685 A.2d 1157 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1995
Pursuant to General Statutes §
In May, 1988, the plaintiff suffered severe leg injuries in the course of his employment, and upon being eligible to return to work, applied for unemployment compensation on July 11, 1994. The examiner denied his application in a decision dated July 13, 1994, using authority granted under General Statutes §
The decision of the board of review was mailed to the parties on November 8, 1994. Pursuant to General Statutes §
A motion for judgment dismissing the plaintiffs appeal was filed by the defendant on January 26, 1995. In addition, the defendant submitted a memorandum of law on that same date.
On January 30, 1995, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion for judgment. Additionally, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in support of his objection to the motion for judgment on that same date. Both parties also submitted trial briefs, the defendant on February 23, 1995, and the plaintiff on March 21, 1995.
The following facts are found in the record. The plaintiff had been a part-time employee of Domino's Pizza until May 24, 1988, when he suffered severe leg injuries in the course of his employment. At that time, it was determined that the plaintiff was eligible for workers' compensation benefits, and he collected workers' compensation benefits until June, 1994, when he was declared eligible to return to work. *288
The plaintiff applied for unemployment benefits effective July 10, 1994, and was found to be ineligible due to the lack of earnings during the special base period. The examiner issued a decision on July 20, 1994. Subsequently, on August 19, 1994, the plaintiff appealed the examiner's decision and had a hearing before an appeals referee, who, on September 13, 1994, affirmed the decision denying him benefits. The referee found that the plaintiff did not qualify for benefits because he had no wages other than workers' compensation benefits for the past twenty calendar quarters. Additionally, the referee found that since workers' compensation benefits are not considered wages in terms of calculating a base salary for unemployment benefits, they cannot be used for unemployment compensation matters.
The plaintiff appealed that decision to the board of review on September 23, 1994. The board of review issued its decision on November 8, 1994, affirming the appeals referee's decision. The board of review found that workers' compensation payments do not constitute qualifying wages that may be used to meet the monetary eligibility requirement contained in General Statutes §
The plaintiff filed this appeal in the Superior Court on December 20, 1994. The plaintiff appealed the board of review's decision for two reasons. First, the plaintiff alleged that the board of review acted arbitrarily and *289
capriciously in holding that workers' compensation benefits received by an injured worker during a period of incapacity do not count as wages to determine the base period of a benefit year. Second, the plaintiff alleged that §
On January 26, 1995, the defendant moved for judgment pursuant to Practice Book § 511B and §
Judicial review of any decision shall be allowed only after an aggrieved party has exhausted his remedies before the board. General Statutes §§
Unemployment compensation appeals must be taken in a timely manner or they are to be dismissed. Gumbsv. Administrator,
"To the extent that an administrative appeal, pursuant to General Statutes §
"As a general rule, `[t]he application of statutory criteria to determine a claimant's eligibility for unemployment compensation under General Statutes §§
Questions involving matters of statutory construction are questions of law on which the agency's view is entitled to deference but is not dispositive. United ParcelService, Inc. v. Administrator, supra,
The court may remand the case to the board of review for proceedings de novo, or for further proceedings on the record, or for such limited purposes as the court may prescribe. General Statutes §
The plaintiff sets forth two grounds for this appeal. First, the plaintiff alleges that the board of review acted arbitrarily and capriciously in holding the compensation benefits received by an injured worker during a period of incapacity do not count as wages to determine the base period of a benefit year. Second, the plaintiff alleges that General Statutes §
In his memorandum of law, which the plaintiff filed in opposition to the defendant's motion for judgment, the plaintiff had argued that the board of review acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in denying the plaintiff unemployment benefits. The court finds that in reaching its decision, the board considered the relevant Connecticut statutes, General Statutes §§
In his memorandum of law, the defendant argues that §
Section
A reasonable interpretation of these statutes suggests that the workers' compensation payments received by *293 the plaintiff did not constitute qualifying wages for the purpose of calculating unemployment benefits. The board of review's decision, therefore, was based on sound reasoning and legal grounds and was not arbitrary or capricious.
The plaintiff also argues that §
"Although the equal protection clause directs that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike . . . it does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same. . . . Generally, the states retain broad discretion to determine what is different and what is the same. . . . In most cases, therefore, a state legislature is free to classify as long as the distinction it draws bears some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose.'" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barannikova v. Greenwich,
The Connecticut Supreme Court has recently discussed the application of the appropriate standard of *294
review for equal protection cases demanding the "rational basis review." In Johnson v. Meehan,
In Connecticut, "the legislature has broad discretion in the exercise of its power to legislate, and . . . `[i]n areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.'" Broadley v.Board of Education,
In the present action, the statutory classification in question is found in §
Section
The court may find from the legislative history that the amendment to §
There is no evidence in the legislative history to indicate why the period was limited to twelve quarters. "As long as the disparate treatment is, as here, rationally based, we may not judge the wisdom, desirability or logic of the legislative determination . . . even where the legislature has not expessly articulated the purpose or rationale underlying its enactment." (Citations omitted.)Broadley v. Board of Education, supra,
The disparate treatment in the present case, giving recipients of workers' compensation benefits a longer period of time to qualify for unemployment benefits, is rationally based on a legitimate state interest in aiding workers who have recently been injured. The legislative history indicates that one purpose of the statute was to give employees, who may have undergone hard times due to their injury and then became unemployed through no fault of their own, the opportunity to receive unemployment compensation. 20 S. Proc., Pt. 3, 1977 Sess., p. 1246. It does not seem unreasonable, however, that the legislature extended the period for only twelve quarters. The legislature may have reasonably decided that if an employee has not worked in the past twelve quarters, the employee no longer has a strong enough connection with the labor market to warrant receiving unemployment benefits.
This statute should be upheld if the statutory classification "`bears some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose.'"