Monarch Beverage Co., Inc. v. Dale Grubb

to the defen- immunity is available fied implicated “[t]he officials government of dants. ensuring performance interest in public free from the distrac- duties

government Conclusion routine law- accompany can even tions that 391, 132 S.Ct. 1657. at suits.” 566 U.S. reasons, affirm the district we For these only affected a defen- Such distractions in fa- summary judgment grant court’s duties, her his or ability perform dant’s to Novay Hodges. and vor of employees any public also “affect[ed] AFFIRMED by embroiling those they work with whom Id. litigation” as well. employees Hodges and undisputed it

Here that direct su working under the

Novay were when car of RHA officials

pervision chal that Meadows out the actions

ried Security Support RHA’s

lenges. Doyle, Hodges that the locks instructed Manager, CO., MONARCH BEVERAGE Novay changed, and on the door should be INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, purp present apartment was dispute does not Meadows ose.12 Doyle if immunity protect would qualified al., COOK, Defendants- David et Here, lock himself. changed had he Appellees. govern that underlie “purposes given No. 15-3440 immunity,” Richard employee see ment 404, 117 son, Novay at Appeals, Court of United States the same Hodges should be afforded Seventh Circuit. protections. 29, 2016 Argued March Richardson, holding is a nar- our As 30, 2017 Decided June should, means, be read by It no row one. immunity to 'all em- guarantee qualified security companies ployees private security services

provide contractual entities. The circumstances

governmental however, here, establish

presented operating at the direct

defendants were government supervising of a

instruction circumstances, quali- these

official. Under (inter- brief, Appellant's Br. 14-15 argues that "the Mr. Cressman.” Meadows also In his 12. omitted). support Metro quotation the court’s conclu- marks Given record does not nal RHA, Novay Hodges were ‘ordered’ sions that we do with the Enforcement's contract particular perform act of by RHA to change Doyle's instruction not believe complains, plaintiff the unauthorized which reasonably interpreted could be as the locks However, apartment.” Id. at entry into his Moreover, instruction to suggestion. acknowledges "Doyle ... con- Meadows necessity change included the locks Hodges that the locks tacted Mr. and told him pur- premises for the to enter the instruction changed Apartment for se- 101 should accomplishing pose that task. suggested by curity safety purposes, Kannon Shanmugam, K. Allison Jones Saharia, Rushing, Amy Attorneys, Mason LLP, WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY Wash- DC, Smikle, ington, Richard A. Derek Molter, Attorneys, Read MILLER ICE LLP, IN, Indianapolis, Plaintiff-Appel- for lant. Fisher, Martin,

Thomas M. Sara Teresa Attorneys, THE OFFICE OF ATTOR- GENERAL, IN, Indianapolis, NEY Defendants-Appellees. EASTERBROOK, FLAUM,

