750 N.E.2d 1149 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2000
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *244
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD NOT RUN IN THIS CASE AND GRANTED APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY *245 JUDGMENT; THEREBY DENYING APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW.
John Doe 54 assigns the following errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING IN PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR SOLELY ON PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF SUBROGATION RIGHTS AS PER R.C. §
2743.72 (A).II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD NOT STARTED TO RUN DUE TO DEFENDANTS BEING INCARCERATED AT THE TIME OF THE SUBROGATION CLAIM AROSE.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM WAS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT THERE WAS NOT ANY GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT.
John Doe 98 assigns the following errors:
*246I. THE TRIAL COURT IS WITHOUT SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION IN THIS ACTION AGAINST APPELLANT.
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION THAT THIS ACTION AGAINST APPELLANT IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONSIDERED SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS ADMITTED INTO THE RECORD WITH APPELLEE'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION THAT WERE NOT SERVED ON THE APPELLANT, WHICH DENIED APPELLANT A MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT OBJECTIONS TO THE UNSERVED SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS AND THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW GUARANTEED BY THE
FIFTH , ANDFOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND SECTIONS2 AND16 , ARTICLEI OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY, MOTION COMPELLING DISCOVERY AND ANSWERS TO INTEROGATORIES, WHICH DENIED APPELLANT THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW GUARANTEED BY THE
FIFTH ANDFOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTION2 AND16 , ARTICLEI OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RULING ON APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF "LACHES" WHEN NEITHER THE APPELLEE OR THE APPELLANT SPECIFICALLY MOVED FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF LACHES, THEREBY, DENYING APPELLANT DUE PROCESS OF LAW PROVIDED BY THE
FIFTH ANDFOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND SECTION2 AND16 , ARTICLEI OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, WHICH PROVIDES DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS.
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO PERFORM ITS MANDATORY DUTY TO THOROUGHLY EXAMINE ALL APPROPRIATE MATERIALS ON THE RECORD BEFORE RULING ON THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION AND COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR.
VII. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION SUSTAINING APPELLEE'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION IS CONTRARY TO LAW PURSUANT TO CIVIL RULE 56 STANDARDS, WHICH DENIED APPELLANT DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW.
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ISSUING AN ORDER ALLOWING THE STATE TO RECEIVE OR RECOVER APPELLANT'S MONEY THAT IS NOT BENEFITS OR ADVANTAGES NOR INCOME AND IS EXEMPT FROM COLLECTION WHEN THE STATE HAS NO RIGHT TO RECEIVE OR RECOVER SAID MONEY.
IX. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTIONS TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT APPELLANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT.
The underlying facts are largely undisputed. By July 7, 1987, all three John Does were convicted of unrelated murders. The families of all three victims applied for reparations from the Crime Victims Fund ("fund") pursuant to R.C.
Appellate review of a trial court's granting summary judgment is denovo. Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. Of Commrs. (1993),
A motion for summary judgment first forces the moving party to inform the court of the basis of the motion and to identify portions in the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Dresher v. Burt (1996),
Because John Doe 32's single assignment of error, John Doe 54's first, second, and third assignments of error, and John Doe 98's first, second, fifth, and seventh assignments of error are interrelated, we consider them jointly. They contend the statute of limitations, the equitable doctrine of laches, or both bar plaintiff's claim for subrogation. Plaintiff counters that (1) the statute is not a traditional subrogation statute because it grants the state an independent cause of action, (2) generally worded statute of limitations do not apply to the state, and (3) that the defense of laches does not apply.
R.C.
If an award of reparations is made under sections
2743.51 to2743.71 of the Revised Code, the state, upon the payment of the award or a part of the award, is subrogated to all of the claimant's rights to receive or recover benefits or advantages for economic loss for which an award of reparations was made from a source that is a collateral source or would be a collateral source if it were readily available to the victim or claimant. The claimant may sue the offender for any damages or injuries caused by the offender's criminally injurious conduct and not compensated for by an award of reparations. The claimant may join with the attorney general as co-plaintiff in any action against the offender.
The statute is triggered when an award of reparations is made from the fund pursuant to one of the enumerated sections of the Revised Code. Here, the statute became operative when the victims of defendants' crimes received reparations from the fund pursuant to R.C.
Given that the fund paid reparations to the families of all three of the defendants' victims, the state became subrogated to the rights of the victims' family members to receive or recover benefits, as provided in R.C.
The claimants here would have had the right to pursue legal remedies under tort law, including wrongful death. Given those options, the applicable statute of limitations would have expired before the current action was initiated unless the statute of limitations was subject to a tolling provision. While the trial court concluded that the statute of limitations was tolled under R.C.
Despite the general rule, defendants contend that statutes of limitation apply to the state when the state's cause of action is based on rights attained through subrogation. Defendants assert that subrogation actions are derivative in nature and thus a "subrogee cannot succeed to a right not possessed by its subrogor * * *." ChemtrolAdhesives, Inc. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. (1989),
Defendants' contentions find support in Ohio Dept. of Human Serv. v.Kozar (1995),
In United States v. York (1968),
Given the foregoing, the essential issue is whether R.C.
Conversely, in York, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the federal statute created an independent right to recovery in the sovereign because the statute gave "the United States `* * * a right to recover from * * * (a) Third person (who was liable in tort for injuries to persons treated by the United States) * * * the reasonable value of the care and treatment so furnished or to be furnished * * * and shall, as to this right be subrogated * * *': to the rights of the injured party." York,supra, at 584, citing Section 2651(a), Title 42, U.S.Code. Thus, the court, based on the text of the statute, concluded that the right of the United States was an independent right.
