By the verdict of a jury the plaintiff was awarded $20,000 in an action for personal injuries resulting from an explosion of gasoline. The defendant Jean Sarlin has appealed from the judgment.
At the time of the accident the appellant owned a plant for the storage and sale of gasoline in wholesale quantities. The respondent, who was in the business of trucking and selling petroleum products, drove his tank-truck to the appellant’s premises for the purpose of buying gasoline. The service tank from which he usually filled his truck was empty, and he volunteered the use of his truck to fill this tank from a storage tank located a short distance away. He placed his tank-truck, which had a capacity of 1,000 gallons, near the storage tank and helped one of appellant’s employees place a *596 portable electric pump in position. The appellant provided a two-inch rubber hose to connect the storage tank and the pump. Another hose was connected to the discharge end of the pump and inserted into the tank on the truck through a dome.
A flexible cable, consisting of four ivires encased in random lengths of rubber garden hose, was connected at one end to a power line in the switch house. The other end of this cable terminated in a four-prong plug, AA'hich was inserted in a socket on the motor. The electricity could be turned on or off either by a switch in the switch house or by pulling the plug from the socket.
After the hose connections were made, the appellant turned on the electricity and gasoline began to flow into the tank-truck and he and one of his employees avIio had assisted in setting up the pump left the scene, leaving the respondent alone. Mondine then stepped on the running board of his truck in a position where he could see the amount of gasoline flowing into it.
According to his testimony, about eight or ten minutes after the pumping commenced he glanced at the electric motor and saw sparks four or five inches long coming from it. He estimated that at that time the tank on his truck was a little less than half full. Jumping to the ground he started for the motor, intending to disconnect it from the power by pulling the cable out of the socket. Before he reached the motor an explosion occurred. The hose pulled out of the tank on the truck, spraying gasoline over a considerable area. Some of this gasoline fell on the respondent, whose clothes caught on fire, causing him to be severely burned.
The evidence shows that the motor and the pump had been used by the appellant almost daily for more than three years. During that time, it appears, there was no indication of any defect in the motor and the respondent himself had used the same equipment on numerous occasions before the accident occurred. In view of these facts the appellant contends that there is no substantial evidence to establish negligence on his part. More specifically, he argues that the defect in the motor was latent and that he, therefore, owed no duty to the respondent to discover it.
*597
An owner owes no duty to a.patron or business invitee to keep his premises in a condition of absolute safety and is not bound to discover defects which reasonable inspection would not disclose.
(Shanley
v.
American Olive Co.,
There is no evidence that the appellant made any inspection of the apparatus at any time prior to the accident. Considering the dangerous use to which the motor was constantly subjected, it was clearly for the jury to decide not only whether the appellant had made reasonably frequent inspection of his equipment but also whether inspection would have revealed a defect. It is true that a witness for the appellant testified that an inspection of the motor made after the accident disclosed no defects, but it was, admittedly, examined under different conditions, and the jury was at *598 liberty to accept respondent’s testimony that the motor was sparking at the time of the explosion as the cause of the accident.
There is a further ground upon which the jury’s implied finding of negligence may be sustained. The motor used was an open-vent model, that is, its mechanism was exposed by four ventilating windows in the casing. Considering the fact that this motor was being operated in proximity to a highly inflammable substance, this court cannot say as a matter of law that the appellant acted with reasonable prudence in leaving the respondent alone in the attendance of the apparatus. Had he or his employee remained near the pumping apparatus, the sparks might have been discovered before the respondent saw them or the current disconnected at an earlier time.
Nor do the facts shown compel the deduction that the respondent was eontributorily negligent. The appellant argues that the evidence established that the respondent knowingly and voluntarily approached a known danger and that he may not invoke the doctrine of “imminent peril”. The fallacy apparent in the appellant’s contention is that he assumes the respondent was not in a position of danger at the time he discovered that the motor was sparking. The imminent • peril rule has no application where one voluntarily leaves a place of safety and places himself in danger
(Bartuluci
v.
San Joaquin Light & Power Corp.,
21 Cal. App. (2d) 376 [
*599
The appellant finally contends that the amount of damages awarded to the respondent by the jury is greatly out of proportion to the injuries which he received. Although the sum to be allowed as damages for personal injuries is within the discretion of the jury, the power of this court to relieve a defendant from a grossly excessive judgment has often been recognized and exercised.
(Livesey
v.
Stock,
At the time of the accident the respondent was 49 years of age. His average annual net income for seven years preceding the accident had been between $2,500 and $3,000. He received extensive skin and third degree burns involving the whole right side of his body from the right ear and right side of his face to his right thigh. Undoubtedly these burns caused considerable pain. He was confined to the hospital for about a month and to his bed at home for about six months. More than 200 skin grafts had been performed at the time of the trial, and others were to be made. The cost of hospitalization and medical service amounted to about $1200 at the date of trial. A physician testified that the resulting scars would be permanent and that the function of the right arm and hand would be impaired. According to the witness he will never be able to close his right hand completely. As against the evidence concerning respondent’s disability, the parties have stipulated that in February, 1938, respondent was, and for six months prior thereto, had been engaged in his former business and occupation of truck driver and independent dealer in petroleum products “except that he no longer engages in the tasks of loading and handling the hose connected with such occupation”. This shows that his permanent disability is much less than that *600 expected by his physician and that his earning power has not been greatly impaired.
Considering these facts, it is apparent that practically the only permanent injury which respondent has sustained is the disfigurement of the right side of his body and the partial impairment of the use of his right hand. There is no medical testimony that the burns he received had any permanent deleterious effect upon his health or will produce serious consequences in the future. Under these circumstances, the jury’s award of $20,000 is obviously excessive and raises a presumption that it could not have been based upon a fair consideration of the facts relating to the injuries which respondent suffered.
Measuring the respondent’s evidence by the rules which have been stated, the st£m of $1,0,000 is the maximum amount which may be permitted to stand. However, in view of the conclusion that the verdict was proper in all respects except as to damages, there is no necessity for a retrial on the issues of negligence.
(Pretzer
v.
California Transit Co.,
Langdon, J., Curtis, J., Seawell, J., Waste, C. J., Houser, J., and Shenk, J., concurred.
Rehearing denied.