*1 NORTH- CO. UTILITIES MONTANA-DAKOTA CO. SERVICE PUBLIC WESTERN 7, 1951. May 27, 1950. Decided Argued November No. *2 William D. Mitchell argued the petitioner. cause for With him on the brief were John Benson, C. H. F. Fellows and Rodger L. Nordbye.
Jacob M. Lashly argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Royhl, Max Fredric H. Staf- and Paul B. Rava. ford
By special leave of Court, Howard E. Wahrenbrock argued the cause for the Federal Power Commission, as amicus curiae. With him on the brief were Solicitor Perlman, General Robert Stern, L. Ross and Bradford Reuben Goldberg. Mr. Justice delivered Jackson opinion Court.
Petitioner respondent and are public electric utilities companies engaged in interstate commerce. Petitioner’s predecessor and respondent were under the same man- agement through interlocking directorships joint and of- interchanged two relationship During ficers. a number made and expenses, shared energy, electric charges, and rates establishing contracts intercompany accepted and with filed were contracts and rates contract These Commission. Petitioner controversy. this root at the charges predecessor 1935-1945, period during the that, charges re- for what prices high unreasonably respondent paid unreasonably received and it, furnished spondent advan- That respondent. provided what rates low was and unlawful fraudulent alleged, it is tage, pro- prevented directorate, which interlocking due to test Fed- *3 provisions to the pursuant established charges Act.1 eral Power and Court District States United in sued Petitioner “arises case the ground on jurisdiction asserted 2 States” United or laws the Constitution under com- regulating a “law under particularly, and, more 3 specifically merce,” Court, District in the was successful Petitioner and rates and fraud for void the contracts found also The court unreasonable. therein established charges what determined for judgment gave question period for the charges charges of reasonable conception between the difference three-quarters over amounting to charges, actual and the dollars.4 a million Appeals Court by the reversed was judgment District ground on the Circuit Eighth jurisdiction.5 without Court 791a-825r. 275, 16 U. S. C. §§ 838, 62 Stat. 1063, 49 Stat. Stat. 1 41 2 1331. S. C. § 3 C. U. S. reported. Not 2d 19. 5 181F.
As frequently happens jurisdiction where depends on subject matter, the question whether jurisdiction exists has been confused with question whether the com- plaint states a cause of action. The Code, Judicial vesting jurisdiction in the Courts, District does not create causes of action, confers adjudi- cate those arising from other sources which satisfy its limiting provisions. Petitioner asserted a cause of action under the Power Act. To determine whether that claim is well founded, the District Court must jurisdic- take tion, whether its ultimate resolution affirmative negative. or the If complaint raises federal question, the mere claim power confers to decide that it has merit, no as well as to decide that it has. In the words of Mr. Justice Holmes, “. plaintiff . . if the really makes a substantial claim under an act of Congress there is jurisdiction whether the claim ultimately be held good or bad.” The Co., Fair Kohler Die 228 U. S. 22, 25. See also Oursler, Hurn v. S. 238, U. Even patently complaint frivolous might be sufficient confer to make a final decision that it is of that nature, binding judicata as res parties.
Petitioner’s complaint, in substance, alleges existence of the interlocking directorship, contends that such rela- tionship was used fraudulently deprive it of its fed- *4 erally conferred right to reasonable rates and charges, reparations. and demands We think there was in the District Court to decide whether the claims so grounded a constitute cause of action in maintainable federal court if and, so, it whether is sustained on the facts. We think a direction to dismiss for juris- want of diction was error and that it should not stand a as precedent.
However, it is clear that the reason underlying the Court Appeals’ of decision was that no federal cause of action If established. this was correct, we should sustain than grounds other though reversal, of judgment those stated. without Scylla avoid tois problem petitioner's arises action of cause If its Charybdis. into drawn being of which action a common-law deceit, it is and fraud from diversity no being there jurisdiction, no court a federal being from arises But if parties. these of citizenship Power by the permitted those of excess rates in charged of powers exclusive with the confronted it is Act, be. are to rates those what to determine as not court, into case bring necessary it is Hence, using Act, the Power to enforce one as action, a fraud of limitations escape the fraud allegations remedies. Power
I. of action cause of its the source identifies Petitioner electric reasonable requirement Act’s Power the Federal right to legal creates contends, which, it rates,6 utility differ if reasonable, even deem may a court which rates Commis by the accepted those ent not utility could a however, that admitted, It is sion. a portion to recover court federal a a suit institute It unreasonable. were alleges simply rates past administra to exhaust for failure court out be it could past, time any at for, remedies, tive reduction and, perhaps, a review and secured applied Commission.7 by rates alleging cast different its case gives Petitioner relationship interlocking abuse fraudulent (a), 824d S. C. 851, 16 U. § Act, 49 Stat. (a) of the Section regulations and rules charges . and all . . “All rates that: states just and rea charges shall or such affecting pertaining or just charge is any such sonable, and be unlawful.” hereby declared (a). 824e C. 852, 16 U. S. (a), 49 Stat. 206§ *5 predecessor its deprived independence its to resort to its administrative remedy.
