This аppeal is taken from a conviction for “possession of a controlled substance, namely: Cocaine” less than twenty-eight grams. Appellant waived trial by jury and entered a plea of guilty before the trial court. Appellant’s punishment was assessed at six years’ imprisonment and a fine of one thousand dollars. The imрosition of the sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on probation subject to certain conditions.
Appellant advances three points of error as follows:
1. “Judge Wisser abused his discretion when he granted the State’s motion to reopen evidence and reversed himself on appellant’s motion to suppress.”
2. “Judge Wisser lacked jurisdiction to рermit the State to re-open evidence and reverse himself on the motion to suppress when the time for State to file an appeal had expired.”
3. “Judge Wisser erred when he denied appellant’s motion to suppress.”
The points of error, inter alia, present questions, apparently of first impression, as to the extent to which a trial cоurt may *135 reconsider its pretrial suppression order and whether the State’s remedy, after the granting of a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, is restricted to its interlocutory appeal from such pretrial order.
On April 1, 1991, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted appellant’s pretrial motion to suppress evidence of the cocaine found in the ashtray of appellant’s 1985 Chevrolet Camaro automobile following a traffic stop. Deputy Sheriff Frank Rodriguez testified that appellant was slow to stop despite the activated overhead lights on his patrol vehicle; and that during this time, appellant made three furtive gestures or movements inside the car. Appellant reached under the car seat and then made movements toward the passenger side of the car and to the center of the automobile. Rodriguez related that he was concerned about the safety of himself and his fellow officer and that he searched the driver’s compartment for weapons. In his search for weapons, Rodriguez opened the ashtray and found the cocaine in question. The officer testified that a .22 caliber weapon, a short single-shot derringer, or other weapon would fit in the ashtray. The trial court expressed the wish that someonе would have “brought the actual ashtray in here.” The trial court thought the search of an ashtray for weapons was “strange” and granted the motion to suppress the evidence.
On April 5, 1991, the State filed a “Motion to Re-Open Evidence.” 1 Attached to the motion were photographs of a .22 caliber mini-revolver fitting easily insidе the ashtray recess in the console of a 1985 Chevrolet Camaro once the metal ashtray had been removed. Affidavits of a police officer and an Austin Capitol Chevrolet Company parts employee were also attached. These affidavits were to the effect that such a weapon аs displayed in the photographs could fit inside the ashtray recess, which contained a cover or lid. The motion noted that the question was whether Deputy Rodriguez had a reasonable belief that a weapon might be hidden inside the ashtray.
The appellate record contains a court order dated July 24, 1991, which states in pertinent part:
On the 1st day of May 1991, came on to be heard the State’s Motion to Re-Open evidence in this cause. Having considered the motion, affidavits, and argument of counsel the court granted leave to re-open. On the 23rd day of July, 1991, having reconsidered the evidence submitted, the affidavits affixed to the State’s Motion to Re-Open, the Court finds that its initial ruling that the evidence in this case be suppressed is in error and the Court hereby rescinds that order.
THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant Abel Montalvo’s Motion to Suppress is denied in all respects.
We shall jointly discuss appellant’s first two points of error. Appellant urges that once Judge Wisser had granted the motion to suppress evidence, “the State’s proper remedy ... was an appeal to a higher court.” See Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Ann. art. 44.01 (West Supp.1992). Article 44.01 permits interlocutory appeals by the State under limited circumstances and certain conditions. The State's only right of appeal is confined to narrowly defined situаtions. The State’s right to appeal is not encouraged by the statutory enactment.
Article 44.01(a)(5) provides:
(a) The state is entitled to appeal an order of a court in a criminal case if the order:
(5) grants a motion to suppress evidence, a confession, or an admission of jeopardy has not attached in the ease and if the prosecuting attorney certifies to the trial court that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay and that the evidence, confession, or admission is of substantial importance to the case.
Thus, the State has a right to appeal an interlocutory order granting a motion to supprеss evidence.
See State v. Kaiser,
*136
In some jurisdictions, the law permits the prosecution to take an interlocutory appeal from a ruling granting the defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress. But there are “differences between appellate review and reappraisal of a pretrial ruling at trial,” and thus it cannot be said that the availability of interlоcutory appeal eliminates any possible argument in favor of reappraisal at trial on behalf of the prosecution. By appeal the prosecutor could overturn an erroneous pretrial ruling especially a misapplication of the law, but only reconsideration at trial would permit сonsideration of new facts. (Citations omitted).