While Section 2651(a) subsequently subrogated that independent right, Section 2651(a) cannot be considered a typical subrogation statute. The injured party in a Section 2651(a) action does not incur any loss regarding medical expenses: the United States is required by law to provide treatment at no charge. Consequently, the injured party has no right to recover the reasonable value of treatment and care because the injured party never paid for any treatment or care. Thus, if the statute were truly a subrogation statute, under no circumstances would the United States ever be allowed to recover the value of the care it provided, as the injured party has no right of recovery to which the United States can be subrogated. The same cannot be said for the Ohio statute because the individual that receives reparations from the fund for a loss sustained and has a cause of action against the tortfeasor.
Moreover, even in the absence of the problem noted above, the text of the statute at issue in York is ambiguous in a way that the Ohio statute is not. In purporting to create an independent right and a right of subrogation, the statute becomes ambiguous. While the statute is ambiguous, a review of the legislative *250 history overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the intent was to create an independent right in the United States. See York, supra.
Similar to the statute at issue in Kozar, R.C.
Plaintiff, however, points to language in R.C.
Plaintiff further asserts our interpretation is incorrect underCrittendon v. Crittendon (1992),
Plaintiff next contends that subjecting plaintiff to the statute of limitations reaches an absurd result. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that if a victim has two years to file for reparations from the crime victims fund, then to subject the state to the statute of limitations will mean the statute of limitations will have expired in some instances by the time the state succeeds to the rights of the subrogor. While the result is frustrating, a court of appeals can use the "absurd result" *251
rationale only if it is reasonably possible to interpret the statute in a different manner. See State v. Rhodes (1958),
Finally, we note that R.C.
The Tolling Provision: R.C.
Even if the statute of limitations appears to have run, it may have been tolled by the provisions of R.C.
When a person is imprisoned for the commission of any offense, the time of his imprisonment shall not be computed as any part of any period of limitation, as provided in section
2305.09 ,2305.10 ,2305.11 , or2305.14 of the Revised Code, within which any person must bring any action against the imprisoned person.
"Generally, a cause of action accrues at the time the wrongful act is committed." Harris v. Liston (1999),
Despite defendants' arguments to the contrary, applying R.C.
Although the wisdom of some of these cases has been challenged, the challenges relate to circumstances where an accrued right is destroyed by retroactive application of the statute of limitations. See, e.g.,Bielat, supra; Eaton v. Ressallat (Jan. 15, 1982), Crawford App. No. 3-81-15, unreported. In such a circumstance, the statute of limitations is more substantive than procedural because a vested right is abolished by operation of the statute. Here, a vested right is not destroyed by retroactive application of R.C.
Nonetheless, given our disposition of the statute of limitations issue, we sustain John Doe 32's single assignment of error, John Doe 54's first, second and third *253 assignments of error, and John Doe 98's first, second, fifth, and seventh assignments of error, all to the extent indicated.
John Doe 54's fourth assignment of error contends summary judgment was inappropriate because he had a right to a trial by jury and because the clean hands doctrine counseled against summary judgment. Even if we were to agree that defendant had a right to a jury trial, it does not follow that summary judgment is improper. "An individual's right to a jury trial is not abridged by the proper granting of a motion for summary judgment."White v. Vrabel (Sept. 30, 1999), Franklin App. No. 1351, unreported; citing Tschantz v. Ferguson (1994),
John Doe 98's third assignment of error contends the trial court erred by considering supporting documents accompanying the state's motion for summary judgment that were not served on defendant. Defendant contends he did not receive his indictment, his guilty plea, and the claim for reparations docket sheet. The guilty plea accompanying the state's summary judgment motion, however, was from a different case, so defendant was not prejudiced by not receiving it. Moreover, in his answer to the state's complaint, defendant admitted he committed criminally injurious conduct and the fund made a reparations payment to the victim's family. His admissions establish most of the information sought to be proved by the three documents. To the extent they do not, the matter has been remanded with the concomitant opportunity to serve defendant with any documents not previously served. As a result, defendant sustained no prejudice and John Doe 98's third assignment of error is overruled.
Because John Doe 98's fourth and ninth assignments of error are interrelated, we address them jointly. John Doe 98 contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for discovery, his motion compelling discovery and answers to interrogatories, and his request for leave to amend and supplement his answers to plaintiff's complaint. The parties agree the trial court never specifically ruled on those motions. In such circumstances, the motions generally are considered denied. State ex rel. The V. Companies v. Marshall Cty. Aud.
(1998),
John Doe 98's sixth assignment of error contends the trial court violated Civ.R. 56(C) by failing to consider all appropriate materials filed in the record *254
before ruling on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. In support, defendant points to the trial court's decision granting the state's motion for summary judgment, where the trial court listed several documents pertaining to the motion for summary judgment. The trial court's failure to list every document defendant filed does not indicate the unmentioned documents were ignored. In contrast to the situation here, in the case defendant relies on, the trial court admitted on the record that it had not read a large portion of the relevant documents. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg (1992),
John Doe 98's eighth assignment of error contends that the trial court erred by allowing the state to recover monies that are exempt from collection. The record does not indicate the trial court specifically ruled on this issue. Because the case is being remanded, the trial court will have the opportunity to formally rule on the issue in the first instance before we consider it on appeal. Accordingly, John Doe 98's eighth assignment of error is overruled as premature.
Having overruled John Doe 54's fourth, and John Doe 98's fourth, eighth, and ninth assignments of error as premature, having overruled John Doe 98's third and sixth assignments of error, but having sustained to the extent indicated John Doe 32's single assignment of error, John Doe 54's first, second, and third assignments of error, and John Doe 98's first, second, fifth, and seventh assignments of error, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
TYACK and KENNEDY, JJ., concur. *255