But problem is whether it open is to the courts to determine what the reasonable rates during past should have been. The petitioner, in contending that they so empowered, and the District Court, in under- taking to exercise that power, regard both reasonableness a justiciable legal right rather a than criterion for application a determining rate. lawful Statutory is an reasonableness quality repre- abstract sented area a rather than pinpoint. It allows spread substantial between what is unreasonable because too low and what is unreasonable because high. too To reduce the abstract concept of reasonableness to concrete expression in dollars and cents is the function of the Commission. is It not the disembodied “reasonableness” that standard when embodied in a rate which the accepts or determines that governs rights buyer and seller. A may court think a different level more reasonable. But the prescription of the statute is a standard for the Commission to and, apply independ- ently of Commission action, creates no right which courts may enforce.
Petitioner cannot separate what Congress joined together. It cannot litigate judicial in a forum gen- eral right to a rate, reasonable ignoring qualification that it shall be specific made exercise of the Com- mission’s judgment, in which there is some considerable element of discretion. It can claim no rate as a legal right that is other than the rate, filed whether fixed or merely accepted by the Commission, and not even court can authorize commerce the commodity on other terms.
We hold that right to a right to the rate which the Commission files fixes, and that, *6 courts the orders, Commission’s the of review except that, ground the one different right to no can assume one. more the or the it is opinion, in its II. is different its case that here contends petitioner The the evidence Those, fraud. of allegations of its reason gen- exceedingly are findings the them, and supports to in addition whether, clear entirely not it is eral, and the from inferred may be fraud constructive the claim deceit acts specific relationship, intercorporate thought been have appear to does Nor found. mattered. fraud actual and constructive between difference fraud active from arises grievance petitioner’s If Such Federal nothing from gains deceit, and no if maintainable have would an action Act, petitioner Before enacted. had been Act rate, a reasonable right statutory no have had would defrauded be right a common-law have it did The Fed- one. or unreasonable an excessive paying into wrong, an actionable fraud nothing to Act adds eral character of this action cause to find therefore, and, diversity. want of it for to dismiss only be heav- more rested appears case petitioner’s But presumed fraud on constructive entirely perhaps ily vests The Act relationship. intercorporate from di- interlocking authorize show- “upon due prohibited, otherwise rectorate, will interests private nor public neither . . . that ing here relationship The thereby.”8 adversely affected be ef- approval. received had concerned relationship from exempt is to approval fect any presumption from it remove the Act ban mere to arise thought might fraud that (b). 825d C. 856, 16 U. 305, 49 § Stat. existence. It would be a strange contradiction between judicial and policies if a relationship which the Commission has declared will not adversely public affect private interests were regarded by courts as enough to create a presumption of fraud. Perhaps, in the absence of the Commission’s approval, such relation- ship would be sufficient to raise the presumption under law, state but it cannot do so where the federal supervis- ing authority has expressly approved the arrangement.
We need not decide what action the Commission is empowered to take if it believes that a fraud has been committed on itself, for it has taken no action which gives rise to or affects this controversy.
III. The entire Court is agreed that the judgment rendered by the District Court cannot stand and all agree that it cannot adjudicate the issues that plaintiff tendered to it. disagree We only as to consequences of the dis- ability. The majority believe the federal court should dismiss the complaint. A minority urges that we should direct the District Court to refer issues to the Federal Power Commission.
It is true
that
some cases the Court has directed lower
federal courts to stay their hands pending reference
to
administrative body of a subsidiary question. Smith v.
