MEMORANDUM OPINION
Resolving All Pending Motions and Granting Dependants’ Motion For Summary Judgment
I. INTRODUCTION
The twists and turns of this case could fill the pages of a book. In fact, much of it already has. In October 2014 Defendant James Risen authored, and his co-
This memorandum opinion is an extended epilogue of sorts, and picks up where Pay Any Price leaves off. Montgomery filed this action claiming, primarily, that Defendants defamed him in the chapter and in the course of promoting the book. After a protracted, and largely unresolved, saga in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, the case was transferred to this district and assigned to the undersigned. Before the Court are Defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment and a number of outstanding discovery related motions. The tale of the Court’s resolution of those motions follows. For those not otherwise tempted to skip to the final chapter—spoiler alert—the end result is that the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Challenged Chapter
Defendant James Risen is the author of Pay Any Price: Greed, Power, and Endless War, which was published on October 14, 2014 by Houghton Mifflin. See Defs.’ Stmt, of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 1, 3 (“Defs.’ SUMF”), ECF No. 202. The nine-chapter book “describes how the war on terror led to waste, fraud, and abuse by U.S. government officials and the contractors who stood to gain from it.” Id. ¶5. Chapter two of the book (“the Chapter”), entitled “The Emperor of the War on Terror,” claims that in the post-September 11th era government officials were quick to fund potential counterterrorism efforts. The Chapter posits that, as Congress “thr[ew] cash at the FBI, CIA, and Pentagon,” a “counterterrorism bubble, like a financial bubble grew in Washington, and a new breed of entrepreneur learned that one of the surest and easiest paths to riches could be found ... in Tysons Corner, Virginia, coming up with new ways to predict, analyze, and prevent terrorist attacks—or, short of that, at least convincing a few government bureaucrats that you had some magic formula for doing so.” Am. Compl. Ex. A at 31 (“Chapter”), ECF No. 44. 2
The Chapter focuses on several types of technology that Montgomery developed. The Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) and other federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies apparently relied on the technology beginning in or around 2003. Id. at 37. The Chapter claims that the technology did not work as billed. For example, Montgomery allegedly created video compression and object recognition technology which the Air Force and other agencies believed could be helpful in storing and analyzing Predator drone video. Id. at 36. In particular, the Chapter states that “Montgomery claimed that his facial recognition software was so good that he could identify individual faces from the video camera flying on a Predator high above the mountains of southern Afghanistan.” Id. at 37. By 2003, the U.S. Special Operations Command and the Air Force had awarded government contracts related to the technology to eTreppid Technologies, the company Montgomery founded along with his financial backer, Warren Trepp. Id. at 34-35, 37.
The Chapter claims that while Montgomery performed field tests of the object recognition technology for Pentagon officials, former employees now allege that those tests were fabricated. Specifically, the Chapter reports one occasion on which Montgomery attempted to’ show that his technology could detect, from a great distance, a toy bazooka Montgomery carried in a field outside eTreppid. Id. at 37. According to the Chapter, Warren Trepp informed the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) that “Montgomery told two eTreppid employees to go to an empty office and push a button on a computer when they heard a beep on a cell phone.” Id. While carrying the bazooka, Montgomery purportedly “used a hidden cell phone to buzz the cell phone of one of the eTrep-pid employees, who then pushed a key on a computer keyboard, which in turn flashed an image of a bazooka on another screen prominently displayed in front of the military officers standing in another room.” Id. This course of events “convinced” the military officials “that Montgomery’s computer software had amazingly detected and recognized the bazooka in Montgomery’s hands.” Id.
The technology most emphasized in the Chapter, however, is technology Montgomery claimed he had developed “enable[ing] him to decipher al Qaeda codes embedded in the network banner displayed on the broadcasts of Al Jazeera, the Qatar-based news network.”
Id.
at 40. This software is often referred to as the “noise filtering” software.
See, e.g.,
Decl. of James Risen ¶ 15 (“Risen Decl.”), ECF No. 203;
id.
Ex. il at 2, ECF No. 203-11. Risen writes that “Montgomery sold the CIA on the fantasy that al Qaeda was using the broadcasts to digitally transmit its plans for future terrorist attacks”—which included “series of
The Chapter posits that “Montgomery brilliantly played on the CIA’s technical insecurities as well as the agency’s woeful lack of understanding about al Qaeda and Islamic terrorism.” Id. Although noting that “Montgomery insists that he did not come up with the idea of analyzing Al Jazeera videotapes,” and that the CIA instead came to him, Risen writes that “even if it wasn’t Montgomery’s idea, he ran with it as fast as he could.” Id. at 41. Montgomery allegedly informed the CIA that the Al Jazeera broadcasts had hidden letters and numbers embedded in them, which “included the letters ‘AF’ followed by a series of numbers, or the letters ‘AA’ and ‘UA’ and two or three digits.” Id. Other series of numbers “looked like coordinates for the longitude and latitude of specific locations.” Id.
The Chapter states that “[t]he CIA made the inevitable connections,” and Risen contends in the Chapter that the technology “so enraptured certain key government officials that it was considered the most important and most sensitive coun-terterrorism intelligence that the Central Intelligence Agency had to offer President Bush.” Id. at 41, 39. Senior CIA officials in the agency’s Directorate of Science and Technology began to vouch for Montgomery’s work. Id. at 39. The Chapter reports that the Directorate’s chief, Donald Kerr, believed the claims about the embedded codes, and convinced George Tenet, Director of the CIA, to take the information seriously. Id. at 42. “As a result, in December 2003, Tenet rushed directly to President Bush when information provided by Montgomery and his software pm-ported to show that a series of flights from France, Britain, and Mexico to the United States around Christmas were being targeted by al Qaeda.” Id. President Bush ordered those flights grounded. Id. The Chapter also recounts that “[o]ne former senior CIA official recalled attending a White House meeting in the week following Christmas to discuss what to do next about the information coming from Montgomery,” a conversation that included a “brief but serious discussion about whether to shoot down commercial airliners over the Atlantic based on the intelligence.” Id. at 45.
Eventually, French officials apparently demanded answers from the United States, and the CIA “was finally forced to reveal to French intelligence the source of the threat information.” Id. at 46. French officials arranged for a French technology firm to “reverse-engineer” the technology. Id. The firm concluded that the broadcasts contained too few pixels to contain hidden bar codes or unseen numbers. Id. While the Chapter reports Montgomery’s claim that “CIA officials continued to work with him for months after Christmas 2003, and that CIA personnel were still showing up at his offices in Nevada until late 2004,” Risen writes that once the CIA came to terms with the French findings, the agency “tried to forget all about him.” Id. Risen claims that “the CIA never investigated the apparent hoax nor examined how it had been handled inside the agency.” Id.
Given this course of events, the Chapter describes Montgomery as “the maestro behind what many current and former U.S. officials and others familiar with the case now believe was one of the most elaborate and dangerous hoaxes in American history, a ruse that was so successful that it nearly convinced the Bush administration to order fighter jets to start shooting down commercial airliners filled with passengers over the Atlantic.”
Id.
at 32;
see also id.
at
The Chapter also describes the apparent aftermath. Beginning in 2005, Trepp and Montgomery became embroiled in a series of personal and legal disputes. Montgomery claimed Trepp had not adequately provided him with a share of the money flowing from eTreppid’s government contracts. See id. at 49. Montgomery allegedly absconded with his technology’s source code, and deleted the code and data from eTreppid’s computer files, which prompted an FBI investigation and a lawsuit between the two. Id. It was during that investigation that many of the allegations concerning Montgomery’s software came to light. Id. at 49-50. Montgomery also made several high-profile allegations that former-Nevada Congressman Jim Gibbons, who had recently been elected as Nevada’s governor, accepted bribes from Trepp in exchange for assisting eTreppid secure defense contracts. Id. at 49. Those allegations led to a federal corruption investigation, which eventually cleared Gibbons of any wrongdoing. Id. at 49-50. Finally, the Chapter detailed Montgomery’s work with a subsequent backer, Edra Blix-seth, with whom Montgomery attempted to-secure additional government contracts for his noise filtering and object recognition technologies through a company they created called Blxware. Id. at 50-51. These efforts led to a meeting with an aide of Vice President Dick Cheney and efforts to convince the Israeli government to use his technology. Id. at 51. Neither proved successful. Id. In part based on these and other events, and drawing from court documents and FBI investigation reports, the Chapter explains that Trepp came to believe-Montgomery’s work was not what he claimed it was, id. at 49, and that Montgomery’s former lawyer, Michael Flynn, “concluded that Montgomery was a fraud,” id. at 36.
The Chapter also published Montgomery’s counter-statements, albeit with somewhat less emphasis. In its opening pages, Risen states that “Montgomery strongly denies that he peddled fraudulent technology” and that Montgomery “insists that the charges have been leveled by critics with axes to grind, including his former lawyer and former employees.”
Id.
at 33. Risen also reports that Montgomery claims he “was following direct orders from both the NSA and the CIA, and says that the CIA, NSA, and U.S. military took his technology so seriously that it was used to help in the targeting of Predator [drone] strikes and other raids.”
Id.
Specifically, “Montgomery insists that he did not come up with the idea of analyzing A1 Jazeera videotapes” and “says that the CIA came to him in late 2003 and asked him to do it.”
Id.
at 41. Montgomery claims that “[t]he fact that the government is blocking public disclosure of the details of its relationship with him ... shows that his work was considered serious and important.”
