construed as succes- and con- grant, source, agree- from does veyed, another to make presents these R. Moore ments which convey implied the said A. are to be sell and unto * * * provisions. royalty in and perpetual a l/16th coal, oil, and other gas sulphur, all the by Moore alleged warranties may be or that minerals and under by the meaning used same * * produced the land. meaning person. private Ar- conveyed thereby. accordingly See enough of a shown warranty is well 1290, R.S.1925, applies ticle Hollings following quotation from grantor as a and to Mexia, Tex.Civ.App. worth v. provisions in veyance. The S.W. 458: Landry refer deeds which *15 warranty “The a rеceives covenator in did thereunder purport convey interests land, price for which he has sold the as a operation not limit of clause covenant, meaning of his and the true conveyance. decisions, fixed which have es- those a conveyance sufficiently evidences The damages, of is general tablished rule abandon determination will, in is entire- case land represented by the interest lost, price person who ly restore that attempted ex- under Article 1290 the rule, true, ap- This it is has lost land. power as far carried ercise be plies perfectly where only in cases those lawfully go. as it could eviction, par- in is total cases of there Having effect determined the II. so as tial it has been modified to allow loss deed, point next de of Moore’s recovery only proportion such of the a is, given what effect shall be termined amount loss as the consideration has in those deeds. Moore warranties Again, whole of doc- bears to it. warranty a covenant of pleaded principal regulating rights of trines implied also covenants subject subrogation surety 1297, hold Article R.S.192S. We person application. The no unenforceable these warranties upon covenants is evicted sue remote resulting defects in from some against title subrogation derived from to the power by the reason vendor, lack any- nor there rights warranties, defects, they cover such such principal thing like relation of pro agreements constitute then would warranty, surety. covenant of until The against performance of du the vendee tect broken, strictly passes, been it has upon city by imposed law. Said ties land, legal right, with when that analogous to the arbitra warranties are 334-336, conveyed. Rawle, pp. Cov. 359. held agreement unenforceable in In tion no owner has An intermediate Tompkins, Tex.Civ.App., 27 v. dustrial Co. upon right of action the covenants under S.W.2d he held he has made to until which respond claims covenantee. course, ordinarily has The original right party But the evicted has title; power to warrant power against all.” of action City Beaumont under Sec in the vested only provision of 1297 The Article Abbott of its charter. 5 v. tion 474, might apply appeal Galveston, This to this is sub- S.W. 1064. which 97 79 Tex. thereof, whereby 2 to contract. Doubt division covenant phase of the is a sup implied conveyed which that the estate “is power to contract to be less a warranty of title would also ordi the time of the execution such con- at port the implied the covenants incumbrances.” support veyance un free from narily R.S.192S; 1297, indemnify against but the actual is a contract der Article loss; in Woodward Har- it was defined authority into those de to enter covenants din, at 121 39 S.W.2d 9 upon power to Tex. and not pends contract 41 That confers (rehearing Article 1297. Tex. statute denied city; operates authority 204), following language: de- in the “The no n only power, Supreme derived Court where Texas cisions statutory gation might our impose have been to effect that the law City. (Rev.St. against warranty The legal covenant incumbrances differs from the 1297) implied obligation effect, art. from the use nature and also ‘convey,’ being transferability. quotation ‘grant’ word above recovery Hollingsworth from y. covenant relied on to sustain Mexia shows that case, looking general warranty is, a covenant to the covenant of substance, compensation indemnify promising a contract to against future and loss, might conveyance future damages time as the same at such under lawful passes actually of the land sustained.” to vendee- vendee obligation until actual eviction. The of the- Apply agreements ultra to thе duty legal under the referred to above- they amount to and what vires indemnity contract, instead, is not an it is. city one council that are contracts substantially duty payor return indemnify will a vendee later council money payee acquired to which the never they ought to do be- act equity. Merryfield Willson, In title council, dealing with cause first page 225, 117,. Am.Dec. vendee, did not abide the law. where vendee sued the vendor re- present case illustrates this conclusion. *16 purchase cover price the of a land certi- deeds, of bene- On face his Moore is a the ficate was under nontransferable the City’s ficiary of the ultra vires lease to law, the court held that he could recover Landry. permitted If lessee the were money on following principle: the public occupy and disturb the the plaintiff specific- “The could not enforce use, enjoy royalty; Moore but his performance contract, very of the it is lease, repudiated as a the the recol- council back, clear. But he was entitled to recover paying purpose of bonds lection of the the money the upon he had advanced con- the recognition public for land and the the upon equitable principle tract the on which- require, might he would recover his weal law common money action for had and: money, with interest Moore’s thereon. maintained; is, received was warranties con- construction person where one money has received indemnity agree- into vert said warranties honesty another which in good con- protecting against Moore the use ments retain, can science he not an action will lie had, it land which in some sense by party back;, entitled recover word, against been dedicated or, expressed conformity it has been City duty performance owed with equitаble- Lord Mansfield’s view the public under that dedication. Such money nature of the for action had and. agreements too direct and intimate a received, money aequo ‘when is due ex et original vires relation ultra act to bono, may recovered in an action of enforced; permit being war- their assumpsit’ money had and received.” necessary ranties, effect, and in- obligation city to- tegral part of an ultra scheme vires repay, existed, if it came into im- existence ultra must themselves be declared vires. mediately City when the received the says City’s warranty of Moore money, obligation required and said repay- only expression of a written an obli- title is City ment then and there. Gould impose gation which the law would City Paris, 650; v. 68 4 Tex. S.W. City any says event. he He City Finn, 139 Ill, Houston v. 161 Tex. $13,772, got nothing for his and that repayment S.W.2d 776. Immediate was. obligation upon places law to required though even city or other him; says he repay further that the payee promised repay had at sometime warranty nothing promise but a Merryfield Willson, in the future. v. 14- perform legal duty. 117; at Tex. 65 Am.Dec. Dew, Tex.Civ.App., v. O’Connor 55 actually got S.W. something Moore performance 2d Continued wanted; 882. $13,772, although not what he his pay, city agreements least under proposition be denied but this purchase, any ultra vires warranty equivalent ap- contracts has is not obli-