Hoboken
Co.,
R.
fraud “De fraud. of remediable element an essential jury is Y. Clark, N. Adams must concur.” injury ceit Connelly v. also See (1925). 642, 644 N. E. 410, 146 403, (1934). 799, E.N. 315, Bartlett, Mass. decide can a case it with presented is court If the administrative anof competence within is issue some comity decide, to proceeding, independent in an body, considerations other as well conflict and avoidance noof know we But issue. refer proper make an issue reference ordered the court where case itself not body which pur- for that a proceeding to determine Com- withheld Congress The fact that pose. require not does reparations9 grant mission themselves they cannot proceedings entertain courts action indirectly to obtain in order decide There directly. be taken allow did Congress Congress’ Act in the no indication intent. remedy without petitioner leaves *8 this urged It is peti- respect, In that agree. We Power under than its its lawsuit losing after off no worse tioner to assume arewe Unless if it wins. customers in sell- its costs buying its include to failed company this amounts unreasonable any must assume we rates, ing Indeed, consumers. collected it suppliers paid it made assumption this is it re- that, if admitted It is here.10 curiae amicus as brief public, from the recouped already what again coups others by which of court out machinery nois there recover.11 it can to charges unreasonable paid who Cong., 1st Sess. 621, 74th Rep. No. curiae, pp. amicus the Federal Brief 13-14. 11 Id., pp. 14-17. such,
Under circumstances, we conclude that, since-the case involves only issues which a federal court cannot de- cide and can refer body which also would have independent no jurisdiction to decide, must decline the case forthrightly rather than resort to improvisation. such
The judgment below is upon affirmed the ground that petitioner has not established cause action.
It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Reed, and Mr. Douglas, Justice dissenting.
The plaintiff, Montana-Dakota Utilities Company, petitioner here, is the successor in interest several util- ity companies which distributed electric energy North and South Dakota. The defendant, Northwestern Pub- lic Service Company, served region south Montana-Dakota’s territory. Both corporations have been subject to the Federal Power Act since its enactment in 1935. 49 Stat. 16 U. S. C. 824§ et seq. The controversy arises out of relations between the two enter- prises prior to 1945. The facts which raise question whether the Federal District Court had entertain the may suit be briefly summarized.
After January 1,1935, all but one of Montana-Dakota’s directors were directors of Northwestern, and all of Mon- tana-Dakota’s officers were officers of the other company. These interlocking arrangements received formal author- ization by the Federal Power Commission, as required by § 305 (b) of the Act. 16 U. S. C. (b). § 825d At differ- ent times between 1935 and 1945 contracts were made between the *9 corporations two for the sale of electric energy. All such agreements have to be filed with the Commission, § 205 (c), 16 U. S. C. § (c), 824d the legality of rates so filed is not upon conditioned the Com- either challenged, they Unless approval. mission’s initiative, the Commission’s the or on party an interested now Montana-Dakota rates. legal the become rates filed Northwestern, decade for essence, that claims, the of Montana-Dakota deprived control, of its virtue Federal the under enjoyed corporation which rights contemporaneously from it prevented and Act Power Commission. Power Federal the before asserting them would filing what prevented was Montana-Dakota the Northwestern, because rates lawful the been have company for that rates filed Montana-Dakota, of dominus exacted rates the less than that were which Act—rates Power the Federal under two the dealing between length by arm’s determined and action of freedom secured Having companies. Montana-Dakota rights, its assert the thereby for Court District States United in the suit brought this the losses recoup Dakota to of South District the it. on imposed thus were claims it want for complaint the to dismiss moved defendant The under a claim to state failed in that 149, and Supp. 73 F. denied, motion was The law. federal unfair Court found District The trial. case the went interlocking relation- the circumstances in the dealing gave and rates, in the unreasonableness resulting ship and $779,958.30, in the sum plaintiff for judgment interest. and principal reversed. Circuit Eighth for Appeals Court juris- “had Commission Power Federal held
It
instance”
first
in the
tribunal
proper
and
diction
reasonableness
determine
securing
practiced
fraud
bearing of
arrangements
interlocking
permission
under the
rights
resulting subversion
no
can,
“The
found
The court
specify
did not
mistakes,” but
own
doubt, correct
*10
the administrative remedies it deemed available.
con-
It
cluded that
the District Court was
power
without
entertain the complaint and ordered it dismissed. 181 E.
2d 19, 23. We brought
the case here since important
issues
the administration of the Federal Power Act
are at stake.