Id.
at 33-34. The Chapter also
In reporting this episode, the Chapter also relies in several instances upon FBI investigation reports, depositions and affidavits filed in various lawsuits, Congressional testimony, and other information in the public domain. For example, the Chapter identifies court documents, which contained Warren Trepp’s statements to the FBI, as the Chapter’s source of the information regarding Montgomery’s purportedly fabricated tests of his object identification software. See id. at 37 (“Warren Trepp later told the FBI that he eventually learned that Montgomery had no real computer software programming skills, according to court documents that include his statements to the FBI.”); id. (“Trepp also described to federal investigators how eTreppid employees had confided to him that Montgomery had asked them to help him falsify tests of his object recognition software when Pentagon officials came to visit.”); id. (describing the fabricated tests, and the use of Montgomery’s hidden cell phone, “according to court documents”). The Chapter also relies on John Brennan’s testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee during Brennan’s confirmation as CIA Director in 2013. Id. at 47. In 2003, Brennan had been head of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which was responsible for distributing intelligence throughout the United States government. Id. When asked in a written questionnaire about Montgomery’s technology, Brennan wrote that the technology “was determined not to be a source of accurate information.” Id.; see also Risen Decl. Ex. 19 at 10.
B. Prior Media Coverage
Media coverage concerning Montgomery’s purportedly fabricated technology, specifically, and discussing Montgomery, more generally, predated publication of Pay Any Price by nearly a decade.
On June 27, 2005, NBC News published an article authored by Lisa Myers and Aram Roston discussing the 2003 grounding of several flights. The article reported that “senior U.S. officials now tell NBC News that the key piece of information that triggered the holiday alert was a bizarre CIA analysis, which turned out to be all wrong,” although the article did not name Montgomery as the source of the technology. Risen Decl. Ex. 4. The article reported that CIA officials believed that they had found secret messages in the crawl bar of Al Jazeera news broadcasts, and quoted Tom Ridge, who had been the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003. Secretary Ridge “confirm[ed] there were no secret terror messages,” but maintained it was not a mistake to raise the threat level, and acknowledged that the analysis was not the only factor in raising the threat level. Id.
In the interim, the Jim Gibbons bribery allegations broke. Media reports indicated that the allegations’ source was sworn testimony Dennis Montgomery provided in the context of his lawsuit with Trepp concerning the rights to his software code.
See, e.g.,
Risen Decl. Ex. 5 at 3. Montgomery’s allegations led to a series of articles in the media, and culminated in Dennis Montgomery sitting down for an interview with Lisa Myers of NBC news to discuss his allegations.
Id.
Ex. 6, Ex. 7 (transcript of NBC news interview). During the course of Montgomery and Trepp’s legal battle, documents concerning eTreppid and Montgomery’s software were unsealed
The focus eventually shifted to Montgomery’s software. Aram Roston, who had written the 2005 story for NBC News with Lisa Myers, wrote a much more expansive article on the Montgomery saga in 2010 for Playboy Magazine, entitled “The Man Who Conned the Pentagon.” See Risen Deck Ex. 11. The article states that Montgomery “apparently convinced the Bush White House, the CIA, the Air Force, and other agencies that Al Jazeera—the Qatari-owned TV network—was unwittingly transmitting target data to A1 Qaeda sleepers.” Id. at 2. And in 2011 Risen and Eric Lichtblau wrote an article for the New York Times canvassing much of the same information. The article, entitled “Hiding Details of Dubious Deal, U.S. Invokes National Security,” was published on February 19, 2011. See id. Ex. 3. The article explained that the Department of Justice had secured protective orders in two cases to shield details of Montgomery’s technology from the public. Id. The article canvassed many of the allegations that would be repeated in the Chapter, including that Montgomery’s technology appeared to be a hoax, that Montgomery’s former lawyer now viewed him as a “con man,” that former employees believed Montgomery had fabricated demonstrations of his technology for government officials, and that Montgomery’s technology prompted President Bush to ground several airliners. See id. at 1-3. The article also stated that “[sjenior administration officials even talked about shooting down planes identified as targets ..,, according to a former senior intelligence official who was at a meeting where the idea was discussed.” Id. at 4.
Risen claims that, in writing his book, he relied on these articles and other media coverage. See Risen Deck ¶¶ 7-18; see also id. Exs. 13, 14. In a footnote of the Chapter, Risen explicitly acknowledges both Aram Roston’s Playboy article, and Risen’s own New York Times article. See Chapter at 53. None of the articles have ever been retracted.
C. Procedural History
On February 24, 2015, following publication of
Pay Any Price,
Montgomery filed this action in the Southern District of Florida.
See generally
Comph, ECF No. 1. The operative, Amended Complaint asserts a multitude of claims for defamation, defamation
per se,
and defamation by implication based on forty-three allegedly defamatory statements.
See
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 96-239, ECF No. 44. The Amended Complaint also alleges additional claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with prospective advantage, and assault.
See id.
¶¶ 240-256. The allegedly defamatory statements include statements made in the Chapter,
see, e.g., id.
¶¶ 106, 109, 111, as well as statements Risen made in interviews when promoting the book,
see, e.g., id.
¶¶ 139-141, 145, 149. The latter statements, in many respects, repeat allegations made in the Chapter or the Chapter’s characterization of Montgomery.
Compare, e.g., id.
¶ 149 (asserting in interview that “when they [the CIA] realized it was a hoax, they covered the whole thing up and never did anything about it”),
with
Chapter at 32 (“Once it was over, once the
On April 9, 2015, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or transfer for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss or Transfer at 12-17, ECF No. 25. In the alternative, Defendants also moved to transfer for improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, to transfer venue for the convenience of the parties and in the interest of justice under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), or to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. 4 See id. at 17-30. After Montgomery filed his Amended Complaint, the district court denied Defendants’ initial motion to transfer or dismiss as moot. See Paperless Order, ECF No, 42. Thereafter, Defendants filed a renewed motion to transfer or dismiss in response to the Amended Complaint. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss or Transfer, ECF No. 52.
Shortly after filing his complaint, Montgomery also raised issues concerning his poor health, and sought to expedite consideration of his claims. See, e.g., Emergency PL’s Mot. for Status Conf., ECF No. 9. The Court set an initial discovery deadline of September 16, 2015, with trial slated to begin on November 30, 2015. See Order Setting Civil Trial Date & Pretrial Schedule, ECF No. 48. Defendants argued that no discovery should occur before their initial motions were resolved, and filed a formal motion to stay discovery pending resolution of Defendants’ motion to dismiss on May 19, 2015. See Defs.’ Mot. to Stay Disc. Pending Resolution of Mots, to Dismiss, ECF No. 55; Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Stay Disc., ECF No. 68. On September 10, 2015—nearly four months later, and after most of the discovery period had already run—the district court summarily denied that motion. See Paperless Order, ECF No. 130. On that same day, the Court also granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to modify the scheduling order. The Court rescheduled trial for March 21, 2016, and extended discovery until November 19, 2015. See Paperless Order, ECF No. 131.
Several discovery disputes arose throughout this period, and were considered by Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman. Of most relevance to the merits of Montgomery’s claims is Defendants’ request that Montgomery produce the software that is the subject of the Chapter. As explained in more detail below, after initially objecting to that request, Montgomery eventually claimed that he had turned over the only copy of his software to the FBI, along with a large volume of other computer drives and electronic information, in connection with an unrelated criminal investigation. Magistrate Judge Good
In the interim, discovery closed (although Montgomery filed a motion to extend that deadline, which also remains pending). See Paperless Order, ECF No. 131; see also PL’s Mot. for Extension of Time to Reset Disc. Deadline, ECF No. 181. On December 14, 2015, consistent with the deadline set by the district court, and even though their motion to dismiss or transfer remained pending, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. 5 See Paperless Order, ECF No. 131; Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. & Mem, Supp. (“Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Summ. J.”), ECF No. 201.
On January 25, 2016, the district court ruled in part on Defendants’ motion to dismiss or transfer. In a four-page order, the district court granted in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss or transfer, concluding that the convenience of the parties and the interests of justice warranted transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See generally Order Grant’g Mot. to Transfer, ECF No. 247. The district court noted that Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim remained pending, id. at 4, and the court did not otherwise resolve the various objections to the magistrate judge’s discovery rulings, Plaintiff^ motion to extend the discovery deadline, or the parties’ motions to file various documents under seal. 6 The magistrate judge also was unable to rule on Defendants’ motions for sanctions prior to transfer.
This action was transferred to this district, and randomly assigned to the undersigned. Since transfer, the parties have completed briefing Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. That motion—which the Court concludes subsumes the pending motion to dismiss—is now ripe for determination along with all of the other, outstanding motions.
7
After review of the
III. ANALYSIS
The Court will first resolve the outstanding discovery issues before turning to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. .
A, A Note Concerning Choice of Law
At the outset, the Court clarifies the substantive law it will apply in this case. As will become clear, the question is relevant to both the summary judgment motion and the outstanding discovery disputes, because Montgomery claims that the software is wholly irrelevant to this action.
“[T]here is no federal cause of action for defamation,”
Bartel v. F.A.A.,
In sum, the issue remained unresolved upon transfer, and the parties have not adequately briefed the issue in the context of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, the Court believes that the question is immaterial. All but one of Defendants’ arguments for
B. Outstanding Discovery Issues
As the Court’s description of this case’s procedural history makes clear, several discovery issues remain outstanding. Most of the motions involve the software that is at the center of the Chapter’s claims. Montgomery had filed several objections to the magistrate judge’s orders that he produce that software, and has moved to extend the discovery deadline to allow the search for the software to continue. Defendants have filed a motion for spoliation sanctions based on Montgomery’s failure to provide the software. Before proceeding to consider Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Court must resolve these motions.
1. Background
Some background regarding this dispute is necessary to understand the parties’ motions and the Court’s ultimate ruling. In their first set of production requests, Defendants requested that Montgomery produce his software.
