103 Ga. 452 | Ga. | 1898
It appears that on May 20, 1892, a judgment was rendered in a justice’s court in favor of Moody against E.T. Davis as principal, and W. O. Davis as security. On this judgment execution issued May 26, 1892, and on May 12, 1893,, was levied on a half-interest in 800 acres of land as the property of E. T. Davis. To this levy C. P. Davis, on July 31, 1893> interposed a claim to said land, which claim was duly returned! by the sheriff and filed in the office of the clerk of the superior-court of Tattnall county, on the 2d day of August, 1893. On April 17, 1894, E. T. Davis, defendant in execution, sold and! conveyed to C. P. Davis, the claimant, the half-interest in the-800 acres of land levied on, at which time the claim so interposed was pending; and on the 7th day of August, 1894, C. P„ Davis, the claimant, executed to J. T. Millen a deed of conveyance to the 800 acres of land in controversy, the claim interposed by O. P. Davis pending also at the time of his conveyance to Millen. On the 7th day of October, 1895, the levy thus made, and to which the claim had been interposed, was dismissed, on motion of claimant’s counsel, “bécause said levy was made by a lawful constable, and his failing to make his return, ‘ due search made and no personal property found sufficient to
The principle of law for which the plaintiff in error contends is firmly established in this State, and must be applied to all cases which fall within the purview of the doctrine. By .section 3936 of the Civil Code, it is declared that “ Decrees ordinarily bind only parties and their privies; but a pending suit is a general notice of an equity or claim to all the world from the time the petition is filed and docketed; and if the same is duly prosecuted, and is not collusive, one who purchases pending the suit is affected by the decree rendered therein.” To the existence of a valid and effective lis pendens, it is essential that
Assuming therefore, without’ deciding, that the levy and claim interposed thereto in this case and returned into the court constituted an action upon which a valid lis pendens might arise as against a purchaser of the property from the claimant, it remains to inquire whether, under the facts of the present case, the title acquired by Millen, the purchaser from the original claimant, is affected by an application of this princi
Again, it is important to inquire to what extent the doctrine of lis pendens is affected by the registry laws of this State. By section 2779 of the Civil Code, which is a codification in part of the registry act of 1889 (Acts 1889, p. 106), it is provided: “The clerk of the superior court of each county shall be required to keep a general execution-docket, and as against the interests of third parties acting in good faith and without notice, who may have acquired a transfer or lien binding the defendant’s property, no money judgment obtained within the county of the defendant’s residence, in any court of this State, whether
With respect to executions of the character involved in the present case, the registry act requires that, in order to become liens as against third persons acquiring a transfer etc. of the property, they must be recorded on an execution-docket appointed and kept for that purpose, within ten days after the