Plаintiffs appeal from a judgment declaring that they are not entitled to additional compensation under the provisions of Government Code, section 74751.
During the effective period of this statute, the Board of Supervisors of San Diego County raised the compensation of 78.5 per cent of the employees of the sheriff’s department. The appellants, employees of the marshals, allege that this increase in the compensation оf the sheriff’s employees was a “general increase,” and therefore under the statute all the employees of the marshals are entitled to a onе-step increase. The trial court held that there was no “general increаse,” and we agree.
Where “general” was intended to mean less than 100 per сent, the Legislature has said so in specific terms. Thus, Government Code, section 73915, applicable to Santa Maria Judicial District, specified that if 75 per cent of the sheriff’s employees received an increase, this would be deemеd a ‘ ‘ general increase.” Where no such index to the meaning or application of a term used is provided by the Legislature in a particular enactment, we must look to the result which would follow adoption of the definition contended for and assess the results.
Plaintiffs argue that the purpose of the statute is to maintаin comparability between the pay of persons engaged in similar work in the two offices. The construction urged by the plaintiffs, however, would not accomplish this purpose. Secretarial and clerical employees of the sheriff’s department did not receive increases. Since the statute .gives all emplоyees of the marshals an increase upon a finding of a “general increase” in the sheriff’s department, the secretarial and clerical employеes of the marshals would receive a raise if a “general increase” is found here. This would destroy the comparability of salaries between secretаrial and clerical help in the two offices. The word “general” must be deemеd to apply as well to classifications as to numbers. If it does not
Plaintiffs argue that the position taken by the trial court would permit the board of supervisors to frustrate the legislative purpose by failing to raise the salary of a single employee in the sheriff’s department—specifically, a chef for whom there is no counterpart in the marshals’ offices. We are not, however, confronted with such a situation, and will not speculate as to the proper answer to this wholly different question unless and until it comes before us as an actual issue.
The instant case is easily distinguished from the case of City of Signal Sill v. County of Los Angeles,
The judgment is affirmed.
Griffin, P. J., and Coughlin, J., concurred.
Notes
Repealed. Stats. 1963, eh. 1725, p. 3445, §19; Stats. 1963, eh. 1726, p. 3448, § 18; Stats. 1963, eh. 1804, p. 3644, § 12; Stats. 1963, eh. 1813, p. 3718, § 12.
Retired judge o£ the superior court sitting pro tempore under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.
The several marshals’ offices in San Diego County were consolidated in 1963. See Gov. Code, § 74361.