Moon v. Chicot County Arkansas Legal Associates, 170 F. App'x 988

PER CURIAM.

Billy Neal Davis (Davis) pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Davis argues on appeal the district court¹ erred when, over his objection, it applied U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) instead of section 5G1.3(b) and declined to adjust his sentence for time he had served on an undischarged term of imprisonment imposed in state court for burglary. See U.S.S.G. §§ 5G1.3(b) (if defendant has undischarged prison term for offense which was relevant conduct and basis for offense-level increase as to instant offense, court shall adjust instant sentence to reflect time already served on undischarged term if Bureau of Prisons will not be giving credit, and shall run instant sentence concurrently with remainder of undischarged term) and 5G1.3(c), p.s. (court may run sentence for instant offense concurrently with or consecutively to undischarged prison term to achieve reasonable punishment for instant offense). We disagree. We see no clear error in the district court’s determination that subsection (c) rather than (b) applied. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, comment. (n.2(A)); United States v. Salter, 418 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir.2005) (application of Guidelines is reviewed de novo and factual findings for clear error), cert. denied, 74 U.S.L.W. 3473 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2006) (No. 05-8557); United States v. Burch, 406 F.3d 1027, 1030 (8th Cir.) (decision whether to apply § 5G1.3(b) or (c) is usually fact-sensitive inquiry reviewed for clear error), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 667, 163 L.Ed.2d 538 (2005).

Finding neither clear factual error nor legal error, we affirm.

Before RILEY, MAGILL, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Guy Moon appeals the district court’s¹ order dismissing his civil complaint, wherein he asserted claims of fraud and racketeering against defendants for their alleged role in thwarting Moon’s challenge to the sale of certain real property in Chicot County, Arkansas. Following careful review, we agree with the district court that Moon’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman² doctrine. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 289, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1521-22, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). We also find no abuse of discretion in the denial of Moon’s recusal motion, and no error in the district court’s consideration of matters outside the pleadings. See Trammel v. Simmons First Bank of Searcy, 345 F.3d 611, 612-13 (8th Cir.2003); Harris v. P.A.M. Transport, Inc., 339 F.3d 635, 637-38 & n. 4 (8th Cir.2003).

Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

Before MURPHY, HANSEN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Darryl Williams appeals the district court’s¹ denial of his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion challenging the district court’s 1993 denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. We deny a certificate of appealability (COA) and dismiss the appeal.

In 1990, this court affirmed Williams’s conviction and sentence on drug charges. See United States v. Turpin, 920 F.2d 1377 (8th Cir. 1990).

Notes

1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Iowa. The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

2

See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983).

Case Details

Case Name: Moon v. Chicot County Arkansas Legal Associates

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Date Published: Mar 20, 2006

Citations: 170 F. App'x 988; 05-2294

Docket Number: 05-2294

Court Abbreviation: 8th Cir.