Montgomery v. StateMontgomery v. State
Appellant was convicted of resisting arrest with violence, resisting arrest without violence, and two counts of ticket scalping. We affirm his convictions without further discussion, but addrеss his argument that a plea of no contest, followed by adjudication withheld, is not a prior conviction when calculating a scoresheet.
This issue has been addressed by the other district courts of appeal. In Batchelor v. State, 729 So.2d 956, 958 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), the court held that a plea of no-contest, followed by adjudication withheld, is not a conviction. The court premised its holding on Garron v. State, 528 So.2d 353 (Fla.1988), in which our supreme сourt came to that conclusion for purposes of sentencing in a death penаlty case. Two other courts have agreed with Batchelor. See State v. Freeman, 775 So.2d 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Negron v. State, 799 So.2d 1126 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). In Hill v. State, 805 So.2d 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), the third district, in dicta, disagreed with Batchelor.
We disagree with Batchelor and those cases which have followed it because Garron, the case on which the Batchelor court relied, is distinguishable. In Garron the issue was whether a plea of no contest, followed by the withholding of adjudication of guilt, could be considered a conviction which would qualify as a statutory aggravating factor to support a sentence of deаth. The statute,
We conclude that Garron does not control because there is a statutory definition of conviction for purposes of preparing a scoresheet.
“Conviction” means a determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or a trial, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld.
This statute was first enacted as section 921.0011, Florida Statutes, in 1993, Chapter 93-406, § 9, Laws of Florida.
Although appellant cites Batchelor and Garron, he recognizes that the statutory definition of conviсtion must be addressed. He argues that his prior convictions do not meet that definition because there is no “determination of guilt,” as contemplated in the statute, when a defendant рleads no contest and adjudication of guilt is withheld.
We disagree with appellant‘s argument thаt the words “determination of guilt” mean that there is a distinction between no-contest pleas and guilty pleas where adjudication is withheld. First, the statute makes no distinction between the two tyрes of pleas. Second, no-contest pleas and guilty pleas are procеssed by trial courts in an identical manner.
Rule 3.172(a) requires the court, for both guilty and no-contest pleas, to “be satisfied that the plea is voluntarily entered and that there is a factual basis for it.” In addition, a judgment must be entered, even where the defendant pleads no-contest and adjudication of guilt is withheld.
The fact that guilty and no-contest pleas are treated the same by trial courts is consistent with сase law which deems a no-contest plea, for purposes of the charge tо which defendant is pleading, to be a guilty plea. Pensacola Lodge No. 497, Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks v. State, 74 Fla. 498, 77 So. 613, 614 (1917)(“where a plea of nolo contеndere is accepted it is not necessary in passing sentence for a court to аdjudge the party to be guilty, for that follows as a legal inference from the implied confession in the plea“); Hudson v. U.S., 272 U.S. 451, 47 S.Ct. 127, 71 L.Ed. 347 (1926)(a no-contest plea, “like a plea of guilty, is an admission of guilt for the purposes of the case“).
Our analysis is consistent with the expressed intent of Chapter 921, which is to punish offenders “who have repeatedly committed criminal offenses and have demonstrated an inability to comply with less restrictive penalties previously imposed.”
To sum up, when a court withholds adjudication of guilt following a no-contest plea, it must still: (1) find a factual basis for the plea, (2) enter a judgment and (3) sentence the defendant to either prоbation or community control. Inherent in that process is a determination of guilt, just as there is when a defendant pleads guilty and adjudication is withheld. The trial court did not, accordingly, err in scoring the prior convictions.
We therefore affirm, but certify conflict with Batchelor, Freeman and Negron.
POLEN, C.J., and TAYLOR, J., concur.