See
Defs.’ First Set of Interrogs. & First Set of Requests for Prod, of Docs, to PI. at 12, ECF No. 90-1. at 13 (request number eight). In response to that request, Montgomery asserted a blanket objection “to any interrogatories or document request regarding a copy of his software,” on grounds of “confidentiality, intellectual property rights, legal restrictions on the Plaintiff responding, that the individual document request by its nature is unreasonably burdensome and oppressive, that the total number of document requests is unreasonably burdensome, oppressive and harassing, and also on the grounds that the request is neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.” Pl.’s Resps. to Defs.’ First Set of Doc. Reqs. to PI. at 7, ECF No. 90-2 at 34. Based on those grounds “and other considerations,” Montgomeiy asserted that he “[would] not produce a copy of any software.”
Id.
Notably, Montgomery
Defendants eventually noted a discovery dispute with the court, and Magistrate Judge Goodman scheduled a hearing for August 21, 2015. In their papers, Defendants cited and reproduced a Nevada federal district court’s orders from Montgomery’s lawsuit against eTreppid in which the software had been excluded from a government-endorsed Protective Order. In that case, Montgomery had been ordered to produce, and then held in contempt for not producing, his software. See Defs.’ Pre-Hearing Mem. at 2-3, ECF No. 94; id. Exs. 2-6. On August 19, two days prior to the discovery hearing before Magistrate Judge Goodman, Montgomery apparently turned over what he would later claim is his only copy of the software to the FBI, along with a large volume of other computer drives and electronic information, in connection with an unrelated criminal investigation. 9 At his deposition, which was held on August 20, he confirmed this series of events. See Montgomery Dep. at 127:12-133:19, ECF No. 166-2. And at the motion hearing the next day, Montgomery’s counsel, Mr. Klayman, represented to the court that the software had been turned over to the FBI. See, e.g., Tr. of Disc. Hr’g at 6:25-7:10, ECF No. 110. Mr. Klayman also conceded that Defense counsel was not given advanced warning of the transfer, but he did represent that Montgomery had arranged to have “continuing access to documentation which is not classified.” Id. at 16:21-17:4.
Following the hearing, Magistrate Judge Goodman ordered Montgomery to “use his self-described right of continued access to non-classified information ... and produce the software to Defendants” by September 4, and to advise FBI General Counsel James Baker and Assistant U.S. Attorney Deborah Curtis of the order. Post-Disc. Hr’g Order at 2-3, ECF No. 107. Montgomery moved to stay that order pending resolution of his objection to the order before the district court, but Magistrate Judge Goodman denied that motion. See Pl.’s Mot. to Stay Implementation of Para. 5 of Magistrate’s Order of Aug. 22, 2015, ECF No. 112; Order Den. Pl.’s Mot. to Stay One Para, of Disc. Order, ECF No. 122.
Montgomery failed to produce the software, and instead filed an objection to the magistrate judge’s order, which remains pending.
See
PL’s Obj. to Portions of Magistrate Judge’s Order of Aug. 22, 2015,
On September 8, 2015, James Baker, the FBI’s General Counsel, responded by letter, disputing Mr. Klayman’s representations concerning Montgomery’s continued access to the software and stating that Montgomery “did not associate potential retrieval of this information [certain personal information] with any- pending civil litigation.” Letter from James A. Baker, Gen. Counsel, FBI, to Larry Klayman (Sept. 8, 2015), ECF No. 126. Mr. Baker also wrote that the government “resolved to treat the materials under review as presumptively classified for security purposes,” and “neither agreed to undertake, nor understood any obligation to conduct, a classification review of any of these materials for the purpose of any civil litigation.” Id. Nevertheless, the government stated that it would be “prepared to facilitate Mr. Montgomery’s reasonable access to unclassified information resident on the drives” but noted the burden that the gov-érnment would undertake if it were to search for the software, without specific instructions, among the 51.6 million files and 600 million pages of documents Montgomery represented were contained on the hard drives. Id. As a result, the government requested that Montgomery provide several pieces of information necessary to identify the software, and said that if the software was located “appropriate U.S. 'Government agencies and/or departments will conduct a classification review of the software.” Id. Mr. Klayman and his paralegal thereafter filed declarations reiterating that they did inform the government that Montgomery was involved in civil litigation and that Defendants had asked for access to the software. See Notice of Filing of Decís., ECF No. 127.
Magistrate Judge Goodman held a second hearing on October 16, 2015. At that hearing, Mr. Klayman argued that he was not certain whether the software was in fact contained among the materials turned over to the FBI, Tr. of Disc. Hr’g at 10:17— 22, ECF No. 163. He also claimed that he did not know whether or- not the software was classified. Id. at 15:20-16:9. Following the hearing, Magistrate Judge Goodman ordered Montgomery to turn over to the FBI a comprehensive set of instructions as to how to pinpoint the software, and to produce the software to the Defendants by October 26, 2015. He also instructed Montgomery to produce all of his correspondence with the FBI up until that point. See Post-Disc. Hr’g Admin. Order, ECF No. 154. ■
On October 21, Montgomery then filed an affidavit contending, for the first time, that “upon searching my memory, I do not believe that I have had access to any of the subject software, nor did I provide it to the [FBI] when I turned over the drives.” Montgomery Deck, ECF No. 158-1. Nevertheless, he claimed that he would provide additional information to the FBI that would enable the agency to locate the software, if it existed, on his drives.
On October 23, in an e-mail to Mr. Klay-man, FBI Assistant General Counsel Ted Schwartz ' informed Mr. Klayman that Montgomery had not provided the information the agency requested in its September 8, 2015 letter.
See
E-mail from Ted Schwartz, Assistant Gen. Counsel, FBI, to Larry Klayman (Oct. 23, 2015, 3:44 PM), ECF No. 166-4. Mr. Schwartz also pointed
On October 26, 2015, Montgomery filed another objection to Magistrate Judge Goodman’s most recent order that he produce the software, claiming that he had made a good faith effort to facilitate the search of the software. See Pl.’s Obj. to Magistrate Judge’s Order of Oct. 19, 2015 & Req. Stay, ECF No. 164. Despite Mr. Schwartz’s October 23 representation to the contrary, Montgomery claimed that the “FBI is working with due speed to search through the millions of files in order to determine whether such software does exist in the documents provided by Plaintiff,” and again reiterated his contentions that the software was not relevant and that Defendants had failed to properly designate an expert to analyze it. Id. at 6, 10-11. Shortly thereafter, Defendants filed a motion for spoliation sanctions, arguing that Montgomery had spoliated the software by providing his only copy to the FBI. See Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. for Sanctions, ECF No. 166. Defendants sought dismissal of the case and attorneys’ fees. See id. at 1.
On Decernber 11, 2015, Mr. Schwartz informed Mr. Klayman, by e-mail, that because Mr. Montgomery had not provided the necessary information and no longer believed that the FBI was in possession of the software, the agency’s October 23 position—that they would not search for the software—remained unchanged. 10 See E-mail from Ted Schwartz, Assistant Gen. Counsel, FBI, to Larry Klayman (Dec. 11, 2015,10:43 PM), ECF No. 196-1.
Nevertheless, Mr. Klayman represented at the January 5, 2016 sanctions hearing that officials on the “criminal side” of the FBI continue to search for the software, at least incidentally. He argued that Mr. Schwartz and those on the “civil side” of the FBI were not involved in that process. He claimed that they were searching everything on Montgomery’s drives as part of the criminal investigation and that Mr. Klayman continued to advise them to keep the software relevant to this litigation in mind. See Sanctions Hr’g Tr. at 54:4-58:15. 11
2. Montgomery’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Orders
With this history in mind, the Court overrules Montgomery’s objections to Magistrate Judge Goodman’s orders. A district court will only set aside a magistrate judge’s order with respect to a non-dispositive matter, like a discovery order, if the order “is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a);
see
D.D.C. Local Civ. R. 72.2(c). The magistrate judge’s decision is “entitled to great deference,” and “the court will affirm the magistrate judge’s determination unless on the entire evidence the court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mis
Most importantly, although Montgomery claims that the software is irrelevant, he is wrong. In making that argument, Montgomery has conflated the distinct inquires for actual malice and falsity.
See
3 Rodney A. Smolla,
Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech
§ 23:6 (2016) (“Wholly aside from the
fault
requirements that have been engrafted upon modern defamation law by the First Amendment, the First Amendment does not permit liability for defamation unless
the plaintiff also demonstrates
that the defamatory statement was a false statement of fact.” (second emphasis added)). Actual malice focuses on the
subjective
state of mind of the defendant. Falsity, by contrast, focuses on the
objective
truth of the defendant’s assertions. Therefore, it does not matter “if the defendant doesn’t know the truth of the matter when he makes the defamatory statement”; “[s]o long as what he says turns out to be true, he is free from liability.”
Bustos v. A & E Television Networks,
Montgomery cites three reasons why the software is irrelevant. First, he repeatedly emphasizes that Defendants did not raise the defense of truth as a ground for dismissal in their motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Pl.’s Obj. to Portions of Magistrate Judge’s Order of Aug. 22, 2015 at 3-6. That omission has no bearing, however. Defendants do not have an obligation to raise every anticipated defense in a motion to dismiss. 12 They did not waive a potential evidence- or merits-based defense of falsity by failing to raise it in their motion to dismiss. Indeed, falsity is the sort of defense that one might think, in many cases, depends on examination of factual evidence. For example, it might have been difficult to argue at the motion to dismiss stage that Montgomery’s allegation the software worked was implausible. Once armed with evidence at the summary judgment stage, though, it is possible to argue, as Defendants do now, that the evidence does not support that allegation. Nor is Montgomery’s repeated assertion that Risen never reviewed the software or other governmental materials either relevant or well-taken. See, e.g., id. at 6. Regardless of what Risen subjectively believed or relied on to form that belief, Montgomery still has the basic burden to show that the Chapter’s assertions were false.
