11 Colo. App. 404 | Colo. Ct. App. | 1898
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a controversy between Monash and Rhodes over title to the office of a member of the board of public works. The form in which the controversy presents itself is not a suit which directly involves the title in the sense that Rhodes is seeking to obtain possession of an office which Monash illegally holds, but it involves the title because it is a claim made by Rhodes against Monash for usurping, occupying, and enjoying that office for a term to which Rhodes claims he was entitled. There is no evidence exhibited in the abstract. We therefore take it, the matter was submitted to the trial court as a question of law whether under the facts as stated Rhodes was legally a member of the board of public works of the city
' The board of public works was created by an act amending the charter of the city of Denver in 1893. Session Laws, 1893, chap. 78. After its passage L. H. Flanders was appointed a member and having qualified entered on the discharge of the duties of the office. His term would have expired on the 1st day of June, 1895. Under the charter, as will be subsequently seen, the terms of all these officers began on the 1st of June and continued for two years. After the adjournment of the legislature, and in June, 1895, Flanders resigned. The then executive by appointment hi writing filed with the secretary of state, appointed Rhodes to that unexpired term. Rhodes qualified and accepted the office. He continued to perform his duties until the ensuing January, when the legislature again met. The term of the Governor who appointed Rhodes expired on the 8th of January, after the meeting of the legislature, and he went out of office not having theretofore sent Rhodes’s nomination into the senate for confirmation. On the 12th of March following, the then governor nominated Monash to the same office, and to fill Rhodes’s place on the theory that there was a vacancy because of the failure to send the other nomination in for confirmation, and he assumed to appoint Monash for the unexpired term as for a vacancy as well as for the two years next following the 1st of June. Monash qualified, went into office and refused to surrender to Rhodes. Rhodes apparently to prevent any unseemly conflict, and to avoid embarrassing the board as it was then constituted did not bring suit to oust Monash or to try the title, though he demanded possession and attempted to serve, but was denied the right. He afterwards sued Monash for the amount of his salary which Monash had received and appropriated. This was practically a mode of trying the title. He got judgment and Monash appeals.
“ Seo. 33. The governor of the state of Colorado shall immediately upon the passage of this act, and biennially thereafter by and with the advice and consent of the senate, appoint a board of public works consisting of a president to be appointed as president, and two other members, whose term of office shall begin on the first day of June following, and continue for two years, one of whom shall be of a different political party from the governor, with power of suspension or removal at any time, but not for political reasons and with power to fill vacancies in vacation of the senate, by appointment in writing filed with the secretary of state.”
The only question involved is the proper construction of this provision. When that is settled the case is determined.
The appellant earnestly contends that the matter is controlled by a section of the constitution. Section 6, article 4 of our organic law provides that the governor shall nominate and by and with the advice and consent of the senate appoint all officers provided for by the constitution and whose appointment is not otherwise provided for with certain powers of removal. This section also gives to the governor power to fill vacancies with this limitation, “ until the next meeting of the senate.” The whole argument of the appellant is based on this section which he attempts to use as a means for the interpretation of the statute and insists that it must be read in the light of it and that the constitutional provision must control the interpretation of the enactment. We do not assent. We do not believe the constitution has anything whatever to do with it, or that it can be rightfully taken either as a limitation on the powers of the executive, or as a means to construe the statute. We of course must admit the appellant’s contention, that where statutes and constitutions relate to the same subject and bear on the same matters either directly or indirectly, the constitutional provisions are of great aid and sometimes must control. It is equally true that you may not interpolate into the statute words which it does
It was contended in the last case, as in this, that the Osborne case did not control, that it was inapplicable because of the differences in the statute, and a very broad attempt is made to distinguish between the present controversy and that. The only distinction we are able to discover is that in the Osborne case, there is a distinct statement in the act that “ the governor shall have power to fill vacancies for the unexpired term.” These words, “ unexpired term,” are not in the statute under consideration, but we do not see that it makes any difference in the application of the rule. That distinguished tribunal, speaking by its then chief justice, said that the constitutional provision only applied to those offices which were created or provided for by the constitution, or to cases where the matters were not otherwise provided for by law. If that be so, then section 6 of article 4 is entirely irrelevant because the office of the board of public works is a creature of statute, was unknown to the constitution, was created by a later law, exists only under and by virtue of it, and the method prescribed for the appointment of the officials who constitute the board is provided for by the act creating it. According to the terms of the act the governor by and with the advice and consent of the senate appoints the members for terms of two years commencing on the 1st of June following the appointment. This much is plain. He may not appoint except by and with the advice and consent of the senate. ' When we come to the other question as to the method
When it is conceded that the appointment must be for a term, that is, for a specific period of time, we think the whole question is resolved adversely to the appellant. That this must be true is plain when we consider public necessities and requirements, the duties Avhieh are laid on these officers and which they have to perform, and the absolute necessity that they should have a tenure independent of the will of the executive. There would be very great impropriety in holding that the governor might appoint and remove at his will and create as you might say an estate from month t’o month
The judgment of the court below accorded with these views, and it will accordingly be affirmed.
Affirmed.