81 Cal. 190 | Cal. | 1889
This is an action to recover damages for a personal injury. The verdict and judgment were for plaintiff, and defendant appeals from the judgment and from an order denying a new trial.
1. Appellant contends that the proof does not sustain the cause of action alleged in the complaint, because, as he contends, the alleged cause of the injury was a defective hook, and the evidence does not show a defective hook. But we think that if the maintenance of the rod,
2. Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the machinery was defective or unsafe. But it would be going beyond the province of this court to hold that the jury erred in finding this unfastened, loose-jointed skeleton of rod and chain, liable every day' to be dislocated by the blow of a long-armed crane, unsafe. It is. argued that it had hung -suspended there for some years without accident; but that circumstance is only a matter of wonderment, and is an instance of how good luck will sometimes protect carelessness for long periods.
3. The most grave point made by appellant is, that the verdict was against the second instruction asked by appellant and given by the court, to the effect that if the accident was caused by plaintiff or his co-employees “carelessly or negligently moving the arm of the crane against said suspended rod and chain, then plaintiff cannot recover in this action.” But, in the first place, there was no evidence requiring the jury to find that the crane ivas moved “carelessly or negligently.” And, in the second place, the said instruction must be considered
4. There was no evidence calling upon the jury to find respondent guilty of contributory negligence.
5. There is a point made on the misconduct of the jury,—the point being that during the course of the trial one of the jurors stated to several of the other jurors “ that if .the hook at the top of the suspended rod had been entirely closed or lashed, the accident could not have happened,” and “illustrated to them with the model used during the trial.” It is, of course, improper for jurors to talk with each other about a ease before it is finally submitted; but here all that -was said is fully disclosed, and it is apparent that this statement of a self-evident fact could not have improperly influenced the verdict. Moreover, this circumstance was known to appellant at the time of its occurrence, and no objection was made; and he could not thus remain quiet and take the chance of a favorable verdict, and keep this point in reserve. (1 Hayne on New Trial, sec. 27, and cases there cited.)
There are no other points requiring notice.
Judgment and order affirmed.
Sharpstein, J., and Thornton, J., concurred.
Hearing in Bank denied.