Monroe BRANSTAD, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa ex rel. NATURAL RESOURCE COMMISSION and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources, Appellees.
No. 14-0205.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Nov. 6, 2015.
871 N.W.2d 291
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Thompson, Solicitor General, and David R. Sheridan and David L. Dorff, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees.
ZAGER, Justice.
In this appeal we are asked to decide whether the State‘s role is “primarily adjudicative” when the Natural Resource Commission decides a contested case following an investigation and subsequent decision by the Department of Natural Resources to assess restitution. We find that the State‘s role in this case was primarily adjudicative, precluding an award of attorney fees. See
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The Iowa Department of Natural Resources (DNR) was called to investigate a fish kill that occurred in the Winnebago River on or around August 28, 2008. The agency found the following facts.
Scott Grummer, a biologist for the DNR, led the investigation into the fish kill. During the investigation, Grummer interviewed Monroe Branstad about the possibility that the fish kill was caused by pollution from his farming operation. According to Grummer, Branstad said he had recently installed a silage leachate runoff basin on his property. Branstad also said that he was the only farmer in the area he knew of who stored silage leachate. The fish kill affected 16.1 miles of the Winnebago River.
As a result of Grummer‘s investigation, he determined that the release of sweet corn silage runoff from Branstad‘s farming operation caused the fish kill on the Winnebago River. Grummer also performed a fish kill assessment, which led him to calculate that the number of fish killed was 31,244 and that those fish had a monetary value of $63,020.23. As a result of this investigation and fish kill assessment, the DNR prepared a litigation report and made a referral to the attorney general‘s office for appropriate enforcement action pursuant to
On May 11, 2010, Branstad entered into a consent order with the State. As part of this consent order, Branstad admitted that on August 28 and 29, 2008, sweet corn silage leachate, a pollutant, discharged from a containment basin on his farm operation into the Winnebago River in violation of
On June 10, the DNR submitted its restitution assessment to Branstad. As noted in the restitution assessment,
A contested hearing was conducted on July 25 before an administrative law judge (ALJ). In his appeal, Branstad raised a number of arguments and defenses. During the proceeding, both Branstad and the DNR were represented by counsel. On December 6, the ALJ issued a proposed decision that affirmed the restitution assessment in its entirety, including the restitution amount of $61,794.49.1 Branstad timely appealed the proposed decision of the ALJ to the Commission. On March 8, 2012, the Commission conducted a hearing on the appeal at which all parties were able to argue their respective positions. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Commission voted 4-1 to affirm the proposed decision of the ALJ, which then became its final decision.
Branstad timely filed his petition for judicial review in the district court. In its ruling issued July 16, the district court affirmed the final decision of the Commission on most of Branstad‘s arguments. However, the district court found that the DNR failed to follow its own rules for investigating fish kills. The district court found that the extrapolation method used by the DNR when it investigated the Winnebago River fish kill was incorrect and inconsistent with the methods prescribed by the American Fisheries Society Special Publication 24 (AFS 24). The district court reversed the final decision of the Commission and struck the restitution assessment. On July 29, the DNR requested that the district court reconsider its ruling and remand the case for a restitution calculation based only on the amount of dead fish actually counted. The district court determined that this was consistent with the rules contained in AFS 24. The district court remanded the case to the Commission to recalculate the damages based upon the 2233 dead fish actually counted by the DNR.
In its decision on remand, the Commission reduced the restitution assessment to Branstad as a result of the Winnebago River fish kill to $5298.19. Branstad did not appeal this restitution assessment.
On October 30, Branstad filed an application for an award of attorney fees under
Branstad appealed the decision of the district court. We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed the district court‘s decision and remanded the case for a calculation of attorney fees. The court of appeals held that none of the exceptions found in
The State filed an application for further review, which we granted.
II. Standard of Review.
The standard of review we use for cases involving a district court‘s interpretation of a statute is for correction of errors at law. Star Equip., Ltd. v. Iowa Dep‘t of Transp., 843 N.W.2d 446, 451 (Iowa 2014). We are not bound by the district court‘s legal conclusions. Van Sloun v. Agans Bros., Inc., 778 N.W.2d 174, 179 (Iowa 2010). The sole question we address is whether the district court correctly applied the law with respect to an award of attorney fees under
III. Analysis.
Because an award of attorney fees are a derogation of the common law, attorney fees “are generally not recoverable as damages in the absence of a statute or a provision in a contract.” Botsko v. Davenport Civil Rights Comm‘n, 774 N.W.2d 841, 845 (Iowa 2009) (quoting Kent v. Emp‘t Appeal Bd., 498 N.W.2d 687, 689 (Iowa 1993)). The statutory authorization must be express and “must come clearly within the terms of the statute.” Id. (quoting Thorn v. Kelley, 257 Iowa 719, 726, 134 N.W.2d 545, 548 (1965)).