Second, Montgomery contends that the software is irrelevant because he can succeed on a defamation claim solely by showing actual malice or ill will.
See, e.g.,
Sanctions Hr’g Tr. at 22:25-26:15;
see also
Pl.’s Opp’n at 22-23. As a matter of law,- he is wrong. “[W]here discussion of public affairs is concerned,” the “truth may not be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions,”
Garrison,
The handful of cases Montgomery cites are not to the contrary.
See
Pl.’s List of Auth. Pursuant to Order of Jan. 6, 2016, EOF No. 226. He cites two cases describing the Florida Constitution which could be read, when taken out of context, to permit a plaintiff to succeed on a defamation claim based on a true statement. The Florida Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f the matter charged as defamatory is true
and
was published with good motives, the [defendant] shall be acquitted or exonerated.”
Fla. Const,
art. I, § 4 (emphasis added). Yet, the Supreme Court held in
Garrison
that “[t]ruth may not be the subject of either criminal or civil sanctions where discussion of public affairs is concerned,” and held these types of provisions unconstitutional in most circumstances.
To be sure, a few cases interpreting Florida law—including the two that Montgomery cites—continue to recite that truth is not a complete defense to defamation unless accompanied by a good motive. As other Florida decisions note, these cases “create confusion,”
Cape Publ’ns,
And the other cited cases involve claims that a defamatory impression could be inferred from true statements. So-called defamation by implication, as the Florida Supreme Court has recognized, has “a longstanding history in defamation law.”
Jews for Jesus,
As the Court explains below, Montgomery is a limited-purpose public figure and the Chapter’s statements are undoubtedly of public concern.
See infra
Part III.C.4.a. Thus, falsity is an element Montgomery must establish in order to succeed on his defamation claims, and evidence demonstrating falsity is of critical relevance. At the dame time, the issue would be no less relevant even if Montgomery anticipated that a court would conclude he is merely a private individual (and if Defendants were found to be non-media defendants). In those circumstances, at least under Florida law, truth operates as a
defense
to a plaintiffs claim, rather than an element the plaintiff must prove.
See, e.g., In re Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases-Report No. 09-01 (Reorganization of the Civil Jury Instructions),
Having confirmed that the software is relevant, the Court also rejects Montgomery’s contention that Defendants forfeited their right to the software by failing to disclose information regarding their named expert witness by the August 3, 2015 deadline. See, e.g., Pl.’s Obj. to Portions of Magistrate Judge’s Order of Aug. 22, 2015 at 7-8. As Magistrate Judge Goodman concluded, this argument is “circular and unconvincing,” because Defendants could not produce an expert report without the underlying software the expert was to analyze. Order Den. PL’s Mot. to Stay One Para, of Disc. Order, ECF No. 122. In addition, Defendants have since served Montgomery with a partial report including the expert’s qualifications, so any omissions were harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).
Nor does Montgomery’s or his counsel’s alleged uncertainty about the location or classification of the software provide grounds for excusing his ability to produce it or for finding that he had no duty to preserve the evidence. Montgomery now invokes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, which states that a party may only request production of items “in the responding party’s possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1); see, e.g., PL’s Obj. to Magistrate Judge’s Order of Oct. 19, 2015 & Req. to Stay at 6. But it is revealing that Montgomery never objected initially on the ground that he did not possess or control the software. See PL’s Resps. to Defs.’ First Set of Doc. Reqs. to Pl. at 7, ECF No. 90-2 at 34. Montgomery’s belated change in position is difficult to credit, and it is likely he waived his eleventh-hour claim that he never in fact had possession of the software.
The Court also has serious reason to doubt that the software is, in fact, classified, and would not be subject to produc
Other than Mr. Klayman’s unsubstantiated say-so, the Court perceives no reason to doubt the Nevada court’s conclusion and find that the software is classified. 17 The Government has not attempted to intervene in this case, despite the fact that it is well aware of the ongoing dispute over the software. Moreover, the CIA’s response to Defendants’ Touhy requests indicated that they did affirmatively search for a copy of Montgomery’s software and represented that they were unable to locate it. The CIA explicitly did not decline to conduct a search at all on the ground that the material was likely to be classified, as the agency did with respect to the other documents requested. See Letter from JoDean Morrow, Assistant Gen. Counsel, CIA, to Laura R. Handman (Nov. 13, 2015), ECF No. 178-3. The same is true for the Air Force’s Touhy response. See Letter from Robert F. Booth, Chief, Gen. Litig. Div., U.S. Air Force, to Laura R. Handman (Mar. 10, 2016), ECF No. 263.
Finally, to the extent Montgomery relies on the FBI’s continued efforts to search for the software as reason to object to the magistrate judge’s orders, the Court rejects those grounds for failing to comply with Magistrate Judge Goodman’s orders. Nothing indicates that a search remains ongoing. To date, over five months since the sanctions hearing, seven months since discovery closed, and ten months since Montgomery turned his hard drives over to the FBI, the Court is unaware of any
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court overrules Montgomery’s objections to the magistrate judge’s discovery orders concerning the production of the software.
3. Motion for Spoliation Sanctions
The fact remains that Montgomery never produced his software despite Defendants’ request and several court orders to do so. And that leaves Defendants’ motion for spoliation sanctions.
19
A party has a duty to preserve potentially relevant evidence once litigation is anticipated.
Chen v. District of Columbia,
Defendants seek dismissal of Montgomery’s complaint both because of his failure to preserve and produce the software and because he violated the court’s repeated orders to produce the software. Such a punitive sanction is only justified when:
(1) the other party has been so prejudiced by the misconduct that it would be unfair to require [the party] to proceed further in the case; (2) the party’s misconduct has put an intolerable burden on the court by requiring the court to modify its own docket and operations in order to accommodate the delay; or (3) the court finds it necessary to sanction conduct that is disrespectful to the court and to deter similar misconduct in the future.
Clarke v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.,
Although the Court is substantially troubled by Montgomery’s and his counsel’s conduct in this case, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion. As explained below, the Court ultimately finds summary judgment warranted in favor of Defendants on the merits of this case. In favorably resolving Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Court provides Defendants in practical terms much of the result they seek in their spoliation motion-judgment in their favor—albeit by a different route. As Magistrate Judge Goodman’s pre-hearing order indicated, a number of factual and legal questions are raised in the particular context of this case which would make resolution of the spoliation issue labor intensive. See generally Order Scheduling Hr’g on Defs.’ Spoliation Sanctions Mot. (with Specific, Add’l Requirements), ECF No. 191. Despite Montgomery’s and his counsel’s actions, the Court is hesitant to allocate additional judicial resources to this discovery dispute, beyond the considerable resources already expended, for little additional gain. Therefore, in light of the Court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion for spoliation sanctions. 20
C. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendants also move for summary judgment on several grounds. As explained below, the Court agrees that summary judgment is warranted here for several reasons. First, the Court agrees with Defendants that several statements Risen made in the Chapter or in ensuing interviews are non-actionable statements of subjective opinion or loose, hyperbolic language that is protected as a matter of law. Second, without record evidence demonstrating that Montgomery’s technology actually worked, Montgomery is unable to show that there is a genuine dispute of
1. Legal Standard
A court must grant summary judgment if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P, 56(a). A “material” fact is one capable of affecting the substantive outcome of the litigation.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
The principal purpose of summary judgment is to streamline litigation by disposing of factually unsupported claims or defenses and determining whether there is a genuine need for trial.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
2. Non-Actionable Statements of Opinion
Defendants first move for summary judgment on the ground that several of the statements contained in the Chapter are non-actionable statements of opinion.
See
Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 19-21. While the First Amendment does not categorically immunize from liability all statements that are framed as opinion,
see Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,
Several of the Chapter’s statements are non-actionable statements of opinion or hyperbole. 21 For example, the Chapter states that:
[Montgomery] provides the perfect case study to explain how during the war on terror greed and ambition have been married to unlimited rivers of cash to create a climate in which someone who has been accused of being a con artist was able to create a rogue intelligence operation with little or no adult supervision. Crazy became the new normal in the war on terror, and the original objectives of the war got lost in the process.
Chapter at 31-32. Defendants argue that several of this passage’s statements are non-actionable.
See
Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 20-21. The Court agrees. The assertion that Montgomery was motivated out of greed or ambition is a subjective judgment that is not verifiable.
See, e.g., Underwager v. Channel 9 Austl.,
The greatest point of dispute between the parties involves the Chapter’s statement that:
Montgomery was the maestro behind what many current and former U.S. officials and others familiar with the case now believe was one of the most elaborate and dangerous hoaxes in American history, a ruse that was so successful that it nearly convinced the Bush administration to order fighter jets to start shooting down commercial airliners filled with passengers over the Atlantic.
Chapter at 32 (emphasis added). Defendants argue that the statement is an inherently subjective ranking of events that is not factually verifiable and consists of the author’s (and the other officials’) own subjective opinion based on disclosed facts throughout the Chapter. See Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 21.
Montgomery disagrees. In fact, he relies upon this statement innumerable times in his opposition and it seems to form the cornerstone of his defamation claims. See, e.g., PL’s Opp’n at 3, 4, 8, 12, 14. Montgomery’s argument is unavailing, however. A person’s opinion concerning which events rank among the greatest hoaxes in American history is a quintessential example of a subjective opinion. There is simply no method to objectively verify where an event ranks among the greatest hoaxes in American history—or whether a particular event even makes the list. As a result, the statement fails to “express or imply a verifiably false fact” about the plaintiff. Weyrich, 235 F,3d at 624. 23 I
Yet, this alternative interpretation also fails for two reasons. First, Montgomery overlooks that the Chapter explicitly refers to officials’
beliefs,
not any particular statement.