985 effect; given any parently not been III. determine We now rights City. ap- what rigorously year Moore two has been has statute v. & Co. We hold he plied. that on the See: Texas Water Gas record before us 21 Tex.Civ.App., Cleburne, agreement with rescind his 393; Cleburne, city S.W. v. recover Ellis the consideration 495; city; Wink him to Civ.App., City of our S.W. conclusion is based Tex.Civ.App., Co., George Machinery (a) following grounds: R. B. Moore 653; Clay Bldg. Material S.W.2d Co. get did not he contracted buy Wink, Tex.Civ.App., convey, contracted City’s obligation thereby lеgal injury; (b) Doubtless sustained mistake; the law could be but not on situation resulted from transferred a mutual (c) unenforceable; running such basis Moore’s as a covenant warranties are (d) perceive any money land. not while expended ‍‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​‍We do substan- has warranty identity spent municipal tial said funds pur- between the were obligation implied poses proper require and it might is therefore repay repayment by purchase under the law city. Moore’s These re- matters price. quire , further discussion. First, injury: regarding the matter says further void; absolutely Moore’s he deed not estopped deny validity acquired title to a the inter- these warranties because the est with which he dealt. repaid $13,772. proposition got burdened a dedi- n overruled. These purport warranties enjoyment cation made thereof executory agreements. sup They must be beyond tingent degree contracted ported by a consideration to be enforceable *17 subjected speculation him to a of such any event, in for the consideration said got a nature as to make what different he price paid warranties was the Moore. quality bought. from kind what he estoppel Thus Moore an claims position analogous Moore’s is that of the in the consideration needed 126 McClellan, v. Tex. vendees Nance executory support first any instance to 580, 774, 89 106 S.W.2d A.L.R. promise. This enough estop is not City. were, If it it is difficult to how see In v. McClellan Nance the vendees deny could validity even of bought a town from lot vendor for .any bond, any any purchase, of contract or special purpose, knew, as the of vendor any Generally, of contract kind. this court thereon; erecting operating a hotel require is not authorized represented and the vendor them that (cid:127)comply executory with agreement which public street ran in front This of thе lot. power make, has no we and if false; representation opened was the lot point very (cid:127)sustain Moore’s we do that upon railway company’s right-of-way thing. ordinarily duty is of public street, commonly which the used as repudiate officers agree vires ultra and the other sides of the lot were bound- ments, always it is Convey- privately property. business one ed owned who deals ance was máde vendees. Thereafter ascertain what they agreements city brought discovered facts and then can, officers and can not price that suit to recover ac- governed make accordingly. and be land, tually paid by them also have, vendee this case we hold that to cancel a for the Moore does note balance rights have enforceable city, price, securing rights and a deed trust depend these Judgment prayed principles note. in their behalf as equity and not principal question See, affirmed. The was regarding contracts. the matter was estoppel: City Teague Sheffield, to be determined whether vendees Tex.Civ.App., 420; 417, brought within ex- had their case at Ward, Springs v. Big rule, 140 Tex. ception to the laid down in Co., Transportation 169 S.W.2d 151. v. Industrial Russell could reverter interests 1034, 258 S.W. which thereunder S.W. conveyed be to some ex- is pecuniary Moore. proof of 462, 51 A.L.R. argues tent a mistake of fact. The a suit be made in damages must loss or petition Moore’s he knew of fraud, shows and the court rescind a contract times; facts at all relevant relevant and this prin- had, saying: “The they held that suggests that the mistake Moore and supports which ciple, generally, stated through their all a mistake law qualification, is or compels exception transaction. we Since have concluded property, real purchaser whether grant relief to Moore way we personal, to the benefit or is entitled all of rescission Moore did even if know obliged to ac- not bargain, and should times, may at relevant all facts And buy.” not cept something that he did rightly construed assumed that purchase regarding the petition. Moore’s represents fraudulently suit- vendor not, which is particular use but for a able entitled to We hold that Moore is vendee result the court said that the equitable from contract relief conveyed been same as he had was the prin following statement of identity differing physical property DeNormandie, ciple in Harrell v. 26 Tex. buyer agreed buy “for the that which he gen pages true, “It 127: propery which is unfit has received eral, person makes contract where purchase and thus particular purpose ignorance or does intentional act from him as would have is as useless law, which otherwise he would identity.” physical been different had it done, binding upon it is nevertheless case v. McClellan was a fraud Nance him, upon juris non ignorantia the maxim here, but the mistake is no fraud there For excusat. then contract act in- in the kind of here same has resulted be; and a party what the intended it should misrepre- jury vendor’s to Moore as equity court relieve substitut will not in Nance caused the vendees sentation something else intended. McClellan. But that from case of very different mistake, mutual error or defeats the Next, parties’ mis regarding the parties. real intention A of the contracting petition *18 : Moore’s at least raises take contract error is want thus made in mutual conveyances the result were issue in of the one essential aof elements and the mistake of himself of mutual a contract. made in mutual error ‘Contracts city. appears on The mistake the face under to char circumstances material their allega and from Moore’s Moore’s deeds consequences upon gеneral acter and seem City’s misrepresenta respecting the tions principles Eq.Jur. invalid.’ 1 Sec. Story It him and reliance thereon. to tions The mutual 134.” mistake Moore and misrepresentations innocent held that has, effect, inten in defeated the may and that a mutual mistake evidence parties. tion the contracting misrepresentation may allegations of also in expressed This view was More al alleging a mutual mistake treated as Atchison, 303, 309, 19 Tex. pages land v. at specifically to. though fraud referred 310, Allison, v. 64 Ramey 697 at Tex. Peterson, Tex.Com.App., v. See Mason page 703. (Sec. 6); 142, 146 page 250 Cul at S.W. 15 Blanchard, 486, 79 expressed v. Tex. S.W. bertson And view Black on course, Rescission, nothing but Of we have 1, page 700. Cancellation Vol. 413, us. pleadings before Sec. analogous There are authorities. of the transaction between At the bottom regard- mistake Willson, was a 224, Merryfield 14 In v. Tex. 65 deal with 117, agreed the defendant ing the to trans- Am.Dec. plaintiff willed. This mistake his certificate a council fer to colonist as the procure It Colony law. caused another mis- in Peters for him one of purely headright certificate, colonist’s a that the elsewhere a take, namely, Landry belief agreed paid defendant the plaintiff owned that the existed and