Unless otherwise provided by law . . . the court in a civil action brought by the state or an action for judicial review brought against the state pursuant to chapter 17A other than for a rulemaking decision, shall award fees and other expenses to the prevailing party unless the prevailing party is the state. However, the court shall not make an award under this section if it finds one of the following:
a. The position of the state was supported by substantial evidence.
b. The state‘s role in the case was primarily adjudicative.
c. Special circumstances exist which would make the award unjust.
A. Prevailing Party. The district court declined to decide whether Branstad was the prevailing party under the statute because it found that the exceptions under
B. Exceptions to an Award of Attorney Fees Under 625.29(1). The district court relied on three of the exceptions contained in
Branstad argues that we should consider the DNR—not the Commission—to be the “State” for purposes of the “State‘s role” under the statute. We do not agree.
The phrase “primarily adjudicative” is not defined in the Code. When we are asked to interpret the language of a statute, we apply well-settled principles of statutory interpretation:
The purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine the legislature‘s intent. We give words their ordinary and common meaning by considering the context within which they are used, absent a statutory definition or an established meaning in the law. We also consider legislative history of a statute, including prior enactments, when ascertaining legislative intent. When we interpret a statute, we assess the statute in its entirety, not just isolated words or phrases. We may not extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the meaning of a statute under the guise of construction.
Schaefer v. Putnam, 841 N.W.2d 68, 75 (Iowa 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“We also consider the statute‘s ‘subject matter, the object sought to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, underlying policies, remedies provided, and the consequences of the various interpretations.‘” Cox v. State, 686 N.W.2d 209, 213 (Iowa 2004) (quoting State v. Albrecht, 657 N.W.2d 474, 479 (Iowa 2003)).
While primarily adjudicative is not defined by statute, we are not without guidance on this issue. In Remer, the court was faced with the question of whether the board of medical examiners’ role in a disciplinary proceeding against a physician was primarily adjudicative under the statute in determining whether to award attorney fees. 576 N.W.2d at 599-600. In that
The court defined primarily adjudicative in Remer and concluded that the board‘s role was primarily adjudicative under the statute. Id. at 601, 603. “[I]f an agency‘s function principally or fundamentally concerns settling and deciding issues raised, its role is primarily adjudicative.” Id. at 601. When a court determines whether the state‘s role is primarily adjudicative in the context of this statute, it must look at the state‘s role in the case currently in front of it, and not the state‘s role in other, similar cases or the state‘s role generally. Id.
The parties agree that the framework this court set out in Remer is appropriate for determining whether to award attorney fees. However, they disagree as to whether the procedural history in this case is similar enough to Remer to preclude an award of attorney fees to Branstad. The district court found that the State‘s role in this case was primarily adjudicative because the agency‘s role was to investigate, to determine if restitution was appropriate and in what amount, and to consider the defenses argued by Branstad. The court of appeals disagreed and reversed on appeal, basing its decision primarily on procedural differences between Remer and Branstad‘s case.
Although it was not exactly the same, the procedure followed by the Commission aligns with that of Remer. Id. at 599. As in Remer, the DNR received complaints about the fish kill and investigated it before assessing restitution and before the hearing. Although Branstad‘s hearing was in front of an ALJ rather than a panel of the Commission, the opinion issued by the ALJ was only a proposed decision. The decision did not become final until it was heard and considered by the Commission.
We also consider the term primarily adjudicative in the context of the statute defining the role of the Commission. As defined by statute, the role of the Commission includes “establish[ing] policy and adopt[ing] rules,” in addition to “hear[ing] appeals in contested cases pursuant to chapter 17A.”
We also rely on dictionary definitions to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase primarily adjudicative. Webster‘s Dictionary defines “adjudicate” as “to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised,” to “enter on the records of a court (a final judgment, order, or decree of sentence).” Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 27 (unabr. ed. 2002). The Commission‘s action in this case falls squarely within the definition of adjudicate. The Commission was presented with the fish kill investigation, the restitution assessment, and various defenses raised by Branstad. Although it was the impartial ALJ who heard the case and made an initial decision, the Commission made the final decision after weighing the evidence, considering the defenses, and determining the rights and duties of the parties.
We are mindful of the concerns raised by Justice Carter in his special concurrence in Remer regarding cases in which the potential award of attorney fees is swallowed by the exceptions. See Remer, 576 N.W.2d at 604 (Carter, J., concurring specially). However, a commentator who has reviewed the legislative history notes that, while there is no explanation provided in the legislation, previous proposed bills would have eased the ability to award attorney fees against the State. See Samuel A. Thumma & Barbara J. Dawson, The Iowa Equal Access to Justice Act: Is Recovery Available?, 39 Drake L. Rev. 431, 436-42 (1989-90). These bills were rejected in favor of more limiting language contained in the final legislation. Id. Key among legislative concerns with prior forms of the bill was the cost to the State if attorney fees were awarded often. Id. at 441.
Because we find the State‘s role was primarily adjudicative and the statutory exception contained in
IV. Conclusion.
We hold that the State‘s role in this case—the final decision of the Commission regarding the amount of restitution for the fish kill—was primarily adjudicative and falls within the exception found in
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
ZAGER
Justice