Opinion by
This appeal raises again the vexing problem of determining whether the injuries sustained by the insured, necessitating medical care and ultimately causing death, resulted from an accident. Appellant, Richard L. Mohn, sought recovery on two medical insurance policies for expenses incurred as the result of his son’s hospitalization. Appellant filed a complaint in assumpsit on the two insurance contracts seeking reimbursement pursuant to the policies terms for the hospital expenses incurred. Appellee, American Casualty Co., responded by filing an answer and new matter. A stipulation was entered in the lower court to the effect that on May 26, 1969, appellant’s son, one of the dependents insured under the policies, was fatally wounded by a police officer’s bullet while he was attempting to flee from the scene of a burglary he was in the process of committing. Both appellant and appellee filed motions for summary judgment in accordance with Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035. The Court of Common Pleas of Berks County entered summary judgment in favor of the appellee and was affirmed by the Superior Court with three judges dissenting. We granted allocatur and now reverse.
*578 The pertinent provisions of the policies provided:
“American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania . . . insures Richard L. Mohn . . . and agrees to pay indemnity for eligible expense incurred as a result of injury or sickness, in the manner and to the extent herein provided.
“ ‘Injury’ as used in this Policy means accidental bodily injury which causes the loss directly and independently of all other causes and is sustained while this Policy is in force, and for which benefits are not payable under any Workmen’s Compensation Act or Law.
“This Policy does not cover any expense incurred because of:
“1. intentionally self inflicted injury, or. . ,”. 1
While the court below was correct in its view that the provision in the one policy excluding “intentionally self inflicted injury” was not applicable because this was not a case of a self-inflicted injury, it fell into error in concluding that the facts did not show a case of accidental bodily injury within the terms of the two policies.
In health and accident policies the law is now reasonably clear that the fact that the event causing the injury may be traceable to an intentional act of a third party does not preclude the occurrence from being an “accident.” See
10 Anderson, Couch Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, ch.
41 (2d ed. 1962).. Thus, the test of whether injury is a result of an accident is to be determined. from the viewpoint of the insured and not from the viewpoint of the one that committed the act causing the injury.
White v. Metropolitan Life Insur. Co.,
One view is that public policy requires that recovery be precluded where the insured’s injury was a direct result of his own criminal conduct. 2 However, among those jurisdictions advocating the public policy basis for denial of recovery a number of those states grant an exception where the suit for recovery is brought by an innocent beneficiary as opposed to the insured or his estate. 3
Many jurisdictions predicated their refusal to allow recovery, even in absence of “violation of law” clauses where liability was conditioned upon injury caused by the insured’s wrongful acts, upon the theory that the occurrence was the normal consequence of his transgressions and thus foreseeable and not “accidental.” 4 Recently, an increasing number of courts have begun to reject this rationale and permit recovery.
In Goodwin v. Continental Casualty Co., supra, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that a demurrer was improperly sustained where the action had been brought by the estate of insured to recover the proceeds of a life insurance policy even though the insured had been unlawfully killed by the beneficiary. The Court reasoned that although under the statutory law of Oklahoma the beneficiary being the slayer could not recover, this fact would not preclude an action by the qualified legal representative of deceased’s estate. In so doing the Court accepted the fact that the occurrence fell within the policy requirement of a “loss of life . . . re- *580 suiting exclusively from bodily injury which is effected solely by external, violent and purely accidental means.”
“There is a total absence of evidence indicating that the fatal injury was received by the assured as a result of his own connivance or that he had foreknowledge of impending injury. The policy in the present case insured against Toss of life * * * resulting exclusively from bodily injury which is effected solely by external, violent and purely accidental means. * * *’ In construing a similar clause in a policy of insurance, this court, in Union Accident Co. v. Willis,
In
Harvey v. St. Paul Western Insur. Co.,
In disposing of the “reasonably foreseeable” rule the Court observed:
“The appellee contends that we should apply the ‘reasonably foreseeable [sic] ’ rule to the particular facts in the case at bar. As we previously stated, the deceased, Foster, was the aggressor in an altercation with *581 Robert Little. Little possessed a firearm. Foster accosted Little and knocked Mm to tbe ground. WMle Little was lying on the ground, he brandished the pistol wMch he possessed and warned Foster to leave him alone. A scuffle ensued between the two men for possession of the firearm and it went off fatally wounding Foster.
“Without going into a discussion of the reasonably foreseeable rule, suffice it to say that the Supreme Court of tMs state in Gulf Life Insurance Company v. Nash, supra, has rejected that rule and in so doing, said:
“ ‘It seems to me that such doctrine of foreseeability is a doctrine totally unsuited and unadaptable in construing accident policies. Moreover, the rationale of these cases seems to be founded not only in the doctrine of foreseeability but intrinsically in negligence on the part of the insured. Were we to make this principle a part of the law of tMs State, it would not only do violence to the reason for buying accident insurance but if it did not preclude recovery in a great majority of deaths arising from accidents, it would place an almost insurmountable burden on the insured to enforce liability.’ ”166 So.2d at 823 .
