Montrone v. MaxfieldMontrone v. Maxfield
Thе plaintiff, Paul M. Montrone, appeals from the Trial Court’s (Dalianis, J.) decision to grant a summary judgment motion filed by the defendants, Henry S. Maxfield and Henry S. Maxfield Real Estate, Inc. We affirm.
In March 1980, Lewis T. Breuninger (the seller) listed his real property in Wolfeboro, New Hampshire, for sale with three real estate brokers including the defendant, Henry S. Maxfield of Henry S. Maxfield Real Estate, Inc. The asking priсe was $250,000. Shortly thereafter, one of the real estate brokers, Allen Freeman, showed thе property and other properties to the plaintiff, Paul M. Montrone. The defendant Mаxfield showed the plaintiff other properties, and the plaintiff informed him that he had seen thе listed property. Subsequently, the plaintiff began to negotiate with Freeman for the purchase of that property. The plaintiff’s offer of $225,000 was communicated to Breuninger by Freemаn; and after Breuninger asked the other brokers, including the defendant, whether they had any better offers, he agreed to begin the process of drawing up a purchase-and-sale agrеement for sale to the plaintiff. After Freeman showed the purchase-and-sale agreement to Breuninger, he instructed Freeman to show it to Breuninger’s attorney. Freeman was then tо have the plaintiff sign the agreement and return it to the seller with a deposit.
As Freeman was on his way to see the plaintiff, the defendant Maxfield contacted the seller to inform him that some people to whom he had been showing the property were interested in purсhasing it. Breuninger told the defendant about his dealings with Freeman. After the defendant Maxfield spokе with his clients again, however, he called the seller and offered $250,000 on behalf of his clients. Brеuninger accepted the offer and then contacted Freeman to tell him that he had accepted another offer.
Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced an actiоn against the defendants alleging that they had tortiously interfered with the plaintiff’s agreement to сontract for the purchase of the listed property or, alternatively, that the defendants had tortiously interfered with the plaintiffs contractual relationship with the seller. After aрproximately nine months of discovery, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and an affidavit of Henry S.
Summary judgment should be granted only if the pleadings and materials submitted present no genuine issues of material fact.
To prove either tortiоus interference with a prospective agreement or tortious interference with а contractual relationship, the plaintiff must prove the following: that the plaintiff had a contractual relationship with the seller; that the defendants knew of the contractual relationship between seller and the plaintiff; and that the defendants wrongfully induced Breuninger to brеach his agreement with the plaintiff.
See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766, at 7 (1979); 3 J. Dooley, Modern Tort Law § 44.03, at 216 (1977);
see also Hangar One, Inc. v. Davis Assoc’s, Inc.,
Having reviewed the affidavits and depositions, we conclude that the plaintiff had presented some evidence that a contractual relationship existed betweеn him and the seller\WR7TTt.inna.lly, he had produced sufficient information regarding the defendants’ knowledge of that relationship to create genuine issues of fact on these two issues. We cannot find sufficient allegations, however, to create a genuine issue of fact as to whеther the defendants wrongfully induced the seller to breach any agreement he may have had with the plaintiff.
The defendants had an obligation to the seller to communicate any offers for the purchase of the property.
Cf. Griswold v. Heat Corporation,
While the actions of the defendants may not have been commendable, the defendants were acting within the law by communicating an offer to Breuninger. For that reason, we affirm the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the defendants.
Affirmed.