14 F. Supp. 602 | D. Kan. | 1935
This suit is one to enjoin the enforcement of a judgment obtained in an accounting partition suit in the District Court of Harper county, Kan. To plaintiff’s bill of complaint the defendant filed various motions, and the issues as now presented for determination arise on defendants’ motion to dismiss. This motion has been argued orally, briefed, and duly submitted.
It is my opinion that the matters alleged in plaintiff’s “Third Amended and Supplemental Bill in Equity,” together with the “amendment,” are res judicata, and that the motion to dismiss should be .sustained.
It appears that the equity accounting partition suit (No. 7374) in Harper county was originally filed by Thomas S. Moffett, August 15, 1929. Judgments were entered from which appeals twice were taken to the Kansas Supreme Court and there affirmed. Moffett v. Moffett, 131 Kan. 582, 292 P. 947, 77 A.L.R. 294; Clark v. Moffett, 136 Kan. 711, 18 P.(2d) 555, certiorari denied 290 U.S. 602, 54 S.Ct. 227, 78 L.Ed. 528; 290 U.S. 642, 54 S.Ct. 61, 78 L.Ed. 558. It appears that all matters now complained of in the amended bill and amendments thereto were either presented in the suit in the district court of Harper county, Kan., and in the appeals, or could have' been presented therein.
An examination of plaintiff’s amended bill disclosed that the plaintiff Louise McGrew Moffett, as sole beneficiary of Thomas S. Moffett, deceased, was a party and filed pleadings in the suit (No. 7374) in the district court of Harper county. Therefore, the judgment rendered in such suit was binding upon her in her capacity as executrix of the Thomas S. Moffett estate. See Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 618, 622, 46 S.Ct. 420, 70 L.Ed. 757, 53 A.L.R. 1265. Grace Torrance Clark, administratrix with the will annexed and ancillary administratrix in Kansas of the Thomas S. Moffett estate, was also a party to the suit.
The bill states that John Moffett and Thomas S. Moffett for many years prior to the death of John Moffett on August 23, 1927, were partners in the partnership known as Moffett Bros. Thomas S. Moffett, as sole surviving partner in Kansas, administered the affairs of the partnership, and when Thomas S. Moffett died December 22, 1930, the trust as to admin
In the accounting partition suit, a decree was entered on January 13, 1932, in favor of R. O. Robbins, administrator with the will annexed of the estate of John Moffett, deceased, for $142,452.24 against Grace Torrance Clark, administratrix with the will annexed of the estate of Thomas S. Moffett, deceased, and administratrix in Kansas of the Moffett Bros, partnership estate and against the Commerce Trust Company, administrator of the Moffett Bros, partnership estate. Complaint is chiefly made herein by plaintiff as to this last-mentioned judgment, and it appears this judgment was the one mainly contested in the state courts. In that same suit a judgment was entered on January 13, -1932, by the district court of Harper county in favor of the Commerce Trust Company, administrator of the Moffett Bros, partnership estate for $101,228.06 against the Moffett Bros. Cattle, Land & Lumber Company partnership estate, administered by Renwick J. Moffett, sole surviving partner; and judgment was also entered in favor of the Commerce Trust Company, administrator of. the Moffett Bros, partnership estate, for $16,469.53 against Grace Torrance Clark, administratrix with the will annexed of the estate of Thomas S. Moffett, deceased, Helen Moffett, widow of John Moffett, and the heirs of John Moffett were parties defendant in the suit complained of.
All parties personally submitted to the jurisdiction of the state court and filed general pleadings in the suit. In the instant case the sole parties are the plaintiff Louise McGrew Moffett, individually and as executrix of the estate of Thomas S. Moffett, deceased, and defendant R. O. Robbins, administrator with the will annexed of the estate of John Moffett, deceased.
This third amended bill now under consideration shows that following the rendering of the decrees complained of, January 13, 1932, only one change was thereafter made by the court, which was in term time and related to conclusion of law No. 11, which has to do with the above-mentioned decree in favor of Moffett Bros, and against the Moffett Bros. Cattle, Land & Lumber Company. This change consisted in a substitution of the domiciliary administrator for the ancillary administrator of the Moffett Bros, partnership estate in the matter of taking judgment against the Moffett Bros. Cattle, Land & Lumber Company. The bill discloses this change was made following a hearing before the court and after notice had been duly' given.
Decisions of state courts of competent jurisdiction are binding and conclusive on all other courts of concurrent power and are not reviewable by federal district courts of concurrent and equal competent jurisdiction. The federal district courts have no appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of state courts. Such decisions of state courts ordinarily cannot be collaterally attacked, except for fraud. Fraud which entitles a party to impeach the judgment of another court of competent jurisdiction, where jurisdiction has been acquired over the parties, as in the suit
An allegation in a bill that a judgment is not supported by evidence is a mere conclusion. That a judgment is based upon evidence supporting it must be conclusively presumed in suit to enjoin enforcement thereof. Harrington v. Denny et al. (D.C.) 3 F.Supp. 584.
Complaint is made of an order of Judge Pollock remanding the cause complained of to the district court of Harper county, Kan. The remanding order was final and cannot be brought here indirectly for review. City of Waco, Tex., v. United States F. & G. Co., 67 F.(2d) 785, 786 (C.C.A.5). In suit complained of, Clark v. Moffett, 136 Kan. 711, 721, 722, 18 P. (2d) 555, the question of removal and remanding was properly passed upon in the state court.
In my opinion the bill of complaint does not contain the indispensable elements of a good cause of action. National Surety Co. v. State Bank, 120 F. 593, 61 L.R.A. 394 (C.C.A.8); Knox County v. Harshman, 133 U.S. 152, 10 S.Ct. 257, 33 L.Ed. 586; Beals v. Illinois, etc., R. Co., 133 U.S. 290, 295, 10 S.Ct. 314, 33 L.Ed. 608; Walker v. Robbins, 55 U. S. (14 How.) 584, 586, 14 L.Ed. 552. Even if the decision of the state court were erroneous and this court might have reached a different conclusion from the evidence, there would be no violation of any federal constitutional right. Owens v. Battenfield, 33 F.(2d) 753 (C.C.A.8).
Nor does the application of state statutes of limitation preserit a federal question. Preston v. Chicago, 226 U.S. 447, 33 S.Ct. 177, 57 L.Ed. 293; Wood v. Chesborough, 228 U.S. 672, 33 S.Ct. 706, 57 L.Ed. 1018; Gaar, Scott & Co. v. Shannon, 223 U.S. 468, 32 S.Ct. 236, 56 L.Ed. 510; Moran v. Horsky, 178 U.S. 205, 20 S.Ct. 856, 44 L.Ed. 1038. Limitation statutes of another state involve nothing more than a question of local pleading and practice. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Miller, 221 U. S. 408, 31 S.Ct. 534, 55 L.Ed. 789.
I am of the opinion the plaintiff has had her day in court and issues as presented in her bill are now res judicata. Coleman v. Apple, 298 F. 718, 720, 721 (C. C.A.8); United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 25 L.Ed. 93.
The motion to dismiss is allowed.