Plаintiff suffered closed head injuries in an automobile accident. Although defendant paid many of plaintifff s expenses, it disputed others, resulting in the instant action to compel payment of some past еxpenses and for a declaratory judgment regarding future expenses. After a jury trial in December 1987, judgment was rendered on the verdict, and defendant’s posttrial motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for а new trial was denied. Defendant appeals as of right, alleging that there was insufficient evidence of past expenses and work loss, that the jury improperly awarded future expenses and payment for services gratuitously supplied by friends, and that the trial court erred in instructing the jury and in supplying the jury with a calculator. We hold that plaintiff was improperly awarded compensation for services which wеre not incurred, and thus reduce the judgment against defendant by $280,000. We also modify the award of future expenses to allow the trial court to retain jurisdiction over future expenses in order to ensure payment only after the expenses have actually been incurred. Further, we reduce the jury’s *247 award of $25,000 for work loss to $21,216 to comport with the proofs presented at trial. We affirm the jury verdict with regard to the rеmaining allegations of error.
First, defendant alleges that the jury award of $280,000 for past care by an aide was not incurred by plaintiff and, therefore, is not recoverable under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101
et seq.;
MSA 24.13101
et seq.
We agrеe. MCL 500.3107; MSA 24.13107 provides that personal protection insurance benefits are payable for allowable expenses consisting of all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services, and accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation. The three requirements under this provision are that (1) the expense must have been incurred, (2) the expense must have been for a product, service, or accommodation reasonably necessary for the injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation, and (3) the amount of the expense must have been reasonable.
Manley v DAIIE,
*248
Second, defendant alleges that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict that the services claimed by plaintiff were reasonably necessary for the plaintiffs recovery or rehabilitation. Viewing the evidence in a light most fаvorable to the plaintiff, we find that a reasonable person could find that the services claimed were medically necessary. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict that сare, such as that provided by Rainbow Tree Center which charged approximately $4,000 per month, was reasonably necessary. The question was properly left to the trier of fact.
Boggerty v Wilson,
Third, defendant аlleges that the jury’s determination of future expenses for care by an aide was improper and that the trial court erred in entering a judgment ordering the insurer to pay $4,000 per month directly to the insured. Our Suprеme Court in Manley, supra, upheld a judgment entered on a jury verdict for future expenses. The Manley Court held that the jury’s verdict concerning the reasonable cost of services is a valid basis for a judgment on the verdict for future еxpenses. The Manley Court noted that, upon a showing of substantial change in the facts and circumstances, both parties are entitled to a redetermination from time to time of the amounts properly allowable for services. The Manley Court further noted:
Until there is a determination by the Court of Appeals in another case or by this Court of the question whether the cost of providing food, shelter, utilities, clothing, and other maintenаnce at home is an "allowable expense” where the injured person, if not at home, could properly be placed in an institution because he cannot care for himself, or there is some other substantial change in the facts and circumstances, the jury’s verdict estab *249 lishing the need and the reasonable cost of providing room and board precludes relitigation of the factual оr legal issues disputed and decided in this lawsuit, except, again, that insofar as nurse’s aides are concerned [defendant] is not obliged to pay any amount except upon submission of evidence thаt services were actually rendered and of the actual cost expended. [425 Mich 159 .]
Thus, we modify the judgment to provide for payment upon documentation of expenses for care by an aide uр to $4,000 per month until modified by the trial court.
Fourth, defendant claims that the jury’s verdict regarding plaintiffs work-loss claim was against the great weight of the evidence and that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion. We affirm the jury’s finding of a work loss, but reduce the amount from $25,000 to $21,216. MCL 500.3107; MSA 24.13107 provides that personal protection insurance benefits are payable for work loss consisting of loss of income from work an injured рerson would have performed during the first three years after the date of the accident had that person not been injured. Section 3107 reduces the amount of the claim by fifteen percent to аccount for taxes and limits the amount of recovery to $1,000 per thirty-day period. Although plaintiff was rather vague regarding her income at Amatron, a company owned by plaintiff and her ex-husband, she eventually affirmed that she had answered an interrogatory to the effect that she had earned $4 per hour and worked thirty to forty hours per week. On the basis of this testimony, we find that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition under either MCR 2.116(0(10) or (C)(8). We find that a genuine issue of material fact existed to create a question for the jury.
Dumas v Automobile Club
*250
Ins Ass’n,
Defendant also claims that the trial court érred in failing to grant its motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial with regаrd to plaintiffs wage-loss claim. Specifically, defendant objects to the trial court’s determination that the jury could award work-loss benefits on the basis of loss of potential profit. Work loss includes nоt only lost wages, but lost profit which is attributable to personal effort and self-employment.
Coates v Michigan Mutual Ins Co,
Finally, defendant alleges that the trial court erred in instructing the jury and providing the jury with a calculator. With regard to the jury instructions, defendant alleges that the trial court erred in presenting plaintiffs theory of the case as if it were the opinion of the court. We disagree. Defendant’s failure to make a timely and specific objection to the jury instructions precludes appellate review unless manifest injustice would result.
Janda v Detroit,
Likewise, the trial court did not err in giving the jury a calculator so as to require reversal. We find that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Any possible inferences to be drawn from allоwing the jury to use a calculator were minimal and do not require reversal.
In sum, we find that the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict for defendant regarding compensation for services which were not provided to plaintiff. Thus, the judgment shall be reduced by $280,000. We find that the trial court properly entered a judgment with regard to the allowable future expenses determined by the jury, except to the extent that the trial court’s judgment requires *252 payment without regard to whether the expenses are actually incurred. We modify the judgment with respect to future expenses to allow the trial court to retain jurisdiction over future expenses and to require documentation of actual expenses. We find that the trial court did not err in allowing the issue of work loss to be addressed by the jury. However, the jury award should be reduced frоm $25,000 to $21,216. The alleged errors in instructing the jury and in allowing the jury to use a calculator do not merit reversal.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for entry of a judgment consistent with our opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.