Moody v. MoodyMoody v. Moody
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff husband appeals, as limited by his notice of appeal and brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schneier, J.), dated July 14, 1989, as valued the parties’ sole marital asset at $33,000, its 1972 value, and awarded him a sum representing 50% of that value plus reimbursement for his investment in that asset.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The parties were married in 1955 and have one daughter, now an adult. In 1964, although they were then informally separated, the parties jointly purchased a home for $26,500, each contributing approximately the same amount toward the down payment and closing costs. The wife and the daughter lived there from that time, while the husband lived there only intermittently. During that time, the husband made some monetary contributions toward the upkeep of the residence.
In 1972, when the daughter was 13 years old, the husband
At the trial of this action for divorce, commenced some 15 years after the parties permanently separated, expert testimony indicated that in 1972 the parties’ only marital asset— the residence where wife still resides—had a fair market value of $33,000 and that in 1988 its fair market value was $265,000. The Supreme Court, making note of the economic and noneconomic contributions of the parties to the marriage in the 17 years before 1972, ruled that the wife was entitled to a 50% share of the 1972 value, but that because the husband made no monetary or other contributions to the home or the marriage after 1972, he was not entitled to any share of the subsequently appreciated value of the marital estate. The court directed that the wife pay the husband a distributive award of $18,000, that sum representing 50% of the home’s 1972 value plus the amount the husband contributed toward the down payment and closing costs.
The husband asserts on appeal that he is entitled to 50% of the present fair market value of the residence, which he contends should be sold so as to liquidate the asset. We disagree.
It is true that, although a trial court possesses discretion and flexibility to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see, Savage v Savage,
Although the husband made some financial contributions to the marital estate before 1972, his contributions to the estate as a whole were minimal (see, DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete,
We have considered the husband’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Lawrence, J. P., Harwood, Rosenblatt and O’Brien, JJ., concur.