987 Dew, an brought In plaintiff Tex.Civ.App., O’Connor 55 sideration. then 882, defendant. price paid brought recover the plaintiff action S.W.2d an action money certificates recover was held these he colonist’s had de- which loaned were nonassignable under agreement under the law and fendant an that defendant act engaged perform had repayment defendant money would secure of this per- a lien he not capacity agreement certain After the legal did land. expressed in equitable form. had principles money On made and over made, quotations plаintiff hereinbefore defendant the parties discovered price. could purchase recover Said land was homestead and that defendant’s paid as the money court: “Here had been defendant a could not create lien on said use property consideration for act for the doing an secure debt. The Court Appeals defendant could of plaintiff which the Civil held: “In these circum- not The contract perform. was doubtless stances trial court learned was ignorance legal made in of the defendant’s giving the defendant in error inability perform act. But him immediate return ascertained, bound the defendant was money.” good conscience refund equity and It is an established rule of decision consideration he received.” had appropriate equitable state that re Ass’n, Odell v. Grubstake Investment In be granted against will lief a mutual mis 151, Tex.Civ.App., 38 S.W.2d the share- take reducing agreement of law in trust, 8 business which had holders writing. The parties knowing the terms run, years yet brought a suit dissolve agreement legal misconceiving wind trust up trust and affairs. The Ward, Kelley effect terms. 94 share- been formed belief that 289, 60 (reformation); S.W. 311 personal liability holders could limit their Norris v. W. Belcher Mortgage C. Land provisions agree- by appropriate in the trust Co., 98 Tex. 82 S.W. ment, held contrary afterwards the 799; Smith, 98 Tex. 83 S.W. Gilbert v. rehearing (pages 152, On state. Tex.Com.App., A.L.R. S.W.2d) the relief granted court 445 (reformation). This granted relief is prayed following grounds: for, on the mistake law de contingency contem- “Such was never spite it; and if will relieve one from equity plated parties, never minds whose form contract to he did not agreement met in the contract nowas agree, reducing for mutual error of law in construed courts and insisted writing, his true contract equity also whereby de- appellee, parties him from contract to relieve did prived protection in сonsidera- very agree, regarding mutual error *19 they agree- into of which entered the tion power convey. of his vendor to ment made. The law thus actually having It has been contract, also held mutual that the nullified material emasculated rights per mistake regarding antecedent provisions controlling permeate and requires taining property contract destroyed agreement, the consid- the entire equitable (in relief. seme it, addi In cases moving parties eration execute hereinbefore cited) tion to some mis provisions remaining pal- its and rendered analogous take unconscionable, made to the mistake was equity should inter- pably regarding here to deal authority en- agreement in vene terminate the parties’ knowledge with and the parties relieve the uncon- and tirety Empire In the facts. Gas & Fuel by Co. upon of imposed them scionable burdens State, 21 provisions. Tex.Civ.App., We conclude that S.W.2d at remaining (affirmed Tex. appel- case presents entitling page record contract, court held that the grantee of State’s 265) cancellation dis- lants to land mineral partnership of had by created solution of trustees, contract, accounting state’s interest'in but mineral land was an from payment to receive purpose winding for the not authorized receiver and to state state’s share bonus and association.” the affairs of up agreement an he gas by had this defect oil and waived grantee an paid said rental his brought made dif- after mistake was (although on lessee; further held held, on various re- attention. The court could lessee that grounds) ferent said waiver, saying grounds, that there was no grantee part of said that cover said agreement things that represented the other among bonus and rental which laboring were parties In had made the been payment. the total share of state’s mistake fact “same mutual under the Pois, Tex.Civ.App., 15 S.W.2d Pierce v. liabilities, rights, to their private law $500, balance Pierce sued Pois it, effecting them and duties under which moved due him of the commission originally,” and enter into the contract exchange between of lands agreement an Ferguson to re- agreement this mistake entitled Pierce and Thurman. 619-620). November, (pages 1922. scind the contract made in exchange was suc- during met and Thurman Pierce commonly Equitable relief has ex- agreed January make ceeding misrepresentations of law. See granted for part his title to a change, 303; Thurman’s Ramey Atchison, 19 Tex. Moreland v. Pierce and he was encumbered de- Allison, two 64 Tex. These 697. agreement where- supplemental then made a but ac- cisions involved of fraud elements perfect he title undertook unnecessary; tually relief fraud is also years three within part his land misrepresentation. based innocent on held indebtedness pay certain Gerbic, Tex.Civ.App., 149 S.W. Altgelt v. comply Thurman not did back Pierce. case, party In this one exchange was agreement and-the party relied another statement Thur- so far as this information; effected superior who had means of Later, Pierce concerned. man’s land was being justified so re- matter tract from Thurman’s bought omitted lying element of the decision. is thus meantime wife, Thurman irt whom beyond However, going there decisions it. Pierce contended conveyed simply granting equitable this and relief orig- the modification of the agreed to representation Pois caused the innocent agreed exchange, contract of inal mistake, made being without reference depend on Thur- payment should justification $500 in relying said state- supplemental compliance with man’s Limpia Royalties, ment. In Means v. accordingly that Pois contract wаs plaintiffs Civ.App., 115 S.W.2d sued not com- Thurman had entitled to because trust, Limpia Royalties, a business The court held plied contract. royal- certain set trustees thereof to aside entitled to the $500 that Pois conveyance 12,- ty made in consideration of made; exchange original contract of They 000 shares of stock in al- the trust. supplemental consented if he leged that this was induced Pierce and Thurman agreement between representations by acting trustees that the payment should agreed $500 personally grantors not be liable for performance contingent on Thurman’s trust; the debts of copy contract, operat- were Pierce agreement, petition, of said trust attached to the regard- mistake law provison exempting mutual grant- under a contained a *20 liability would not be rights, his that he ors from for debts trust and ing Mounts, Ferguson provide requiring any so In Tex.Civ. trustees to bound. contract them behalf of agreed to on the trust. Mrs. Mounts App., S.W. They alleged representa- further that Ferguson. parties con- to The convey land false, tion but it was good was that made in assumption that Mrs. Mounts on tracted false, The court held that faith. was of the executrix estate independent was material, that that it was if it induced mistake; awas her deceased husband. deed, execution of the relief would be independent to of the sell power no she had granted by way of cancellation. such could not convey court and probate convey. agreed Ferguson to It us that she had to seems an inno as tilte person misrepresentation by one deposit she contended that cent to for an- sued

