{¶ 3} In addition, appellee brought a third-party complaint against Tommel Financial Services, Inc. and Fitzpatrick Enterprises. Third-party defendant, Fitzpatrick Enterprises, was the owner and landlord at the premises where Malibu Beach Tans conducted business. Fitzpatrick had threatened to evict Malibu Beach Tans for nonpayment of rent. According to apрellee's third party complaint, Tommel Financial Services had asserted alleged security interests in the tanning beds utilized by Mаlibu Beach Tans.
{¶ 4} On October 20, 2004, appellee Campisi filed a motion for temporary restraining order seeking an order prohibiting an eviction until such time as the issues in this case could be resolved between the parties. A hearing on the motion for a restraining order was scheduled for October 25, 2004. However, on the day of the hearing, the Magistrate entered an Ordеr which indicated that "[a]fter discussions, the parties were able to come to an acceptable agreement. Accordingly, [appellee's] motion for a temporary restraining order is MOOT." (Emphasis original)
{¶ 5} Subsequently, on November 8, 2004, аppellee filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement. Appellee's motion was supported by a sworn affidavit оf appellee's counsel and exhibits. Appellee claimed that a settlement had been reached at the October 25, 2004, conference. According to appellee, the parties had agreed that appellant would pay the third-party defendant, Fitzpatrick Enterprises, the sum of $7,500 by Monday, November 1, 2004. This was in consideration for Fitzpatrick аgreeing not to proceed with the eviction. Further, appellee alleged that appellant and the appellee, through their respective counsel, agreed that appellee would take over the day-to-dаy operation of the business. According to appellee, appellant also agreed that he would pay to appellee the sum of $50,000 as a full and final settlement of all pending claims in the lawsuit. Specifically, appellant was to pay $25,000 in a lump sum upon the signing of a settlement agreement and the remaining $25,000 was to be paid at the rate of $2,000 every two weeks for a period of six months. Appellee claimed that a written settlement agreement to that еffect was subsequently faxed to appellant. However, according to appellee's motion, appеllant, through counsel, denied there was a settlement agreement.
{¶ 6} On November 15, 2004, a hearing was held before a Magistrate on the Motion to Enforce Settlement. That same day, November 15, 2004, the trial court issued a Magistrate's Recommendations/Judgment Entry enforcing the alleged settlement between appellant and appellee.1 The Magistrate's Recommendations/Judgment Entry was signed by both the Magistrate and the Judge.
{¶ 7} It is from the November 15, 2004, Magistrate's Recommendations/Judgment Entry that appellant appeals, raising the following assignment of error:
{¶ 8} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO HOLD AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO RESOLVE THE PARTIES DISPUTES REGARDING THE EXISTENCE OF A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT."
{¶ 9} The hearing on the motion to enforce settlement was heard by a Magistrate. Magistrates' decisions are controlled by Civ. R. 53(E). Once a Magistrate issues a decision, a party has fоurteen days in which to file objections to the magistrate's decision. Civ. R. 53(E)(3)(a). If a party does not file objections, that pаrty cannot appeal the court's adoption of any finding of fact or conclusion of law. Civ. R. 53(E)(3)(b). Thus, in this case, if apрellant disagreed with the Magistrate's findings of fact or conclusions of law, he had 14 days from that filing date to file objections. However, appellant did not file objections. Accordingly, appellant is foreclosed from pursuing an appеal concerning any of the findings of fact or conclusions of law.
{¶ 10} However, appellant does not challenge a finding of fact or conclusion of law. Appellant challenges the procedure used in the hearing on the motiоn. Specifically, appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing, in violаtion of Rulliv. Fan Company (1997),
{¶ 11} However, this сourt finds that the issue was waived nonetheless. The record shows no indication that appellant requested an evidentiary hearing or objected to the nature of the proceedings. An appellate court need not consider any error which counsel could have, but did not call to the trial court's attention at a time when the error could have been avoided or corrected. First Fed. S. L. Assn. of Akronv. Cheton Rabe (1989),
{¶ 12} Accordingly, appellant's assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 13} The judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Edwards, J., Hoffman, P.J. and Farmer, J. concur