186 P.2d 1021 | Colo. | 1947
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a proceeding under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
On July 26, 1943, Steve Patrick McFall, a coal miner, sustained an accident in the course of his employment,
The sole question involved herein is whether or not the dependents are entitled to said benefits under the applicable statute. Section 342, chapter 97, ’35 C.S.A., provides: “In cáse death proximately results from the injury within a period of two (2) years, the benefits shall be in the amounts and to the persons following:” Then follows basis of payment not material herein.
The essential facts are not disputed. They are: that McFall was employed by Moffat Coal Company; that he sustained an accident in the course of his employment; that death proximately resulted from said accident; and that if the dependents are entitled to any benefits, the amount awarded was proper.
The above statute provides in simple and unambiguous language that in order that dependents be entitled to receive benefits, death must occur within a period of two years from the date of the injury.
It is contended by dependents that the act should be construed and considered as whole and, if possible, every section thereof harmonized and given effect. This is familiar law and requires no citation of authority to support it, but the rule is not applicable here. They do not seek to have various sections of the act harmonized. They ask, in effect, that that part of the statute be deleted, and that the words “within a period of two (2) years” be entirely disregarded.
We cannot, under the guise of harmonizing various sections of the statute or by employment of rules of con
The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to direct the Industrial Commissipn to amend its award in conformity herewith.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
By the majority opinion, when death results from accident to an injured employee more than two years after the date of injury, his dependents have no right to compensation.
1. Such construction of the Workmen’s Compensation Act offends against our sense of social justice and is destructive of the very purpose of the act. Employee was killed in an industrial accident. Lives, as well as materials, are consumed in industry. Where dependents suffer loss, compensation for a life consumed should be an obligation at least equal to that for mine props and explosives, and so to provide is a basic purpose of the statute. Compensation to the entire family of dependents for six years at the rate allowed to a single old-age pensioner for life,- is surely not excessive and the conclusion that even such allowance should be denied in the event the disabled breadwinner endures his suffering for two years before his resulting death, speaks its own condemnation.
2. Such construction of the statute produces an absurd and illogical result. Under sections 64 and 65 of the act (sections 343, 344, c. 97, ’35 C.S.A.) there is no such time limitation in case of death of the injured employee from an independent cause, and by this decision it becomes the law of this state that if an employee who survives his accident for two years, dies from some cause other than the accident, his dependents may re
3. Such construction is contrary to the explicit provisions of section 54 of the statute (sec. 333, c. 97, ’35 C.S.A.). The majority opinion is based on section 63 of the act (sec. 342, c. 97, ’35 C.S.A.), the initial paragraph of which reads: “In case death proximately results from the injury within a period of two (2) years, the benefits shall be in the amounts and to the persons following:”, and the majority opinion holds that this is equivalent to an express condition that death must result within that period to entitle dependents to receive benefits. I cannot agree with such holding. The statutory provision for benefits under one set of circumstances, does not even by implication exclude right to benefits under other circumstances. If the right of recovery by dependents under the statute is restricted to cases where death occurs within two years, such restriction must be found, not in any specific limitation of section 63, but in failure of the legislature elsewhere to provide affirmatively for such benefit in other cases.
In our original Workmen’s Compensation Act, chapter 179, S.L. 1915, section 15 contained the substance of the present sections 63, 64 and 65. Under the original act there is no provision for compensation other than is now
4. Such construction is not in harmony with prior decision of this court. In McBride v. Industrial Commission, 97 Colo. 166, 49 P. (2d) 386, employee died more than two years after date of accident. The main issue raised
For the above reasons it is my opinion the award of the commission and judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr. Justice Jackson concur in this dissent.