112 N.Y.S. 249 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1908
On August 15, 1904, one Kraft and the defendBirchell, entered into two separate written contracts for the sale of two parcels of real property at Locust Valley in Nassau county, in which Birchell was the vendor and Kraft the vendee. The parcels of real property were contiguous, and the title to one was in Birchell individually, and to the other in his minor children. As to his own parcel, Birchell
Assuming these facts toSke true, and they stand uncontradicted on the record, it is qufffevapparent that Kraft had, on March 7, 1905, elected to rescind1 <the contracts in question because of an alleged breach by BirShdl.
On June 12, 1905, Kraft assigned to tnfis. plaintiff, his brother-in-law, whatever interest he had underxthese contracts. Of course, he gave no more rights to Mon"d,s by his assignment than he had himself.
If, by the act of his attorney, Nicoll, he had rescinded these contracts, as against him the parties were restored S^o their original conditions, and the rescission, once made, walk irrevocable. Stewart v. Huntington, 4 N. Y. St. Eepr. 760; 49 N. Y. 164.
The letter of March 7, 1905, to the defendant, Birchell, from Mr. Nicoll, shows clearly that Kraft intended to and did rescind the contracts; for in it he rejects the titles and demands back the earnest money and says, “ please send me
After Monds came into the matter by assignment from Kraft some negotiations went on between him and Birchell, as to which the evidence is conflicting and unsatisfactory; but, taken in its most favorable light to this plaintiff, it does not show the making of a new agreement between him and the defendant.
So far as the plaintiff claims under the Kraft contracts, he is met with the situation that Kraft had formally rescinded them before the assignment to the plaintiff. Efe is chargeable with this situation, even if he had no notice of it. Wood v. Perry, 1 Barb. 114.
In the light in which the case presents itself to me it becomes unnecessary to consider the various other questions discussed in the learned briefs submitted by the respective counsel as to the question of laches in relation to the relief of specific performance and as to the measure of damages for refusal to convey.
The plaintiff is, however, entitled to a judgment for the amount of the earnest money and the expenses of searching the title, with interest and costs.
Judgment accordingly.