DANIEL MOHN, CHAD WALLACE AND IRENE SILVEUS v. BUCKS COUNTY REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE
No. 2694 EDA 2018
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
September 03, 2019
2019 PA Super 270
KUNSELMAN, J.
J-E01003-19. Appeal from the Order Dated December 14, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s): 2016-03560. BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., GANTMAN, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 03, 2019
Daniel Mohn appeals from the order granting summary judgment in favor of the Bucks County Republican Committee (“the BCRC”), and denying his cross-motion for summary judgment on his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief based on alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Election Code. Mr. Mohn directed his appeal to the Commonwealth Court, which has jurisdiction over Election Code violations pursuant to
We briefly summarize the relevant factual and procedural history underlying the appeal as follows. Mr. Mohn was elected as a Republican committeeperson in Yardley Borough, Bucks County, in 2014 and again in 2016. After the 2016 election, the Bucks County Republican Party filed ethics complaints with the BCRC regarding Mr. Mohn’s actions during the election, including campaigning against Republican-endorsed candidates and failing to fulfill his responsibility to cover the polls on the day of the primary election. Following a hearing, the BCRC Executive Committee disqualified Mr. Mohn from his position based on his violations of the Rules of the Republican Party of Bucks County (“the Local Party Rules”).
Thereafter, Mr. Mohn, along with two co-plaintiffs who have since discontinued their claims, filed a complaint against the BCRC in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Mr. Mohn alleged that the BCRC improperly removed him from his position as
On December 18, 2017,2 the trial court denied Mr. Mohn’s motion for summary judgment, and granted the BCRC’s motion for summary judgment on the basis that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the internal operations of a political party pursuant to section 2842 of the Election Code.3 See Trial Court Opinion, 3/13/18, at 5 (“This is a purely intra-party disciplinary matter that the [United States] Constitution has reserved to the [BCRC] to address free from government intervention.”).
We certified this appeal for en banc consideration to decide the following two questions:
- Whether exclusive jurisdiction over this appeal lies in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania pursuant to
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 762 ? - Whether this Court’s prior, three–Judge Panel decision on the issue in Gordon . . . should be overruled?
See En Banc Certification Order, 2/5/19. As we explain below, the answer to both questions is yes.
The issues for our review concern the scope of this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Chapter Seven of the Judicial Code sets forth the “legislatively ordained division of labor” between appellate courts in Pennsylvania. Valley Forge Indus., Inc. v. Armand Constr., Inc., 374 A.2d 1312, 1316 (Pa. Super. 1977); see also
The Superior Court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all appeals from final orders of the courts of common pleas, regardless of the nature of the controversy or the amount involved, except such classes of appeals as are by any provision of this chapter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or the Commonwealth Court.
Id. (emphasis added).
Notably, the General Assembly consciously removed a group of cases from this Court’s appellate jurisdiction and committed them to a court of specialized appellate jurisdiction. See Newman v. Thorn, 518 A.2d 1231, 1235 (Pa. Super. 1986). In this regard, section 762(a) of the Judicial Code enumerates seven specific categories of appeal from the courts of common pleas over which the Commonwealth Court has exclusive jurisdiction. In this case, we are concerned with only one of those categories. Pursuant to section 762(a) of the Judicial Code,
(a) General rule.—Except as provided in subsection (b), [which is inapplicable herein] the Commonwealth Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of the courts of common pleas in the following cases:
. . . .
(4) Local government civil and criminal matters.
(i) All actions or proceedings arising under any municipality, institution district, public school, planning or zoning code or under which a municipality or other political subdivision or municipality authority may be formed or incorporated or where is drawn in
question the application, interpretation or enforcement of any: . . . .
(C) statute relating to elections, campaign financing or other election procedures.
