Thе plaintiffs, Lorenzo Montalto and Carmelina Montalto, who were substituted for the original plaintiff, Sam Montalto, will be referred to herein as plaintiffs. This cause is concerned mainly with the right to set off a judgment, acquired by a defendant Edgar G. Yeckley (referred to herein as defendant) during the pendency of the action, against plaintiffs’ judgment on which their actiоn is founded. Incidentally, the claim of plaintiffs’ counsel that their right to attorney fees is superior to any right of set-off in favor of the defendant will be considered.
This action was formerly in this court on an entirely different question with the result that there was a reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals (to which an appeal had been taken from Court of Cоmmon Pleas on questions of law and fact) and a remandment to the appellate court for further procеedings not inconsistent with the court’s opinion.
Montalto
v.
Yeckley,
It was early stated by this court that “the practice *183 of setting off one judgment against another, between the same parties, and due, in the same rights, is ancient and well established.” Holmes v. Robinson, 4 Ohio, 90.
As between judgments, which are somewhat different in this respect from claims not reduced to judgment, this court has recognized the doctrine of equitable setoff. One judgment may be set off against another at the court’s discretion, which must be exercised in accordаnce with sound principles of equity jurisprudence
Diehl
v.
Friester,
Jurisdiction to set off judgments against each other exists in chancery independent of statute and is inherent in the court. Nevertheless the power to apply the statutes in proper cases is accepted as a corollary to the stated doctrine. In
Oliver
v.
Canan,
Does a different rule prevail when the defendant seeks to have a judgment obtained by purchase and assignment set off against a judgment on which the
*184
plaintiff sues? According to the better view a judgment so obtained by the assignee may be set off in the sound discretion of the сourt, where the assignee purchases the judgment in good faith unconditionally and thereby becomes the absolute and beneficial owner thereof, even though the purchase is made for the purpose of using the judgment as a setoff.
Johnson
v.
Noble, Admx.,
Nor does it in our opinion make any difference in the application of such rule that the judgment against the plаintiff was, as in the case at bar, purchased by the defendant during the pendency of a suit in the nature of a creditor’s bill brоught by the plaintiff, as a judgment creditor, to enforce collection of his judgment against the defendant.
The application of the rule is not altered because the defendant purchased the judgment far below its face amount. So long as the contract of purchase has the essential elements stated, courts of equity do not look upon the amount of consideration paid for the judgment as a positive limitation upon the amount that is to be set off. Thе defendant in making his purchase is exercising his right to contract. In defendants’ brief it is said in substance that it is “common commerсial practice” to buy judgments “at discounted prices or at salvage value.” If this statement be too broad, it nevеrtheless suggests an evident truth and if the defendant made a good bargain that is his good fortune. The low purchase pricе was no more than a fact which the trial court (in this instance the appel *185 late court) could take into consideration in exercising its discretion.
Counsel for plaintiffs insist that defendant’s judgment should not be set off so as to deprive them of their attorney fees for services rendered herein in endeavoring to colléct plaintiffs’ judgment. Their fee was contingent and was to be based upon an agreed percentage of the amount that might be collected They had no lien on the judgment and no assignment of any part thereof to protect their contingent fee. It was laid down in Diehl v. Friester, supra, that in setting off one judgment against another “the claim of the attorneys for fees will be respected, whenever it apрears to be right, in view of the facts, that this should -be done.”
The court’s power to exercise discretion in the allowаnce of a setoff finds its counterpart in the court’s power to exercise discretion with regard to attorneys fees. If the claim for fees is allowed, then the amount allowed to a defendant as a setoff must be reduced accordingly. The trial court herein refused to take into consideration attorney fees in allowing the setoff to defеndant. This action of the court was within its discretion and did not constitute reversible error under the particular facts of this case.
For the reasons given the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.