gggf appears both, guardian that upon was no more at other, and acted believed in plaintiff; fault the matter was the equal terms than parties are where the plaintiff and the fact that both and defend why one should shоwn no reason is good ant acted in upon his faith and that one relied' than the other relied more attorney’s on advice as much fault than no judgment involves more own other and support was as much mislead mistake, him ought to any other brings the situation so close all. to ordin ground of mistake relief on ary pro case of mutual mistake that sub no True, an element there seems apparent. stantial difference part of is Where on curing such a case cause put parties contract, mistake has into a the defendant which contributes otherwise, they executed or never suggests plaintiff’s predicament, and make, intended think in granted it is we matter relief can bring who did the most the mistake about equitable defendant make to allow unimportant is However, significant wrongful act. profit out of a equitable fact controlling the such cases and one difference between relief is real, the fact that the contract was never simple apparent more than mistake is really agreed to. ini generally for business transactions thereto, al party who thus by one tiated is Third, regarding imposition of liabil- always most more less cause ity upon repayment pur- of the party’s mistake. That difference other price: chase expended The has that, degree, re down one of comes $13,772paid Moore, but under the facts necessarily garding a matter which does not why of this case there is liability no reason part is any fault defendant’s on the involve imposed upon this sum not be Emery, Emery v. shown the decision in city. power convey The has a Tex.Civ.App., 75 There Through land. power, the exercise of this plaintiff acquired rights had enforceable equitable rights to rescission have vested an father under oral foster his in Moore. rights converse of The those land; contract for city’s liability repay purchase occupied years, had for several the land price; liability repay improvements, had made and had valuable an necessary automatic and incident purchase $3,- $2,385 price of on the Moore’s right to rescind. If Moore can monthly provided 500 in installments as in not price recover he has contract; representa said oral but on the deprived been of whatever value attached attorney tion of an guardian his to his of rescission and thus has been (who father foster had become insane deprived of the substance of right. placed guardianship been after the City’s liability repay goes The thus back rights accrued), plain aforesaid that said power land; convey for said lia- plaintiff tiff no rights, in entered bility consequence exists as a power of that agreement to a guardian written wifh said partially actual and an effective exer- buy pay the land and therefor the sum of thereof, cise be enforced as such. $2,000. opinion court’s motion for liability element of rehearing everyone acting shows that equity give a court of com- good faith and the attorney mislead plete parties relief to the and we do not plaintiff. well client as own question implied think there is plaintiff held could rescind However, may tract in the case. be noted purchase the second contract of and en in this connection that where money has rights original force his under the contract deposited with the to insure the performance ground regard illegal contract, on the mutual mistake of the de- rights original under said agree positor been allowed to recover the *21 money deposited. City ment. mistake was said to Lubbock be analo v. Geo. Co., Simpson Tex.Civ.App., gous to a & 31 mistake of fact. While the at L. S.W.2d torney guardian’s agent (page 669) was There court said and while 665. : “The $7,500 рrocuring have held agent deposited the act said was the could not plaintiff’s mistake, performance it to affirmatively appel- cause of insure the 990 Rescission with the ob was thus consistent such contract because contract lee of ject pleaded originally suit been as not have Moore’s and could void illegal and