See
Chapter at 32 (stating that officials “now
believe
[the circumstances surrounding Montgomery’s technology] was one of the most elaborate and dangerous hoaxes in American history” (emphasis added)). Contrary to Montgomery’s argument, the Chapter never asserts that particular individuals expressed that exact turn of phrase, and Risen’s own deposition describes the statement as his own articulation of the views he heard others express.
See
Risen Dep. at 290:16-292:14, ECF No. 234-3 (asserting that “I believe ... many people do believe that,” and explaining that the statement is “my language, not a direct quote” and “my phraseology based on having talked to a lot of people at the CIA and elsewhere about this operation ... describing what they said”). Moreover, an assertion that officials perceived Montgomery a particular way depends, again, entirely upon those officials’ particular viewpoints; it is difficult to prove false the assertion that someone
thought or believed
a particular thing, as opposed to an assertion that an individual affirmatively said or expressed a particular viewpoint.
See, e.g., Mirafuentes v. Estevez,
No. 1:15-cv-610,
Second, and in any event, even if it were possible to infer a provably false assertion from the statement, Montgomery is unable to show that Defendants made that assertion with actual malice. For the reasons explained below in Part III.C.4.b, Montgomery has not shown that Defendants published the Chapter with knowledge that Montgomery’s technology worked or with reckless disregard to the truth or falsity of the Chapter’s assertions. Instead, there is a plethora of evidence showing that officials and others who worked with Montgomery do believe his work to have been a hoax—evidence that Montgomery fails to dispute with concrete opposing evidence from which a jury could find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. As a result, even if this assertion did not constitute non-actionable opinion, the Court holds that Montgomery’s defamation claims fail to the extent they are based on it.
Defendants also argue that summary judgment should be granted in their favor because no reasonable jury could find on the basis of this record that the Chapter’s statements concerning Montgomery’s technology were false. If a plaintiff fails to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the defendant’s statements are false, summary judgment is warranted.
See Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co.,
Without the software,, he cannot do so. Whether because the information is classified or because Montgomery gave it away to the government without retaining a copy, the simple fact is that the software, and therefore any ability to con
The only evidence in the record that Montgomery points to which might create a genuine issue of fact are his own, vague representations that the technology worked.
See, e.g.,
Pl.’s Opp’n at 28. A plaintiffs own, even self-serving testimony will often suffice to defeat summary judgment—particularly where he has firsthand knowledge of a fact or observed an event, and where the case depends on the jury’s resolution of competing testimony and witness credibility.
See Johnson v. Perez,
Here, while Montgomery of course has personal knowledge concerning whether or not the software worked, his generalized, conclusory assertion nevertheless fails to place the trier of fact in a position to assess whether the Chapter’s claims about the software were false. As Montgomery’s own counsel hypothesized at the sanctions hearing, it could turn out that certain portions of the software did not work as represented.
See, e.g.,
Sanctions Hr’g Tr. at 81:18-23, 181:25-182:6. Providing the jurors with evidence that would allow them to measure the size of any gulf between fully operational technology and technology that works only in certain respects is critical to Montgomery’s burden to show falsity. Montgomery would have to show that any falsity was “material,” because “[m]inor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as the substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge [can] be justified.”
Masson,
And there is reason to believe that such additional background information, if it did exist, was available in the record. At the August 21, 2015 discovery hearing, there was some discussion of the government’s own tests confirming the validity of Montgomery’s software. Montgomery claims to have produced that information to the Defendants (although the evidence appears to have consisted of one, single-page document).
See
Tr. of Disc. Hr’g at 74:9-77:3, ECF No. 110. Tellingly, however, no document confirming that the government tested and confirmed the validity of Montgomery’s software has been presented on summary judgment. There is no mention of this evidence in Montgomery’s opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
28
Indeed, the Air Force’s
Without any evidence beyond Montgomery’s general representation that the software worked, a reasonable jury would not be in a position to assess his claim that the Chapter’s assertions that the software was fraudulent or a hoax were false. As a result, Montgomery is unable to make a prima facie case on any defamation claim based on the statement or implication that his software did not work, and Defendants’ motion should be granted for the bulk of Montgomery’s claims on this ground alone. And even if his general statement is sufficient to create a triable fact on falsity, he has failed to identify evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, as the Court explains below.
Montgomery similarly is unable to show that the Chapter’s claims that Trepp and Flynn now believed Montgomery to be a con or fraud were false, to the extent those statements can even be considered actionable as statement of non-opinion. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 110 (referring to Chapter’s assertion that Montgomery “has been accused of being a con artist”); id. ¶ 119 (quoting statement that “Michael Flynn, Montgomery’s former lawyer—who later concluded that Montgomery was a fraud ... ”); id. ¶ 121 (referring to statement that “Trepp later told the FBI that he eventually learned that Montgomery had no real computer software programming skills, according to court documents that include his statements to the FBI”). The record indicates that these assertions are literally true. During Montgomery’s deposition in his bankruptcy proceeding, Flynn stated that “I know you conned me and you conned the U.S. Government ... You’re a computer hacker and you’re a fraud, Mr. Montgomery.” Montgomery Dep. at 230:2-5, ECF No. 203-16. Flynn also filed an affidavit in which he wrote that Blxware’s valuation “is fraudulent” because “the technology as represented does not exist.” Aff. of Michael J. Flynn ¶ 13, ECF No. 203-17. Similarly, Trepp’s statement to the FBI reads: “recently Trepp has found out that Montgomery’s skills may not be what he has purported them to be.” Risen Deck Ex. 15 at 5, ECF No. 203-15. 29 Montgomery points to no evidence that these statements—drawn directly from court or government documents repeating them—were false.
4. Actual Malice
Defendants prevail on much, if not all, of their motion because Montgomery’s
a. Limited-Purpose Public Figure
As a constitutional matter, the level of fault a plaintiff must prove to prevail in a defamation case depends on the plaintiffs status as a public official or public figure, on the one hand, or a private figure on the other. A more circumscribed group of public figures also exists: as the Supreme Court explained in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
an individual might “voluntarily inject[ ] himself or [be] drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby become[] a public figure for a limited range of issues.”
“Whether the plaintiff is a public figure is a question of law to be resolved by the court.”
Dameron v. Wash. Magazine,
Defendants claim that Montgomery is a limited-purpose public figure and thus must show actual malice to prevail on his defamation claims. See Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 25-28. The Court agrees. Montgomery’s participation in the controversy depicted in the allegedly defamatory Chapter at issue here satisfies all three prongs set forth in Waldbaum.
Admittedly, the relevant public controversy involves several angles. Montgomery contends that there are in fact two separate controversies at issue: one involving the efficacy and use of his software, and the other involving “a different controversy about Congressman Gibbons.” PL’s Opp’n at 23;
see also id.
at 24 (referring to “two different controversies”). Despite the somewhat discrete issues, however, the Court views the controversy as an undifferentiated whole. Courts “often define the public controversy in expansive terms,” and a court “may find that there are multiple potential controversies, and it is often true that ‘a narrow controversy may be a phase of another, broader one.’ ”
Jankovic,
Second, Montgomery “achieved a ‘special prominence’ in the debate” and purposely attempted “to influence the outcome” or could be expected “to have an impact on its resolution.”
Waldbaum,
Moreover, even if the relevant public controversy was cabined solely to the efficacy of Montgomery’s software and the government’s actions taken in reliance upon it, Montgomery remains a limited-purpose public figure with respect to
that
distinct controversy. Whether a particular plaintiff injected himself into the controversy is not the “be-all and end-all of public figure status.”
Dameron,
In this case, newspaper coverage regarding the government’s use of Montgomery’s software well predated publication of the Chapter. NBC News first reported on
Finally, there is no dispute that the Chapter’s statements—which discuss the government’s use of Montgomery’s technology and allegations concerning whether it worked—are germane to the public controversy. Montgomery does not argue otherwise. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Montgomery is a limited-purpose public figure and proceeds to consider whether he can meet the actual malice standard.
b. Actual Malice
As the Supreme Court has explained, an “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and ... it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need ... to survive.’”
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
Moreover, the inquiry also focuses on the subjective beliefs of the particular defendant at issue. The yardstick is
not
whether “a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing.”
St. Amant v. Thompson,
The clear and convincing evidence standard of proof is also of critical importance, even at summary judgment. The court “must bear in mind the actual quantum and quality of proof necessary to support liability under
New York Times.” Anderson,
Here, Defendants point to an abundance of evidence in the record tending to show that Risen and Houghton Miff-lin neither knew nor had reason to suspect that the Chapter’s assertions regarding Montgomery, his technology, and the surrounding circumstances were false. Of most relevance is the plethora of other news articles, court documents, and government records, pre-dating the Chapter, which align with and corroborate the Chapter’s general thrust: that Montgomery’s technology did not work as billed.
32
For example, the Chapter expressly acknowledged Aram Roston’s prior article in
Playboy
magazine and Risen and Eric Lichtblau’s prior article in the
New York Times,
which both made substantially similar claims regarding Montgomery’s technology.
See
Chapter at 53;
see also
Risen Decl. ¶¶ 5, 15;
id.
Exs. 3, 11. Risen also asserts in a declaration that he also relied on a number of additional articles, which he attaches.
See
Risen Decl. ¶¶ 8—18;
id.
Exs. 4-14. Each of those articles make similar factual claims, and none have been retracted or otherwise called into dispute. Indeed, Risen asserts that “[t]o my knowledge, up to the time of publication and today, none of the articles I reviewed and relied [upon] were subject to a correction, retraction, or lawsuit.”
