167 Mass. 298 | Mass. | 1897
The plaintiff has been totally blind for many years. There seems to be no doubt upon the evidence that his
It is contended that the plaintiff’s condition of total blindness, although the result of an injury which produced the disease in the eyes that finally left them sightless, does not entitle him to relief under the contract, and the argument in substance is that the contract gives the plaintiff a right to receive relief only so long as sickness continues, or as he is suffering the direct primary effects of an accident. It is also contended that his blindness is not sickness, within the meaning of the contract. We think the argument is not sound. The stipulation of the contract is, according to the translation agreed to by the parties, that “ a member who shall find himself incapable of working, by reason of sickness or accident, shall receive the sum of five dollars per week,” etc. It is not denied that the plaintiff is a member who is incapable of working. He is in a condition of incapacity by reason of sickness or accident. Whether the diseased condition of the eyes caused by the accident be called sickness or not is immaterial, for his condition of total blindness, which is a condition of incapacity to work, is by reason of an accident which injured one of his eyes, and through that injury deprived him of sight. The words “by reason of” refer to the active efficient procuring cause of which the incapacity to work is the consequence. In Freeman v. Mercantile Accident Association, 156 Mass. 851, 353, which was an action on a policy insuring against death from accident, it is said that “ an injury which might naturally produce death in a person of a certain temperament or state of health is the cause of his death, if he dies by reason of it, even if he would not have died if his temperament or previous health had been different; and this is so, as well when death comes through the medium of a disease directly induced by the injury, as when the injury immediately interrupts the vital processes.” So in Lynn Gas & Electric Co. v. Meriden Ins. Co. 158 Mass. 570, 575, it is said that “the active efficient cause that sets in