was granted and could have been under have appellee could city and enforced prayer general relief, Further, being one for such relief where deposit.” recovered supported. Hagelstein facts v. as the See under property to has delivered Blaschke, 718, at Tex.Civ.App., has S.W. 149 of sale contract ultra vires 721; 978, property page 7 Sec. Texas 57 recover brought an action Jur. 515, imposed upon 75; 25 page 1008 Sec. Sec. city, courts have from the Tex.Jur. 124; 470, 33 amend reasonable value 49. The for the Sec. liability city a Tex.Jur. formal; during time only ment was some property extent of the use of said possession. Fabric city’s regarded enlargement as it be in the it was remedies, Teague, permissible Tex.Civ. City of was did not Hose Co. Fire v. 506; Rubber Mineralized 152 state new Invest App., cause of action. Home S.W. Tex.Civ.App., 621, 56 Cleburne, 342, 22 Strange, ment Co. v. 109 Tex. 195 S.W. Co. v. 220; Floydada v. American 849, (1,2); Directors page S.W. 851 Becker v. Industries, Cir., 5 87 Co., Ry. & Foamite Real La France of Gulf Street & Estate impose liabil- 475, 1094; courts can 820. If the 223 F.2d 28 15 S.W. Tex.Jur. no reason is 5539b, ity these circumstances (Secs. 124,125); Article Vernon’s de- liability should be perceived why that Civil Statutes. expenditure of nied here. question of us. No is before laches purpose would $13,772 unlawful for an say that However, proper deem it we liability, but prevent imposition this rati- petition shows he never Moore’s case; Moore has question not this in- City’s conveyance; defective fied spent $13,772 for “mu- was alleged with the ob- he the matter litigated stead purposes.” nicipal do, parties, as hе had jecting against judgment rendered final foregoing reasoning Under the him, repayment. presented demand for question the case of limitation is no there year presented four now reconvey has offered to not R.S.1925, 5529, statute, namely, Article acquired under property which he rescission and However, action applies for prayed deeds. has petition exception' to Moore’s failure for cancellation to tender interpreta statute. On not raised reconveyance excepted has not to. been Rush, Deaton see Article tion of willingness pleading manifests His page at 113 Tex. S.W. original shall be restored to Tipton, Tex.Civ.App., 142 Kimmell v. ‍‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​‍position and under the circumstances (Par. 9). formally reconveyance failure to tender a Further, in time. This suit was filed only to be matter of form and need seems 26, 1939, September suit filed on special significance. given See years the land was after than four was less Rule 90. Moore amended his conveyed Moore. accordingly trial court in dis- erred court on his is before the petition; he missing plaintiff’s and the trial suit court’s petition, original but the amended second is reversed and the judgment case is re- same facts alleges basic amendment court for pro- trial further manded to the original petition alleged opinion. ceedings in accordance same basic cause thus states Rehearing. On Motion petition did ex original action. The following have the We comments pray for cancellation while pressly assigned matters regarding the er- make does, but amendment amendment City’s motion for rehearing: ror original prayer; Moore only elaborated motion, paragraphs of various (1) In recovery money of his prayed directly paragraph 28, the perhaps most prayed relief, equitable relief n could is made that point without rendered not have mutual mistake of law contract, for See Gossett contract. rescission contract, does not run parties to that Tex.Civ.App., 43 S.W.2d 622. Manley, *22 qqi against municipal corporation, powers a City’s exercise power of to abandon specified open whereof the law a airport are in of the and the exercise of men, 'though City’s even run all between the to sell are property dis private individuals. and separate tinct matters; and Moore’s transaction with City was inclusive, nothing paragraphs 46, In 42 purchase a City’s sale property. paragraph 47, City to state- refers a opinion, is original in our that “it ment Nor do we any inconsistency see between always with one who deals business holding a and our statement that “it city city agreements what ascertain always is the business of one deals who can, make, gov- cannot and be officers with the city to agreements ascertain what accordingly.” This statement is erned City can, officers make, and can not applied holdings then various made governed accordingly.” It is also the original opinion, our and on this basis business individuals to know the law City says granting “any that we erred they come contracts, to make yet purported upon the relief herein based equity grants sometimes against relief point right of rescission.” made The these parties’ contracts mutual mis- quoted language in- seems law, take the relief has not been with a Moore consistent decree granting thought to be obliga- inconsistent a rescission of a mistake law tion. City’s powers. regarding the The existence and extent of the judgment good against our We think powers law, are matters of and mistaken arguments. both powers, by views of city these officers and by individuals who deal with the are principles support inevitable. very It seems often to be equitable true private relief between individuals prevents mistake contract be contracts, against their mutual mistake made; transaction is generally law, void applied here can be between question and the of rescission does ap not City precisely Moore and pear because a contract is prerequisite a grounds City same held liable to any of rescission. As said of the city For for torts. the torts of officers ultra vires contract before the court in incidental of cor exercise Causeway Nass, Inv. Co. v. 131 12, porate, distinguished Tex. governmental 111 (1-2): 704 City “It powers, damages. is liable in could not be rescinded because there was liability law; rests the common nothing to rescind.” Now we have re private city effect treated as cor ferred to decisions in our original opinion poration city’s and the officers are treated rights establish enforcible City agents. v. Posnain Galveston city favor of the individual who at 118, Am.Rep. 517; sky, Bauguss 62 Tex. 50 tempted to make certain contracts Atlanta, 74 Tex. v. 12 S.W. city; judgments we have listed awarding 750; Antonio, v. White San 94 property the individual which he had de 426; Tex. S.W. 60 Amarillo city livered to the under void contract of Ware, v. Tex. 40 S.W.2d 57. So sale, judgments decreeing him the rental officers be property value of said while used determining treated in whether rescission city, and awarding him money granted Moore and shall be whether the deposited by him city. with the these required To purchase repay shall authorities we add the decision in price oper South Moore. The Lloyds western v. corporate Wheeler, ation was a governmental Christopher (Court function. S.W.2d 739 of Civil opinion Paso, Appeals’ reported, Tex.Civ.App., of El S.W. Wheeler Lloyds, sale 2d 394. And Southwestern 81 S.W.2d 188) corpo holding involved exercise liable the reasonable rate, governmental power. sanitary equipment No value of sold and deliv point сlosely how related time, contract, matter ered void be *23 (cid:127)992 pay Landry under a were based lease to a tax levied supported valid