Before SYKES, Judges. Circuit SYKES, Judge. Circuit again We are asked to decide whether an aspect regulation of Indiana’s alcohol system violates Protection years, ago upheld Clause. Two we an from exempt and distillers are grocery and brewers prohibits Indiana law 7.1-5-9-10(b).) § restriction. See id. selling chilled this stores convenience Marketers & Petroleum beer. See Indiana restricting permits across In addition to Cook, 808 F.3d Ass’n v. Convenience Store chain, of the distribution the vertical tiers 2015). In case Monarch this per- the issuance of Indiana also restricts a feature of challenges Beverage Company by type tier wholesaling mits within law that interest” “prohibited Indiana’s wholesaling The law allows some- alcohol. wholesaling by and separates beer combined: a beer wholesaler permits holding wholesalers prohibiting beer wine; a get permit can a to wholesale permit. liquor-distribution an interest in a get permit can also a liquor wholesaler 7.1-5-9-3, 7.1-3-3-19, §§ 7.1- See Ind. Code § id. 7.1-3-13-1. But wholesale wine. See compo- that this contends 5-9-6. Monarch requires the prohibited-interest law law lacks nent of the liquor wholesaling: and separation beer rejected judge A rational basis. district an in- may acquire a beer wholesaler the law. We argument upheld and this permit and liquor-wholesaling terest in a judgment. policy Indiana’s affirm 7.1-5-9-3, § -6. This id. vice versa.1 See wholesaling and separating beer is regulatory Indiana’s scheme aspect of rationality. survives review unique to the state. apparently to wholesale permits Monarch holds Background I. wine and would like to both beer and scheme, like regulatory alcohol Indiana’s liquor. include its business to expand states, divides the mar- many that of other that combination of Indiana doesn’t allow dimensions: three tiers along ket two Monarch sued members of permits, so wholesal- (producers, chain the distribution Alcohol and Tobacco Commission retailers) ers, kinds of alco- and and three (The are the law. defendants to invalidate wine). (beer, permit A liquor, hol capacities, in their official so we’ll sued any part in of this required to do business “Indiana.”) collectively to them refer (beer §§ to -5-5 market. See id. 7.1-3-2-1 aspect of the alleges suit The wholesaler, per- and retailer producer, facially discrimi- mits); 7.1-3-12-1 (liquor); 7.1-3-7-1to -10-13 in against beer wholesalers violation nates (wine). exceptions, limited to -15-3 With equal-pro- the Fourteenth Amendment’s any who holds a prohibits person Indiana Const, amend. guarantee. tection chain tier of the distribution permit one XIV, § 1. permit an in a holding from also summary judg- holding On cross-motions for example, anyone For another tier. ment, rejected Monarch’s the district court producer’s permit in a beer an interest judge’s upheld the law. The challenge in a may not also hold an interest beer rea- proceeds along § two lines of 7.1-5-9-2. decision permit. wholesaler’s See id. First, equal- any soning. she ruled anyone who holds an interest And starting gate failed at the generally pro- protection claim retailing permit kind of identify could not a simi- any interest in a man- because Monarch having hibited from persons class of that receives permit any larly situated ufacturer’s or wholesaler’s 7.1-5-9-10(a). (Small-scale under the statute. Sec- § better treatment type. See id. wholesaling brandy, between beer and distribute ration 1. Wine wholesalers type § completely airtight, as a id. 7.1-3-13-3. which Indiana otherwise classifies see isn’t sepa- 7.1-1-3-21, liquor, see Ind. Code so § ond, laws, applied she rational-basis review and arguing est the “uncontested upheld regulatory the law as rational historical suggests evidence prohi- appealed. measure. Monarch bition was protect enacted to promote a patronage system operated to the Meanwhile, separate litigation against benefit of state and local politicians.” That ongoing the Commission is in state court true; may be put doesn’t much question testing on a related pro- how the effort into contesting historiog- Monarch’s hibited-interest law applies corporate n raphy. But disagreement about the overlapping alcohol distributors with own- genesis of this law can be left unresolved. ership interests. appeal While Monarch’s Court has made it clear that in this has pending, case been a Marion review, under rational-basis the challenger County judge ruling rejecting issued a “negative must every conceivable basis” interpretation Commission’s of the statute. law, that might support the challenged Sales, Spirited LLC v. Indiana Alcohol & “it entirely irrelevant ... whether the Comm’n, Tobacco No. 49D01-1502-PL- conceived reason for challenged dis- (Marion Cty. 24, Super. Aug. Ct. actually tinction legislature.” motivated the 2016). The case is now before the Indiana Commc’ns, Inc., FCC v. Beach 508 U.S. Court, Supreme argument which heard on 307, 314-15, 2096, 113 S.Ct. 124 L.Ed.2d 23, February Though the cases in- (1993). statutory volve the same provisions, the parties The dispute, also this time more question here is distinct and seems unlike- vigorously, whether certain threshold diffi- ly to be Spirit- affected the outcome of n culties doom Monarch’s claim from Sales, ed proceed so we to decision.

start. Indiana contends that we don’t need II. Discussion to decide whether the (1) law has a rational basis because Mon- a summary judgment We review de arch similarly has not identified a situated Plans, novo. Inc. v. Sec. Den Life Life of persons class of that is treated more favor- (7th Co., 343, ver Ins. 800 F.3d 348-49 Cir. (2) ably; and Monarch chose to be a beer 2015). wholesaler “complain and therefore cannot doesn’t draw lines any based race or unequal of treatment compared with those classification, other suspect it doesn’t bur who made a different choice within the den a right, fundamental and it raises no system same permits.” of limited These federalism concerns under the Supreme mistaken; contentions are no threshold ob- Court’s dormant commerce-clause doc stacles to rational-basis review exist here. trine. So Monarch’s equal-protection chal lenge triggers only the most lenient form true, It is of course as the judicial of review: the law is valid unless it said, Court has often that the Pro lacks a rational Fitzgerald basis. v. Racing essentially tection Clause “is a direction Iowa, 103, 107, Ass’n Cent. 539 U.S. persons similarly that all situated should 2156, (2003); S.Ct. 156 L.Ed.2d 97 Indiana City be treated alike.” v. Cleburne Cle Marketers, Petroleum 808 F.3d at 322. Ctr., 432, 439, Living burne 473 U.S. This deferential standard review is a (1985) S.Ct. (citing notoriously “heavy legal lift for the chal Doe, Plyler v. 457 U.S. 102 S.Ct. lenger!].” Marketers, Indiana Petroleum (1982)). 2382, 72 Relying en 808 F.3d at 322. tirely on equal-protection “class of one” cases,