33
Risen Decl. ¶ 7. Generally, a defendant’s “good faith reliance on previously published reports in reputable sources ... precludes a finding of actual malice as a matter of law.”
Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
Risen also testified that he relied on statements made by Trepp, Flynn, Montgomery’s former employees, and others in FBI interview reports and court documents.
See, e.g.,
Risen Decl. ¶¶ 20-25; Risen Dep. at 109:19-110:5. For example, the FBI’s report of its interview with Warren Trepp states that Trepp had “recently learned that Montgomery would require eTreppid employees to falsify the results of live demonstrations for it’s [sic] customers.” Risen Decl. Ex. 15 at 5.
34
An Air Force Office of Special Investigation Inquiry report also reproduces the statement of Jesse Anderson, an employee of eTrep-pid, who recalled a demonstration of Montgomery’s object recognition software dur
And Risen also states that he further corroborated these individuals’ claims with other government officials. 35 See Risen Deck ¶¶ 26-35. For example, he asserts that CIA Paris Station Chief William D. Murray told him about the French Intelligence Agency’s efforts to reverse-engineer Montgomery’s software and that the agen-Gy’s conclusion that the broadcasts contained insufficient pixels to contain hidden messages. Id. ¶27. Defendants produced the copy of an e-mail Risen received from CIA spokeswoman Jennifer Youngblood, who stated that “the CIA looked at what Montgomery claimed he could do but determined that his threat detection tools weren’t exactly as billed.” Id. ¶ 29; id. Ex. 21.
Finally, Risen interviewed Montgomery and published his denials and counterclaims throughout the Chapter. Indeed, the Chapter emphasizes those comments by placing them in the opening pages and the closing paragraph, among other places.
See, e.g.,
Chapter at 33-34, 37, 41, 53. As the D.C. Circuit has explained, “reporting perspectives at odds with the publisher’s own, ‘tend[ ] to rebut a claim of malice, not to establish one.’”
Lohrenz,
Collectively, this evidence paints a bleak picture for Montgomery’s claims, and Montgomery’s effort to rebut it and demonstrate a triable issue of actual malice is unavailing.
36
As an initial matter,
But even assuming, merely for the sake of argument, that the Chapter’s statements turned out to be false, Montgomery has not identified record evidence that would “allow a rational finder of fact to find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.”
Anderson,
First, Montgomery argues that his own statements to Risen suggesting his story was inaccurate gave Risen reason to know that the Chapter’s claims were false.
See
Pl.’s Opp’n at 27. The e-mails Montgomery points to largely consist of Montgomery questioning why Risen has not focused his attention on Trepp, Flynn, or government officials, and Risen seeking certain documents to corroborate some of Montgomery’s own claims.
37
See
Pl.’s Opp’n Exs, 13, 14. Although Montgomery never makes a full-throated denial of the Chapter’s claims, in the e-mails he does make some passing assertions that his technology “is still being used against Americans for covert purposes,” Pl.’s
Next, Montgomery claims that the Defendants knew all of the sources they relied upon had either an ongoing feud with Montgomery or a motivation to shift responsibility from their own actions to Montgomery.
See
PL’s Opp’n at 26. He points specifically to Trepp and Flynn, with whom he claims he was locked in litigation over eTreppid’s assets, including his software, and their statements that they now believed Montgomery to be a fraud or a con man. He also points to the government officials Risen quotes—named and unnamed—who Montgomery argues were simply “shifting the blame for their own bad decisions and failures onto a private individual as a scapegoat.” PL’s Opp’n at 28. It is true that, although a publisher’s failure to investigate “does not itself establish bad faith,” once “the publisher has obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of a story, the publisher must act reasonably in dispelling those doubts.”
Lohrenz,
Montgomery similarly points to the fact that the government neither prosecuted him nor asked for its money back.
See
Pl.’s Opp’n at 26. He claims that “Defendants ignore[d] warning signs that the U.S. Government kept re-hiring Dennis Montgomery and his employers through various contracts and various businesses as evidence that his software and technology was valuable and worked.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 28. To the contrary—Defendants explicitly acknowledge this fact, and the Chapter states that “[e]ven more stunning, after the debacle over the bogus Christmas 2003 terrorist threats, Montgomery kept getting classified government contracts awarded through several different corporate entities,” Chapter at 47. The Chapter drew a different inference from this fact: it asserted that “[t]he secrecy that surrounded [Montgomery’s] work once again worked in his favor” and that he was able to secure contracts because “CIA officials were reluctant to tell their Pentagon counterparts much about their experiences with Montgomery.”
Id.
An “adoption of one of a number of possible rational interpretations” is “not enough to create a jury issue of ‘malice’ under
New York Times,”
particularly absent warning signs which would have led Risen to doubt his account.
Time, Inc. v. Pape,
Next, Montgomery makes the unsupported claim that Risen’s original publisher, Simon & Schuster, refused to publish his book because he could not support the book’s claims. See, e.g., Pl.’s Opp’n at 8, 5, 16-18. This assertion is not supported by the record. When one actually looks at the e-mail correspondence Montgomery cites, it becomes clear that the Simon & Schus-ter editor with whom Risen worked merely raised concerns that several of the chapters might not work in concert to advance a central thesis, and suggested that additional chapters might be written to shift the book’s focus. As to the specific Chapter discussing Montgomery, however, the editor never raised a single substantive objection. Instead, she highlighted it as among the strongest in the book and always suggested that it remain. See PL’s Mot. for Leave to File Under Seal, Ex. A., ECF No. 272-4. 40
At bottom, the limited evidence Montgomery has supplied does not show by clear and convincing evidence that Defendants subjectively knew the Chapter’s assertions were false or acted with reckless disregard as to those assertions’ truth or falsity. The evidence and speculation on which Montgomery relies “is of insufficient caliber or quantity to allow a rational finder of fact to find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence,”
Anderson,
Finally, it is hornbook law that “a plaintiff may not use related causes of action to avoid the constitutional requisites of a defamation claim.”
Moldea II,
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 201) is GRANTED; Defendants’ motion to
Notes
. Defendants note that Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Company is improperly sued as "HMH Holdings, Inc.” See Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. & Mem. Supp. at 1, ECF No. 201. Although the Court refers generally to "Defendants” throughout this opinion, for ease of reference the Court will refer to "Houghton Mifflin” when referring only to the publishing company defendants.
. The entire book Chapter is filed as Exhibit A to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. The com
. See also, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 122, 124, 126, 127, 129, 131, 133, 135, 136, 138, 142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 150, 152, 154, 155, 158, 169, 182, 184, 185, 187, 190, 194, 200, 202, 204, 206, 208, 210, 212, 216, 218, 220, 222, 224, 230, 232, 234, 236.
. Defendants also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under the District of Columbia’s Anti-SLAPP statute, which they renewed after Montgomery filed his Amended Complaint. See Defs.’ Special Mot. to Dismiss the Compl, ECF No. 26; Defs,' Renewed Special Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 53. Defendants withdrew that motion after the Washington Supreme Court held Washington state’s anti-SLAPP statute unconstitutional, presumably because the motion relied on Washington state's statute in addition to D.C.’s. See Notice of Suppl. Auth, & Withdrawal of Defs.’ Anti-SLAPP Mot., ECF No. 61.
. Montgomery’s motion for an extension of time to file his response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment remains outstanding, despite the fact that he later filed that opposition. See Pl.’s Mot. for Extension of Time to File Opp’n, ECF No. 221; see also PL’s Mem. Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No, 233. The Court grants the motion nunc pro tunc and accepts his opposition as filed.
. After this Court ordered the parties to file certain sealed documents that were omitted from the docket as transferred from the Southern District of Florida, Montgomery withdrew his requests to seal. The Court therefore denied those motions as moot. See June 15, 2016 Minute Order.
.After this action was transferred, the Court issued an order requesting that the parties submit a joint status report addressing, among other things; the history of the litigation; any impending events or proceedings that might affect the course of the litigation; which motions and issues remained pending; whether any party sought to withdraw any pending motions; whether any pending mo
. The exception is the common law privilege for fair reporting of official government reports. The law in each state on this question is substantially similar. See infra.
. Both in their filings and throughout the course of the discovery dispute, Montgomery and his counsel repeatedly invoke this purported whistleblower investigation concerning illegal government surveillance on American citizens, legislators, judges, and other persons. Beyond the fact that Montgomery claims that the software relevant to this case was bound up among the material he provided to the FBI to substantiate his allegations, he never meaningfully explains any connection between those allegations and the subject of the Chapter. Therefore, the Court will not discuss it further. In his Amended Complaint, Montgomery does allege that Defendants’ “tortious actions alleged herein were furthered and aided and abetted by the CIA and the NS A, who want to destroy Plaintiff Montgomery to prevent him from disclosing as a whistleblower the full extent of their unconstitutional and illegal Government surveillance on American citizens to the Congress, the Inspector General, and to the courts.” Am. Compl. ¶ 256. Beyond the fact that Risen admits he spoke with certain CIA officials and officials from other government agencies, Montgomery has provided no evidence supporting this allegation. He also suggests that government officials are "falsely discrediting me to cover up wrong-doing.” Am. Compl. Ex. C. ¶ 61. To the extent this allegation is relevant to Montgomery's claims that government officials’ potential for bias should have provided Risen with reason to doubt the allegations made in the Chapter, the Court considers those assertions in the actual malice context, below.
. Although Montgomery initially moved to file Mr. Klayman’s communications with the FBI regarding, the search for the software under seal, he has since withdrawn that request. The communications can be found on the docket at ECF No. 273. Those filings include several,e-mails from Mr. Klayman to General Counsel James Baker in November 2015 raising concerns about Mr. Schwartz’s responses, but there is no indication in the record of Mr. Baker’s response, if any.