Section 317 of the Federal Power Act in its present form confers on the district courts of the United States “exclusive of violations of Act or this rules, regulations, and orders and of thereunder, all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty by, created or enjoin any violation of, this Act any rule, regulation, or order thereunder.” 49 Stat. 862, 16 U. S. C. 825p. There can be no doubt, therefore, that if the complaint, fairly construed in light of the successful determination of the issues, seeks to enforce duty which the Federal Power Act recognizes, the District Court properly entertained the suit under the jurisdictional provisions of Act, reinforcing, as they do, general jurisdictional provisions governing the district courts. See Act of March 3, 1911, 24§ First, Eighth, 36 Stat. 1091, 1092, 28 U. S. C. 1331, §§
The Federal Power Act directs that
“All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public utility for inor connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and all rules regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or charges shall just and reasonable, and any such rate or charge that just and reasonable is hereby declared to be unlawful.” § 205 (a), 49 Stat. 851, 16 U. S. C. (a). § 824d We face at the outset the contention that this section confers on the Federal Power Commission authority to award reparations for unreasonable rates collected in the such gave legislation railroad past. Feb. Act of Commission. Commerce Interstate amended, 384-385, 382, 24 Stat. 16, 9, 1887, 4, §§ 308, 1921, § Aug. Act of cf. (1); 169,§§C.S.U. *11 to the given not was itBut §C.S. 165, Stat. deliber- withheld It Commission. Sess. 1st Cong., 74th 621, Rep. No. See ately. apparently were energy electric of consumers Wholesale provi- the by protected adequately rule, a considered, as grant to the authorizing Act the sions of order circumstances, to in certain and, relief prospective of pendency the during accumulated sums refunding of 16 Stat. (a), (e), §§ proceedings. rate unqualified the Despite (a). (e), 824e 824d §§ S. C. U. unlaw- rates unreasonable that statutory declaration either intend not did Congress that it clear think ful, we repara- award have the or court charge or filed properly a that ground the tions on were that If low. high unreasonably been in fact that agree would we showed, us before complaint the all be not action civil damages recovery should complaint that and remedy, appropriate dismissed. Montana- different. very isus before case But fixed and merely that assert not does Dakota Mon- unreasonable. were defendant by filed for show evidence introduced and claimed tana-Dakota were filed toAct by the required contracts some late; and months filed were that others all; at filed not obtained contracts fide the bona were that some appeared they face their on negotiation length arm’s operation into put and “conceived were instead be, but officers directors aforesaid its defendant by the charges [Montana- exacting large purpose for offsetting things, among other purpose, for Dakota] energy gen- electrical charges [Montana-Dakota] erated North Dakota and transmitted to and sold to defendant for resale South Dakota.” See cause 3, Y¶ of the complaint. Thus the complaint in substance al- leges that Northwestern misled the Commission into approving schedules which would not have been approved had complied Northwestern with the obligations full and fair imposed disclosure the Federal Power Act. While complaint does not artistically allege that domination by prevented Northwestern Montana- Dakota from complaining to the Commission that rates and charges were unreasonable, plain import and the facts so were found at the trial.
We are not here concerned with complaint insofar as it sets forth common-law cause of action based on misuse of powers by the directors of a controlled corpora- *12 tion. Such an action itself of course cannot be brought in a federal court in the absence of diversity of citizenship between parties. the But this preclude does not the same circumstances from giving rise to a cause of action that has its roots the Federal Power Act. As such con- the troversy does fall within of a federal court. The essence this cause of action is that the Federal imposed Power Act on Northwestern the duty to charge and pay reasonable rates its transactions with Montana- Dakota; and that while under the Act rates appropriately filed are, when unchallenged, the legal rates and deemed to be reasonable, in the circumstances here alleged the schedules and contracts filed were not complete or timely or bona fide. Since it coercively controlled, Montana- Dakota could neither file rates that were truly reasonable nor protest unreasonable rates filed on its behalf.