Monarch devotes considerable attention argues prohibited- that the origins prohibited-inter- of Indiana’s subject judicial any law is if type, of that litigation In first identifies unless Monarch review similarly identify a situated plaintiff can’t that re- comparator class similarly situated group comparison purposes, or person under preferential treatment ceives the anal normally unnecessary to take it’s statute. further; simply claim fails. ysis any on the class-of-one Indiana’s reliance easy F.3d at 532. It’s to see Harvey, 649 In that kind of misplaced. of cases is line guarantee is why. equal-protection litigation, plaintiff equal-protection classifica governmental with “concerned citizens challenge groups a statute or ordinance ‘affect some doesn’t tions that ” (or differently Engquist than others.’ Ore public that a official argues instead gon Dep’t Agric., 553 U.S. officials) has treated him differ group (2008) (quot 170 L.Ed.2d 975 similarly situated ently persons than other Maryland, ing McGowan reason.2 illegitimate irrational for an or (1961)). 6 L.Ed.2d 393 can take the in treatment The difference case, it equal-protection In a class-of-one of a criminal form of selective enforcement challenged gov may not be clear Winnetka, law, Village Inc. v. LaBella action entails classification ernmental 2010), Winnetka, or 628 F.3d similarly situated com Identifying at all. government bene withholding of selective way disparate is a to show parator services, Village fits or Willowbrook of “a in fact has occurred and sets treatment Olech, 145 120 S.Ct. against departures, which clear standard (2000) (failure provide 1060 to wa L.Ed.2d readily single plaintiff, [can] even for a service); Merrill Harvey v. Town ter of 2146. In Id. at 128 S.Ct. assessed.” 2011) (7th ville, (ignoring 649 F.3d 526 Cir. here) (as contrast, chal plaintiff the where mosquito-infested pond); complaints about by or its lenges a statute ordinance (7th Lisle, Village 588 F.3d 940 Srail v. of on a imposes regulatory terms burdens 2009) (failure provide water ser Cir. (in case, this beer specific persons class of vice); Inc. v. Bd. Props., RJB Educ. distributors), identify a of there’s no need to of (7th 2006) Chi., F.3d 1005 Cir. City 468 appears in comparator; the classification of (denial provide government contract itself. text of the statute the services); v. Vil janitorial Vision Church that Monarch can- Indiana also contends (7th Grove, F.3d 975 Cir. lage Long 468 challenge law (denial 2006) applica land-use special consequences it of be- knew tion); 457 F.3d City Chicago, Smith namely, coming a beer wholesaler— 2006) (failure (7th to reimburse Cir. distribution off doing put liquor so would One, fees); Inc. Racine Charter attorney’s anyway. one limits—and chose to become Dist., square 424 F.3d 677 with our argument v. Racine Sch. is hard to This Unified students). (failure Marketers. 2005) in Indiana Petroleum decision to bus "improper execution claims that the law's label is mislead- 2. The class-of-one somewhat agents” through duly constituted is unconsti- distinguishes cases ing because what these Olech, Village Willowbrookv. plaintiff is tutional. necessarily the fact that the isn’t 564, n.*, category 120 S.Ct. only includes U.S. one harmed. This (2000) (explaining that the com- alleging, example, enforce- L.Ed.2d for selective suits five,” allege plaint read to a class of against "could be law fans of ment of criminal or of five is of pro- whether it is "a class of one particular sports refusal to franchise or consequence because we conclude that neighbor- no utility to an entire vide services a class is immaterial of individuals in distinguishing in this kind number hood. The element equal protection analysis”). plaintiff equal-protection claim is prohibit- There we reviewed Indiana’s law The rule Indiana proposes is unsupport- grocery ing and convenience stores from ed and unworkable. It’s also un- wholly justified. selling only chilled beer. Equal-Pro- 808 F.3d at 322-25. demand the tection it, places Clause Though thought no one to mention on a nonsuspect statutory classification is that it be ration- beer sellers were no doubt aware of the al. We see no reason to limit application of “no cold they ap- beer” restriction before requirement basic constitutional plied for a beer permit, yet dealer’s we Indiana proposes. reviewed the claim on the merits. Mon- arch’s situation is no different. Moving to the merits of Monarch’s claim, Indiana insists that Indiana Petroleum comes to strong us with “a presumption distinguishable Marketers is because the Commc’ns, validity.” Beach 508 U.S. at ban on “ancillary” cold-beer sales was 314, 113 S.Ct. 2096. Monarch must shoul class, statutorily defined while the law heavy der the negative burden “to every separating beer and distribution is conceivable might support basis which it.” part of the class definition. It’s not at all Id. at (quoting S.Ct. 