85 Ala. 114 | Ala. | 1887
Mrs. Mohr, being a married woman, was relieved of the disabilities of coverture under the provisions of section 2731 of the Code of 1876. Her petition, which alleges that she owns a statutory separate estate consisting of a stock of merchandise, is sufficient to give the chancellor jurisdiction, and the proceedings and decree appear to be in substantial conformity to the statute, and regular. — King v. Bolling, 75 Ala. 306; Meyer v. Sulzbacher, 76 Ala. 120. After the rendition of the decree, Mrs. Mohr purchased goods, wares and merchandise of appellees, during the lifetime of her husband; and after his death, made a voluntary conveyance of real estate to her son, Marcus Mohr. The bill is filed by appellees, and seeks to annul and set aside the conveyance, and to condemn the real estate to the payment of their claims. The appeal is taken from a decree of the chancellor overruling a demurrer to the bill.
The main question presented for decision is, whether a married woman, who has been relieved of the disabilities of coverture, under the statute, has capacity to contract a debt, in consideration of the purchase of goods, wares and merchandise, on which the creditor can maintain a bill, under section 3544 of Code of 1886, to subject to the payment thereof property fraudulently transferred or conveyed by the married woman; the answer to which depends on the question, whether such debt creates a personal obligation, on which a personal judgment can be rendered. In Parker v. Roswald, 78 Ala. 526, it was held, that a married woman, whose disabilities of coverture had been removed, could be sued at law on a debt
By the uniform construction of the general statutes creating and regulating the separate estates of married women, they were regarded as enabling, but no^ enlarging the wife’s capacity to contract, even in reference to her separate estate, except in the mode and for the purposes prescribed and defined. While the statutes created a liability for articles of comfort and support of the household, and the tuition of the wife’s children, she could not otherwise make a contract, which would charge her estate, or on which a personal judgment could be rendered against her. Her capacity at common law to acquire property by purchase was not enlarged, and she had no power of disposition, except by the joint sale and conveyance of herself and husband, or by will. After the general statutes had been in force for many years, and their effect and operation been discovered, the legislature deemed it expedient to provide for the enlargement of the wife’s capacities in certain respects and for specific purposes. To this end, the act of February 10, 1875, amending the former act of April 15, 1873, was passed, conferring jurisdiction on the chancellors to remove the disabilities of coverture, with authority to act in term time or vacation. The amendatory act constitutes section 2731 of Code, 1876, and precisely defines the power as follows: “to relieve married women of the disabilities of coverture as to their statutory and other separate estates, so far as to invest them with the right to buy, sell, hold, convey and mortgage real and personal property, and to sue and be sued as femes sole.” Like the general statutes, this statute has been uniformly construed as enabling in its purpose, and as authorizing the exercise only of the specified powers, and only in reference to statutory or other separate estates. It was not intended to vest a married woman with all the rights of a feme sole, nor to constitute her a free-dealer, nor to remove the trusteeship of the husband, or deprive him of the right to receive the
The first argument is, that it is apparent from the petition of Mrs. Mohr, that her purpose in procuring the removal of the disabilities of coverture was to engage in a mercantile business, and that the right to carry on such business, or to buy goods for that purpose, is tantamount to capacity to make general contracts, which the chancellor has no authority to confer. ■ The vice of the argument consists in the failure to regard the questions decided, the manner in which they arose, and in the misinterpretation and misapplication of some expressions contained in the opinions delivered in the cases of Ashford v. Watkins, 70 Ala. 156, and Falk v. Hecht, 75 Ala. 293, which are cited and mainly relied on.
In the first case, the mortgage in question rested on the validity of a decree of the chancellor, which declared Mrs. Ashford “to be a feme sole only so far as to invest her with the right to mortgage her said house and lots, in order to obtain an addition to her stock of goods and merchandise.” The decree was held invalid, and the reason assigned is, “the want of jurisdiction to change, temporarily and partially, the status of the appellant, as a married woman — to convert her into a feme sole for a specific purpose, and as to specific property — renders the decree void.” The principle underlying the decision is, that as a married woman has not capacity, either at common law, or under the statutes creating separate estates, to engage as a sole trader in merchandise, the chancellor had no jurisdiction to confer only this partial and specific right, and that all the powers prescribed by the statute must be conferred as an entirety. It was not intended to decide what would be the capacity of the wife in this respect, under a valid decree rendered on a sufficient and proper petition. Equally invalid would have been a decree removing her disabilities of coverture so as to invest her solely, separately and specifically with a right to sell, convey and mortgage property for any other specific purpose, for the reason, that the chancellor has no jurisdiction to convert
In the last case cited, the decree was in the words of the statute, but was rendered on a petition the prayer of which was, that a decree be rendered declaring Mrs. Ealk “a free-dealer, relieving her of the disabilities of coverture, as to her said statutory separate estate, so far as to invest her with the power to mortgage the same, to enable her to invest her means in purchasing a stock of goods and groceries.” The decree, though following the statute, was held invalid on the ground, that “it passes beyond tbe petition, confers capacity, and works a change in the status of the wife, to which she did not express her assent, as the statute requires its expression, and which the chancellor could not impose upon her in invitumP The sole question was the power or jurisdiction of the chancellor to render such decree on such petition. What would have been the effect, had the petition conformed to the statute, may be inferred from the following observations in the opinion: “It is insisted, however, and such was the view of the court below, that the decree of the chancellor, relieving Mrs. Ealk of the 'disabilities of coverture, so far as to invest her with the right to buy, sell, hold, convey and mortgage real and personal property, and to sue and be sued as a feme sole, empowered her to execute the mortgage without the concurrence of her husband. Such, it may be admitted, is the effect and operation of the decree, if it is valid — if the chancellor had power and jurisdiction to render it. The power and jurisdiction, if it exists, must be derived from the statute.” Neither of those cases involved the question of the right of a married woman, who had been relieved of the disabilities of coverture by a valid decree under the statute, to contract a personal obligation in the. purchase of goods for the purpose of carrying on a mercantile business. The question arose more directly in Meyer v. Sulzbacher, supra, where a decree was upheld, which was rendered on a petition setting forth in what the separate estate consisted, and expressly stating, “that your petitioner wishes to employ her said separate estate in merchandizing, as her husband is experienced in that business, and can in this way best employ her said means,” notwithstanding the part of the decree which conferred power “to contract and be contracted with,” was held invalid. The wife’s purchase of a stock of merchandise from her husband was sustained.
It is further insisted that Parker v. Roswald is incon
The manifest purpose of the statute was to provide a well
When, in addition to the power to. contract such debts, the statute provides that she may sue and be sued as a feme sole, the logical sequence is, that a personal judgment may be rendered, which, like judgments against parties sui juris, will be enforced against any property she may own liable to execution, without reference to the time when acquired. As there is nothing in the statute indicating a contrary purpose, a judgment against her, founded on an authorized contract, has the same force and effect as other personal judgments rendered in actions at law, and will be enforced in the same manner. — Caldwell v. Waters, 55 Amer. Dec., note, 608, where the authorities are cited. It follows, that the demands of complainants, having been incurred by Mrs. Mohr after being relieved of her disabilities of coverture, constitute a claim on which complainants may maintain the bill to subject property fraudulently transferred or conveyed, which would have been liable to execution on a personal judgment against her.
Affirmed.