4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 11.2(f) at 260 (2nd ed. 1987).
In the instant case, the State acted within four days of the initial ruling to seek reconsideration of new facts bearing on the issue in question and substantially affecting the credibility of the evidence adduced at the original pretrial hearing. The State never sought to appeal the first ruling on the motion to suppress. We reject appellant's claim that article 44.01(a)(5) accorded the State an exclusive remedy and that the trial court lacked “jurisdiction” to permit the State to reopen the evidence on the suppression issue.
Cf. United States v. Scott,
Shifting his position, appellant also argues that if the trial court had thе necessary discretion, it abused that discretion when it granted the State’s motion to reopen the evidence and then reversed itself by rescinding the earlier order.
We observe that appellant made no objection to the trial court’s actions. Generally, error must be preserved at trial with a timely and speсific objection.
See
Tex.R.App.P. 52(a);
Turner v. State,
Even if it could be validly argued that error was preserved for review, and in light of the jurisdictional claim asserted, we shall further consider the contention. Both parties cite and rely оn Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 36.02 (West 1981), which provides: “The court shall allow testimony to be introduced at any time before the argument of a cause is concluded, if it appears that it is necessary to a due administration of justice.”
The decision to reopen a case is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Cain v. State,
Appellant relies on article 36.02 and contends that the argument on the pretrial motion to suppress had concluded and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to untimely reopen the evidence. Appellant would apparently substitute “before the argument of a motion to suppress is concluded” for the statutory language of “before the argument of a case is concluded.” Appellant argues that caselaw requires “that if the evidence is rеopened after argument is concluded, the case will be reversed.” He cites
Williams v. State,
A motion to suppress is nothing more than a specialized objection.
Galitz v. State,
Other jurisdictions have held that the trial court has the discretionary power to reconsider rulings on supprеssion hearings, even in the absence of a statute such as article 36.02.
Scott,
If it can be said that appellant preserved error, he presents neither controlling precedent nor persuasive policy argument to support his position. The trial court had continuing jurisdiction over the ease and was free to reconsider its own earlier suppression ruling. The trial court was presented with a State’s motion indicating that the evidence had been lawfully obtained, and the decision to reconsider did not result in а purposeful delay. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Appellant’s first and second points of error are overruled.
In his third point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence. Appellant attempts to rely alone on the statement of facts at the first evidentiary suppression hearing when the trial court granted the motion to suppress. As earlier noted, the statement of facts of the hearing on the State’s motion to reopen the evidence on the suppression hearing and of the second evidentiary suppression hearing are not in the appellаte record. Appellant did not sustain his burden to present a sufficient record showing error requiring reversal. Tex.R.App.P. 50(d). We are unable to appraise appellant’s contention with only a partial statement of facts. Nothing is presented for review.
Smith,
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Notes
. Appellant contends that the State’s motion was filed on May 4, 1991. The motion was filed on April 5, 1991, and was granted on May 1, 1991. A duplicate motion was subsequently filed on May 4, 1991. The reason for this second filing is not clear from this record.
. In Rogers, the trial court permitted the State to reopen the evidence after both sides had closed at the “punishment phase” of the trial. After quoting article 36.02, the court statеd:
This statute has been construed to mean that a trial judge commits reversible error when he refuses a request to reopen for the purpose of producing relevant and admissible evidence, regardless of its weight or the issue upon which it is offered, so long as the request is timely under the statute and does not threaten to unduly imрede the trial. Vital v. State,523 S.W.2d 662 , 664-665 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). By this reckoning, had appellant requested an opportunity to reopen under the circumstances presented here, he would have been entitled to do so. See, e.g., Cain v. State,666 S.W.2d 109 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); Holifield v. State,599 S.W.2d 836 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). We perceive no meaningful difference in application of the statute to evidence offered by the prosecution. See, e.g., Holcomb v. State,523 S.W.2d 661 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Boatright v. State,472 S.W.2d 765 , 770 (1971); Rodriguez v. State,171 Tex.Crim. 476 ,350 S.W.2d 854 (1961).
Rogers,