2096 Lehn (if one) why clear this distinction it is Co., hausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts should make analysis. difference support Indiana cites no cases to this pro- (1973)). And Indiana does not need to posed ancillary/definitional dichotomy. It’s present support actual evidence to prof its not even clear that the restriction Monarch law, fered rationale for the which can be is challenging is definitional rather than “based on speculation rational unsupported ancillary. empirical evidence or data.” Id. In an effort to illustrate the distinction court, In the district Indiana offered explain why matters, it points three reasons for policy sepa- its choice to prohibiting fishing to laws without a li- rate beer liquor wholesaling; and it repeats says system cense and that a in only justifications which those here. The first is essen- fishing tially license holders fish can’t be a temperance rationale: Indiana ar- on challenged equal-protection grounds gues be- legitimate it has a in (license in cause difference treatment discouraging consumption, espe- alcohol holders) precisely holders v. nonlicense cially consumption de- liquor, hard fines the class. not higher We’re so sure about which has alcohol sep- content. The conclusion, but analogy inapt is in aration liquor wholesaling of beer and ra- challenging event. Monarch is not tionally by making serves this interest dis- prohibits Indiana’s law that liquor whole- tribution more in expensive, which turn saling permit; without a it challenging prices Second, is for increases consumers.3 prohibiting the law beer wholesalers from points to its interest in maintain- obtaining liquor-wholesaling revenue, permits. ing arguing This tax that separating restriction is not inherent in tripartite the beer- and liquor-wholesaling markets scheme; all, permitting after wine whole- helps indepen- to maintain the number of salers are allowed to liquor-wholesal- have dent in turn pay wholesalers ing permits. Finally, alcohol excise taxes. Indiana relies tiers, prohibited- 3. Indiana also manufacturing maintains that the and and whose size ar- helps consumption by pro- interest law limit guably brings power market that can be used hibiting conglomerates “tied whose pressure retailers to increase sales. houses"— retail, wholesale, operations extend across the separating beer and stability, arguing irrational to think in market its interest if ensue upheaval would wholesaling likely impose high- that market invalidated. law is than if and er distribution costs beer That, turn, wholesaling were combined. strong these reasons is The first of higher, with the salu- keeps liquor prices Indeed, Indiana makes er than the others. tary reducing effect of con- corresponding ra the tax-revenue little effort to defend sumption. it en to note that was tionale other than The market- judge. by dorsed the district specifically, regulators More rational briefly outlined in justification is upheaval could believe that Indiana’s beer wholesal- really defended.4 So Indiana’s brief protec- ers —with their robust franchise temper to the limit our discussion we’ll existing tions and distribution infrastruc- ance rationale. (warehouses, drivers, relationships tures reducing liquor Everyone agrees etc.) retailers, vigorously with —would governmental consumption legitimate is a if, liquor wholesalers allowed compete with argues that it’s irration- interest. Monarch permits to hold to distribute both kinds al to think that regulators might also be- alcohol.5 Rational any meaningful furthers this interest competition could lieve that this increased certainly not the It’s way. disagree. We consumers (a liquor prices drive down achieving this aim way of most direct See, hardly thereby consumption. increase way), but it’s tax is the most direct against nomic benefits to certain in-state industries protecting mar Indiana’s interest in equivalent essentially pastime to an upheaval ket remains the favored of state local industry. The protecting weigh interest in incumbent governments.”). We not need to do "classifications Supreme Court has said that today. expectation protect legitimate serving to deny equal protec reliance interests do not argues that Indiana’s franchise 5. Monarch Hahn, laws,” Nordlinger v. tion of the protections are irrelevant for beer wholesalers place when the were not in (1992), ap that rule but it’s unclear whether originally prohibited-interest laws were enact- plies expectation and reliance inter when the explained, the actual historical ed. As we’ve allegedly created ests were themselves to rational- impetus for the law is immaterial A few circuits have unconstitutional measure. argues review. Monarch also basis protectionism addressed whether incumbent protections wouldn’t allow beer franchise Compare St. Jo legitimate state interest. .is wholesalers to enter the market and 215, Castille, 222 (5th seph Abbeyv. 