The Court of Appeals apparently closed door of the District Court to this suit on the assumption that relief could be had from the Federal Power Commission damage flowing from violation of the Federal Power Act. Of course a court would not grant relief, at least in the 260 were remedy administrative adequate instance, if
first leg- regulatory federal to fundamental It is available. for relief judicial to entitled is one “no islation ad- prescribed until injury threatened supposed Myers exhausted.” remedy ministrative This 50-51. 41, 303 U. S. Corp., Shipbuilding Bethlehem regulation. to relevant particularly principle S. Co., 204 U. Oil Cotton v. Abilene Co. Pac. R. & Texas S. Co., 230 U. R. Pennsylvania v.Co. Coal Mitchell 426; Com- S. 312 U. Co., R. Alton v.Co.& Armour 247; Co., Elevator v. Merchants Co. R. Northern pare Great S. provides Act Power that the find not But we do before situation meet to remedies administrative authorize does not Act have seen We us. to subjected those to reparations award to afford does Act likewise The rates. unreasonable conferred authority dam- award statutes regulatory other under agencies Compare by violations injured those ages C.S.U. 382, 49 Stat. 9, 24 1887, § February 4, Act 166, 42 Stat. (e), 1921, § 15, August Act 9; give true, does it is Act, 210 (e). C. § S.U. in order past into to look authority the Commission 307§ violated. has been Act whether determine Atlantic See (a). 825f §C. U. S. Stat. (a), such But 301, 312. Florida, 295 U. v.Co. R. Line Coast *13 administrative an for the basis made cannot inquiry Again, violations. victims damages award suggests, Government may, as Commission vacate 309§of provisions omnibus under by obtained approval when approval does this But 825h. C. § 858, 16 U. S. 49 Stat. fraud. retro- orders fix rate not authorize establish may spectively. “to be thereafter observed and in force.” (a), § 206 Stat. 852, 16 U. S. C. (a). § 824e
If the Commission can fix neither rates retrospectively nor award damages, it clearly can afford no adequate remedy to Montana-Dakota. Vacating its acquiescence in the interlocking directorate or in the schedules filed by Northwestern might prevent Northwestern from as- serting approval of the federal agency in an action brought against it under law; State it would not provide a basis for recovery by the injured party impose any certain liability on the wrongdoer. We are bound to conclude that Appeals Court of was in error in thinking that an adequate remedy existed precluded courts from granting relief.
But we cannot agree that
inability
of the Federal
Power Commission to grant relief requires that courts
be similarly disabled. Courts, unlike administrative
agencies, are organs with historic antecedents which bring
with them well-defined powers.
do not
They
require
explicit statutory authorization for familiar remedies to
enforce statutory obligations. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v.
Clerks,
Brotherhood
548; Virginian
S.
R. Co.
System Federation,
If civil liability
appropriate
to effectuate the purposes
aof
statute, courts are not denied this traditional remedy
because it is not specifically authorized. Texas & Pac. R.
Co. v. Rigsby, 241
33;
U. S.
Steele v.
&
Louisville N. R.
Co.,
That of words by alike attested isus before situation liability, of principles familiar of force by the statute, legislative out carrying considerations practical by objectives. charge that “rate or any explicit isAct
The
unlaw-
to be
hereby declared
is
just
is not
The
(a).
C. 824d
S.U.
851,16
49 Stat.
(a),
205§
ful.”
“defi-
if this
aborted
needlessly
be
would
Congress
of
aim
civil
impose
did not
of conduct”
prohibition
statutory
nite
rem-
by
not covered
a
liability in situation
explicitly
relief
judicial
no
merely because
edies
Brother-
R. Co.
N. O.
&
Texas
Compare
authorized.
recovery
civil
of
right
The
at
Clerks, supra,
hood of
or discrimina-
unreasonable
pay
compelled
persons
by
forms
the oldest
one
is
carriers
to common
tory
Pub-
v.Co. Call
Tel.
Union
Western
our law.
of relief
remedy for collec-
a
To
enforce
Co., 181 U. S.
lishing
us,
before
situation
charges in
unreasonable
tion
deny it
law; deeply-rooted
recognize
would
therefore,
judicial prac-
long-established
with
inconsistent
be
indicates
Commission
experience
tice.
it com-
duties
positive
of the
by virtue
itself,
statute
largely
very
circumstances
normal
mands, under
fa-
providing
explicitness
Want
own sanction.1
should
disobedience
case of
rare
remedy for the
miliar
it.
denial
construed
pro
reductions
show that
by
supplied
Data
than
More
filed.
effective
invariably become
posed
utilities
automatically as
effective
become
likewise
rate increases
half
aas
are
suspended
Those
filed.
con
informal
after
approved
modified, or
withdrawn,
general rule
staff.
the Commission’s
parties and
between
ferences
*15
To leave relief to the diverse and conflicting State
law dealing with intercorporate relations would make for
conflicting local administration
an important
national
problem. This Court has
shown
recently
reluc-
marked
tance to leave to the States determination of even State
questions
law
involved
the administration of the Fed-
eral Power Act.