. In response to Magistrate Judge Goodman’s invitation, Defendants filed five specific questions for the court to ask Montgomery's counsel during the sanctions hearing, requesting that the document be sealed, at a minimum, through the conclusion of the hearing. See Defs.' Mot. to Seal, ECF No. 210; see also Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Seal, ECF No. 269. That hearing having concluded, the Court will deny the motion to seal.
. And, of course, Defendants never filed an Answer in this case because their motion to dismiss remained unresolved throughout discovery and summary judgment briefing.
. To be sure, the Court has also “carefully eschewed” a categorical rule that there are absolutely no circumstances in which a truthful statement could be actionable, "mindful that the future may bring scenarios which prudence counsels [the Court] not resolving anticipatorily.”
The Fla. Star v. B.J.F.,
. The final case Montgomery cites,
Noonan v. Staples, Inc.,
involved a pure matter of private concern and a private individual.
See
. For these reasons, the Court places no reliance on the CIA’s response to Defendants’
. Mr. Klayman now asserts that he was more equivocal at the August 21 discovery hearing about the software's inclusion among the drives. See Sanctions Hr’g at 28:23-40:17; PL’s Notice of Filing Related to Alleged Software, ECF No. 228.'While a few of his statements during that hearing were couched in uncertainty, the vast majority were expressed without qualification. For example, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: The FBI has the software?
MR. KLAYMAN: They have the software, yes.
THE COURT: How did they get it?
MR. KLAYMAN: Because Mr. Montgomery provided it to them.
THE COURT: When?
MR. KLAYMAN: He provided it to them three days ago. It has been in the process to provide that to them and he provided them a lot of other information too, which they are looking at because it is classified information and he is a whistleblower.
Tr. of Disc. Hr’g at 6:25-7:10, ECF No. 110; see also id. at 7:25-8:18 (representing that "relative to this case the software is included” in what was turned over to the FBI). For his part, Mr. Klayman now states that he has never even seen or reviewed the software that forms the basis of Montgomery’s complaint— and partially offers that as an explanation for why he does not know if the software was ever turned over. See, e.g., Sanctions Hr’g Tr. at 31:24-32:3; id. at 50:20-25; id. at 65:24-66:3; id. at 114:20-21. This assertion implies that Mr. Kiayman filed this lawsuit without a rigorous attempt to verify the claims that the software did in fact work—claims he asserted were false and defamatory. The Court is not insensitive to Mr. Klayman’s assertion that the software is classified (despite the absence of any real evidence showing it is), but his admissions nevertheless raise serious questions about whether he conducted the investigation necessary to meet his obligations as counsel under Rule 11.
. Mr. Klayman asserted that he did not read those orders that way, see Tr. of Disc. Hr’g at 40:7-22, ECF No. 110, but as Defendants point out, Montgomery, represented by the same counsel, appears to have argued before the Ninth Circuit that the software and all other documents at issue in the prior Nevada case were determined to be not classified, see Emergency Mot. for Stay on Appeal, ECF No. 103-1 at v. At the August 21, 2015 motions hearing, Mr. Klayman argued that he did not write that brief. See Tr. of Disc. Hr’g at 42:11-43:12, ECF No. 110. Later in that same hearing, however, Mr. Klayman admitted he was not aware of any Nevada opinion holding that the software was classified. - Id. at 45:25-46:25.
. Montgomery also filed a motion to extend discovery on this ground, even after Mr. ' Schwartz’s October 23 e-mail stated that the FBI would not continue to search for the software. See PL’s Mot. for Extension of Time to Reset Disc. Deadline, ECF No. 181. To the extent the motion has not been mooted by the Southern District of Florida’s failure to act on the motion before summary judgment briefing was concluded, the Court will deny it. As explained above, the FBI’s representations that are in the record state that because Mr. Montgomery had failed to provide then necessary information to conduct that search, the FBI would no longer expend resources to look for it. There is no need to extend discovery for the FBI to undertake a search it has definitively represented it will not conduct, and there is no other indicatidn that a search remains ongoing. The other reasons pressed for an extension—the pendency of two motions to compel—are now moot because those motions have been rejected or otherwise decided, or the documents Mr. Montgomery sought have been produced, so far as the Court is aware. See Pl.'s Suppl. to Mot. for Extension of Time to Reset Disc. Deadline, ECF No. 182; see Sanctions Hr’g Tr. at 6:20— 7:9, 71:21-72:2. To the extent any motions to compel remain pending, Montgomery’s opposition to Defendants' summary judgment motion does not claim that he was prejudiced by any outstanding discovery.
. Montgomery also filed an objection to Magistrate Judge Goodman's September 15, 2015 order prohibiting him from asking Houghton Mifflin’s officers and directors about Houghton Mifflin’s net worth or about officers’ alleged failure to disclose this lawsuit in SEC filings and purported insider trading that arose out of that omission.
See
Pl.’s Obj. to Limited’ Portions of Magistrate Judge’s Post-Disc. Hr’g Order, ECF No. 143;
see also
Post-Disc. Hr’g Order at 2, ECF No. 136 (addressing deposition topics 8 and 9); Pl.'s Suppl. to Obj. to Limited Portions of Magistrate Judge’s Post-Disc. Hr'g Order, Ex. 1, ECF No. 144 (reproducing notices of deposition). Magistrate Judge Goodman concluded that the net worth line of questioning was premature because it related to punitive damages, and that the insider trading and SEC allegations were an improper subject for deposition and irrelevant to the defamation claims made in this case.
See
Tr. of Mot. Hr’g at 21:2-18, ECF No. 145. Montgomery does not raise any SEC or insider trading-related claims for relief in this litigation. And Montgomery's opposition on the net worth issue does not even acknowledge that the magistrate judge ruled that inquiry was premature at this time, a ruling that is amply supportable.
See Kubicki ex rel. Kubicki v. Medtronic,
. If the judgment in this case were ever reversed, thereby removing the basis for the Court’s denial of Defendants’ motion for spoliation sanctions, the Court would entertain a renewed motion.
. Montgomery concedes that there are “a few statements that might qualify as opinion or hyperbole,” but, unhelpfully, he does not specify which ones. PL’s Mem. in Opp’n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 35.
. Other purely subjective or hyperbolic statements which appear in Montgomery's complaint but which he does not discuss or refers to only perfunctorily in his opposition include: Risen's hyperbolic reference in the book’s prologue, generally and without referencing Montgomery, to "hustlers and freebooters” who "continue to take full advantage” of the war on terror, Am. Compl. II195; Risen’s colorful and metaphoric reference to Montgomery as the "Emperor of the War on Terror,” id. ¶¶ 106, 199; and Risen’s subjective assessment that “Montgomery’s story demonstrates how hundreds of billions of dollars poured into the war on terror and went to waste,” id, ¶ 213,
Defendants also contend that the assertion that Montgomery created a "rogue intelligence operation with little or no adult supervision” is a non-actionable assertion of opinion. See Defs.’ Mem, Supp. Summ. J. at 20-21. Montgomery does contest this point in a
. Montgomery's Amended Complaint also includes a statement by Risen that, Montgomery claims, implies Montgomery should be in jail,
See
Am. Compl. ¶ 151, 156. Montgomery references this statement in a perfunctory manner in his opposition’s factual background section, without developing an argument for why the statement should survive summary judgment.
See
Pl.’s Opp’n at 8. Regardless, the full context of the interview shows that the
interviewer
asked Risen whether Montgomery was "in jail for that [the alleged fraud],” to which Risen answered "Well, no, he’s not in jail.” Am. Compl. ¶ 151, The same is true for the other statement in Montgomery’s complaint in which an inter
. There is a split of authority and an "ongoing debate” concerning whether a plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence or by a preponderance of the evidence that the allegedly defamatory statements are false, and whether the higher clear and convincing standard should apply for public officials and public figures even if a private figure can satisfy her burden by only a preponderance.
See
3 Smolla,
supra,
§ 23:7.50. The D.C. Circuit has interpreted District of Columbia law as requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate the falsity of a defendant’s statements by only a preponderance of the evidence.
See Moldea I,
. Montgomery also claims that malice and damages are
presumed
in
per se
defamation cases.
See
Pl.’s Opp'n at 22-23. As courts have explained, however, such statements involve the
common law
concept of malice (ill will or spite), which "does not incorporate, and thus cannot subsume, any fault standard.”
Levinsky’s, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
. Recall that the Court already concluded that the government has not been so definitive, and orders from the district of Nevada indicate otherwise.
. In a case in which Montgomery’s counsel here, Mr. Klayman, represented the plaintiff-appellant.
. In his statement of undisputed material facts, Montgomery claims that “Defendants knew that the government tested the Plaintiff's technology to confirm that it worked.” PL’s Stmt, of Disputed Material Facts ¶ 76 ("PL's SDMF”), ECF No. 234. But none of the documents he cites confirm, either Defendants' knowledge or that the government conducted successful tests. He cites to his own declaration, which again contains only his conclusory assertions that the government independently confirmed his technology.
See
Montgomery 2d Deck ¶¶ 9, 20, ECF No. 234-4. He also cites to Risen’s deposition which briefly discusses the testing of the software, but does not state the outcome of those tests or whether Risen believed or knew that the government had confirmed it worked.
See
Risen Dep. 297:7-299:23. Finally, he cites an email containing questions from Mr. Risen's colleague, Eric Lichtblau, to an Air Force spokesman. PL's Ex. 25, ECF No. 203-25. One of those questions states that ‘‘[e]arly reports from the Air Force about the data provided by Blxware indicated that the company had turned over 24 boxes of archive data and was performing very well in the early testing of its product,”
but then asks
"[w]as this true at the time and, if so, when did the Air Force begin to have doubts, about the product?”
