Moore v. C.F. ex rel. R.F. (In re Moore)Moore v. C.F. ex rel. R.F. (In re Moore)
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- Before:
- Thompson
MEMORANDUM OPINION
MYRON H. THOMPSON, Chief Judge.Retired Associate Justice Powell has observed that,
“Few cases are more difficult to try than one of child abuse where the child is very young and does not testify in court. Moreover, there is rarely a non-party witness to alleged child abuse, with the result that rulings on admissibility of evidence on behalf of the child are particularly sensitive.”
Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 951 (4th Cir.1988) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This is such a ease. Appellant Elzie Frank Moore appeals to this court from a final decision of the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Alabama, holding that a state court judgment awarding
I. BACKGROUND
In September 1991, in response to a civil lawsuit brought by C.F., a minor, the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, found that Moore had sexually abused C.F. and entered a default judgment against him for $50,000 in compensatory damages and $150,000 in punitive damages.2
Moore later initiated a chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding pursuant to
Moore has now appealed to this court, contending that the bankruptcy court improperly admitted into evidence an out-of-court statement, made by C.F. when she was six years old to her professional counselor, that Moore had inappropriately touched her.5
II. DISCUSSION
A.
As stated, “there is rarely a non-party witness to alleged child abuse.” Morgan, 846 F.2d at 951 (Powell, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part). As a result, because small children often lack the maturity to provide evidence in formal and open in-eourt proceedings, such cases would be difficult, if not impossible to prove, without some reliance on out-of-court statements made by these children in other settings. On the other hand, however, because a person found liable for having sexually abused a child, even if only civilly, is considered especially contemptible in the eyes of the public, courts must be especially sensitive that the civilly accused are shielded from unreliable evidence of their culpability.- In other words, before admitting these out-of-court statements by minors, a trial court must have some objective basis to conclude that the statements are reasonably reliable. Although such a basis can often be found in those Federal Rules of Evidence governing the admission of hearsay — that is, Rules 800 to 806 — the court must still be “particularly sensitive,” Morgan, 846 F.2d at 951 (Powell, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part), in the application of these rules.
Here, this difficult task is doubly difficult because, in admitting C.F.’s out-of-court statement naming Moore as her abuser, the bankruptcy court gave no reason for its decision. Moreover, counsel for C.F. provided no legal argument as to why the statement was admissible in a civil case. The bankruptcy court merely announced that Moore’s counsel’s objection to the statement as hearsay was “overruled” and then admitted into evidence the following testimony from C.F.’s counselor:
“[C.F.] began talking about . . . Mr. Moore . . . and about her feelings about Mr. Moore. She liked him a great deal. She expressed to me some concern about some of the things that had been happening on visits when her mother would leave the room. Specifically, she said that Mr. Moore touched her inappropriately.”
“Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.”
Two justifications are often given to support
Admittedly, the advisory committee notes to
“Statements of identity seldom are made to promote effective treatment; the patient has no sincere desire to frankly account for fault because it is generally irrelevant to an anticipated course of treatment. Additionally, physicians rarely have any reason to rely on statements of identity in treating or diagnosing a patient. These statements are simply irrelevant in the calculus in devising a program of effective treatment.”
However, as the Eighth Circuit further recognized, it is only “ordinarily” true that statements of fault and identity do not fall within
Statements of identity by a minor receiving treatment for sexual abuse can also meet the first part of the two-part test for admission of out-of-court statements pursuant to
In conclusion, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence six-year-old C.F.’s out-of-court statement to her professional counselor that Moore had inappropriately touched her. See, e.g., United States v. George, 960 F.2d 97, 99-100 (9th Cir.1992) (physician allowed to testify under
B.
There are alternative reasons not to find error in the decision of the bankruptcy court. First, the copy of the state-court record in which Moore was held to be liable to C.F. for sexual abuse was admitted into evidence before the bankruptcy court.11 This record, by itself, provided a sufficient eviden-tiary basis for the bankruptcy court’s decision that Moore had abused C.F. The bankruptcy court’s admission of C.F.’s out-of-court statement identifying Moore as her sexual abuser was therefore superfluous.
Second, the issue before the bankruptcy court was not whether Moore had sexually abused C.F. but rather whether his conduct was “willful and malicious.”
An appropriate judgment will be entered.
Notes
. C.F. brought her state-court action through one of her parents, R.F.
. As with the state-court action, C.F. initiated the bankruptcy adversary proceeding through her . parent, R.F.
.
. C.F. was six years old when she made the out-of-court statement to her counselor; she was five, however, when the abuse allegedly occurred.
. On appeal, counsel for C.F. advances that the bankruptcy’s court decision may supported by Rules 701 through 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which govern the admission of expert testimony. The court need not address whether these rules would permit the admission of C.F.’s out-of-court statement.
. Moreover, under Alabama law, mental health providers have an obligation to prevent an abused child from being returned to an environment in which he or she cannot be adequately protected from recurrent abuse; the providers are required to report all reasonable suspicions of child abuse, including the name of the suspected abuser. 1975 Code of Alabama §§ 26-14-3, 26-14-5 (1992).
. The record reveals, for example, that C.F. understood that her counselor was helping her with her “problems” and that should her problems reoccur she could visit with her counselor again.
. In applying
. Aside from being admissible under
. Moore objected to the admission of the state-court record on the ground that the bankruptcy court had entered an order “avoiding the judicial lien” in the state court case. Transcript of the bankruptcy court proceeding at 16. The bankruptcy court overruled this objection, id. at 72, and Moore has not appealed from that ruling. In any event, Moore himself later introduced the entire state-court file, except for a deposition to which he maintained an objection. Id. The state-court file, without the deposition, is conclusive evidence of Moore’s liability to C.F. for having sexually abused her.