712 F.3d immediately prices. To illustrate the slash 2013) ("[N]either precedent nor broader Cir. point, Monarch notes that beer wholesalers protec principles suggest mere economic that wine-wholesaling the mar- have not overtaken industry legitimate particular is a tion of a permitted though to also ket even are .”), governmental purpose ... v. Merrifield permits. wine-wholesaling But Indiana hold 978, (9th Lockyer, 991 n.15 Cir. 547 F.3d prove absence of doesn’t need to that in the 2008) ("[E]conomic protectionism for its own separating beer and wholesal- its law sake, regardless to the common of its relation ing, completely domi- beer wholesalers would of a good, cannot be said to be in furtherance liquor-wholesaling nate the market. It's interest.”), legitimate governmental and Cra enough regulators that rational could con- Giles, 220, (6th igmiles 224 Cir. v. 312 F.3d entry by into the clude that beer wholesalers 2002) ("Courts repeatedly recognized have prices liquor-wholesaling lower market would group protecting a discrete interest from Moreover, through competition. it's increased legitimate gov competition not a economic pro- Harris, think that the franchise not irrational to purpose.”), with Powers v. ernmental 1208, enjoyed by would 2004) beer wholesalers tections 1221 379 F.3d advantage against give slight ("[W]hile them at least pas national be the baseball liquor wholesalers. citizenry, dishing special eco incumbent out time of 685 e.g., Christopher Nirupama T. Conlon & of [and existence these provisions the] nec Rao, Liquor essarily The Price is Too Damn easts considerable upon doubt Alcohol High: proposition Taxation and Market that the [challenged provision] (Kilts Marketing 17 Booth ser- rationally Structure could have pre been intended to 2015) ies, 2-009, very No. Paper (https://papers. vent same those abuses.” Id. at 536 -37, 2821; ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract-id= see City also Cle 2610118) (finding burne, that requiring 446, wholesal- U.S. at 473 105 S.Ct. 3249 Moreno, publicly prices list “promote[s] (relying ers non- 413 U.S. at 93 competitive pricing among behavior whole- explaining S.Ct. govern salers, potentially leading higher ment “may rely on a classification al., prices”); Alexander et Wagenaar, relationship C. whose to an goal asserted is so Beverage Alcohol and Tax Price attenuated as render the distinction ar Effects of irrational”). Drinking: Meta-analysis Levels on A bitrary or Studies, 1003 Estimates 112 104 Ad- from Supreme The Court’s broader rational- (2009) (concluding higher diction 179 however, basis jurisprudence, points in the prices consumption). reduce opposite direction. The Court has re- response argue Monarch’s is to peatedly said fact “[t]he that other are far more there direct and effective better means are suited to the achieve- ways prices for Indiana to increase ment of governmental ends ... of no consumption and thus reduce obvi- moment under rational basis review.” —most through ously, INS, 53, 77, taxation.6 Monarch insists Nguyen Tuan Anh v. 533 U.S. (2001); attenuated connection between S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 115 see 452, 473, law and Indiana’s also Gregory Ashcroft, 501 U.S. objective, (1991) temperance obvious 111 and the S.Ct. (“[A] availability of a more call direct alternative State ‘does not violate the rationality question. of this law into merely Protection the clas- Clause because imper- sifications made its laws are Supreme occa The Court has on limited ” (quoting fect.’ Massachusetts Bd. Ret. willing irrationality sions been to infer Murgia, S.Ct. availability poli of an alternative (1976))). Against 49 L.Ed.2d cy directly effectively that more fur backdrop, City Moreno and Cleburne government’s thers the asserted interest. extraordinary are better understood as example, in Department For United States exemplary rather than cases. rational-basis Moreno, Agriculture v. The Court has never invalidated (1973), regulation an economic on rational-basis invalidated a prohibited Court statute that review more direct or effective households unrelated individuals from policy alternative was available. Neither food receiving stamps. government we, Monarch given have has us no justified the law on fraud-prevention change reason to course. review, grounds. Applying rational-basis rejected separating liquor Court rationale because Indiana’s beer and statutory provisions other wholesaling rationally were aimed to the related fraud, “specifically problems at the ... in encouraging state’s temperance; ministrators, currently Spir- among Indiana is 10 State Tax states Rates on Distilled (cid:127) (exclud- (Jan. 1, 2016), with the lowest excise taxes on http://www.taxadmin.org/ its D.C., Washington, ing and the 17 states that assets/docs/Research/Rates/liquor.pdf. themselves). sell of Tax Ad- Federation 686 (such as beer whole- indirectly sis review of statuses purpose does

