31 Ind. 113 | Ind. | 1869
The appellees filed their complaint in the • court below against the appellants, charging an indebtedness from the latter to the former for commissions and 'moneys advanced in the course of trade. It is sought to charge* real estate in the name of the wife for this indebtedness, on' the ground that she was a partner in trade with her husband,. and that she had held herself out as such, thereby giving * credit to the firm.
The court found as follows: “That the defendants consigned to the plaintiffs twenty-nine thousand five hundred, and thirty and £$ bushels of wheat, which the plaintiffs sold for fifty-three thousand three hundred and ninety-three dol- • lars and eighty-nine cents; that the net proceeds of said sales,, after deducting charges for insurance, freight, elevating,, storage, inspection, government tax, and commission, was - forty-six thousand five hundred and seventy-three dollars-
A motion for a new trial was overruled. The evidence is made a part of the record by a bill of exceptions.
The complaint, as well as the testimony, shows that the appellant Emily J. Montgomey was, during all those transactions, the wife of the appellant James Montgomery. The proof shows that the real estate described in the complaint was the property of the wife, conveyed to her long before these transactions with the appellees, and that no part of the purchase money had been paid out of the means of the husband.
The only grounds on which the court below could have based its decree against the property of Emily J. Montgomery were, that she held herself out as the partner of her husband, and that her property gave credit to the pretended firm.
It is clear that a married woman cannot bind herself as a partner with her husband. Her contracts during coverture are void. The appellees were bound to know the law. They knew when they were dealing with Montgomery & Co. that Emily J. was a married woman, and they were legally bound to know that her contracts were void. How can it be said, then, that her property gave credit to the pretended firm?
It is claimed, however, that a married woman may charge her real estate by contracting debts. This record does not present a case in which equity would give relief by charging the wife’s separate estate. ~We shall therefore not enter upon that question.
The court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial as to Emily J. Montgomery.
The judgment is reversed as to Emily J. Montgomery, with costs, and affirmed as to James Montgomery, with costs; and the cause is remanded, with direction to grant a new trial as to Emily J. Montgomery, and for further proceedings.