Monroe v. DallasMonroe v. Dallas
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Corbin
On November 16, 1980, the appellant Allen Monroe and Catherine Monroe, deceased, became engaged in a heated argument which culminated in Catherine Monroe’s being shot to death by appellant Allen Monroe. A Texas jury convicted him of voluntary manslaughter and he was given a sentence of twenty years.
Appellants argue that the Arkansas probate court erred in appointing the appellee as guardian of the minor child: (1) over the objection of the minor’s father, (2) contrary to the minor’s father’s preference of the appointee and (3) in disregard of the probate proceedings for appointment of a guardian for the minor in Texas. Appellants additionally argue that the Arkansas probate court had no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian as the minor child was a domiciliary of the State of Texas.
The parents of an unmarried minor, or either of them, if qualified and in the opinion of the court suitable, shall be preferred over all others for appointment as guardian of the person. Subject to this rule, the court shall appoint as guardian of an incompetent the one most suitable to serve who is willing to serve, having due regard to: (a) any request contained in a will or other written instrument executed by the parent for the appointment of a person as guardian of his minor child;... (d) the relationship by blood or marriage to the person for whom guardianship is sought.
A reading of this statute indicates that parental preference is
Evidence in the record supports the finding that the appellee, who is the maternal grandfather of the minor, is a person suitable to protect the minor’s welfare. ARCP Rule 52 provides in part:
Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous (clearly against the preponderance of the evidence), and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
We do not find that the appointment was an abuse of the probate court’s sound discretion.
In Shaw v. Shaw, 251 Ark. 665, 473 S.W.2d 848 (1971), the Supreme Court, quoting from Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws, (1971), § 79, stated:
The state where the child is physically present has the most immediate concern with him; its courts also have direct access to the child and may be most qualified to decide what would best redound to his welfare.
If the incompetent is not domiciled in this state but resides in this state, the county of his residence shall be the proper county for the appointment of a guardian.
We hold that physical presence of the children in this state is a proper basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Miller Chancery Court to determine whether there should be a change in custody of the children involved. The fact that the decree of that court might not be accorded extraterritorial effect should not limit the power of the courts of this State to act for the best welfare of the children physically present within their territorial jurisdiction and to treat them as its wards, at least when their presence is not purely transient. See Keneipp v. Phillips, 210 Ark. 265, 196 S.W.2d 220; Pope v. Pope, 239 Ark. 352, 389 SW.2d 425; Tucker v. Turner, 195 Ark. 632, 113 S.W.2d 508. The General Assembly has clearly made a policy determination which supports this view. A guardian who would have custody of a minor may be appointed by the probate court of a county in which he resides, even though he may be domiciled elsewhere.Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-601 , 606, 620,625 (Supp. 1969). This statutory determination can only be based on the premise that this state has such an interest in the welfare of a minor living within its borders that its courts should take such action as may be necessary to provide for its best welfare.
We affirm.
Glaze, J., not participating.