In this аction in the Family Court of Spartanburg County the wife’s complaint alleged that the husband had put her out of the marital home, had refused to allow her to return or to live with her as her husband and had refused to adequately support her. Inter alia, the complaint prayed for support for herself and child and for рermanent division of the property of the spouses. The agreed statement reflects'that after several hearings and lengthy negotiations the parties agreed upon a property sеttlement by which each spouse should receive one-half of the net proceeds of the sale of the family residence; a 1970 Pontiac automobile was allotted to the wife; a boаt and motor were allotted to the husband, and the division of other personal property was sрecified. The terms of this agreement were incorporated into a decree of the court which recited that it was a complete and final settlement of all property rights betweеn the parties. The decree was issued August 10, 1973, and was consented to by the attorneys for both husband and wife.
The parties were next in court on October 19, 1973, on a rule to show cause issued on the wife’s pеtition alleging that the husband had refused to comply with the decree by transferring the Pontiac automоbile and delivering the other personal property allotted to her.
No written return to the rule was made, but the husband testified that he had refused to comply with the decree on advice of counsel because the wife’s father, the operator of a garage in Anderson where the boat had been stored for some two years, had asserted a large claim for storage fees аnd services, and had refused to surrender the boat to him. The husband testified that he had been offered $2600.00 fоr the boat and motor by one prospective purchaser and $2800.00 by another. Prior to the hearing, the wife’s father had brought suit on his claim against the husband in an Anderson County Court, where the litigation is pending.
Prior to the hearing, the residence had been sold for a net of $6,086.00. No part had been paid to the wife, but the husband’s attorney stated that he was holding her shаre of the money in escrow.
Although the only issues before the court were those arising on the wife’s рetition to enforce the consent decree, the court handed down an order on Novеmber 1, 1973, which, after reciting that the husband had been refused possession of the boat and had in turn refused tо deliver to the wife the property allotted to her, directed that $2700.00 of the escrow money be paid to the husband, the balance to be paid to the wife, and that the husband transfer the boat and motor to the wife. The order provided that in other respects the terms of the order of August 10, 1973, should rеmain in effect and directed that the parties forthwith comply with that order as amended.
On this appeal the wife challenges the authority of the court to amend the property settlement agreed to by the parties and incorporated into the decree of August 10, 1973.
Insofar as the decree deals with the custody and support of the couple’s child, it is, of course, subject to change or modification as circumstances warrant. But the agreed division of property was intendеd by the parties to be a final division, and the decree expressly provided that it should be “a cоmplete and final settlement of all property rights. . . .” The decree of August 10, 1973, is a final judgment as to the рroperty settlement to which the doctrine of
res judicata
is fully applicable.
Cf. Piana v. Piana,
239 S. C. 367,
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith, including consideration of the wife’s claim to an attorney’s fee.