(cid:127)cause not City’s price. upon propositions: (a) purchase two The installments future attempting not limited of reverter was possibility courts were seems working individual the lessee’s but extended interest to restore they best could as minerals throughout City’s he en fee in the occupied before position he to the sug transaction; underlay royalties and this is reserved into the tered lease; possi- rough City (b) City’s parties, at least in gestive because the they bility equivalent the sum position which reverter occupied like that was ly, a interests upon rights, powers of sim all occupied a decree total of would have lessee; composite us in- granted differs it was a case before ple The rescission. terest, transac fee fee is a or a because the determinable all cases these roy every got simple, a a reverter void. included was not tion here up with right, power the les- royalty granted covered and interest alty, but see; being which com- therefore the bond “dedication” a beyond the speculative pelled convey nothing, position all or could his made fee, deny him vey To a in of the reverter royalty him. out degree contracted effect, convey royalty is, enforce just in as the can a fee owner rescission parties did not of the minerals before lease. him a contract which the out a proper to set make, it is and therefore propositions just men- The first n contract aside. in having acted The ran possibility of reverter tioned —that capacity selling the corporate in mineral the lessor throughout fee proper Having so, it is then done to him. royalties underlay the lessor’s —was the courts precisely what court do for the upon a common based what seemed to be to, just referred the cases done have in recognition of the lessor’s lease in this state property, mon namely, him restore royalties amounting to a distinct broadly, we think Viewing matter ey. land —which neces- interest identifiable logical a extension judgment but our expired sarily lease. See: Hoff- with the liability to return unquestioned Co., Magnolia Tex.Com. man Petroleum v. con a property it under void delivered 828; Hart, App., 273 S.W. Richardson purchase and sale. tract of Tex.Sup., in- 185 S.W.2d 564. The no give interest, should tegrated This result of this or com- character im- complaint. interests, ground for indicated bination fol- statement, which poses lowing from Richardson contract taken no does it occasion Hart, referring nor not make City could loss; tois place, all we done part have minerals fractional operated which subject including contract fraction- set aside lease they clear, did not contem- parties way royalty: in a “It is al lease the status think, them to conveyed restore plate, and to then that the instrument two we quo separate land. ante. estates in the distinct permanent interest The first was 14 of mo- paragraphs In (2) in place minerals to subsist dur- paragraphs 13 and seem tion, to which beyond existing ing and the life of lease. our con- City assigns error to related, the pay- other was the to be due and Landry City’s lease to clusion And it has been able under lease.” held void, have deed would Moore’s had been conveyed convey- interest interests, name- him title two vested ance lease terminated with the of a royalties in the lease ly, an interest Anderson, Tex.Civ.App., Curlee v. lease. City’s possibility of interest 235 S.W. 622. automatically would have reverter royalty when the into a expanded Dunn, l/16th In Tennant v. 110 S. terminated. 57 (followed W.2d McLean v. Tex.Civ.App., regarding State, 725), way and statements Our royalties profits, Moore’s deed would were-described as lessor’s manner in following language: gif# interests operated upon City’s various “The