Given that the Commonwealth Court transferred Mr. Mohn’s appeal, which involves election matters, to this Court pursuant to Gordon, an understanding of that case is essential to our analysis. In Gordon, a 2-1
While the lawsuit was pending, the Ward Committee reinstated Gordon to her position. Thereafter, counsel for co-plaintiffs filed a partial
On appeal, the Gordon Majority first addressed the question of Johnson’s standing. It ruled that her claim at Count I as to Gordon’s removal was moot. 80 A.3d at 473. The Majority additionally ruled that Johnson’s claim at Count II as to prospective use of the Rule was not ripe. Id. As such, the Gordon Majority affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for defendants. Applying the same rationale, the Majority affirmed the trial court’s order denying the PDPC’s motion to intervene. Id. (concluding the issues were moot and unripe).7
After affirming the trial court’s rulings, the Gordon Majority addressed “[a]s a final matter” the question of whether the Superior Court had jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Id. The Majority acknowledged that,
Nevertheless, the Gordon Majority concluded that it had jurisdiction over the appeal because “we were not required to apply, interpret, or enforce the Election Code in reaching our holding.” Id. at 474.8 The Majority further concluded that, even if it was “incorrect[,] and [the] interpretation of the Election Code was sufficiently at issue to invoke the Commonwealth Court’s jurisdiction,” it acted within its discretion under [Pa.R.A.P. 7419] in choosing, in the interests of judicial economy, to consider the appeal.” Id.; see also
Judge Bowes dissented on the basis that section 762(a)(4)(i)(C) of the Judicial Code confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Commonwealth Court to hear appeals involving elections matters and the Election Code. She explained:
[A]ll cases, since the Commonwealth Court was created, that involve elections[,] emanate from the Commonwealth Court or our Supreme Court on appeal from the Commonwealth Court. The present matter involves an election and election procedures[,] and should be decided by the Commonwealth Court.
. . . .
When we decide whether to retain an appeal:
we must balance the interests of the parties and matters of judicial economy against other factors such as: (1) whether the case has already been transferred; (2) whether our retention will disrupt the legislatively ordained division of labor between the intermediate appellate courts; and (3) whether there is a possibility of establishing two conflicting lines of authority on a particular subject. Moreover, each transfer should be decided on a case-by-case basis.
[Trumbull Corp. v. Boss Construction Inc., 747 A.2d 395, 399 (Pa. Super. 2000).]
In my opinion, consideration of these factors compels that we transfer this case to the Commonwealth Court. . . . [O]ur retention of it would upset the [L]egislature’s decision to vest exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Commonwealth Court over litigation involving elections. Further, this Court has no body of case law concerning election cases and the questions of either standing or mootness in that context. This Court simply has no
experience with election contests and the majority has risked rendering a decision that may conflict with the body of law existing in the Commonwealth Court as to the issues it addresses. I consider it inappropriate for this Court to decide a case involving an internal rule of the Party and whether it conflicts with the Election Code. I would transfer this appeal to the Court with the experience and skill-set to handle the matter expertly.
Id. at 475-76 (Bowes, J. dissenting) (some citations omitted).
Reconsidering Gordon, this Court, en banc, now concludes that the Majority Opinion in Gordon was incorrectly decided. First, the panel should have determined, at the outset, whether the appeal fell within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court. See e.g., Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383, 392 (Pa. 2005) (“Prior to considering the merits of the legal issues before us, we must address . . . threshold matters. First, we will determine our jurisdiction to entertain this challenge . . ..”). The Gordon Majority improperly deferred its jurisdictional determination until after it had affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment and denial of intervention. This was error. The Majority should have determined its jurisdiction over the appeal as a threshold matter. See id.