In
Macklin v. Commonwealth Life and Accident Co.,
*582
“Whether the consequences of an insured’s conduct are. accidental or are natural, probable and reasonably foreseeable, depend upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case. In the present case, it does not appear that Macklin could have anticipated that he might be stabbed when he advanced on his wife or that he could have expected some serious injury other than being stabbed. She had never resisted him before and he had no reason to suspect that she would this time. Her prior passive behavior would not lead him to expect resistance with a deadly weapon. There is no evidence that suggests that he saw the knife in her hand. Although she secured it with the hope that the sight of it would deter him, she did not say she had it, threaten him with it or brandish it. She held it by her side and it may have been concealed, or partially hidden, by her full skirt. When she raised her hand as he rushed upon her it was an instinctive movement to shield herself from his impending blow. There is nothing in the record to indicate that she thrust the knife toward him or deliberately held it in a position where it would cut his throat; she did not know that he had run into it until he exclaimed that he had been cut. Under the evidence it cannot be said that he could have foreseen his injury or death, or that either was the probable and natural result of his attack.” 121 Ill. App. 2d at. 122,
In
Martin v. Mass. Mutual Life Insur. Co.,
. With this background of the. development of the law in this area throughout the nation we must now turn to
*583
the pertinent decisions of the appellate courts of this Commonwealth. This Court’s decision in
Wells v. The New England Mutual Life Insur. Co.,
Begardless of the earlier decisions, this Court in
Eisenman v. Hornberger,
“Royal’s second allegation is that it would be against public policy to allow recovery on the insurance contract since the property damage occurred as a result of acts performed by the insured in the course of the commission of a crime. We are not so persuaded.
“We note initially that the insurance contract itself does not contain a 'violation of law’ clause. Royal is thus placed in the position of asserting that we should rewrite the policy to provide for a contingency which it could have provided for itself. However, under the facts of this case, we are not confronted with any overriding public policy which would preclude recovery. There is no evidence whatsoever that the policy was procured in contemplation of the crime. Nor can the insurance policy be said to have promoted the unlawful act. Moreover, it seems equally implausible that denying coverage would serve as a crime deterrent. Finally, the insurance policy in no way saves the insured from the consequences of his criminal act. In the context of this case, the sanctions of the criminal law and the coverage of the insurance policy address themselves to quite separate and distinct actions on the part of the insured.”438 Pa. at 50 ,264 A.2d at 675 .
Although admittedly we are here concerned with recovery under an accident policy and not recovery of property damage as was the case in the Msenman decision, nevertheless we believe this distinction to be meaningless and that the reasoning of that decision is particularly appropriate to the facts of the instant appeal. Furthermore, most of those jurisdictions which still embrace the public policy argument as a basis for denying recovery, as noted infra, provide an exception where the suit is being brought by an innocent beneficiary as *585 is the instant case. For the reasons set forth we therefore hold that recovery cannot be denied on the basis of public policy.
Finally, we must turn to the lower court’s determination that the injuries necessitating medical care were not a result of accidental bodily injury. As has been indicated the modern legal trend is to abandon the former “reasonably forseeable” rule and treat the occurrence as accidental even though it resulted from the insured’s criminal conduct. This Court noted its adherence to the modern view in our decision in
Beckham v. Travelers’ Insur.
Co.,
“It has been suggested, however, that we limit our holding to those cases which do not involve an unreasonable risk of harm to the insured and that we therefore affirm the Superior Cofirt’s decision. This argument, of course, assumes that the insured’s action in the instant case did amount to an unreasonable risk of harm. While this assumption might be valid vis-a-vis his general health and well being, there is no basis in the record for concluding that the insured was unduly exposing himself to the risk of death by his action. Moreover, no jurisdiction which has interpreted accidental means and accidental results to be legally synonymous has denied recovery on the basis of the above suggested distinction. Indeed some jurisdictions maintaining the distinction have permitted recovery in similar situations.
“More importantly, the attempt to determine, on the basis of the clause in question, what is and what is not an unreasonable risk will return us to the Serbonian bog from which we are attempting to escape. While we see nothing improper in a contractual limitation which would disclaim coverage in cases such as the instant one, we are unwilling to recognize such a restriction on the basis of the ambiguous language contained in this policy which the company knew was susceptible of dif *586 fevent interpretations.” (Footnotes omitted).424 Pa. at 116-117 ,225 A.2d at 536 .
A contract of insurance like any other contract requires that the intention of the parties be determined from the words of the instrument. Furthermore, where the contract is one of insurance any ambiguity in the language of the document is to be read in a light most strongly supporting the insured.
Burne v. Franklin Life Insur. Co.,
The order of the Superior Court affirming the summary judgment entered by the Court of Common Pleas is reversed. The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas in favor of the appellee is vacated and judgment is entered for appellant.