82 Mo. App. 603 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1900
The Monarch Rubber Company brought an attachment suit in the Vernon circuit court against defendant Bunn — writs being issued to Vernon county and to Cedar county where said Bunn resided. Under the writ to Cedar county the sheriff levied on certain goods therein as the property of Bunn. Subsequently, Hutchison filed his interplea claiming the goods attached in Cedar county. On the trial of the issues formed by plaintiff’s answer to the interplea, it is conceded that the evidence tended to prove that Hutchison’s alleged purchase of the goods from Bunn was merely color-able, and was made with the intent to hinder, delay and defraud Bunn’s creditors, among whom was the Monarch Rubber Company.
There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and against the interpleader, and the latter appealed.
The theory of this instruction is, that bare possession of personal property is sufficient to resist the claim of one clothed with no right whatever.
Interpleader’s counsel are clearly correct in the contention that the circuit court of Vernon county had no authority to issue a writ of attachment to Cedar county, unless property of the defendant was found and attached in said Vernon county. The defendant resided in Cedar county, was served there and never appeared in any way to the action. The only way then that the Vernon county court could acquire jurisdiction to issue a writ of attachment to Cedar county was by attaching property of the defendant found in Vernon county. R. S. 1889, sections 541 and 2010.
It results then that the judgment of the lower court must be affirmed.