Lead Opinion
The plaintiff State Treasurer filed a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition, seeking, among other things, to prohibit the transfer to the Investment Board Expense Fund of any further interest income earned by the Investment Board upon the investment of the assets of the public school endowment fund. Other issues presented by the writ were quashed. The Investment Board had, pursuant to appropriations by the legislature, on June 25, 1976, transferred $100,000 interest income earned by investment of public school endowment funds into the Investment Board Expense Fund, to defray expenses of investing those assets by the investment board.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I am impelled to dissent for a number of reasons. This Court has since statehood indulged in the presumption of the constitutionality of legislative action. Engelking v. Investment Board,
I find it hard to conceive that the drafters of the Constitution, while specifically providing that the corpus of the Public School Fund should remain “inviolate” and requiring the makeup of all losses to said fund, also meant that the gross earnings from the investments are similarly “inviolate” from any costs reasonably incurred in the investment process. I realize that the language of the Constitution:
“No part of this fund, principal or interest, shall ever be transferred to any other fund, or used or appropriated except as herein provided”
could be so construed, however, I do not believe that such a narrow construction of that clause is either necessary or desirable.
It appears clear that the Public School Endowment Fund constitutes the corpus of a trust, and that the State of Idaho through the legislature and its delegates are the trustees thereof. In my judgment the general law is clear that a trustee is entitled to reimbursement or setoff of those expenses reasonably incurred in the investment and administration of the trust corpus. See, Restatement, Trusts, 2d § 244; 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 394 at pp. 716-717; Bogert, Law of Trusts (1973) § 153, at p. 509.
I would hold that in the case at bar the Court should be guided by the principle announced in Moon v. Investment Board, supra:
“Implementation of constitutional principals is an appropriate function of legislation, and unless such implementing legislation is clearly in violation of the constitutional principle, it is a valid exercise of the legislative power.