993 Smith, Tex. Hogg v. in Schlittler v. 101 opinion 128 Sheffield [124 the in gas oil and S.W.2d 543. Yet no decision is that we have seen 77 S.W.2d 1021] holding, in in kind or from court and payable a of this state so royalties, whether persuaded Dil- arising Murphy the ordi- are not v. from we that money, and whether worth effect. in the lessor owns was intended nary lease of land which quotation minerals, under Richardson made made above from or from a lease the contrary. v. Hart the Act, adjudged indicates Further- Relinquishment should be more, min- owns really than of the present in land rather lessor to be interests 1/8 place in royalty erals under a reservation rights personalty in uncer- mere at some 1/8, a date, profits possibility of and of they arising reverter tain because minerals, and, further, remaining of the it is land, such out of clas- 7/8 of, conveyance awhy hard to in fee sification, practice see which accords say, place of in would industry, sta- minerals gas in furnishes a the oil and 1/24 royalty. not essential, be taken in full out of said highly important, if not bility 1/8 logical say For it seems that structure of that business.” charged min- against of minerals should be by royalties a lessor are If the reserved reverter, a against erals and not different profits expire when lease profits, these Yet in Theo Oil v. kind of estate. Co. prof- expires. longer owns a lessor no Thomas, Tex.Civ.App., 108 S.W.2d it; again in him owns the estate vested he Murphy (cited apparently followed in land, more leased and it seems he grantee Dilworth) the court held that v. reacquired say the lessor reasonable to that in interest in the minerals fee 1/24 way reversion instead by his full estate place only took title 1/24 1/8 namely, ways, a combination of royalty grantor in reserved a lease interest, which reversion of the lessee’s deed outstanding when his executed profit, is, the merges with that lease delivered, is, royalty to a 1/192 produce owned royalty, estate before (And holding in tract. was the made. lease Hart, Tex.Sup., the court in Richardson v. Nevertheless, following statement 563, supra.) court S.W.2d Thus the Murphy Dilworth, 137Tex. from v. charged grantee’s fee mineral 1/24 indicates that grantor’s possibility both royalty something than lessor’s more royalty; grantee nec- reverter be, instead, profit, equiv- might that is got as did essarily reverter he 1/24 royalty. ownership place sub- of minerals alent to implies The decision 1/24 ject buy, lessee to a vested royalty had to be com- and reverter sell, royalty minerals when or deliver the fee, out and this bined to make the 1/24 produced: outstanding had the “The lease combination, (under the difference from placing effect title the lessee to in- types of any theory) in the interests the minerals for the of ex- 7/8 volved, imply us to further that the seems ploration development, subject but needed to make reverter were lease; reversion termination minerals, up granted as estate retaining and of in the lessor the title distinguished from fraction possibility the minerals with the 1/8 judgments conveyed. Thus the minerals reversion remaining interest. 7/8 Thomas, v. Richard- in Theo Oil Co. * * Hogg Sheffieldv. Hart, perhaps Murphy v. son language quoted just Murphy from Jf support Dilworth well seems to our con- applied literally, Dilworth is there seems royalties clusion lessor’s lease do simple to be why no obvious reason ownership constitute of minerals true veyance the lease else, place, something in- vest title in fee to fractional interest in to and which with the cidental terminates place, distinguished the minerals in lease. expire an interest which would rate, regardless of what At pure the lease as distinguished from a royalties lease benеath reserved as the lies court had before them process lessor, regardless although transfer mis- lessor take certainly whereby injury the estate owned contributed him back to suffered. gets made when he terminates, still of we are when the lease just stated, For the reasons no if for royalties, at least opinion other, significance of no *25 in mining ordinary under the lease used expired. lease Landry to State, include in fact either are or else We adhere our rea holding, to and to the inciden- in fact which are interests in land soning on based, which that holding is the expire with tal to the and which lease City’s the deed to Moore with title vested opin- accordingly We still of the lease. are a royalty, subject contingencies mistaken City were ion Moore and the original opinion. noted in our general, A available regarding property interests the potential power conveyance the unnecessary City. the for transfer provision existed charter under the express any opinion regarding the for us to simple ownership the alleged fee City’s royalty would way in which the deed generally: Dig Moore. See Adams v. operated upon City’s interests have nowity, Tex.Civ.App. 201, 28 S.W. vest effectually to a lease valid 379, 380; pages at Gal Abbott v. perpetual royalty; to Moore with title veston, 97 Tex. S.W. 1064. statements our in and we withdraw power, at least when construed with convey- opinion have that this deed would granted to lease Art. R.S. City’s possi- ed Moore an interest potential power included con bility under a valid lease. of reverter vey a mineral interest in which the lands operation concerning remarks Our was not forbidden lease upon royalty interests re- of Moore’s deed statute. At the time of transaction maining lease under a valid 83j City, Chapter between Moore and the primarily, fully to describe were made Legislature, Acts of the 41st 1st called parties nature mistake the made. Sess., of the 1269h, Ann.Civ.St. art. Vernon’s principal injury, On record Moore’s acquire authorizing airports, cities to regard or at least we sufficient what enacted; in force as originally it contained being injury, royalty resulted provision might no construed as a up “dedication” with the socalled covered City’s power limitation to con purpose of the airport tract to the vey. basis, On having in mind enjoy- bonds which for it. Moore’s Strauch, Refugio the decision in Town of subject only ment of his was not Tex.Com.App., have we contingencies incidental to perceive any why been able to reason lands; privately owned because of the Moore, awhy deed or mineral lease “dedication”, subject also con- any conveyance any or other other in air- tingency abandoning airport terest in the should be ex defeated rely upon port. Thus Moore could cept by reason of following matters: per- lease-right interest owner’s self represents (1) proceeds suading that the land even- owner lease specific purpose bonds voted for tually possible rely any nor could he can not be therefore to another devoted compel right implication of said owner use is inconsistent in fact with use orig- to lease land. As we said our purpose, for bond until say the court can opinion: royalty (Moore) got inal “The purpose the use of the land for dedication which was burdened (and been abandoned we see no reason contingent beyond enjoyment thereof made why evacuate the subjected degree contracted for airport out make an abandonment speculation a nature to fact), him to (2) agree, can not got expressly he different or quality by necessary implica make what and either bought.” tion, kind from what abandon As we view use the land for the matter, purpose at a Moore suffered material harm future time. In bond regardless airport, he and whether made a mineral case of operations about airport presupposes mistake interests available for tract reasoning original for an under the stated of the land in our will with use interfere opinion, necessarily we think it is tó be airport accordingly and is invalid later, implied implies that, or had a sooner necessarily vey subject, always, abandon use of will opinion. contingencies lessee. noted in said the will bond in the A other interest disposition (3) We our satisfied in royalty, airport, might other than a of other matters the motion to in referred reason. substantially the same valid rehearing. refer, course, conveyances We The motion rehearing accordingly leases, co before and not or after made overruled. with, incidental abandonment segregated thereof. *26 royalty ownership of a outstanding