Cooperative
First Iowa
v. Federal Power
Commission,
We could attribute such purpose to Congress only if to allow civil relief in the situation before us would inter- fere with the administrative remedies contemplated under Act, impose on courts alien responsibilities or they duties equipped to fulfill. No such con- sequence is remotely involved in utilizing age-old this remedy. The statute is based on the assumption that unlawful rates will ordinarily be promptly corrected at the initiative injured parties permitted to resort to the Commission for prospective 306, relief. 49 Stat. 856, 16 U. S. C. procedure § 825e. That is not available when the wrong asserted is corpo- the defendant ration has established unlawful schedules fraudulent domination of the utility with which it transacts busi- ness. To grant judicial relief for wrong such a will not interfere with procedure the remedial to which the Act corporations confines which are their own masters. Nor will it transfer to the courts responsibility for de- ciding questions properly which should presented to the Power Commission. In a variety of we situations agencies courts principle emphasized recently jus instrumentalities collaborative to be deemed “are 409, 422, S. 313 U. Morgan, v. States United tice.” To Massachusetts, S. 308 U. Palmer 183; S.U. may enter courts practice established that end aid to their call them, brought before actions tain within questions agency administrative appropriate v. Hoboken See Smith competence. Co., R. Mexican Texas Thompson v. 123; Co., S. R. v. United Assn. Alkali States United 134; cf. U. Oil Works Dorado El In the States, 325 U. S. *16 Dis the required procedure that proper held we litigation to look but a contract on a suit to entertain Court trict toas guidance Commission Commerce Interstate the con the out carrying involved practices transportation El Dorado v. Corp. Car Tank American General tract. v. Works Oil El 433; Dorado 422, Co., Terminal Federal the The fact 12. States, S.U. United dam award itself authorized is not Power questions a advising court fromit not disable does ages United States See needed. is judgment on which Florida, Co. v. R. Coast Line Atlantic supra; Morgan, why the Commission’s no reason We see at 312. supra, sought here. not be findings should the within of action a cause therefore, that think, We by com- a stated district courts at whole- energy electric of distributor a charging plaint selling at or buying (1) with commerce in interstate sale pro- with comply failure with (2) rates, unreasonable Act, Power the of requirements cedural remedies the resorting to others preventing (3) with court district In cases such by that afforded by determination request stay proceedings should within matters the Federal Com- within the It is competence. special Commission’s not, should filed whether to rule domain mission’s in view all circumstances, relevant be considered “reasonable” rates. It also falls to the Commission to decide what would have been the rates. The opinion of the Commission, being “only preliminary, a step” interim towards final judgment, would not be under 313 (b) Act, reviewable order would be reviewed part judgment by entered district court. Federal Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Co., Gas 591, 618, U. S. objections procedure raised apparently to this
not been considered substantial the Federal Power Commission, body charged with primarily admin- istration of the Act.2 think they We do should prevail. The function of District Court is not sim- ply to serve as a behind which the Commission facade accomplish is enabled to indirectly what it cannot do directly. completeness Certain issues of fact —the of dis- closure, for instance, loyalties the directors— are properly for the may court. Action the court similarly required in determining appropriate dis- position of the fund. See Federal Power Comm’n v. Co., Interstate Natural Gas 336 U. S. 2dF. Recovery by Montana-Dakota need not be a windfall *17 company. Many that changes in costs utili- charged prices ties are they may not reflected in Compare collect. St. States, Louis & O’Fallon R. Co. v. United 279 U. S. 461, 488, (Mr. 505-509 Brandéis, Justice dissenting). To the extent that passed Montana-Dakota on its customers, loss to its may permitted they recovery from on principles unjust well-established enrich- ment. And even if awarding the effect of relief is ulti- mately to benefit Montana-Dakota, certainly has a better claim to the exacted funds than Northwestern.
2In its brief here urged adoption the Commission substantially ground opinion. set forth this that unlike is “not here outlined procedure supra, Morgan, States employed United Court made on the resourcefulness demand a similar where situation. unusual to meet remedy find of law as be- unjust enrichment defeats remedy Such public in the accomplished This private parties. tween Power effectuating the Federal interest while Court, the District conclude we Because should complaint, to dismiss refusing correct mat- to determine asked its find- report competence within peculiarly ters remanded should be the case court, think we ing to with not inconsistent proceedings further to that court any opinion intimate course, not, of do opinion. We this support con- sufficiency of the evidence as to not be in this case should filed rates clusion appropriate any we restrict Nor lawful. deemed make of evidence might wish use the the trial. at adduced