that it serves this saler) voluntarily, and people assume the law irrational. not make think this dis- My colleagues so it would. Affirmed. I position, but do positive against Indiana’s EASTERBROOK, Judge, Circuit not. judgment. concurring in the liquor-distri demand that the Monarch’s my colleagues I with agree adequately justified even scheme be bution constitutionally valid. law is any person differ though it does not treat cuts down says that state law Monarch any is a substan ently person other But so injuring consumers. competition, And the disguise. claim tive-due-process Corp. v. the laws in Exxon Governor did only persons has held that Supreme Court 117, 2207, 57 437 U.S. 98 S.Ct.

Maryland, have rights been whose “fundamental” Dukes, (1978); v. New Orleans can maintain substantive-due- abridged 297, 2513, 511 49 L.Ed.2d 96 S.Ct. U.S. Washington claims. See Glucks process Cases, (1976); Slaughter-House and The 117 S.Ct. berg, 521 U.S. (1873). Wall.) (16 36, 21 L.Ed. 394 U.S. (1997). be so No one would L.Ed.2d anti- has facilitated Court holding three kinds bold as to contend that by creating an ex- legislation competitive licenses simultaneous of alcohol wholesale states ception principles to antitrust when right. Litigants should ly a fundamental regulatory a competition part curtail on sub to evade the limits not be allowed Brown, Parker v. program. See process by characterizing sub stantive due (1943), L.Ed. 315 rules as objections to state-law stantive limits on the extent its successors. State equal-protection claims. long pedigree, thus have a competition the Fourteenth Back when liquor industry receives regulation of the ratified, argu- the sort of Amendment was § 2 of the Twen- an additional boost from not have presents Monarch would ment ty-First Amendment. equal-protection or as either an been seen My colleagues say prevails that Indiana theory. It would substantive-due-process a That’s its law has a rational basis. request a for relief have been conceived as Equal Protection the standard under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. under the that do not entail Clause for classifications Slaughter- majority A of the Court bare But like the suspect criteria. race or other force, that clause of House drained any classifica- judge district I do not see not Slaughter-House have calls to overrule any person not treat tion. Indiana does Chicago, succeeded. See McDonald one, No direct- differently from other. through corporation a or other busi- ly or (2010). Recasting privileges-or-immuni- ness, wholesale can have all three alcohol theory theory equal-protection as an ties silly, but That sensible or licenses. (for evading plaintiffs) has the benefit Beer wholesalers it does discriminate. Glucksberg, but Slaughter-House and both just type, license as wine get can one other footing. it lacks constitutional may, but not two or wholesalers beer-liquor license combination others. A given has Supreme Court Perhaps the everyone by Ind. Code is forbidden to Equal Protection to the portfolio § § 7.1-5-9-3and 7.1-5-9-6. prove- of historical despite the lack Clause my That’s what support. textual understanding of nance and says that this Monarch right, judges If colleagues think. are rational-ba- would eliminate discrimination appeals the courts of must fall line. into But the consistently Justices write about oper- Protection Clause as if it discriminatory

ates on classifications. Be-

cause I don’t see classification at all in scheme, I would treat Monarch’s

contention as a objection substantive

fails at the threshold under Slaughter- Glucksberg.

House and America,

UNITED STATES

Plaintiff-Appellee, JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

Keefer

No. 16-1494

United Appeals, States Court of

Seventh Circuit.

Argued November

Decided June

Case Details

Case Name: Monarch Beverage Co., Inc. v. Dale Grubb

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Date Published: Jun 30, 2017

Citation: 861 F.3d 678

Docket Number: 15-3440

Court Abbreviation: 7th Cir.