But airport not interfere with

in the can land for an be- of the use owner, City,

cause the shall

determines when use the land made. a lease shall be

abandoned and when original Perhaps, we our have said HAYWARD CORPUS et al. CITY OF circumstances when opinion, will be et there CHRISTI al. owner, court, prayer will at the 2666. No. right to make compel owner the lease Appeals Court of Civil of Texas. Waco. lease; ever circumstances but these July 11, 1946. prin- arise, act under the court some will jurisprudence and not ciple equity Rehearing July Denied court of law. And a rule of land some which would grant relief equity would proceeds airport bonds divert bonds, would nor of those effect, require City to court, air- to abandon the discretion

exercise

port. can not ownership

Private degree, impel appreciable

tend, airport— abandonment of

the misuse brought might about result profit from lease possibility outstanding royalty Moore’s a lease lessen value

would actually tendency some might airport. ‍‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​‍delay an abandonment owner, private might

Moore, any other persuade lease the

attempt to possibility City officers

land; but if destroys erroneously act

being persuaded powers. have no power, that we would have hold to us It seems deed Moore was wholly it; policy to defeat and the public Art. by enacting

Legislature, exactly opposite public as the down

laid For the State. leases author- of this

policy conveyances statute are by that ized individuals; private interests

mineral

Case Details

Case Name: Moore v. City of Beaumont
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Apr 18, 1946
Citation: 195 S.W.2d 968
Docket Number: No. 4325.
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.
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