Id,
The Air Force's
Tóühy
response indicates that those tests were never completed.
See
Letter from Robert F. Booth,
. Montgomery also alleges that Defendants’ publication that he was arrested in 2010 for bouncing more than $1 million in bad checks is defamatory per se. See Am. Compl, ¶ 178. In their statement of undisputed material facts, Defendants assert that "Montgomeiy’s gambling and other debts led to bankruptcy and his arrest for passing $1 million in bad checks,” and that "[t]he prosecution for passing bad checks is still pending Defs.' SUMF ¶ 29. Although Montgomery generally disputes the entire paragraph in which this fact is included, he does not respond to or discuss the prosecution at all. The Court therefore treats the fact as conceded. See Pl.’s SDMF ¶ 29; see also D.D.C. Local Civ. R. 7(h)(1). That being the case, he cannot show falsity.
. The Court notes that, on occasion, both the Eleventh Circuit and Florida state courts have expressly applied the
Waldbaum
test when determining whether a particular plaintiff has attained the status of a limited-purpose public figure.
See, e.g., Silvester v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.,
. Defendants also press another ground for concluding that Montgomery is a limited-purpose public figure: they claim that “Montgomery reconfirmed his public figure status by seeking and obtaining U.S. government contracts involving national security even after he was subject to extensive media scrutiny, thus assuming the risk of further public scrutiny about his alleged contracting fraud." Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 27;
see
Defs.' Reply at 16. Defendants rely primarily on a Fourth Circuit case in which the Court wrote that a government contractor that supplied civilian interrogators at Abu Ghraib "surely knew when it accepted the interrogation work that it was potentially exposing itself to the inhospitable climate of media criticism—criticism that could be emboldened by the actual malice standard."
CACI Premier Tech., Inc. v. Rhodes,
, Montgomery claims—without any legal citation—that these documents are hearsay and would be inadmissible at trial.
See
Pl.’s Opp'n at 19. But to the extent they would be introduced for the non-hearsay purpose of showing the Defendants’ subjective knowledge or state of mind regarding the veracity of the Chapter, they would be admissible. Courts regularly rely on media publications, government reports, arrest records, and other purportedly hearsay documents when considering defendants’ motions for summary judgment in defamation cases.
See, e.g., Liberty Lobby,
. Montgomery claims in his statement of material facts that he "produced email communications between Montgomery and Eric Lichtblau and James Risen as early as 2011 demanding retraction”—presumably referring to the New York Times articles Risen and Lichtblau authored. Pl.’s SDMF ¶ 65. But, as Defendants point out, he offers no documentary support for that assertion, Montgomery cites to Exhibit 9. That exhibit shows email traffic from 2012 (not 2011), sent only to Risen (and not both Risen and Lichtblau), and contains no discussion of a retraction. See Pl.'s SDMF Ex. 9, ECF No. 234-9. He also cites to his deposition, during which he claimed he sent e-mails to Risen and an editor seeking a retraction. See Montgomery Dep. at 191:4-197:19, ECF No. 234-5. No such emails have been identified to the Court.
.Because Exhibit 15 includes a number of separate reports and interview notes in a single document, the Court will cite to the ECF-generated page numbers for ease of reference.
. In passing, Montgomery asserts that Risen did not identify some sources at his deposition that were later discussed in his declara-I tion—although Montgomery does not identify the names of any particular individuals. See Pl.'s Opp’n at 16. The Court’s comparison of Risen’s deposition and his declaration reveal that, at the very least, Risen disclosed at his deposition the names of CIA Paris Station Chief William D. Murray, former White House counterterrorism official Frances Townsend, CIA Office of Public Affairs officials George Little and Jennifer Youngblood, and former adviser to Vice President Cheney Samantha Ravich. See, e.g., Risen Dep. at 93:19-21, 282:23-283:18, 292:20-22, 313:12-315:18, 380:2-385:1. These sources, on their own, are sufficient to show an absence of actual malice.
. This evidence also demonstrates why Montgomery cannot carry his burden to show negligence even if he is properly considered a private figure. To demonstrate negligence, a plaintiff must show “a failure to observe an ordinary degree of care in ascertaining the truth of an assertion before publishing it to others,” or, in other words, "a failure to make a reasonable investigation as to truth."
Kendrick v. Fox Television,
. On this latter point, the e-mails contain some vague discussions regarding Montgomery’s claims that John Brennan was or continues to be involved in some unspecified program related to Montgomery’s software. Montgomery claims that Risen “blackmailed” him and "attempt[ed] to get Dennis Montgomery to provide classified information and documents, including John Brennan’s emails.” PL’s Opp'n at 29. Simply put, the email conversation neither supports Montgomery’s assertion of some nefarious intent nor indicates that Risen threatened to publish his Chapter unless Montgomery divulged classified information.
. Other speculative assertions made without any record evidence (or an attempt to connect those assertions to Defendants’ subjective knowledge) include the following: Montgomery’s claim that Defendants "knew that the French at that time [that they purportedly reviewed Montgomery's software] were opposed to President Bush’s foreign policy”; his claim that "Defendants publish accusations that the U.S. Government shared classified intelligence, sources[,] and method [sic] with a private French firm at a time when France was hostile to George W. Bush’s foreign policy and in bed with commercial interests in Iraq and throughout the Middle East”; that the New York Times and other media sources refused to publish the Chapter’s claims, that Defendants "ignored contradictory information that was readily available”; and that Defendants "went far beyond and exaggerated to the extreme anything that was said in prior publications, public documents, or through any named sources.” PL’s Opp'n at 26-28. As for Montgomery’s claim that the French did not have access to the dis-encryption technology at issue, that statement is disclosed in the Chapter. See Chapter at 46 (explaining that the French company was hired to “reverse-engineer Montgomery’s purported technology”). And Montgomery does not explain why that fact should have given Defendants reason to doubt the ability of the French to verify, without Montgomery’s technology, the possibility that secret messages were being transmitted through Al Jazeera broadcasts.
. Montgomery also latches on to Risen's statement during a podcast interview that it was "difficult to tell what was really going on” or that one could "never tell what was the truth and what was not the truth.” Am. Compl. ¶ 149, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 27. As Risen explained in his deposition, however, that statement was taken out of context and involved an entirely different chapter of Pay any Price, a Chapter on “Rosetta” (a subject that is not further described in the record). See Risen Dep. 365:15-366:11 ("I know that you’ve mischaracterized and taken that out of context because I looked at the actual interview and it was related to a different chapter in my book, not the chapter involving Dennis Montgomery. ... It had nothing to do with Dennis Montgomery.”). The Amended Complaint does not provide the full context or transcript of the interview, but its use of brackets to explain why both the preceding and following portions of the interview were not relevant, and the fact that the quoted portion does not discuss Montgomery at all, cast serious doubt on Montgomery’s assertion that Risen was admitting he did not know whether Chapter Two was accurate. See Am. Compl. ¶ 149. Indeed, the Amended Complaint introduces the assertion by stating that Risen “winds up the Chapter on ‘Rosetta’ [sic] by saying ....” Id. And, in any event, the evidence discussed above demonstrates that, at least insofar as the Chapter concerning Montgomery is concerned, there is nothing in the record seriously indicating Risen had doubts about the truth of that Chapter’s assertions or the interpretation of events that he finally settled on.
. The Court's vague description of these documents’ contents is intentional. The documents were obtained from third-parties Simon & Schuster, Priscilla Painton (a Simon & Schuster editor), and Tina Bennett (Risen’s literary agent) pursuant to a subpoena. They were marked confidential pursuant to Magistrate Judge Goodman’s Protective Order.
See
Protective Order, ECF No. 89. Montgomery filed a motion to remove these documents from the Protective Order relying on little more than a statement by Magistrate Judge Goodman, taken out of context, to support his claim that the documents should not remain confidential.
See
Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to File Under Seal, ECF No, 236. Yet, two days before filing that motion he publicly filed his opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and quoted verbatim from the confidential documents. Defendants claim that the documents contain sensitive editorial information concerning Simon & Schuster's review of Risen’s book.
See
Defs.’ Resp. Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Remove Docs, from Protective Order at 4, ECF No. 239. The Court agrees and will grant Defendants’ motion to retain the documents under seal, deny Montgomery’s motion insofar as it requests to remove the documents from the protective order, and grant Defendants’ motion to seal their unre-dacted reply to plaintiff’s statement of additional material disputed facts, which discloses this information.
See
Defs.’ Mot. to Seal, ECF No. 253; Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Seal, ECF No. 270. To remedy the dissemination of the confidential information, the Court will order Plaintiffs to substitute a redacted version of
. The Court’s conclusion also makes it unnecessary to definitively resolve to what extent the common law fair report privilege protects the statements made in the Chapter. The common law privilege, retained in contemporary defamation law, immunizes from liability the fair and accurate reporting concerning official government proceedings and acts as "a recognized exception to the common law rule that the republisher of a defamation is deemed to have adopted the underlying defamatory statement as its own.”
White v. Fraternal Order of Police,
The Court does note that, in several instances, the Chapter describes allegations that were contained in FBI interview reports, Congressional testimony, and court documents. When it does so, Risen attributes the statements to those sources. In those instances, the statements would be shielded by the fair report privilege.
See, e.g.,
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 121, 123. At the same time, however, the Chapter as a whole is not a prototypical example of a work premised entirely on summarizing or discussing an official report; in many respects, extended passages of the Chapter discuss the surrounding events without explicitly referencing the contents of official governmental reports. In those cases, the Chapter leaves the reader "with the impression that the conclusion is that of the [Chapter’s] author based on his own research—which may or may not have included government reports.”
Dameron,
