Appellant Margaret Moon filed a complaint for divorce in the Superior Court of Fayette County on June 27, 1997, and immediately moved to Kansas with the couple’s two children. Appellant was designated the temporary primary physical custodian of the children in an order filed in November 1997; appellee David Moon was awarded the temporary primary legal and physical custody of the children in December 2000. A bench trial took place May 17, 18, and June 22, 1999, аnd December 7 and 12, 2001. The final judgment and decree of divorce awarded sole legal and physical custody of the children to Mr. Moon, found Mrs. Moon to be an unfit parent, required her to pay child support of thirteen percent оf her gross monthly income or at *376 least $229.71 for each child, 1 made her responsible for one-half of the children’s uninsured medical costs and all of the children’s uninsured psychiatric, psychological, or counseling expenses, required her to maintain life insurance policies of $25,000 payable to each child, and placed restrictions upon the exercise of the visitation awarded her. 2 Mrs. Moon’s motion for new trial was denied by the trial court, and we granted her application for discretionary review of the trial court’s judgment.
1. Mrs. Moon contends the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to permit Mrs. Moon to present the expert testimony of the psychologist who treated the couple’s son. The triаl court based its ruling on the fact that Mrs. Moon had not identified the psychologist as an expert she intended to call at trial in her responses to Mr. Moon’s interrogatories requesting such information. See OCGA § 9-11-26 (b) (4) (A) (i). Generally, in order to obtain reviеw of a ruling excluding testimony, it must be shown what testimony was expected of the witness.
Anderson v. Jarriel,
2. Mrs. Moon next contends the trial court erred when it declined to hear the testimony of the couple’s 14-yеar-old daughter and 13-year-old son at the final hearing on the petition for divorce. OCGA § 19-9-1 (a) (3) (A) provides that a child who has reached the age of 14 “shall have the right to select the parent with whom he or she desires to live. The child’s selection shall be controlling, unless the parent so selected is determined not to be a fit and proper person to have the custody of the child.” OCGA § 19-9-1 (a) (3) (B) requires the trial court “to consider the desires, if any, and educational neеds of the child [who has reached the age of at least 11 but not 14 years] in determining which parent shall have custody. . . .” The trial court based its ruling on Mrs. Moon’s failure to comply with Uniform Superior Court Rule 24.5 (B), which requires leave of court in order for minor children of the parties to testify at a temporary hearing. Any error in failing to have heard from the children during the final hearing is rendered harmless by the trial court’s determination that Mrs. *377 Moon, was unfit, since the 14-year-old child’s statutory right to choosе her custodial parent is not controlling when the parent chosen is declared unfit and the 13-year-old child’s statutory right to have his desires considered by the trial court is limited by the trial court’s statutory right to have complete discretion in assigning сustody. Furthermore, we note that no proffer was made regarding the content of the children’s testimony.
3. Mrs. Moon next takes issue with the imposition of the requirement that she post a $100,000 bond as a prerequisite to her exercise of her visitation rights. “The bond . . . merely assures that appellant will comply with the terms of the court’s order and return the children ... at the expiration of the visitation period.”
Dearman v. Rhoden,
4. Mrs. Moon next sees error in the trial court’s dual requirement that her visitation with her children be supervised as well as be preceded by the posting of the $100,000 bond. Supervision of visitation serves as a means to allay concerns the parent might abduct the child.
Chandler v. Chandler,
5. Mrs. Moon maintains the trial court’s award of child support exceeds the statutory guidelines without written findings of special circumstances to warrant departure from the guidelinеs. See OCGA § 19-6-15 (c). In its order, the trial court found Mrs. Moon had a gross monthly income of approximately $1,767 and Mr. Moon’s gross monthly income was approximately $3,429. The trial court ordered Mrs. Moon to pay as child support an amount equal to 13 percent of her gross monthly income for each of the two children, with payment no less than $229.71 per child, making her total monthly child support payment 26 percent of her current gross monthly income. 3 *378 Under the Child Support Guidelines, the aрplicable range of percentages of gross income to be considered when two children are involved is 23-28 percent. OCGA § 19-6-15 (b) (5).
Mrs. Moon contends the payments set by the trial court, when combined with the requirement she pay one-half of uninsured medical expenses and all of the uninsured psychiatric, psychological, and counseling expenses, have the possibility of exceeding the statutory guidelines and must be overturned since there are no written findings supporting аn award in excess of the Guidelines. A child’s extraordinary medical costs is a special circumstance to examine when considering whether the statutory Guidelines’ presumptive amount is excessive or inadequate. OCGA § 19-6-15 (c) (2). Inasmuch as it is unknоwn whether the children will incur amounts of uninsured medical expenses and uninsured counseling expenses so as to constitute “extraordinary medical costs,” the mere possibility of such expenses is not sufficient at this juncture to support a finding thаt the award of child support departs from the Guidelines. Mrs. Moon also maintains it is improper for the trial court to set a minimum monthly payment amount, contending it will require payments in excess of the Guidelines should her gross monthly income decrеase in the future. OCGA § 19-6-15 (a) requires the trial court to “specify in what amount and from which party the minor children are entitled to permanent support.” Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it set out the actual amount of child support to bе paid by Mrs. Moon. The child support requirement does not preclude Mrs. Moon from seeking downward modification of her support obligation should she experience in the future a reduction in income that makes her child support рayments fall outside the Guidelines.
Jarrett v. Jarrett,
6. Lastly, Mrs. Moon contends the trial court’s award of $14,300 in attorney fees to Mr. Moon was not based on sufficient evidence. Without stating the basis for its award, the trial court determined that Mr. Moon should be paid $6,800 attorney fees for the litigation that took place in Kansas and $7,500 for legal services rendered in Georgia. During the bench trial, Mr. Moon testified he had hired attorneys in Kansas to represent him in litigation filed there by Mrs. Moon, he had paid the Kansas attorneys “between $5 to $7,000” and owed them an additional $1,800. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court asked Mr. Moon to present evidence of the amount of attorney fees he had incurred in the divorce litigation in Georgia. *379 Cоunsel informed the court they were seeking $7,500 to cover the “numerous hearings” seeking visitation, the discovery process, the temporary hearing, and the four days of trial. Mrs. Moon’s counsel declined the opportunity to cross-examine the attorney presenting the evidence.
Generally, an award of attorney fees is not available in Georgia unless authorized by statute or contract.
Cary v. Guiragossian,
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with direction.
Notes
The trial court found Mrs. Moon’s gross monthly income to be approximately $1,767 and noted that the applicable range of support under the Georgia Child Support Guidelines for two children was 23-28 percent of the payor’s gross monthly income.
Mrs. Moon’s visitation was subject to the continuous supervision of the Fayette County Department of Family and Children Services or its designee, and she was required to post a $100,000 bond and present documentation of the bond to Mr. Moon prior to the period of visitation.
As noted earlier, Mrs. Moon is also required to maintain two $25,000 life insurance policies for the benefit of her children. “The amount of the premium for such life insurance shall be counted as a part of the support ordered pursuant to the provisions of Code Section 19-6-15 [the Child Suppоrt Guidelines]. . . .” OCGA § 19-6-34 (b). See also
Esser v. Esser,
*378
If the award was predicated on OCGA § 19-6-2, we note that “direct testimony as to the value of legal services is not required in determining attorney fees in those cases involving alimony. [Cit.] . . . [A]s experienced and able lawyers, trial judges are quitе capable of placing a value on the legal services rendered by an attorney in a divorce action. [Cits.]”
Webster v. Webster,