Moreover, the Majority compounded that error by using its substantive rulings to justify its acceptance of jurisdiction over the appeal. Importantly, Johnson claimed that the local Democratic party Rule violated section 2842 of the Election Code. Rather than considering, initially, whether the election-related claims brought the appeal within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth
Finally, the Gordon Majority should not have invoked Rule 741 to assert jurisdiction over the appeal on the basis that “[a]ppellees did not object to this Court’s jurisdiction, and judicial economy was served by our deciding the case after it was filed, briefed, and argued before us.” 80 A.3d at 474-75. Ordinarily, Rule 741 allows this Court to accept jurisdiction of an appeal that belongs in another appellate court when the parties do not object. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 722 A.2d 167, 169 (Pa. Super. 1998). However, even where no party objects to this Court’s exercise of appellate jurisdiction, as was the case in Gordon, we still have discretion under rule 741 to transfer the matter to the Commonwealth Court. See e.g. Fengfish v. Dallmyer, 642 A.2d 1117, 1120 n.2 (Pa. Super. 1994); Pa.R.A.P.741(a) (providing that
Given the Commonwealth Court’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction over claims involving election matters, we conclude that “judicial economy” was an insufficient basis for the Gordon Majority to accept jurisdiction over the election-related appeal. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 858 A.2d 627, 630-31 (Pa. Super. 2004) (“the concepts of ‘institutional comity’ and ‘system-wide efficiency’ should not be relied upon as reasons for this Court’s exercise of appellate jurisdiction.”). As Judge Bowes warned, “[t]his Court simply has no experience with election contests and the majority has risked rendering a decision that may conflict with the body of law existing in the Commonwealth Court as to the issues it addresses.” Gordon, 80 A.3d at 476 (Bowes, J., dissenting). Moreover, by asserting jurisdiction over the appeal, the Gordon Majority risked establishing two conflicting lines of authority on the Election Code, which is within the purview and expertise of the Commonwealth Court. Thus, to the extent that Gordon stands for the proposition that this Court can
We now hold that, in deciding whether this Court has appellate jurisdiction, we must consider all of the potential issues underlying the parties’ theories of the case. If any potential substantive issue (or participation of a particular party) invokes the Commonwealth Court’s jurisdiction, transfer is appropriate, and we must transfer prior to reaching the merits of the appeal. Otherwise, we invade the Commonwealth Court’s exclusive jurisdiction to decide those substantive issues and to develop its own, consistent line of precedents.
Turning to the case before us, Mr. Mohn seeks appellate review to address the following two issues:
- Did the trial court have jurisdiction to address Mohn’s request for a declaration that the [BCRC] violated the Pennsylvania Election Code by disqualifying Mohn from his duly elected position as a Republican Committeeperson for alleged misconduct that did not constitute a basis for disqualification under the [L]ocal [P]arty [R]ules?
- Is Mohn entitled to summary judgment where: (i) the [BCRC] did not have authority to disqualify Mohn as a publically elected committeeman serving his Republican constituents, for alleged violations of [L]ocal [P]arty Ethics Rules, and (ii) allegations of misconduct on the day of the primary election immediately preceding the term from which he was disqualified cannot constitute a basis for disqualification.
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
Mr. Mohn’s issues on appeal require a determination of the scope of the trial court’s jurisdiction under the Election Code to address the application,
Mr. Mohn’s issues on appeal also require a determination of whether, in disqualifying Mr. Mohn from his position, the BCRC violated the Local Party Rules, which the BCRC is required to follow under section 2837 of the Election Code, and whether those Rules are inconsistent with the by-laws of the Republican Party of Pennsylvania, in violation of section 2837. Additionally, the appeal requires a determination as to whether the BCRC had the right to direct and discipline Mr. Mohn pursuant to section 2842 of the Election Code. These issues involve election matters that “draw[] in question the application, interpretation or enforcement of . . . statute[s] relating to elections, . . . or other election procedures.”
As the Legislature has designated the Commonwealth Court as the exclusive forum for election-related appeals, we must defer the instant matter to its expertise.
President Judge Panella, President Judge Emeritus Bender, President Judge Emeritus Gantman, and Judges Lazarus, Dubow, Murray and McLaughlin join this Opinion.
Judge Nichols concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/3/19